Phillip Johnson
Jan-18-93 08:25AM
SWAA Lecture
This is the text of the plenary session lecture which I gave at
the annual meeting of the Southwestern Anthropological
Association in Berkeley in April, 1992. It will be published in
a forthcoming issue of the California Anthropologist. The
lecture refers to an exhibit at the California Academy of Sciences
Museum in San Francisco -- the "Hard Facts Wall" -- which
was illustrated by two drawings. These cannot be reproduced
here, but I will mail a copy of the drawings (or the complete
lecture with reference notes) to anyone who sends me a mailing
address. I have also had to leave the accent off the "e" in P.
Grasse's name.
The anti-Darwinian evolutionary theory of Grasse provides an
interesting contrast to the orthodox Anglo-American Darwinism
of e.g., Chris Colby's FAQ. Phillip E. Johnson
Darwinism's Rules of Reasoning
My starting point is a book review which Theodosius
Dobzhansky published in 1975, critiquing Pierre Grasse's book
"The Evolution of Life." Grasse, an eminent French zoologist,
believed in something which he called "evolution." So did
Dobzhansky, but when Dobzhansky used that term he meant neo-
Darwinism, evolution propelled by random mutation and guided by
natural selection. Grasse used the same term to refer to
something very different, a poorly understood process of
transformation in which one general category (like reptiles) gave
rise to another (like mammals), guided by mysterious "internal
factors" which seemed to compel many individual lines of descent
to converge at a new form of life. Grasse denied emphatically
that mutation and selection have the power to create new complex
organs or body plans, explaining that the intra-species variation
that results from DNA copying errors is mere fluctuation, which
never leads to any important innovation. Dobzhansky's famous
work with fruitflies was a case in point. According to Grasse,
The genic differences noted between separate
populations of the same species that are so often
presented as evidence of ongoing evolution are, above
all, a case of the adjustment of a population to its
habitat and of the effects of genetic drift. The
fruitfly (drosophila melanogaster), the favorite pet
insect of the geneticists, whose geographical,
biotropical, urban, and rural genotypes are now known
inside out, seems not to have changed since the
remotest times.
Grasse insisted that the defining quality of life is the
intelligence encoded in its biochemical systems, an intelligence
that cannot be understood solely in terms of its material
embodiment. The minerals which form a great cathedral do not
differ essentially from the same materials in the rocks and
quarries of the world; the difference is man's intelligence,
which adapted them for a given purpose. Similarly,
Any living being possesses an enormous amount of
"intelligence," very much more than is necessary to
build the most magnificent of cathedrals. Today, this
"intelligence" is called information, but it is still
the same thing. It is not programmed as in a computer,
but rather it is condensed on a molecular scale in the
chromosomal DNA or in that of every other organelle in
each cell. This "intelligence" is the sine qua non of
life. Where does it come from?... This is a problem
that concerns both biologists and philosophers, and, at
present, science seems incapable of solving it.... If
to determine the origin of information in a computer is
not a false problem, why should the search for the
information contained in cellular nuclei be one?
Grasse argued that the Darwinists who dominate evolutionary
biology have failed, due to their uncompromising commitment to
materialism, to define properly the problem they were trying to
solve. The real problem of evolution is to account for the
origin of new genetic information, and it is not solved by
providing illustrations of the acknowledged capacity of an
existing genotype to vary within limits. Darwinists had imposed
upon evolutionary theory the dogmatic proposition that variation
and innovative evolution are the same process, and then had
employed a systematic bias in the interpretation of evidence to
support the dogma. Here are some representative judgments from
Grasse's introductory chapter:
Through use and abuse of hidden postulates, of bold,
often ill-founded extrapolations, a pseudoscience has
been created..... Biochemists and biologists who adhere
blindly to the Darwinist theory search for results that
will be in agreement with their theories.... Assuming
that the Darwinian hypothesis is correct, they
interpret fossil data according to it; it is only
logical that [the data] should confirm it; the premises
imply the conclusions.... The deceit is sometimes
unconscious, but not always, since some people, owing
to their sectarianism, purposely overlook reality and
refuse to acknowledge the inadequacies and the falsity
of their beliefs.
Dobzhansky's review summarized Grasse's central thesis
succinctly:
The book of Pierre P. Grasse is a frontal attack on
all kinds of "Darwinism." Its purpose is "to destroy
the myth of evolution as a simple, understood, and
explained phenomenon," and to show that evolution is a
mystery about which little is, and perhaps can be,
known.
Grasse was an evolutionist, but his dissent from Darwinism
could hardly have been more radical if he had been a creationist.
It is not merely that he built a detailed empirical case against
the neo-Darwinian picture of evolution. At the philosophical
level, he challenged the crucial doctrine of uniformitarianism,
which holds that processes detectable by our present-day science
were also responsible for the great transformations that occurred
in the remote past. According to Grasse, evolving species
acquire a new store of genetic information through "a phenomenon
whose equivalent cannot be seen in the creatures living at the
present time (either because it is not there or because we are
unable to see it)." Grasse acknowledged that such speculation
"arouses the suspicions of many biologists... [because] it
conjures up visions of the ghost of vitalism or of some mystical
power which guides the destiny of living things...." He defended
himself from these charges by arguing that the evidence of
genetics, zoology, and paleontology refutes the Darwinian theory
that random mutation and natural selection were important sources
of evolutionary innovation. Given the state of the empirical
evidence, to acknowledge the existence of some as yet
undiscovered orienting force that guided evolution was merely to
face the facts. Grasse even turned the charges of mysticism
against his opponents, commenting sarcastically that nothing
could be more mystical than the Darwinian view that "nature acts
blindly, unintelligently, but by an infinitely benevolent good
fortune builds mechanisms so intricate that we have not even
finished with analysis of their structure and have not the
slightest insight of the physical principles and functioning of
some of them."
Dobzhansky disagreed with Grasse fundamentally, but he
acknowledged at the outset that his French counterpart knew as
much about the scientific evidence regarding animal evolution as
anyone in the world. As he put it,
Now one can disagree with Grasse but not ignore him.
He is the most distinguished of French zoologists, the
editor of the 28 volumes of Traite de Zoologie, author
of numerous original investigations, and ex-president
of the Academie des Sciences. His knowledge of the
living world is encyclopedic.
In short, Grasse had not gone wrong due to ignorance. Then where
had he gone wrong? According to Dobzhansky, the problem was that
the most distinguished of French zoologists did not understand
the rules of scientific reasoning. As Dobzhansky summed up the
situation:
The mutation-selection theory attempts, more or less
successfully, to make the causes of evolution acces-
sible to reason. The postulate that the evolution is
"oriented" by some unknown force explains nothing.
This is not to say that the synthetic...theory has
explained everything. Far from this, this theory opens
to view a great field which needs investigation.
Nothing is easier than to point out that this or that
problem is unsolved and puzzling. But to reject what
is known, and to appeal to some wonderful future dis-
covery which may explain it all, is contrary to sound
scientific method. The sentence with which Grasse ends
his book is disturbing: "It is possible that in this
domain biology, impotent, yields the floor to
metaphysics."
I began with the Dobzhansky/Grasse exchange to make the
point that whether one believes or disbelieves in Darwinism does
not necessarily depend upon how much one knows about the facts of
biology. Belief that the various types of plants and animals
were created by an extension of the kind of changes Dobzhansky's
experiments brought about in fruitflies is at bottom a question
of metaphysics. By metaphysics, I mean nothing more pretentious
than the assumptions we all make about just which possibilities
are worth considering seriously.
For example, Pierre Grasse was willing to consider, and
eventually to endorse, the possibility that the so-called
"evolution in action" which the neo-Darwinists were observing is
merely a variation within the limits of the existing genotype and
not a source of genuine evolutionary innovation. To put the
point in the language used by some contemporary biologists,
Grasse proposed to "decouple macroevolution from microevolution."
Such proposals havegenerally foundered on the inability to
establish sufficiently credible distinctive macroevolutionary
mechanisms. (For example, the widely publicized "new theory" of
punctuated equilibrium turned out to be just a gloss upon Ernst
Mayr's thoroughly Darwinian theory of peripatric speciation.)
Grasse differed from the Darwinists in that he was willing to
consider the possibility that science does not know, and may
never know, how new quantities of genetic information have come
into the world.
From Dobzhansky's viewpoint, to consider such a possibility
would be to give up on science. As Dobzhansky saw it, we already
know a lot about how plants and animal populations vary in the
everyday world of ecological time. Dog breeders have given us
St. Bernards and dachshunds, laboratory experiments have produced
monstrous fruitflies, mainland species have differentiated after
migrating to offshore islands, and the ratio of dark to light
peppered moths in a population changed when the background trees
were dark due to industrial air pollution. To be sure, none of
these examples demonstrated the kind of innovation that Grasse
had in mind. In the absence of a better theory, however,
Darwinists consider it reasonable to assume that these observable
variations illustrate the working in ecological time of a grand
process that over geological ages created fruitflies and peppered
moths and scientific observers in the first place. By making
that extrapolation Darwinists create a scientific paradigm which
can be fleshed out with further research, and improved. For a
critic to suggest the possible existence of some factor outside
the paradigm is helpful only if he can also propose a research
strategy for investigating it. To Dobzhansky, therefore,
Grasse's insistence that the sources of new genetic information
might be a mystery to our science was pointless and harmful to
the cause of science.
There is a political and religious dimension to the issues
Grasse and Dobzhansky were debating which must also be
considered. To say as Grasse did that, in the domain of
creation, "biology, impotent, yields the floor to metaphysics" is
to imply something important about the relative cultural
authority of biologists and metaphysicians. Whatever that might
mean in France, in the United States the scientific establishment
has been in conflict over evolution for generations with the
advocates of creationism. Although the scientists have won all
the legal battles, there are still a lot of creationists around
who are very much unconvinced with what the Darwinists are
telling them.
How many there are depends upon how "creationism" is
defined. The most visible creationists are the Biblical
fundamentalists who believe in a young earth and a creation in
six 24-hour days, and Darwinists like to give the impression that
opposition to what they call "evolution" is confined to this
group. In a broader sense, however, a creationist is any person
who believes that there is a Creator who brought about the
existence of humans for a purpose. In this broad sense, the vast
majority of Americans are creationists. According to a 1991
Gallup poll, 47 per cent of a national sample agreed with the
following statement: "God created mankind in pretty much our
present form sometime within the last 10,000 years." Another 40
per cent think that "Man has developed over millions of years
from less advanced forms of life, but God guided this process,
including man's creation." Only 9 per cent of the sample said
that they believed in biological evolution as a purposeless
process not guided by God.
The evolutionary theory endorsed by the American scientific
and educational establishment is of course the creed of the 9 per
cent, not the God-guided gradual creation of the 40 per cent.
Persons who endorse a God-guided process of evolution may think
that they have reconciled religion and science, but this is an
illusion produced by vague terminology. A representative
Darwinist statement of "the meaning of evolution" may be found in
George Gaylord Simpson's book bearing that title. In the words
of Simpson:
Although many details remain to be worked out, it is
already evident that all the objective phenomena of the
history of life can be explained by purely naturalistic
or, in a proper sense of the sometimes abused word,
materialistic factors. They are readily explicable on
the basis of differential reproduction in populations
(the main factor in the modern conception of natural
selection) and of the mainly random interplay of the
known processes of heredity. ...Man is the result of a
purposeless and natural process that did not have him
in mind."
"Evolution" is a vague term which can be used in a variety
of senses. When it means only that a certain amount of natural
change occurs in nature, it has no great philosophical
consequences. What Simpson was describing was something much
more specific, which I prefer to call the "blind watchmaker
hypothesis," after the famous book by Richard Dawkins. According
to Dawkins, ""Biology is the study of complicated things that
give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose."
Dawkins wrote his book to convince the public of something that
Darwinians take for granted: The appearance of purposeful design
in biology is misleading, because all living organisms, including
ourselves, are the products of a natural evolutionary process
employing random variation and natural selection. As Dawkins
explains,
Natural selection is the blind watchmaker, blind
because it does not see ahead, does not plan
consequences, has no purpose in view. Yet the living
results of natural selection overwhelmingly impress us
with the appearance of design as if by a master
watchmaker, impress us with the illusion of design and
planning.
But blind people doe plan ahead, and pursue purposeful action.
What Dawkins is described is a watchmaker that is not merely
blind, but unconscious.
The really important meaning of "evolution" is not that
creation was a gradual process that required billions of years.
It is that the process was supposedly undirected and purposeless.
The prestige of the scientific establishment, and of the
intellectual class in general, is heavily committed to the
proposition that evolution -- in the blind watchmaker sense -- is
either a fact, or a theory so well supported by evidence that
only ignorant or thoroughly unreasonable people refuse to believe
it. If the scientists ever had to retreat on this issue, the
cultural consequences could be significant. Persons who now have
a prestigious status as cultural authorities would be
discredited, and the political and moral positions they have
advocated might be discredited with them. That is the fear of
Michael Ruse, author of "Darwinism Defended." Ruse proclaims
proudly that Darwinism reflects "a strong ideology," and "one to
be proud of." According to Ruse, most contemporary Darwinians
"show a strong liberal commitment" in both their politics and
their sexual morality. Advocates of creation, on the other hand,
want to restore a "morality based on narrow Biblical lines" with
respect to marriage and sexual behavior. Ironically
Darwinism, which has at so often been associated with ideologies
of racial superiority, eugenics, and unrestrained competition, is
currently enlisted in the fight against that trinity of political
incorrectness: racism, sexism, and homophobia. Ruse concludes
his book with these stirring lines "Darwinism has a great past.
Let us work to see that it has an even greater future."
Such statements are equivalent to the claims of creation-
science advocates that to doubt the Genesis account is to open
the floodgates for all kinds of immorality. I think that Michael
Ruse and Henry Morris are both right to insist that cultural
acceptance of Darwinism has had important consequences for
politics and morality. Recognition of this factor, however, also
has important implications for how we should regard Darwinism's
rules of reasoning. Are those rules designed to protect a
cherished doctrine from scientific criticism -- criticism that
might, wittingly or unwittingly, give aid and comfort to persons
who want to deprive the Darwinist establishment of its cultural
authority? If physicists were to start to proclaim that belief
in the Big Bang has had wonderful political and moral
consequences, and we must all work to see that the Big Bang has a
wonderful future, surely we would begin to wonder about their
objectivity.
Darwinism's rules of reasoning not only protect the cultural
authority of Darwinists. They also permit Darwinist writers to
take the mutation/selection mechanism for granted even when they
are describing evidence which directly contradicts it. This feat
of intellectual contortionism is strikingly illustrated by
Stephen Jay Gould's book, Wonderful Life. Gould's bestseller
adds a great deal to our knowledge of the "Cambrian explosion,"
meaning the sudden appearance of the invertebrate animal phyla,
without visible ancestors, in the 600 million-year-old rocks of
the Cambrian era. Unicellular life had existed for a long time,
and some multicellular groups appear in the immediately
Precambrian rocks, but there is nothing that can be established
as ancestral to the Cambrian animals. As Richard Dawkins
described the situation, "It is as though [the Cambrian phyla]
were just planted there, without any evolutionary history."
In recent years the mystery has deepened, because it appears
(at least according to Gould) that the Cambrian animal groups
were far more varied than had been imagined. The more distinct
groups there were in the Cambrian, the more chains of ancestors
there ought to have been in the Precambrian. Some remarkable
Cambrian fossils found in a Canadian formation known as the
Burgess Shale were originally classified in familiar groups.
Gould explains that the discoverer of the Burgess Shale fossils,
Charles Walcott, tried to "shoehorn" the odd creatures into
familiar taxonomic categories because of his predisposition to
avoid multiplying the difficulties of what is called the
"artifact theory" of the Precambrian fossil record. As Gould
explains the problem:
Two different kinds of explanations for the absence
of Precambrian ancestors have been debated for more
than a century: the artifact theory (they did exist,
but the fossil record hasn't preserved them), and the
fast-transition theory (they really didn't exist, at
least as complex invertebrates easily linked to their
descendants, and the evolution of modern anatomical
plans occurred with a rapidity that threatens our
usual ideas about the stately pace of evolutionary
change).
The two drawings in the Appendix to this paper illustrate
both the problem the Cambrian Explosion poses for any theory of
evolution, and the way a museum exhibition attempts to control
the damage. The Exhibition is titled "Life Through Time: The
Evidence for Evolution," and it is at the California Academy of
Sciences Museum in Golden Gate Park in San Francisco. The
drawing on the right (not part of the museum exhibit) shows a
realistic picture of the evidence itself, with the phyla
appearing on parallel lines and absolutely no evidence of any
common ancestors or transitional intermediates. The museum
exhibit on the left -- labelled the "Hard Facts Wall" -- dresses
up the evidence to force it into conformity with Darwinian
ideology. The exhibit adds the hypothetical common ancestors and
alters the vertical dimension representing the age of the
fossils, in order to give the impression that the recalcitrant
data constitute the required "evidence for evolution." At the
intersection point where the common ancestors ought to be, the
curators have placed magnifying glasses. Similar devices are
used elsewhere in the exhibit to mark tiny animals or fossils.
Unsophisticated museum visitors are apparently meant to get the
impression that the invisible common ancestors are known to
science, but just a little too small for the naked eye to see.
By such means even a spectacular example of absence of evidence
for evolution can be transformed into evidence for evolution, and
even evidence for the creative power of natural selection.
The museum exhibit illustrates the Cambrian Explosion with
just a few well-known groups and thus understates the difficulty
in reconciling the facts with any known theory of evolution.
Reclassification of the Burgess Shale fossils has now established
some 15 or 20 Cambrian species that cannot be related to any
known group and therefore constitute distinct and previously
unknown phyla. There are also many other species that can fit
within an existing phylum but are still remarkably distinct from
anything known to exist earlier or later. The general history of
animal life is thus a burst of general body plans followed by
extinction. Many species exist today which are absent from the
rocks of the remote past, but they fit within general taxonomic
categories present from the very beginning. Darwinian theory
predicts a "cone of increasing diversity," as the first living
organism, or first animal species, gradually and continually
diversifies to create the various levels of the taxonomic order.
The animal fossil record more resembles such a cone turned upside
down, with the phyla present at the start and thereafter
decreasing. In short, the more we learn about the Cambrian
fossils, the more difficult it becomes to see them as the product
of Darwinian evolution.
Gould describes the reclassification of the Burgess fossils
as the "death knell of the artifact theory," because it adds so
many new groups that appear without Precambrian ancestors.
If evolution could produce ten new Cambrian phyla and
then wipe them out just as quickly, then what about the
surviving Cambrian groups? Why should they have had a
long and honorable Precambrian pedigree? Why should
they not have originated just before the Cambrian, as
the fossil record, read literally, seems to indicate,
and as the fast-transition theory proposes?
A mysterious process that produces dozens of complex animal
groups directly from single-celled predecessors, with only some
words like "fast-transition" in between, may be called
"evolution" -- but the term is being used more in the sense of
Grasse's heresy than of Dobzhansky's Darwinian orthodoxy. Each
of those Cambrian animals contained a variety of immensely
complicated organ systems. How can such innovations appear
except by the gradual accumulation of micromutations, unless
there was some supernatural intervention? It is not only that
the Darwinian theory requires a very gradual line of descent from
each Cambrian animal group back to its hypothetical single-celled
ancestor. Because Darwinian evolution is a purposeless, chance-
driven process, which would not proceed directly from a starting
point to a destination, there should also be thick bushes of side
branches in each line. As Darwin himself put it, if Darwinism is
true the Precambrian world must have "swarmed with living
creatures" many of which were ancestral to the Cambrian animals.
If he really rejects the artifact theory of the Precambrian
fossil record, Gould also rejects the Darwinian theory of
evolution.
Readers familiar with Gould's writings know that he has at
times expressed great skepticism concerning the neo-Darwinian
theory that Dobzhansky proclaimed so confidently. In a paper
published in Paleobiology in 1980, Gould wrote that, although he
had been "beguiled" by the unifying power of neo-Darwinism when
he studied it as a graduate student in the 1960's, the weight of
the evidence has since driven him to the reluctant conclusion
that neo-Darwinism "as a general proposition, is effectively
dead, despite its persistence as textbook orthodoxy." In place
of the dead orthodoxy Gould predicted the emergence of a new
macroevolutionary theory based on the views of the geneticist
Richard Goldschmidt, another heretic whose views were every bit
as obnoxious to Darwinists as those of Grasse. The new theory
did not arrive as predicted, however, and Gould subsequently
seems to have heeded Dobzhansky's admonition: if you can't
improve on the mutation/selection mechanism, don't trash it in
public.
For whatever reason, Gould did not point out to his readers
that the utterly un-Darwinian Cambrian fossil record provides no
support whatever for claims about the role of mutation and
selection in the creation of complex animal life, or for
metaphysical speculations about the purposeless of the process
that created humans. Instead, he indulged freely in just such
speculation himself, rightly judging that his audience of
intellectuals would accept an atheistic interpretation of the
evidence uncritically. In the concluding chapter he commented on
a Burgess Shale fossil called Pikaia. Walcott classified Pikaia
as a worm, but a more recent study concludes that the creature
was a member of the phylum Chordata, which includes the subphylum
Vertebrata, which includes us. That for Gould means that Pikaia
might be our ancestor, which implies that, unlike many other
Burgess Shale creatures, it left descendants. If Pikaia had not
survived the mass extinctions that killed off so many other
Cambrian fossil creatures, we would never have evolved. The
existence of humans is therefore not a predictable consequence of
evolution, but a never-to-be-repeated accident. Gould concluded
this reflection, and the book, with the following sentence:
We are the offspring of history, and must establish our
own paths in this most diverse and interesting of
conceivable universes -- one indifferent to our
suffering, and therefore offering us maximum freedom to
thrive, or to fail, in our own chosen way.
Of course there is absolutely nothing in the Burgess Shale
fossils to support Gould's speculation that the universe is
indifferent to our sufferings, or to discredit the belief that we
are responsible to a divine Creator who actively intervened in
nature to bring about our existence. On the contrary, the
genuine scientific portion of Wonderful Life provides ample
grounds for doubting the expansive notions of metaphysical
naturalists like Theodosius Dobzhansky and George Gaylord
Simpson. But because of Darwinism's rules of reasoning, even
evidence which is thoroughly contrary to Darwinism supports
Darwinism.
Darwinian evolution will surely remain the reigning paradigm
as long as Dobzhansky's metaphysical rules are enforced. To say
this is merely to say that the neo-Darwinian synthesis is the
most plausible naturalistic and materialistic theory for the
development of complex life that persons philosophically
committed to excluding the Creator from the Cosmos have been able
to invent. The neo-Darwinian synthesis is a vague and flexible
conglomeration that readily incorporates any seemingly non-
Darwinian elements -- such as the molecular clock, or punctuated
equilibrium, or even the ability of bacteria to summon needed
mutations -- that appear from time to time. If Dobzhansky's team
makes the rules this conglomeration of naturalistic ideas wins,
because all the powerful critical points made by such informed
critics as Pierre Grasse are excluded a priori from
consideration.
To Darwinists evolution is by definition a single
phenomenon. Dobzhansky's fruitfly variations constitute
evolution, and evolution is also the grand creative process that
produced fruitflies and human beings in the first place. Of
course new genetic information originates by some combination of
random genetic changes and natural selection: how else could it
originate without the participation of some force unknown to our
science? Darwinism is the product of Dobzhansky's rules, and to
protect the theory contemporary Darwinists insist that those
rules are binding upon all who would ask questions about how
complex life came into existence. Does Darwinian selection
really have the creative effect that Darwinists claim for it?
The question doesn't arise. The power of natural selection to
create was settled long ago -- not by evidence, but by the
cultural power of those who made the rules. Anyone who questions
those rules -- even if he is President of the French Academy and
the most knowledgeable zoologist in the world -- is dismissed out
of hand. He doesn't understand how science works.
I have the honor of speaking today to an audience of
anthropologists in an age which is often characterized as "post-
modern." Surely this audience above all others ought to
understand how a priesthood can maintain its cultural authority
by enforcing rules of discourse that prevent consideration of
alternatives that the priests disfavor. I assume that this
audience also has some acquaintance with the literature of the
philosophy of science. If so, you are not likely to be fooled by
persons who proclaim that there is a unitary activity called
"science," which has fixed boundaries and is governed by a set of
rules that no one may question. Philosophers know better. Here,
for example, is the concluding paragraph of Larry Laudan's famous
article, "The Demise of the Demarcation Problem:"
Through certain vagaries of history, ...we have
managed to conflate two quite distinct questions: What
makes a belief well founded (or heuristically fertile)?
And what makes a belief scientific? The first set of
questions is philosophically interesting and possibly
even tractable; the second question is both
uninteresting and, judging by its checkered past,
intractable. If we would stand up and be counted on
the side of reason, we ought to drop terms like
"pseudo-science" and "unscientific" from our
vocabulary; they are just hollow phrases which do only
emotive work for us.... Insofar as our concern is to
protect ourselves and our fellows from the cardinal sin
of believing what we wish were so rather than what
there is substantial evidence for (and surely that is
what most forms of "quackery" come down to), then our
focus should be squarely on the empirical and
conceptual credentials for claims about the world. The
"scientific" status of those claims is irrelevant.
Surely Laudan is on the right track. For example, whether
mutation and selection can create complex organs like wings and
eyes is a question to be resolved by evidence. To insist that
belief in the creative power of natural selection is
"scientific," and doubt on the subject is inherently "religious,"
or even an instance of the thought crime known as "creationism,"
is simply to try to prejudice the inquiry with a tendentious use
of labels. Perhaps those who attribute creation to a Creator are
committing what Laudan called "the cardinal sin of believing what
they wish were so rather than what there is substantial evidence
for." On the other hand, perhaps this is still more true of
Darwinists, who are so eager to believe on slight evidence that
natural selection can do all the work of creation.
The points in dispute can only be settled by an unbiased
examination of the evidence. Those who have confidence in their
evidence and their logic do not appeal to prejudice, nor do they
insist upon imposing rules of discourse that allow only one
position to receive serious consideration, nor do they use vague
and shifting terminology to distract attention from genuine
points of difficulty. Still less do they heap abuse and ridicule
upon persons who want to raise questions about the evidence and
the philosophical assumptions that underly a theory. When an
educational establishment has to resort to tactics like that, you
can be sure that some people are getting desperate.
[This address was followed by commentary by Dr. Eugenie Scott
of the National Center for Science Education and a young anthro-
pologist I will forbear to mention. The moderator of the session,
Professor Robert Anderson of Mills College, wrote an article in
the Association's Newsletter protesting the unprofessional, ad
hominem, and thoroughly boring responses of these two to my
remarks. Of course, I knew what they would say and anticipated
it in my final paragraph. Dr. Scott's paper can also be read in
the forthcoming issue of the California Anthropologist.]
--
Phillip E. Johnson
School of Law, University of California, Berkeley CA 94720
=========================================================================
From: Bruce Salem
To: All Msg #87, Jan-18-93 09:40PM
Subject: Re: SWAA Lecture
Organization: Stanford Univ. Earth Sciences
From: salem@pangea.Stanford.EDU (Bruce Salem)
Message-ID: <1jg489INN135@morrow.stanford.edu>
Newsgroups: talk.origins
In article <1jelm6$ejh@agate.berkeley.edu> philjohn@garnet.berkeley.edu
(Phillip Johnson) writes:
>This is the text of the plenary session lecture which I gave at
>the annual meeting of the Southwestern Anthropological
>Association in Berkeley in April, 1992.
It would be much better if you broke it into sections
and posted them!
I have tried to pare down this large posting to isolate
the prejudicial statements, the unsupported assertions that
drive Mr. Johnson's criticism of Evolution. I have left out his
argument about variation not being sufficient as it has been
discussed. Mr Johnson seems to go out of his way to dismiss
Punctuated Equillibrium, without understanding what it
is. Please notice the rhetorical devices in the following,
most notably rendering every thing in moot metaphysical terms.
There is no more facile way to argue, while not arguing, than
to muddle otherwise useful distinctions.
> Grasse insisted that the defining quality of life is the
>intelligence encoded in its biochemical systems, an intelligence
>that cannot be understood solely in terms of its material
>embodiment.
Not only is this an old cant, but it is an unsupported
assertion. How does Mr. Johnson know what the mind or intelligence
consists of, or does not? Do we see any definitions? Next we
would have Mr. Johnson agreeing with the Scientologists and calling
for the outlawing of psycho-active pharmecuticals, as if small
molecules can have no effect on the psyche. What do we get then,
faith healing, or exorcisms?
> There is a political and religious dimension to the issues
>Grasse and Dobzhansky were debating which must also be
>considered. To say as Grasse did that, in the domain of
>creation, "biology, impotent, yields the floor to metaphysics" is
>to imply something important about the relative cultural
>authority of biologists and metaphysicians.
Right, and render limited, objective, and careful knowledge
moot, so your metaphysical prejudices can be pushed. I don't think
that the problem is with weaknesses in generaling population biology
to gene frequency changes as much as with "metaphysical" prejudices
that Mankind HAS to have a nonmaterial soul and mind, and that he
HAS to be created by a supernatural agent who has a purpose in doing
so. And there is no defense given of why any of these assumptions
must be true or what is missing if they are not. I think it is the
payoff for assuming that they are true rather than any demonstration
that they are true which is at stake. In the same vien Evolution is
a threat to these cherished assumptions.
>In a broader sense, however, a creationist is any person
>who believes that there is a Creator who brought about the
>existence of humans for a purpose.
Which is an unasailable assumption with far reaching
consequences. It cannot admit any evidence to the contrey, by
definition. This is another prejudice that is unsupported and
whose meanng is not discussed.
> The really important meaning of "evolution" is not that
>creation was a gradual process that required billions of years.
>It is that the process was supposedly undirected and purposeless.
As such, evolution is not a scientific theory to be tested
against rivels, but an opposing dogma or ideology which is set in
opposition to a stated prejudice that our origins and existance is
driven by divine purpose, un unsupportable assertion. Notice the
not too subtile shift from discussion in the full posting of the
merits of a scientific theory to the posing of a rhetorical
question. This is like the title, "Did Mankind evolve, or was he
Created?", "Did the killer kill someone?".
It would be better to say: "If evolution can descern no
pre-ordained course in the history of life, and no evidence of
a purpose in our origins, how do we then find our purpose?" If
there is no teleology, where does our direction come from?
>Michael Ruse, author of "Darwinism Defended." proclaims
>proudly that Darwinism reflects "a strong ideology," and "one to
>be proud of." According to Ruse, most contemporary Darwinians
>"show a strong liberal commitment" in both their politics and
>their sexual morality. Advocates of creation, on the other hand,
>want to restore a "morality based on narrow Biblical lines" with
>respect to marriage and sexual behavior. Ironically
>Darwinism, which has at so often been associated with ideologies
>of racial superiority, eugenics, and unrestrained competition, is
>currently enlisted in the fight against that trinity of political
>incorrectness: racism, sexism, and homophobia.
Here is the other tactic, make what you don't like into
an ideology and a political one at that and associate it with all
that is disreputable, social darwinism, Hitler, the Final Solution,
Gay Bashing, Racism. Of course Johnson doesn't mention that his
religious ideology has been used to support as many and more myths
of racial and cultural superiority and that even though he decried
the congitive dissonnance created by science in the mythology of
primative peoples, he ignores the way Christian colonists crushed
the cultures of millions of native peoples in the New World.
Truth is, social darwinsim was an error from the start.
Darwinism talks about the reproductive success of individuals of
a species, not about competaton, racial purity, or nationalism.
The King of the tribe would have no effect on evolution if he
didn't reproduce or effect the reproduction of members of his
clan. Political favor and competion are not essentually the
arena for evolution.
I think that what Mr. Johnson is really about is the same
thing alot of Christians and Molsems are about, a catigory I
heard called "conversion religions", which is the authority of
their moral prescription, rather than the enlightment of their
spiritual life. If you mystify human origins enough, you can
get people to accept the idea that because morals are trancendant
they cannot be challenged.
What Mr. Johnson characterized as "liberal", (can you tell
how he voted in the last election?) and evolutionist, is probably
not the Family Values prescription that comes out of the Christian
Right, and last year's GOP convention, is that morals are not
trancendant, not entirely universal, but arbritary, and that they
do change in response to changes in the relationship between
realities in the environment. What he may cherish as the values
of community, of family, of monogamy, can be accounted for as
behaviors that have an impact on evolutionary sucess, the reproductive
success of individuals in a social setting, and that other behaviors
have an explaination in a similar context. Man is different from
animals, but not necessarily in the way Mr. Johnson presupposes.
The reason Mr. Johnson would view evolution as a political
issue is because in his terms it is at the crux of a conflict between
an ethnocentric and theocratic utopia that would simplify his life
and would weed out "auslanders" and the suspended judgement and
multicultural toleration of a secular society in which an established
state religion is anathama.
Bruce Salem
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