(continued
From: philjohn@garnet.berkeley.edu (Phillip Johnson)
Subject: SWAA Lecture
Date: 18 Jan 1993 16:25:42 GMT
)
Readers familiar with Gould's writings know that he has at
times expressed great skepticism concerning the neo-Darwinian
theory that Dobzhansky proclaimed so confidently. In a paper
published in Paleobiology in 1980, Gould wrote that, although he
had been "beguiled" by the unifying power of neo-Darwinism when
he studied it as a graduate student in the 1960's, the weight of
the evidence has since driven him to the reluctant conclusion
that neo-Darwinism "as a general proposition, is effectively
dead, despite its persistence as textbook orthodoxy." In place
of the dead orthodoxy Gould predicted the emergence of a new
macroevolutionary theory based on the views of the geneticist
Richard Goldschmidt, another heretic whose views were every bit
as obnoxious to Darwinists as those of Grasse. The new theory
did not arrive as predicted, however, and Gould subsequently
seems to have heeded Dobzhansky's admonition: if you can't
improve on the mutation/selection mechanism, don't trash it in
public.
For whatever reason, Gould did not point out to his readers
that the utterly un-Darwinian Cambrian fossil record provides no
support whatever for claims about the role of mutation and
selection in the creation of complex animal life, or for
metaphysical speculations about the purposeless of the process
that created humans. Instead, he indulged freely in just such
speculation himself, rightly judging that his audience of
intellectuals would accept an atheistic interpretation of the
evidence uncritically. In the concluding chapter he commented on
a Burgess Shale fossil called Pikaia. Walcott classified Pikaia
as a worm, but a more recent study concludes that the creature
was a member of the phylum Chordata, which includes the subphylum
Vertebrata, which includes us. That for Gould means that Pikaia
might be our ancestor, which implies that, unlike many other
Burgess Shale creatures, it left descendants. If Pikaia had not
survived the mass extinctions that killed off so many other
Cambrian fossil creatures, we would never have evolved. The
existence of humans is therefore not a predictable consequence of
evolution, but a never-to-be-repeated accident. Gould concluded
this reflection, and the book, with the following sentence:
We are the offspring of history, and must establish our
own paths in this most diverse and interesting of
conceivable universes -- one indifferent to our
suffering, and therefore offering us maximum freedom to
thrive, or to fail, in our own chosen way.
Of course there is absolutely nothing in the Burgess Shale
fossils to support Gould's speculation that the universe is
indifferent to our sufferings, or to discredit the belief that we
are responsible to a divine Creator who actively intervened in
nature to bring about our existence. On the contrary, the
genuine scientific portion of Wonderful Life provides ample
grounds for doubting the expansive notions of metaphysical
naturalists like Theodosius Dobzhansky and George Gaylord
Simpson. But because of Darwinism's rules of reasoning, even
evidence which is thoroughly contrary to Darwinism supports
Darwinism.
Darwinian evolution will surely remain the reigning paradigm
as long as Dobzhansky's metaphysical rules are enforced. To say
this is merely to say that the neo-Darwinian synthesis is the
most plausible naturalistic and materialistic theory for the
development of complex life that persons philosophically
committed to excluding the Creator from the Cosmos have been able
to invent. The neo-Darwinian synthesis is a vague and flexible
conglomeration that readily incorporates any seemingly non-
Darwinian elements -- such as the molecular clock, or punctuated
equilibrium, or even the ability of bacteria to summon needed
mutations -- that appear from time to time. If Dobzhansky's team
makes the rules this conglomeration of naturalistic ideas wins,
because all the powerful critical points made by such informed
critics as Pierre Grasse are excluded a priori from
consideration.
To Darwinists evolution is by definition a single
phenomenon. Dobzhansky's fruitfly variations constitute
evolution, and evolution is also the grand creative process that
produced fruitflies and human beings in the first place. Of
course new genetic information originates by some combination of
random genetic changes and natural selection: how else could it
originate without the participation of some force unknown to our
science? Darwinism is the product of Dobzhansky's rules, and to
protect the theory contemporary Darwinists insist that those
rules are binding upon all who would ask questions about how
complex life came into existence. Does Darwinian selection
really have the creative effect that Darwinists claim for it?
The question doesn't arise. The power of natural selection to
create was settled long ago -- not by evidence, but by the
cultural power of those who made the rules. Anyone who questions
those rules -- even if he is President of the French Academy and
the most knowledgeable zoologist in the world -- is dismissed out
of hand. He doesn't understand how science works.
I have the honor of speaking today to an audience of
anthropologists in an age which is often characterized as "post-
modern." Surely this audience above all others ought to
understand how a priesthood can maintain its cultural authority
by enforcing rules of discourse that prevent consideration of
alternatives that the priests disfavor. I assume that this
audience also has some acquaintance with the literature of the
philosophy of science. If so, you are not likely to be fooled by
persons who proclaim that there is a unitary activity called
"science," which has fixed boundaries and is governed by a set of
rules that no one may question. Philosophers know better. Here,
for example, is the concluding paragraph of Larry Laudan's famous
article, "The Demise of the Demarcation Problem:"
Through certain vagaries of history, ...we have
managed to conflate two quite distinct questions: What
makes a belief well founded (or heuristically fertile)?
And what makes a belief scientific? The first set of
questions is philosophically interesting and possibly
even tractable; the second question is both
uninteresting and, judging by its checkered past,
intractable. If we would stand up and be counted on
the side of reason, we ought to drop terms like
"pseudo-science" and "unscientific" from our
vocabulary; they are just hollow phrases which do only
emotive work for us.... Insofar as our concern is to
protect ourselves and our fellows from the cardinal sin
of believing what we wish were so rather than what
there is substantial evidence for (and surely that is
what most forms of "quackery" come down to), then our
focus should be squarely on the empirical and
conceptual credentials for claims about the world. The
"scientific" status of those claims is irrelevant.
Surely Laudan is on the right track. For example, whether
mutation and selection can create complex organs like wings and
eyes is a question to be resolved by evidence. To insist that
belief in the creative power of natural selection is
"scientific," and doubt on the subject is inherently "religious,"
or even an instance of the thought crime known as "creationism,"
is simply to try to prejudice the inquiry with a tendentious use
of labels. Perhaps those who attribute creation to a Creator are
committing what Laudan called "the cardinal sin of believing what
they wish were so rather than what there is substantial evidence
for." On the other hand, perhaps this is still more true of
Darwinists, who are so eager to believe on slight evidence that
natural selection can do all the work of creation.
The points in dispute can only be settled by an unbiased
examination of the evidence. Those who have confidence in their
evidence and their logic do not appeal to prejudice, nor do they
insist upon imposing rules of discourse that allow only one
position to receive serious consideration, nor do they use vague
and shifting terminology to distract attention from genuine
points of difficulty. Still less do they heap abuse and ridicule
upon persons who want to raise questions about the evidence and
the philosophical assumptions that underly a theory. When an
educational establishment has to resort to tactics like that, you
can be sure that some people are getting desperate.
[This address was followed by commentary by Dr. Eugenie Scott
of the National Center for Science Education and a young anthro-
pologist I will forbear to mention. The moderator of the session,
Professor Robert Anderson of Mills College, wrote an article in
the Association's Newsletter protesting the unprofessional, ad
hominem, and thoroughly boring responses of these two to my
remarks. Of course, I knew what they would say and anticipated
it in my final paragraph. Dr. Scott's paper can also be read in
the forthcoming issue of the California Anthropologist.]
--
Phillip E. Johnson
School of Law, University of California, Berkeley CA 94720
Return to The Skeptic Tank's main Index page.
The views and opinions stated within this web page are those of the
author or authors which wrote them and may not reflect the views and
opinions of the ISP or account user which hosts the web page. The
opinions may or may not be those of the Chairman of The Skeptic Tank.