TL: INDONESIA'S PROPOSED NUCLEAR PROGRAM (AUSTRALIA'S RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA) SO: Greenpeace Australia DT: May 1992 Keywords: indonesia australia nuclear power plans risks safety proliferation reports gp greenpeace / Submission to the Inquiry by the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee May 1992 Terms of reference of the Inquiry: To investigate and report on Australia's relations with Indonesia, with particular reference to: a: Economic relations including trade, investment and development assistance. b: Cultural, political and security issues C: Regional issues involving Australia and Indonesia. INDONESIA'S PROPOSED NUCLEAR PROGRAMME CONTENTS Page EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 1. Introduction 3 2. History of the nuclear industry in Indonesia 3 3. The current position of the industry 4 4. Energy in Indonesia 6 5. Alternative energy for Indonesia 10 6. Nuclear power and the greenhouse effect 13 7. Who will build? 15 8. The Indonesian economy - costs of reactor building 17 9. Environmental hazards of the proposed nuclear plan: 21 - Seismic 21 - Technical problems 23 Possible environmental impact: 25 - Indonesia 25 - Neighbouring countries 27 - Financial costs of an accident 29 - Radioactive wastes 29 - Worker health 30 10. Regional nuclearisation: 31 - Connections - an example 32 11. The International Atomic Energy Agency: 33 - Its Role and Capabilities 12. Proliferation issues 35 13. Associated political and human rights issues 44 14. Recommendations to the Committee 50 15. References 52 Appendix 1, Article, Far Eastern Economic Review Appendix 2, Map of the region, showing fallout zone Appendix 3, Australian parliamentary questions and answers on Australia's involvement with Indonesia EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Indonesian Government is planning to build between seven to twelve reactors to come on line between 2003 and 2015. It is claimed these are essential to meet future electricity demand. The present growth in electricity demand in Indonesia is 17% per annum. Increasing electricity supply to meet this demand would entail the construction of two large power stations each year. It is not believed that electricity will continue to grow at this rate. Lower, more realistic estimates for future demand can be met by carrying out a combination of measures. These include increased energy efficiency, particularly in the industrial sector and maximising energy conservation. Natural gas is recommended as a transitional fuel until the country's vast geothermal and hydro-power resources are exploited in small scale units. In the longer term, additional alternative and renewable energies (solar, wind and tidal) should be developed to meet any further demand. First world countries, instead of encouraging or allowing the spread of the nuclear industry to the third world, should be doing all they can to help negate the need for such an industry. Nuclear industry figures for the costs of the nuclear programme outlined above are severely underestimated. The industry claims it will cost only US$1 billion per reactor for construction. The cost of construction per reactor is, however, closer US$2.1 (AU$2.8) billion. That would give a total of US$25 billion for the full programme, but would cover only building costs. Additional sums, totalling billions, would have to be found for waste management and reactor decommissioning. It is planned to build the reactor in an area known for its seismic activity. This significantly increases the risk of a major accident happening at the site. A massive release of radioactivity from a reactor in Java would have a serious and damaging impact on the economy, health and environment of Indonesia. Some 45,000 people live within a 10 mile radius of the proposed site. Even a relatively 'localised' release of radioactivity could have a severe impact on that area. The whole of Java, on which 100 million people live, lies well within the same range of radioactive fallout zone which contaminated the area around the Chernobyl plant. Radioactive fallout could also severely impact on neighbouring countries. The decision to build a reactor must be seen within a regional and not a national context. There is no effective emergency plan which could cope with such an accident. There is no suitably stringent liability regime to cover compensation following such an accident. Nuclear weapons proliferation concerns have not been raised regarding the Indonesian nuclear plan. However, there are matters related to this issue, such as nuclear technology transfer, which do give rise to concern. International safeguards have not proved effective in halting the spread of nuclear technology that can be misused in weapons programmes. There are serious concerns that laws currently used within Indonesia to counter subversion (which carry penal sentencing) could be used to suppress legitimate opposition to the nuclear programme. It is absolutely essential that there is free and open discussion on this matter both inside and outside Indonesia without fear of legal reprisals. All possible steps should be taken to help Indonesia improve its electricity supply sector, without having a nuclear programme. Nuclear power presents a unique technical, financial, social, political and environmental hazard. 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Indonesia - one of the most overcrowded places on the planet is desperately struggling to improve the living standards of the 180 million inhabitants who live on the Indonesian archipelago. 1.2 Indonesia, which is experiencing rapid growth, is classed as a 'developing' country - a fairly meaningless Western expression that does nothing to reflect the sophisticated cultural and philosophical basis of this, the world's fourth largest nation. Defining such a country in purely economic terms infinitely limits its real potential. In the same way Western countries and companies are limiting the full potential of Indonesia's energy future, by offering only the outdated polluting technologies of fossil-fuel burning or nuclear-powered plants. This paper concerns itself with the latter of these two energy systems. 1.3 In brief, the Indonesian Government has announced that it wants to build 12 nuclear reactors, ranging from 600 Mega Watts (MW) to 1,000 MW, to come on line between 2003 and 2015. 1.4 The following pages contain information on the present situation regarding Indonesia and nuclear technology/power. Also, a number of questions are asked - questions that have to be answered at both a national and international level. 2. HISTORY OF THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY IN INDONESIA 2.1 In 1958 the Committee for Nuclear Energy was formed in Indonesia, followed a year later by the founding of the Institute of Atomic Energy. Technicians were sent overseas to the former-Soviet Union, the US, France, West Germany and Japan for training, to both increase and encourage Indonesian expertise and interest in the nuclear industry. 2.2 In May 1960, Jakarta signed a US$5 million aid-project with Moscow for a research reactor. The US reacted to this agreement with a US$350,000 gift from the 'Atoms for Peace' project. 2.3 When the Institute for Atomic Energy was changed to the National Atomic Energy Agency (Badan Tenaga Atom Nasional - BATAN) in 1965, it was also given government department status. This equipped it with the political power and impetus to safeguard its future - which effectively meant pursuing a nuclear programme. 2.4 Interest in nuclear power steadily grew until 1969, when the then President Sukarno shocked the world by stating "God willing, Indonesia will make her own bomb shortly." Despite scepticism as to Indonesia's ability to carry out this threat, foreign funding was withheld until the present President, Suharto, came to power (1). 2.5 In 1972 the Joint Preparatory Committee for the Development of a Centre for Nuclear Powered Electricity was set up, between the nuclear agency (BATAN) and Perusahaan Umum Listrik Negara (PLN), the national electricity utility. 2.6 Over the years a number of international and national resource and development corporations, as well as foreign Governments and agencies, continued to encourage Indonesia's interest in nuclear power. 2.7 The five-year national plans for development (REPELITA) have given differing estimates of the need for nuclear power in Indonesia. Coal and oil-powered plants have variously held the most-favoured energy option position. Economic and political activities have also effected the BATAN plans. Thus, it has taken some 30 years for Indonesia's nuclear industry to get to the stage where it has ordered a feasibility study for its first commercially sized nuclear reactor. 2.8 By the mid-1980s, Indonesia had signed agreements for major research facilities projects with companies from Canada, France, Germany, Italy and the United States. The most recent research facility at Serpong opened by President Suharto in December 1989, is one of the largest and most sophisticated nuclear sites in Asia and has been said to be the 'third largest of its kind in the world.' Serpong cost US$150 million (2). 2.9 The agreements with foreign governments and nuclear agencies also included training of staff in various locales: 68 BATAN personnel in Canada, 25 engineers and operators in Germany, 50 local engineers are receiving on-site training at Serpong and a new agreement will permit electricity company staff to travel to South Korea for training in the management of nuclear energy facilities (3). Australia also trains technicians at the Lucas Heights facility near Sydney. 3. THE CURRENT POSITION OF THE INDUSTRY 3.1 In its 1990 report on nuclear developments in the Asia and Pacific Region, (4) the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) gives the following description of the presently operating Indonesian nuclear facilities. "Indonesia has three research reactors in operation, a 1 MW Triga reactor at Bandung, a 250 kW (kilowatt) Triga at Jogjakarta and the most recent, a 30 MW multi-purpose (MPR-30, later called RSG-GAS) at Serpong supplied by Interatom (Germany FR), which achieved criticality in 1987. A fuel fabrication facility delivered by Nukem GmbH (FRG) was inaugurated in August 1987 at the Research Centre, near Serpong. The plant fabricates reload fuel elements for the MPR-30 at the same site and includes a prototype plant for power reactor fuel." 3.2 The Indonesian Government has been using the facilities for research projects and for in-the-field application of the radioisotopes produced. The following precis of these activities was given by Mr. Johannes Petrus Lounhanapessy (the Indonesian Ambassador) at the 1991 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) meeting in Vienna (5). "Mr. Lounhanapessy said that Indonesia has placed a great deal of emphasis on the agricultural sector, human health and industrial applications (of nuclear energy). He introduced some examples in which Indonesia had gained remarkable success. In plant breeding, he said that they had succeeded in improving varieties of rice, through the techniques of mutation induction and breeding, and cited recent success in obtaining soya-beans and mung-beans in using the same nuclear technique. As for irradiation technology, he said that through more extensive public information, a more positive attitude had been created towards marketing and consumption of preserved food by means of irradiation. A commercial irradiator for sterilisation of medical supplies is presently being constructed by a private company. Another area is, he said, the application of tracers in sediment movement and in geothermal exploration and oil exploitation. Regarding public health issues, he announced that Indonesia would be hosting the Fifth Asia and Ocean Congress of Nuclear Medicine and Biology in 1992. "Secondly, he introduced Indonesia's recent progress concerning the planned construction of a nuclear power plant. He said that Indonesia had recently awarded a contract to a Japanese company to carry out a study covering the first nuclear power plant. Indonesia's nuclear power programme, he said, would be annually updated in order to cope with changing priorities. Regarding safeguard matters, he stated that as a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Indonesia supports full-scope safeguards, as well as measures that could increase their effectiveness. But, he added, for such kind of actions, pertinent procedures should be defined. He finally emphasised the importance of regional security based on the concept of a zone for peace, freedom and neutrality." 3.3 The Indonesian position is clearly laid out in the paper presented to the IAEA seminar on nuclear power, which took place in Canberra, August 1990. "The Government of Indonesia is seriously considering the use of nuclear energy for electricity generation in Java. The strong arguments for nuclear energy in Java are as follows: *The high demand of electricity. Even in 1990, Indonesia is experiencing shortage of electricity supply. The additional capacity needed in 2000 is 10,700 MW and in 2015 is 26,000 MW. *Environmental and ecological benefits. Due to production of CO2, SO2, NOx, heavy metals and dusts, fossil power plants are more harmful to the environment than nuclear plants. * Safety aspects. Considering the whole fuel cycle, the health risks of fossil plants are greater than nuclear plants. *Economic aspects. Nuclear Electricity is competitive, even less costly than conventional electricity. Especially if the fossil plants are to install flue gas desulphurisation (FGD) and DENOX systems then the capital as well as operating costs will increase appreciably. *Additionally, nuclear energy is the most potential resource for the long-term to diversify electricity generating systems besides coal." (6). 4. ENERGY IN INDONESIA 4.1 The per capita income of the Indonesian population is approximately US$550. The population is growing at 2.5% per annum. Income is very unevenly distributed. Some 30% of the population live below the poverty line, with a rich minority owning most of the wealth. It is believed that for Indonesia to continue to grow economically there has to be a corresponding growth in energy supply. 4.2 Indonesia is rapidly developing - with GDP growth of 7.4 percent in 1989 - as well as that of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) it is expected to continue far above the global average. 4.3 The average annual growth rate of electricity consumption in Indonesia has been higher than that in other Asian countries (7.9 percent annually) and much higher compared with that of the world total (3.6 percent annually). 4.4 Government projections for electricity demand indicate a 17% per annum growth for Indonesia, as compared to 1.5 per cent for China and 12% for Egypt. Indonesia's foremost environmental group, WAHLI, has estimated that if the Government attempts to meet this forecast demand of 17% per annum, it will have to build two new 600 MW nuclear plants every year. (7) 4.5 Java, with an area of only one-fourth of Indonesia's land, has to accommodate 60 per cent, 100 million, of the total population. It is claimed that a an increased population needs a vastly increased electricity programme. It is within this context that the Indonesian Government's proposal, to have 7-12 nuclear power plants supplying some 27% of Java's electricity requirements by the year 2015, needs to be seen. 4.6 Energy potential in Java itself is very important as some 70 per cent of demand comes from that island. Almost all of Indonesia's estimated 31.9 billion metric tons of coal reserves, however, are located on Sumatra and Kalimantan. 4.7 At the Jakarta International Energy Conference in October 1990, Djali Ahimsa, Director General of Indonesia's Atomic Energy Agency said that "by 2015 Java alone may experience an estimated power shortages of more than 7,000 MW." (8) The Jakarta Post, (9) reporting on the nuclear power plans quoted BATAN officials as claiming 'that people in Java would consume about 27,000 MW of electricity by the year 2015. The capacity of electricity generation by water, geothermal activity, natural gas and coal would reach only about 20,000 MW in Java that year.' 4.8 In a report (10) from the Directorate General for New Power and Energy it was claimed that Java will only require installed power capacity of 16,000 MW in the year 2000. The same report said that Java's power supply is 5,800 megawatts. The Indonesian Minister for Research and Technology, B. J. Habibie, in presenting evidence to the House of Representatives Commission X on Technology said that because Java has little potential in geothermal, hydropower, coal and gas, "This could cause a problem in the long run." Habibie reckoned that in the year 2015, when Java will need 32,000 megawatts, the island would require 7,000 megawatts of additional power, which could only be met by nuclear energy." That estimate is some 5,000 MW more than that given by the BATAN officials. 4.9 Demand for electricity, from both domestic and industrial consumers is notoriously difficult to forecast. With nuclear power plants taking an average 10-16 years to build, the short and even long term demand is not necessarily met. In the United Kingdom various reports from the electricity boards, even went so far as to predict that the UK would suffer power shortages by the late 1980s if the number of nuclear power plants did not double. Those predictions, made in the early 1970s, never came to pass. In fact, although the UK continued to experience economic growth, the number of nuclear power stations ordered continued to diminish. A certain amount of the reduction in forecast demand was due to energy conservation, increase energy efficiency and a much improved comprehensive national energy strategy (although it is still not an ideal model). 4.10 Predictions made for Indonesia have been equally wrong. A national energy seminar held in 1974 stated that electricity supply would have to grow from 1,000 MW (1973 figure) to 64,000 MW by 2000. That would have meant a programme of building 63 large-scale power stations built within 18 years, obviously an overly ambitious project. Nuclear power, it was said, would supply some 25 - 39 per cent of this new programme. (11) 4.11 With most countries the picture of energy needs and wants differ depending on which department or company is consulted. Indonesia is no exception to this rule. There is some discussion within Indonesia as to the best way to meet energy demand. The attached article from the Far Eastern Economic Review (12), expands on some of these discussions and explains some of the structural, social and economic problems facing Indonesia in dealing with its increasing electricity demand. 4.12 President Suharto raised the matter of finite fossil fuel resources, when he dedicated two nuclear facilities in Serpong in 1989. He took that occasion to reiterate the call for nuclear power, stating that "Research shows that 20 years from now, all sources of energy available to us, including geothermal, water, natural gas and coal, won't be enough to meet even the electricity requirements of the island of Java. Therefore we should start from now to consider using nuclear power." (13) 4.13 Some Indonesian sources have said that generating plants drawing on hydropower and geothermal energy sources will account for more than 67 per cent of the additional 5,222 MW scheduled to come on line between 1990-1992. By the end of the 1989/90 fiscal year, coal, hydro and geothermal powered- plants constituted 43 per cent of installed capacity. Estimates and reports on the geothermal reserves, however, vary wildly. The Ministry of Mines and Energy has estimated that Indonesia's geothermal reserve potential exceeds 60,000 MW, (60 GW) concentrated primarily in Java (14). Others have estimated that of Indonesia's has only 10-15 GW of geothermal power reserves, of which only 0.9 GW are located in Java. Similarly, only around 0.9 GW of hydro resources are estimated to be available in Java. 4.14 Nuclear officials do concede that Indonesia possesses some 75 GW of hydro-power, 10-15 GW of geothermal and 19 billion tonnes of coal, together with massive oil and gas reserves (some 89 billion barrels of oil equivalent) - a formidable energy resource base (15). Some have put forward that Java could draw on the 10 billion tonnes coal reserves in Sumatra, but this is rejected by environmentalists because of concerns over global warming and acid rain. 4.15 Dr. Ing Nengah Suja, of the state-owned electricity utility, PLN has concluded that nuclear power is an inappropriate source of energy for producing electricity at least until the year 2010, as it is more expensive to produce compared with coal power, natural gas, oil and other sources of power which are available in Indonesia. 4.16 A study by Indonesian Institute for Technology and Application (BPPT) in conjunction with Kernforshunganlage Juelich, estimated that the capital cost of 900 MW nuclear power would be $2383/kW (1984 prices). The study asserted that nuclear power was inappropriate for the production of electricity in Indonesia for the period 1990-2015 (16). 4.17 According to the 1988 World Bank report "For the short to medium term a nuclear power program can't be justified (for Indonesia)". The bank ranked nuclear power last among options for meeting Indonesia's rising electricity demand (17). 4.18 An ANSTO (18) report, not surprisingly, supports the view that Indonesia needs nuclear power. "Indonesia is interested in introducing nuclear power, despite an abundance of oil and natural gas. With a population of 220 million expected by 2000, there will be a need for large amounts of competitive clean energy. Early in 1987 five foreign reactor vendors were asked to examine the technical and economic feasibility of building a 600-1000 MW nuclear power unit under a build-operate-transfer (BOT) scheme. Under such a scheme the vendor would construct and operate the plant for a specific number of years, recouping construction costs through sale of the electricity produced by the plant to the Indonesian grid. Three proposals are believed to have been received, from Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., from a Westinghouse-Ansaldo-Mitsubishi consortium, and a joint offer from Framatome and KWU (now the joint venture company, Nuclear Power International). Talks are thought to be continuing." 4.19 As the article in Appendix 1 notes, the push for nuclear power in Indonesia is strongly supported by B. J. Habibie, Minister of Research and Technology. Although there is dissent within the Indonesian Cabinet over the nuclear power proposals Habibie's position is such that "as long as Habibie is around, you can count on seeing a nuclear power plant eventually." (19) 4.20 This view has recently been reinforced. Energy in Europe recently (20) carried the following 'Indonesia will go ahead with the construction of its first nuclear plant "no matter what", according to Dr. Achmad Baiqunio, a member of the National Research Council. The decision is apparently political. The new reactor will be built at Semenanajung Muria on Java.' 4.21 Emil Salim, Minister for the Environment and Population who, in a recent talk in Jakarta, said that oil will be used as the main energy source for Indonesia before nuclear power would be. He did warn that Indonesia's oil reserves would be finished in 25 years. Coal would then be the next alternative, although there were worries over greenhouse gases. Indonesia's coal reserves are available for hundreds of years.(21) 4.22 At the cost of several billion dollars each, Indonesia has constructed two modern liquified natural gas facilities in Arun, Sumatra and Bontang, Kalimantan. Indonesia currently exports about 20 million tonnes of LNG annually - making it the largest LNG exporter in the world - with about 80% going to Japanese buyers under 20 year contracts. In 1985 exports of oil and gas made up two-thirds of total exports. By 1989, this had shrunk to 39%. (22) 4.23 The irony is that Indonesia may be gaining money from selling gas and oil, but it will pay dearly to buy a nuclear programme from the Japanese. 4.24 It appears that the Indonesian Department of Mines and Energy is not convinced by the nuclear option. At a coal conference in Sydney, December 1991, the Director of Electric Power Programme development, Mr. Andoyo, issued a paper.(23) That paper made no direct reference to nuclear power. It concluded: a. The current role of coal in the Indonesian power industry is considered to be important. This role will still be increased in the future in line with the government policy to diversify energy sources. b. The government has pursued and shall continue to pursue electrification programmes vigorously in order to meet the growing electricity demand. It is projected that electricity demand will grow fast due to the fast growing economy. This growing demand will be primarily met by maximising the construction of coal-fired power plants. 4.25 It is believed that the oil industry is in decline within the Asian region, but this has not deterred exploration or exploitation. Studies of the three major power players - coal oil/gas and nuclear exposes a disparate and disjointed approach to Indonesia's energy needs. In short, each organisation or department is pushing its own product without thought to the total and real needs of the country. There is no doubt that Government officials and politicians are subject to many aggressive sales campaigns from each sector. 5. ALTERNATIVE ENERGY FOR INDONESIA 5.1 Indonesia has huge reserves of natural gas, oil and coal on which it depends for generating export income. The World Bank report in 1988 estimated that the country has 'economically developable hydroelectric resources five times its present electricity usage, although resources are largely located in the remote territories of the archipelago.' 5.2 A comprehensive and cohesive national energy strategy, with the correct grid connections are essential for Indonesia. Java cannot afford to see itself as a separate island, funding nuclear power to supply it own energy, if less damaging energy sources can be tapped into on other islands. 5.3 Unfortunately, the problems of large scale hydro-power projects are many and manifest. Indeed, funding of such projects by the World Bank, particularly in South American countries, has already been roundly condemned. Similarly, the removal of many farmers from around the site of one of Indonesia's largest dams has led many in the country to oppose any more similar projects. It is acknowledged, however, that the micro-hydro projects, in which a few houses or a whole village are served by small-scale locally serviceable schemes, are a possibility. 5.4 Many of the potential electricity sources such as large scale hydroelectric schemes or increased used of fossil fuels (which lead to greenhouse gas emissions) are becoming less and less socially and environmentally acceptable. Nuclear power is, incorrectly, offered as an alternative to both. There is, however, an alternative to large scale power stations or massive hydro-electric projects. 5.5 The Government has not properly considered the amount of energy which could be saved by increasing industrial efficiency and maximising conservation efforts. This could have a major impact on Indonesia's future energy demands, especially if combined with an increased use of geothermal power and natural gas. (24) 5.6 A US-company, Onocal, the world's largest producer of geothermal energy, has stated that it could build geothermal power plants in Indonesia for considerably less than coal or nuclear power plants (25) 5.7 Diversified small scale energy technology is believed to the most appropriate to meet many of the energy demands of rural Indonesia. A combination of solar, biomass, hydro and geothermal projects will obviate the need for large scale centralised power plants - be they coal or nuclear. Such projects have the added advantage of involving local labour for maintenance, and also require more skilled tradesmen. 5.8 Both Indonesian officials and overseas experts in alternative and renewable energy fields, point out that unless these newer technologies are more cost-effective they will not be widely applied. The New Energy Sector of the Indonesian Department of Mines and Energy claims that the State electricity board PLN is governed by financial expediency in energy planning, rather than long term energy strategy, which could involve alternative power sources. 5.9 The current price of a solar panel, which collects enough power each day to run two small lights and a black and white television, is close to the average annual Indonesian per capita income. However, such technology is crucial for the rural areas and for those islands which would prove too costly to link to the national grid. 5.10 Rob de Lange, a representative of the Dutch-owned R&S company has said "If we can reduce the price (of a solar panel) from one million rupiah (US$518) to five or six hundred thousand (US$259-310) it could be the cheapest option". He noted that half a million families in the crowded island of Java used car batteries to run a television. "In the near future the role of renewable energy will not be very big (other than traditional methods), but in qualitative terms it gives a significant impact" said Mr. Utomo, director of New Energy, Indonesian Department of Mines and Energy. "In the end we can't rely on fossil fuels. Sooner or later oil, gas and coal will be exhausted." (26) 5.11 Wind power has matured rapidly, and the cost of electricity generated from wind in the US has dropped from 25 cents per kilowatt hour, to 7 to 9 cents in the late eighties (27). The Danish Ministry of Energy reports that wind-power costs just 5.3 cents/kWh (28). The United Kingdom's department of Energy's own data show that wind power can save almost as much carbon dioxide as nuclear power by the year 2005 - for nearly one-quarter of the cost.(29) 5.12 Electricity generated from biomass currently costs about 5 cents/kWh, and the commercialisation of biomass-gasification co-generation technology is expected to generate electricity from sugar wastes for 3.3 cents/kWh within five years. (30) 5.13 Solar photovoltaic (PV) technology produces electricity from sunlight with no moving parts and no fuel. Recent improvements in solar PV technology have been dramatic, and the costs of PV electricity have plummeted from $1.50/kWh in 1980 to between 20 to 40 cents/kWh today (depending on the particular system employed)(31). The potential for solar PV has been assessed by the United States Department of Energy (USDOE). The USDOE is hardly a solar-advocacy group, yet its conclusions are remarkable: PV can be used effectively anywhere in the United States, including under the grey skies of the north east. No cooling water is required, and contrary to widespread belief, land requirements per kWh of electricity produced are very similar to those for coal production and combustion.(32) 5.14 PV sales are currently expanding at 30 per cent per annum, and the cost of PV electricity (with storage for supplying electricity at night) is expected to fall to 4 cents/kWh by 2030, or sooner (33). Rather than the usual incremental growth, there is a likelihood of explosive growth in the PV market when the price reaches about 8 cents/kWh, which could happen as early as 2000. Thus, according to the USDOE assessment, 'the ultimate role of PV may be far larger than most assume', and 'PV appears to be a long-term and desirable solution to U.S. and global concerns for energy and environment.' (34). 5.15 A Princeton University/ World Resource Institute assessment (35) of the potential for a solar hydrogen economy suggests that by the year 2000, DC electricity could be produced in sunny regions for 2 to 3.5 cents/kWh, and that baseload AC electricity, with underground pumped hydro storage, could be produced for 5 to 8 cents/kWh. 5.16 The Princeton study draws a striking comparison between PV technology and nuclear power. The attraction of nuclear power is that small quantities of fuel can produce large quantities of energy. Cycled through fast-breeder reactor (the most efficient nuclear technology), a single gram of uranium can produce 3,800 kWh of electricity. However, a uranium atom can only be fissioned once, whereas a silicon solar cell can absorb photons repeatedly and convert them to electricity. The amorphous silicon solar cell requires a thin film of silicon about one micron thick, which means that 3 grams of silicon are required per square meter of cell area. Over its lifetime in 15 per cent efficient thin-film PV solar cells, one gram of silicon produces 3,300 kWh of electricity. Thus, gram for gram, silicon and uranium produce comparable amounts of electricity, and silicon is 5,000 times more abundant in th earth's crust. Silicon accounts for about half the mass of ordinary sand, and the electricity that could be produced from one tonne of sand is equivalent to that from burning over half-a-million tonnes of coal. (36) 5.17 A plan for a mixed energy economy, utilising both large scale power plants and localised energy systems has been put forward. A number of companies who have developed solar cell technology and biomass equipment have put their ideas to the Indonesian Government. It is seen as particularly important to fix the energy needs of the small scale communities which would be very expensive to connect to a national grid. On the matter of the national grid - despite claims that the state owned national electric company cannot meet demand (37) WAHLI, in their energy report, state the national electricity board is capable of meeting the supply. 5.18 The transition from coal to gas powered plants, to phasing out fossil-fuel consumption, has to be the way forward for Indonesia. Meanwhile, every cent spent on pursuing nuclear power is a cent wasted. Much could have been achieved even with the US$15 million dollars going into the feasibility study for the nuclear plant. 5.19 There is no public debate within Indonesia on the effectiveness of energy conservation. Again, there are no reports which deal with energy efficiency within Indonesia, but some impression of possible savings can be made by looking at US reports. This is particularly relevant in relation to claims made over greenhouse gas emissions, and which is the best technology to reduce them. 5.20 Under present conditions, the cost of generating electricity from new US nuclear plants is around 13.5 cents/kWh (in 1987 $) (38). This figure assumes a capital cost of US$3,000 per kW, which is the average capital costs for the twenty-three US plants completed between 1984 and 1987. Meanwhile a number of recent studies analyse the cost and savings potential of electrical efficiency improvements. Several technologies are considered, including solid-state ballasts, compact fluorescent lamps, improved refrigerators and water-heaters, motor improvements, and so on. While the best electric-efficiency investments cost less than 1 cent per kWh of electricity saved, the average costs weighted over a wide range of electric efficiency improvements is around 2 cents per kWh of electricity saved. For example, the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL), and the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE) have documented large potential electrical savings at average costs of 2 cents/kWh. (39) 5.21 Assuming a strategy of displacing coal-fired power, the reciprocals of these unit costs give the amounts of coal-fired electricity that can be displaced for each dollar invested: 7.4 kWh/$ for nuclear electricity and 50 kWh/$ for electric efficiency. Thus, at the present time in the United States, each dollar invested in efficiency displaces nearly seven time more carbon than a dollar invested in new nuclear power.(40) 6. NUCLEAR POWER & THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT 6.1 It is accepted that the nuclear power industry worldwide is experiencing severe problems, particularly in the developed world. Of the 33 countries that have nuclear power or who are planning it, 19 have moratorium or phase out policies.(41) 6.2 The majority of the world's nuclear reactors are presently in Western or First World countries. Many industry spokespeople admit that they are facing an uphill struggle persuading the more educated populations to accept an increase in nuclear power. Given the damage caused by Chernobyl, the increasing costs of nuclear electricity and decommissioning, coupled with waste disposal problems, public opposition comes as no surprise. The nuclear industry sees rich pickings in Asia. 6.3 The governments of developing countries are, of course, not ignorant and are well aware of the problems that nuclear power has caused. For this reason nuclear power is now being sold as the possible saviour from the 'greenhouse effect'. 6.4 Of all the activities which contribute towards carbon dioxide emissions, the burning of fossil-fuels in power stations contributes only 10%. Some 90 per cent of all fossil- fuel plants are coal powered. Nuclear power can only be used to substitute these fossil-fuel burning plants, it cannot be used to replace any other energy system, such as transport. 6.5 In order for nuclear power plants to replace coal power plants globally five thousand large nuclear power plants will have to be built between now and 2025. Nearly half of these would be located in the Third World. This means, on average, a new nuclear power plant (of 1,000 MW capacity) must be built every two-and-a-half days from now (1990) until 2025. The total capital costs of this programme would be US$5.3 trillion (in 1987 prices), or an average of $144 billion annually, of which developing countries are responsible for US$64 billion per annum.(42). 6.6 Total electricity generation costs would average US$525 billion per year, of which developing countries' share would be US$170 billion annually. By 2025, the global installed nuclear capacity would reach 5,200 gigawatts (GW: a gigawatt is a billion watts), an 18-fold increase over today's capacity. (43) 6.7 Of this 2,330 GW are in the Third World, which would mean a staggering 155-fold increase over today's installed capacity of 15.02 GW (44). In Latin America alone, which has only 1.7 GW operating today, the required capacity is 334 GW by 2025 - substantially more than all the nuclear power in the world today.(45) 6.8 The economic strain on the rich industrialised nations would be extreme, if not disastrous. Developing countries could not even consider this scenario, which entails building 2,351 large nuclear power plants in the Third World. For perspective, the World Bank lent US$3 billion in 1987 to the electricity power sector (46) - less than 5 per cent of the US$64 billion that would be required annually . Indeed, the current Third World debt burden would roughly double - just to build the required plants. 6.9 Regardless of the problems of the greenhouse effect it is obvious that nuclear power would simply bankrupt countries who pursued a major programme. At the same time greenhouse gas emissions would not be significantly reduced. 6.10 Keepin and Kats (47) estimate that even if the massive nuclear programme mentioned above were to go ahead that greenhouse gas emissions would still continue to grow because of the increased use of oil and natural gas, which is used mainly in activities that cannot replaced by nuclear power stations. Electricity is responsible for just one-third of fossil fuel consumption. 6.11 Nuclear power supplies less than 5 per cent of the world's energy, less than that contributed by the burning of firewood. Nuclear power, though, invariably takes the largest percentage of energy research and development budgets. 7. WHO WILL BUILD? 7.1 The 1976 pre-feasibility study was updated in 1987 at Indonesia's invitation. Those who took part were Framatome (France); Kraftwerk (KWU a German firm which is now a subsidiary of Siemens AG) a German multinational corporation or MNC ; Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) and a consortium consisting of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Limited (Japan), Westinghouse Electric, and Ansaldo (Italy). A Swiss consulting firm, Motor Columbus, was chosen to evaluate Build-Operate-Transfer construction options in the bids put out by the pre- feasibility parties. 7.2 Nuclear Power International, the French-German consortium, has not won an order since it was set up in 1989. Framatome has not gained a foreign order since 1986 and Kraftwerk (KWU) has had no overseas contracts awarded since 1982. (48) 7.3 The feasibility study contract, for Indonesia's first nuclear power plant, went to New Japan Engineering Consultants, a subsidiary of the Japanese company, Kansai Electric Company. 7.4 It comes as no surprise that a Japanese firm was awarded the feasibility study contract. Nor would it be surprising if the Mitsubishi consortium (which has strong ties to Kansai) is awarded the Build-Operate-Transfer contract after the final feasibility study is filed with BATAN in 1995-1996. 7.5 Close links already exist between the two nations on nuclear matters.(49) "In March 1988, Indonesia and Japan signed a 5-year agreement covering the exchange of personnel and technological information in the fields of reactor physics, utilisation of research reactors, production and utilisation of radioisotopes, radioactive waste management, radiation protection and nuclear safety engineering." 7.6 The site chosen is on the Muria Cape, near a town called Ujung Watu. This lies in the Jepara district on the North Coast of central Java, 80 kilometres north-east of Semarang, the provincial capital. The feasibility study is expected to be completed by 1995. Research stations, to test for meteorological information and seismic activity, are already operating on the Muria Peninsula. 7.7 There has been little publicity given to the serious problems that Kansai has experienced with No. 4 reactor at the Mihama nuclear power plant (see Environmental Hazards, Technical Problems, 9.3) 7.8 "The Japanese nuclear industry have made it clear that the best way to maintain competence and profitability in the nuclear energy sector at home is to expand into export markets abroad. Japan has explicitly targeted Southeast Asia as a viable market for Japanese dominance in the transfer of nuclear technologies. And rather than compete directly with large, better established exporters from the US and Europe, Japanese companies have sought and concluded joint venture agreements with those firms in order to develop their export capabilities in this market." (50) 7.9 Of the four sets of bids originally tendered to BATAN for nuclear energy plants, two involved consortia combining leading Japanese with US firms. 7.10 There are a number of other reasons which indicate a Japanese company will probably be awarded the construction contract. Firstly such a decision would recognise Japanese negotiating strength in the region. 7.11 At the end of 1988 some 60 per cent of bilateral loans to Indonesia were from Japan and some 40 per cent of all commercial loans to Indonesia were from Japanese financial institutions. (51) 7.12 Japan has long standing aid agreements with Indonesia. In 1990 Indonesia received US$2 billion from Japan, which accounted for some 70% of Indonesia's aid and 10% of budget revenues. (52) 7.13 Japanese officials have visited Jakarta in the past with promises of environmental aid packages. Japan's Environment Minister, Kazuo Aichi, visited Indonesia in May of last year. After visiting the deforested regions of Kalimantan (which have suffered huge forest fires due to uncontrolled logging) Aichi stated that "efforts to protect the environment are not contradicting economic development." (53) It would have been more appropriate had he noted that developing the economy might hamper efforts to protect the environment. 7.14 Some have suggested that the consortium of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Westinghouse Electric and the Italian company Ansaldo is most likely to win the first construction contract. 7.15 Mitsubishi is one of the world's largest corporations, with business interests in many fields. Mitsubishi has recently signed a ten year deal with Westinghouse to develop nuclear power technology for third world markets and Indonesia and Taiwan in particular (54). It is no secret that these companies, which have collaborated for some time, are chasing the Indonesian contract. 7.16 Westinghouse certainly needs the support of a Japanese partner, as it is currently embroiled in a scandal over the building of the Philippines reactor at Bataan. The Brazilian Government have also said that they intend to sue the company. (see Environmental Risks, Technical Problem 9.3) 7.17 Another contender for future sales is Atomic Energy of Canada. They, too, have already had dealings with Indonesia. ANSTO reported: "In December 1989 President Suharto inaugurated a new Nuclear Mechano Electronic Installation at Serpong. The facility, designed, equipped and commissioned by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, houses a cyclotron, hot cells and a radiopharmaceutical laboratory as well as a mechanical and electrical workshop."(55) 7.18 All but one of the countries expected to submit bids for the construction of Indonesia's first nuclear power station are experiencing major setbacks in their domestic nuclear power industries. 7.19 In France the state electricity utility, EDF (Electricite de France) has accumulated debts of over US$39 billion (56) - and now has to find the money for the previously overlooked costs of nuclear waste disposal and plant decommissioning. EDF is also coming under attack over the deteriorating safety standards of nuclear plants and over capacity of electricity supply. In West Germany no nuclear power plants have been ordered since the mid-1970s, plans to reprocess spent fuel have been cancelled and there is massive opposition to nuclear waste disposal. 7.20 In the former-East Germany the nuclear power industry is being rapidly phased out due to worries over reactor safety. In the US no nuclear power plant has been ordered or completed since 1974. From 1976 to 1989 no less than 108 nuclear power plants were cancelled in the US. In Canada plans to build 12 reactors have been shelved. Within all the countries above, as well as Japan, there are major concerns over nuclear waste disposal and reactor decommissioning. 7.21 Thus all of the countries who will attempt to sell nuclear power to Indonesia have varying political, financial or environmental problems with their own nuclear power programmes. 8. THE INDONESIAN ECONOMY - COSTS OF REACTOR BUILDING 8.1 At present day prices a 1,000 MW (1 GW) reactor would cost US$2 billion (57). That figure does not include the cost of decommissioning, nuclear waste disposal and increasing health and safety costs. Djali Ahimsa, BATAN's Director General, has quoted the cost of a 600 MW plant at $1 billion (US). The full programme of twelve reactors could cost anywhere between $12 - 24 billion. Additional costs for ancillary facilities could bring that to US$30 billion. The budgetary problems of funding such a scheme have been recognised. But Habibie has said that President Suharto and his cabinet was willing to go-ahead with preparing for nuclear, "because we will need it in the future."(58). There are no publicly available figures for the cost of Indonesia's nuclear programme to date. 8.2 The US$15 million for the feasibility study eventually came from the Ex-Im Bank of Japan. The news report which gave that information also noted that "the decision to choose a Japanese firm may play a role in helping Japanese firms receive orders to construct more than $18 billion worth of nuclear plants".(59) The Japanese Government has consistently refused Official Development Assistance (ODA) for nuclear power studies. 8.3 The Japanese Citizens Nuclear Information Centre, has reported that "A group of citizens opposing the export of nuclear reactors to Indonesia had a meeting with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on May 10th regarding Official Development Aid, requested by the Indonesian Government for conducting feasibility study of the site. The officials said that the request came in March last year and they rejected it in June. The reason was that they could not find urgent needs for building nuclear reactors in Indonesia in terms of electricity supply. They also found that the Indonesian Government had no realistic plans to raise enough money for it." (60) 8.4 Investment in Indonesia is already declining (61). "According to a recent study by the Singapore office of US based consultancy firm A.T. Kearney, private Indonesians have up to 76 billion dollars worth of Asian currency Unit deposited in Singapore. The figure is three times the Indonesian Government's annual expenditure and far exceeds the country's total foreign debt of 45 billion dollars." 8.5 Over reports, show a much higher level of debt. 'Externally the two major issues for Indonesia are the twin flows of debt and aid. At the end of 1988 Indonesia's total foreign debt, including undisbursed amounts, reached US$58 billion. External debt rose sharply in the mid-1980s when the dollar-based oil receipts plummeted and the Japanese yen appreciated sharply.' (62) 8.6 By the end of 1991 Indonesia's debt was confirmed as US$65.7 billion, placing it close to India ($69.8 billion debt with a population of 848 million) and well behind China ($45.4 billion debt with a population of 1,158.4 million. (63) 8.7 According to parliamentary testimony in February 1990, servicing the debt in the 1990-91 fiscal year would take US$4.03 billion in principal repayments and US$2.76 billion in interest repayments.(64) 8.8 Indonesia has resisted calls to reschedule its debt repayments and is committed to paying on time. Most of Indonesia's debt is from other governments or from multilateral institutions and much of it is on concessional terms. The Inter-Governmental Group in Indonesia (IGGI) - an aid consortium which meets annually in the Hague - has been of crucial help in keeping Indonesia current on its debt. 8.9 IGGI funnelled billions of dollars to Indonesia in cheap loans from 1986-89, at a time when seeking commercial credits would have been difficult and expensive for Indonesia. Of the US$4.9 billion in project aid and special assistance - which Indonesia received in 1989-90 - US$4.2 billion came through IGGI. (65) 8.10 In 1990 IGGI's aid amount was debated. Indonesia was in grave need of new external loans both to service its foreign debt and to fund development plans. There was pressure on Suharto to ensure that the outer islands and lower income groups benefited more directly from economic reforms. In 1990 Indonesia budgeted US$6.2 billion in foreign aid for 1990-91, the lion's share to come from IGGI. At the time commentators expected the 1990 IGGI contribution to stabilise at the 1989 US$4 billion mark. One World Bank economist was quoted "Special assistance is definitely in the declining phase." The Bank sees special assistance falling to zero by 1993. (66) 8.11 The above figures are fairly dire for the future funding of a 12-reactor nuclear power programme. A country with such a massive foreign debt and huge sums of private capital offshore does not make for a good customer. It certainly explains the reason why the Japanese build-operate-transfer scheme, through which capital from Japan will build the plant, is so attractive. 8.12 The most recent concerns over Indonesia's ability to pay its debts come from the dissolution of IGGI. This came about as a result of Holland withdrawing aid in protest at the killings in Dili in East Timor in December 1991. Jakarta has said that it will not allow conditions to be applied to aid. It has also baulked at its ex-colonial occupier - Holland - making demands to improve human rights. Some observers believe that the row will blow over, and that IGGI will continue. Funding for the coming year is estimated at US$4.8 billion.(67) 8.13 Such optimism has proved unfounded. Jakarta has dug in its heels and has told western countries that it would rather do without aid than succumb to conditions imposed externally.(68) Holland donates US$120 million annually to Indonesia. Japan, which has not made any public statements on aid and human rights issues, donates approximately US$1.7 billion via IGGI. Since the public row over aid, Holland has sent diplomatic missions to Jakarta to try to resolve the situation. 8.14 In their report to the Australian Foreign Affairs Sub- Committee (69), the Australian Foreign Affairs raised the issue of IGGI. Their report pre-dated the dissolution of IGGI. Australia donates some 5% of the amount of aid to Indonesia via the IGGI budget. Indonesia will received AU$105 million in bilateral aid from Australia. For 1991-92 that figure will rise to AU$110 million. 8.15 Pro-nuclear agencies within Indonesia have not fully publicised the true costs of nuclear power. The economics of waste disposal and decommissioning as well as capital costs have proven to be too much even for a number of relatively wealthy western countries. 8.16 In the United Kingdom, a report from the House of Commons Select Committee on the costs of nuclear power (70) noted "after years of official assurances that nuclear power was (or could be) the cheapest form of electricity generation, Parliament and the public are entitled to know why it was only when faced with the commercial discipline of life in private sector that nuclear power (from both existing and proposed reactors) suddenly became an expensive form of generation." 8.17 In 1989 also, the financial market in the UK refused to buy into the privatisation of the nuclear industry, fearing that the ever escalating costs of waste disposal and decommissioning would not see a return on their investment. It is worth noting that the Commons Committee which criticised the nuclear industry was controlled by a majority of MPs from the pro-nuclear Conservative party. 8.18 Other countries have also felt the financial sting of nuclear power. One of the most frequently-quoted remarks on nuclear power economic failings comes from Forbes US Business Magazine "The failure of the US nuclear power programme ranks as the largest managerial disaster in business history, a disaster on a monumental scale... It is a defeat for the US consumer and for the competitiveness of the US industry, for the utilities that undertook the programme and for the private enterprise system that made it possible. Without even recognising the risks, the US electric power industry undertook a commitment bigger than the space programme or the Vietnam War". (71) 8.19 Again, the condemnation came from a recognised conservative quarter. The sad fact is that the criticism came years before the real cost of clean-up of the US reactor and reprocessing sites became known. It is hardly surprising that failed construction projects, rocketing prices and seriously contaminated sites have not encouraged the US public to have confidence in nuclear power. Which is why companies like Westinghouse are turning to developing countries to sell their product. 8.20 The problems posed by the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) scheme that is planned to finance the reactor, have not been addressed. Indonesia is seeking to transfer the lion's share of contract risks to builders by calling for the BOT scheme. An increasingly utilised foreign direct investment, this option includes the mandate for the builder to operate the plant for some specified number of years in order to recover most of its construction costs. Only then is the plant turned over to the purchaser. Under this scheme Mitusbishi and/or Westinghouse will expect to recover their costs, but there is no guarantee that they will do so. 8.21 Further matters which could confuse this are the ownership rights and loan-repayments. If there is an accident and Indonesia is deprived of essential electricity supply will they be obliged to continue payments? Or, alternatively, what if there is a change in Government or a major financial upheaval and Indonesia can't or won't pay? What legal steps will be taken over this issue? How will the investors money be secured against political, financial and possible environmental problems? These are questions that both the Indonesian and Japanese parliament, public and banks would do well to seek answers to. 8.22 It is thought that NPI (the French-German consortium) is having second thoughts about the BOT guarantee, as a similar deal with Turkey has failed. This could leave the only viable bidders as the Canadian (AECL) versus the Japan-US consortium. 8.23 None of the nuclear suppliers club have suggested that Indonesia should try to develop a full nuclear fuel-cycle capability - which would mean the mining and enrichment of uranium; nuclear fuel production; reactor construction; spent fuel reprocessing and waste disposal. It would simply be too costly for Indonesia to embark on such a programme. Very few countries have all the necessary components within their own borders. The dependence of Indonesia on other countries, for the fuel, technology and waste disposal is something the developed nuclear countries want to continue. Technical independence is not encouraged. It is contrary to the nuclear industry's interests to allow countries to become technologically independent. 8.24 Mochtar Lubis, a well-known Indonesian writer, recognised this as a problem with Indonesia's nuclear programme when he wrote, "Isn't it preferable for Indonesia not to be dependent on any other country for something like this?" 9. ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS OF THE PROPOSED NUCLEAR PLANT 9.1 There are numerous environmental problems associated with the building, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants. Not all of these can be fully discussed here, but some pointers as to the main concerns are listed. The consequences of a major release of radioactive material following an accident are considered. When full details of the plans for the Muria Peninsula become known then an environmental impact assessment, of routine discharges from the proposed facilities, will have to be undertaken. 9.2 Seismic 9.2.1 Within Indonesia itself there are specific environmental problems relative to the nuclear programme. The threat from seismic activity, to any installation, is very real. The island of Java is located on the "Ring of Fire", so called because of its frequent and violent geological activity. The island has over one hundred volcanoes, over fifteen of which are active. The Seismographic Institute of Jakarta registers two-three earthquakes a day. The Indonesians are used to the perils of living in such a region. In 1963 Mount Agung, on Bali, erupted with great loss of life and property. Almost eighty years previously the famous explosion of Krakatoa - which caused massive tidal waves and was of such force that it covered the world in a fine dust. It is estimated that some 30,000 lives were lost because of the eruption. 9.2.2 On December 12th 1890, a major earthquake registering over 9 on the Richter scale occurred with the epicentre at Gannet (Pati), only 50 kms south-east of the proposed reactor site. (72) On 7th September 1984 an earthquake registering 6.5 on the Richter scale occurred with the epicentre only 70 kms north of the proposed reactor site. 9.2.3 Seismic activity in relatively low risk areas can cause damage. In December 1979 an earthquake occurred in the Irish Sea, 150 miles north west of the Wylfa nuclear power plant. Cracks subsequently found in the support columns of a spent fuel crane at the plant were attributed to the quake. 9.2.4 There are fears for the safety of the Diablo Canyon reactor in California, which lies very close to the San Andreas fault. Despite incurring massive losses the Philippines Government did not commission its only reactor because of the threat posed to the facility by possible seismic activity. Long dormant volcanoes in Japan and the Philippines have recently become active again. In Japan a major eruption has led to the devastation of a large area of inhabited land. In the Philippines military bases and townships near Mount Pinatubo have been evacuated as the volcano has erupted after 700 years silence. 9.2.5 The recent devastation caused by the Mount Pinatubo eruption serves as a timely reminder that 'extinct' volcanos can come to life again. The US Armed Forces had built their large Subic Bay base near to Mount Pinatubo, after sophisticated seismic testing had shown it to be a safe place. The proposed reactor site in Indonesia lies only 30 kms north of a volcano which is believed to be extinct. 9.2.6 Within Japan there are increasing concerns over the capability of nuclear power plants to withstand seismic activity. At the Hamaoka complex, where a fourth reactor is being built, there are worries that the region will soon be hit by another major earthquake. Management of the construction company accept that the region is one of the most seismically dangerous in the world, but believe their understanding of earthquake risks places them in a better position to guard against damage. Other scientists are not so sure, with one local government geologist quoted as saying "It's a dangerous gamble, but we are an energy-poor country and nuclear power plants have to be located somewhere." (73) 9.2.7 Doubtless, Japanese willingness to build nuclear power plants in earthquake zones obviously impresses certain factions of the Indonesian political and scientific community. There seems to be no discussion as to whether the Japanese are right in taking such risks - especially as they have not fully considered alternative energy sources. 9.2.8 Is Japan, as an earthquake-prone, energy-deficient country right to encourage nuclear power in another earthquake-prone, but energy-rich country like Indonesia? 9.2.9 There is no guarantee that sites of low geological activity will always remain so. The international insurance companies are acutely aware of the ever increasing cost of damage from natural causes. The international nuclear liability regime which is presently in force does not cover individuals or their property for full cover in the event of a nuclear accident. Further, ordinary insurance policies in all countries specifically exclude compensation for damage from radioactive fallout. This is a good measure of how the money- markets view the risk from nuclear power. 9.3. Technical Problems 9.3.1 The reactor design most favoured at present is the Westinghouse/ Mitsubishi consortium's Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR). It is believed that the PWR design is deficient in many safety aspects. One of the better known accidents involving a PWR is that which took place at Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania, US in 1979. 9.3.2 Since that time there have been other severe accidents in PWRs. On 9th February 1991 a major accident occurred at the Mihama No. 2 reactor in Japan. The accident, which almost led to a meltdown, sent shockwaves through the Japanese nuclear establishment. This accident is believed to be the closest Japan has come to a Three Mile Island-type accident. The accident could have lead to serious and widespread contamination. As it is the reactor will be shut for three years for repair work. 9.3.3 The plant was designed by Westinghouse and manufactured under licence by Mitsubishi. Preliminary investigations point towards faulty workmanship by the plant installers. Fifteen of Japan's 17 PWRs have suffered heat-exchanger damage. This is the same type of accident that caused the near-meltdown in the PWR at Three Mile Island in 1979. Eleven residents in the Japanese city of Osaka have filed a law-suit to shut-down a reactor at Kansai's nuclear plant in Fukui prefecture. They claim engineers have found serious flaws which could cause a dangerous release of radioactive materials.(74) 9.3.4 An investigation at Mihama by the Kansai Electric Power Company, showed that a steam generator tube had ruptured, leading to a serious loss of coolant from the reactor core. The cooling water surrounding the reactor boiled - which meant the core had no effective cooling. 9.3.5 Kansai originally claimed that the accident had no off- site implications. There were reports, however, that the radioactivity leaking from the plant was detected by an American satellite. Kansai now admits that radioactivity was released, but they will not permit independent assessment of the readings taken at the time. The company is also refusing to check the damage to the fuel assembly until ordered to do so by Government. 9.3.6 Kansai's investigation revealed that the tube was damaged by vibration fatigue. The company now believes that the 20-year old steam generator may not have been fabricated according to design and that the manufacturer, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, may have neglected to install - or negligently installed, so it worked loose - an anti vibration bar around the tube that ruptured. 9.3.7 Mitsubishi apologised for the apparent quality control mismanagement and promised 're-examination' of all nine similar PWRs it built nearly two decades ago. Kansai has stated that it finds such sloppiness 'unbelievable'. (75) The most recent report on the accident agrees with the interim report that bad standards of workmanship were to blame. (76) Estimates of the amount of radioactivity which entered the environment were not released in that report either. 9.3.8 Other reports on the accident also revealed that, as with Three Mile Island, the operators of the plant compounded the problem by failing to follow the operating manual. Operators spent the better part of an hour checking whether higher radioactivity readings from the condenser air ejection monitor reflected reality or faulty instrumentation. 9.3.9 A new report from England (77) casts new light on the Chernobyl accident. It is now believed that the major part of the damage was done by an explosion caused by a nuclear reaction - similar to that in a nuclear weapon detonation. The most startling aspect of that report is that there is no reactor containment built which could withstand the blast from the type of nuclear reaction that took place in Chernobyl. The type of reactor most quoted for Indonesia, a PWR, is of the same type that could have a nuclear reaction explosion. PWRs operate in a number of countries, such as the US, France, Japan, Belgium and Germany. Western nuclear industry claims that their reactors are inherently safer than eastern-bloc reactors, are singularly unfounded. 9.3.10 It is a worrying prospect that Mitsubishi and Westinghouse are so aggressively selling their reactor design to Indonesia - especially when history has shown that neither company has met the high standards so necessary to meet nuclear safety. 9.3.11 Westinghouse is particularly vulnerable on this point. The Brazilian government is currently considering legal action against the company over the failure of the Angra plant to work properly. Brazil claims that the plant has been forced to shut down because of the faulty steam generator installed by Westinghouse. Further embarrassment lies ahead for Westinghouse over two legal actions from US companies. Two major American power companies, Houston Lighting and Power and Commonwealth Edison, have filed suits against Westinghouse over failing generators. (78) 9.3.12 Westinghouse has recently attempted to settle a much- publicised case in the Philippines, where it was accused for procuring constructions contracts through bribery. Westinghouse, in an out-of-court settlement, have agreed to pay compensation, make necessary safety adjustments to the plant and operate it at no charge for a number of years. The settlement will cost the company tens of millions of dollars. The deal is, however, being opposed by a number of leading politicians and scientists who believe that the plant can never operate safely because of lack of trained personnel and that there is always a risk of major seismic disturbance where the plant is located.(79) 9.3.13 There is concern that Indonesia does not have the capacity to support a demanding technology like nuclear power, without the properly trained personnel. At present there seems to be much resting on the hope that all these problems will be resolved by the time the plant comes on stream. Habibie, who is somewhat relaxed about this matter (80) has said "when eventually our development effort requires the use of nuclear energy to generate electricity, we will then have mastered the technology." 9.3.14 It remains to be seen whether the Indonesian people, or any other for that matter, will settle for an apology as reparation for the possible damage from a major nuclear accident. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has fairly limited powers of search, whether it be for proliferation or safety reasons. In fact the IAEA cannot insist on entering any country's nuclear facilities unless at the express permission of that country. 9.4. Possible environmental impact Indonesia 9.4.1 A relatively small-scale accident at the planned Muria plant could have a phenomenal impact on Java itself. Even the relatively 'small scale' contamination of a 50-100 mile radius from the plant, would have a major impact on the Indonesian economy. The cost of replacing contaminated foodstuffs and caring for the huge numbers of people who live in that region would financially cripple Indonesia. 9.4.2 The full impact of a serious nuclear accident in Indonesia, which led to a major release of radioactivity, is almost unthinkable. Substantial areas of the Indonesian island of Java would be severely contaminated and require immediate evacuation. Neighbouring Indonesian islands would also be amongst the first effected.(81) Radiation damage would cause immediate and long term effects - resulting in fatal and non- fatal cancers; genetic damage; hereditary damage and illnesses. 9.4.3 Java is home to 100 million people. The island of Java has one of the highest population densities in the world at 818 people per square kilometre. The population around the reactor is estimated to be 45,000 people within 16 kms. This is some 10,000 families. 9.4.4 Approximately 135,000 have been permanently evacuated from the industrial towns around Chernobyl (82). Over the next five years another 150,000 will have to be evacuated as they are living in areas which are contaminated to dangerously high levels. In contrast, millions would have to be moved in Java if there was an accident at the Muria peninsula site. Unlike the USSR, however, the Indonesians will have no space in which to relocate evacuees. 9.4.5 Very few countries have effective evacuation and emergency plans. Indonesia has not sufficiently developed its response to industrial accidents to be able to claim it could cope with a major nuclear accident. If major evacuation plans were not enacted in the first instance then it would mean millions would be forced to continue to live in a region where crops and livestock would be too contaminated to eat. 9.4.6 In the short term radiation doses can be avoided by keeping people indoors (although many Javanese houses are open plan because of the tropical climate) and by supplying 'clean food' from other regions of the world. In the long term, this matter could only be resolved by evacuation of the people in the worst effected areas to regions of the world where they would not be at risk from increased radiation doses. Given the size of the population and the small land area in which they are located, it would be impossible to mount an effective evacuation plan within Java itself, or the surrounding Indonesian territory. 9.4.7 Given the population density of Java it is hard to imagine where such a huge number of people could be moved to. This is a major question for the Asian region and it is one which ASEAN and countries such as Australia are going to have to address. 9.4.8 Neighbouring countries might well be asked to take people from Indonesia. It would be surprising if requests were not forthcoming. Could, or would, any of the neighbouring countries cope with a massive influx of dispossessed people - who might also be in need of long-term medical care as a result of radiation exposure? 9.4.9 The question of 'environmental evacuees' has already been raised by a number of countries, as has the question of liability for damage caused by nuclear accidents. 9.4.10 Australia has recently requested that the International Atomic Energy Agency's Liability Committee consider the matter of compensation for environmental contamination. The Australian delegation to the IAEA Liability Committee has pushed for significant changes to the statutes covering liability. Unfortunately it looks that this initiative is at risk because of budget limitations now being placed on the delegation. Any reduction in efforts to formulate a much stronger liability regime for the nuclear industry are shortsighted. Even the most cynical would argue that an essential element of agreeing to a neighbouring nuclear programme would mean having an effective 'insurance policy'. 9.4.11 The Soviets have not paid one rouble of compensation to the countries contaminated as a result of Chernobyl. It is fair to ask that even if Indonesia were willing to pay compensation, would it be able to? 9.4.12 The issue of transboundary pollution has taken on new urgency in recent years. As we realise the impact of fossil fuel burning on the global atmosphere, so too do we realise the impact our neighbour's nuclear activities could have. Neighbouring countries 9.4.13 Depending on wind direction large areas of Singapore, Malaysia, New Guinea and Australia could also be contaminated by an accident in Indonesia. The forest fires in Indonesia which caused smoke to billow over Singapore and Malaysia are a graphic indicator of how far contamination could travel in a concentrated form. 9.4.14 Many countries lie near to Indonesia within the Chernobyl-fallout zone. This is a rough, but effective measure of distance in which damage - in terms of radioactive contamination - can be expected from a major nuclear accident. The map in Appendix 2 gives a rough idea of the possible countries in the South East Asian region which could be effected. (83) 9.4.15 To give another example of what could be expected in terms of contamination spread. Prior to Chernobyl the world's largest nuclear accident in a nuclear reactor took place in 1957 at Sellafield complex in the north-west of England. That accident contaminated as far afield as Sweden, Holland and central Germany.(84) 9.4.16 It is not necessary for a reactor to release all of its contents for severe and widespread contamination to occur. The Chernobyl accident released only 3.5 per cent of the radioactivity contained within the reactor. (85) 9.4.17 The contamination from Chernobyl spread a significant distance, contaminating the whole of Europe, as far west as the atlantic coast of Ireland (3,000 kms away), as well as contaminating Spain and Portugal and as far south as Turkey and Greece. Even now many of the worst effected communities still have to restrict the types and amounts of locally produced food they are allowed to consume as a result of radioactive contamination from Chernobyl.(86) 9.4.18 The upland areas which cover the northern reaches of Norway and Finland, are used by the Sami people to graze their reindeer herds on. The sale of reindeer meat by the Sami is still restricted. The result of this is that their traditional way of life and independence is diminishing as they have to rely more on imported food and cannot trade effectively by selling reindeer produce. 9.4.19 The attached map is a simplified diagram of the possible range of contamination. The scope of any possible contamination depends very much on the season in which an accident might occur. 9.4.20 During the wet season winds from the North West and West would spread radioactivity from Eastern Java, to Bali and Irian Jaya, Papua New Guinea and on across the northern and north-western regions of Australia. 9.4.21 For example, it takes five days for winds from Java to reach Australia. The contamination from Chernobyl travelled 4,000 kms in six days. It is estimated that the cloud from Chernobyl took five days to reach Scotland - which is still contaminated six years after Chernobyl. Traces of contamination from Chernobyl were detected in the USA. 9.4.22 The distance from Chernobyl to Scotland is 2,400 kms. The distance from Cape Muria, Java, to Darwin, is 2,070 kms. As of April 1991, 63 farms and 116,000 sheep in Scotland were still subject to restrictions, as were a number of farms in north-west England and Wales. This position has not changed significantly in the past year. 9.4.23 If the accident happened during the dry season the winds would go over West Java, Sumatra, and across the ocean to Sri Lanka and the south of India. India would, however, bear the brunt of fallout brought down by the monsoon. 9.4.24 Agricultural land and pasture is at risk around the reactor site. There is a very real possibility that an accident could severely damage the economies of those countries which lie close to Indonesia as well as bankrupting Indonesia itself. Nor are the problems related to radioactive contamination solely restricted to long-term livestock and agricultural management. 9.4.25 In Europe huge areas were badly contaminated in the early days after Chernobyl. The levels were such that restrictions on drinking milk and fresh rainwater and eating vegetables were placed in many countries.(87) There were numerous and various restrictions imposed or recommended by different European states. After Chernobyl, for example, the UK Government initially advised against the drinking of fresh rainwater in upland areas. 9.4.26 Many of the restrictions led to confusion. Most countries reacted in an ad hoc way to the arrival of radioactive fallout. Most European countries have nuclear power programmes and therefore some organisation that could respond to the accident. The same is not true of Java's neighbouring islands and Indonesia's neighbour-states. None of these have the necessary staff and equipment which would be needed to cope with the impact of widespread radioactive contamination. 9.4.27 Many will argue that an accident on the scale and size of Chernobyl could not happen again. The same was said in 1957 after the fire in the Plutonium Reactor at Sellafield. Had that accident happened today a substantial area of northern England would have, at the very least, been temporarily evacuated. 9.4.28 The International Atomic Energy Agency calculates the possibility of a major nuclear accident now to be one every 5-10 years. 9.4.29 Indonesian Technology Minister B. J. Habibie recently moved to quell fears over possible radioactive contamination following an accident.(88) It was thought this came in response to increasing Australian press coverage of the Indonesian plans. 9.4.30 One final point to consider here, is the possibility of large discharge of radioactively contaminated water into the sea near the Muria site. Sea covers two-thirds of the area within Indonesia's national borders. It is, plainly, of national significance for a trading country which also has many fishing concerns. Not all accidents lead to large plumes of radioactive material being dispersed in the air. After the 1957 Fire at Sellafield the water used to put out the fire, which became contaminated, was released directly into the Irish Sea. Similarly, contaminated water from the Three Mile Island accident also went into a nearby river. 9.5. Financial costs of an accident 9.5.1 The costs of Chernobyl are astronomical. Early figures severely underestimated the economic damage. "In the Soviet Union, direct expenditures come to US $3 billion according to official estimates and up to US $6 billion according to independent economists... The costs of Chernobyl could eventually climb to over US $10 billion if all of the indirect expenses are included. (89) 9.5.2 By 1990 the Wall Street Journal was carrying detailed costings showing that Chernobyl would cost up to US $358 billion. (90) 9.5.3 Of course, such an accident could occur in a Western reactor. As we have seen in Japan and America, not all the unsafe reactors are in third-world or Eastern bloc countries. However, in those countries there are more effective means by which the public and parliament can protest against such plans. 9.5.4 It is in the interests of all the nations of the Asia- Pacific region to scrutinise the Indonesian reactor programme. Regardless of where the contamination from Indonesia might spread after an accident there are a number of serious matters that need to be addressed. 6. Radioactive wastes. 9.6.1 Few details on waste disposal within Indonesia are known, if indeed this problem has been looked at. 9.6.2 The Indonesian nuclear authority, BATAN, has said that they are considering an uninhabited island (of which Indonesia has many) as a possible dumping ground for the country's radioactive waste.(91) The area covered by Indonesia is known for its heavy rainfall. Even for the state-of-the-art disposal sites currently being discussed in Europe recognise that water encroachment is a major problem. Water intrusion at any site chosen within Indonesia could lead to contamination leaking off-site. The unstable geology of that area would also make an underground dump highly unsuitable. 9.6.3 Reports from overseas trade union delegations indicate that the wastes are presently being held at the Serpong research reactor site, near Jakarta. There seems to be no publicly available information on how the waste is transported to the site. There is no discussion on what to do with waste created in the Indonesian programme. Villagers from the area surrounding the planned commercial reactor site have been told that a "waste processing" plant will be located alongside the reactor, but no further information has been given on this. 9.6.4 In a recent statement the Environment Minister, Emil Salim, said that Indonesia will not commit itself to a nuclear power programme until the issue of waste disposal has been resolved. (92) In a meeting at the Jakarta Foreign Correspondents Club he stated that "Before we have it on the table (nuclear power) cannot go ahead with a nuclear power station. For Indonesia nuclear energy is still the second best energy source." 9.6.5 In response to a parliamentary question on Indonesia's ability to deal with nuclear waste the Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, said "Development in nuclear waste disposal methods between now and the time when spent fuel storage would require disposal would clearly influence any final decision on nuclear waste disposal taken by the Indonesian authorities." (93) Clearly, there is no answer at present and everyone is hoping that someone will find a solution. 9.6.6 Much of the information used in the publicity material from the Indonesia nuclear industry, BATAN, is drawn directly from overseas nuclear companies. This is, evidently, very flawed and biased. The fear is not that waste is being improperly dealt with now (although there is no independent access to information), but that a much larger industry will increase the number of problems - and the amount of waste - to deal with. 9.6.7 There is no currently available information on how Indonesia plans to transport its spent nuclear fuel and other wastes to storage/disposal depots. 9.6.8 Within Australia there are concerns that the proposed pilot plant for Synroc (a synthetic rock which immobilises high-level-liquid waste) could (94) involve the eventual importing of high level radioactive waste into Australia. Over a number of years various schemes have been put forward to import foreign low and intermediate level for disposal in Australia's desert regions. There is well-founded speculation that Australia would be under particular pressure to take wastes from any of the smaller island nations, such as Taiwan and Indonesia, that it might supply uranium to. 9.6.9 Australia is already experiencing difficulties in ridding itself of its own nuclear waste, the 1,550 spent nuclear fuel rods at Lucas Heights (95). Australia hopes to send the spent fuel/waste to America for reprocessing/direct disposal. It is somewhat ironic that Australian claims to be able to advise other countries on nuclear waste management, when its own response to waste management is to send it abroad. It is hardly surprising that other countries might want to follow this example. 9.6.10 The Taiwanese, Chinese and Koreans have moved to resume the dumping of low level radioactive wastes at sea.(96) The moratorium, which was placed following opposition from European countries, will be discussed in October 1992 at the London Dumping Convention. At present there are moves to turn the moratorium into a ban, but this is being resisted by the Japanese, UK, French and other nuclear nations. The nuclear industry faces major hurdles in attempts to dispose of its wastes. If it does not get a suitable land site it will attempt to resort to ocean disposal. 9.6.11 The spread of the nuclear industry continues the creation of wastes for which there is no safe, final disposal method. Countries seem all too willing to resort to dumping their waste on another countries doorstep or in the communal seas. Indonesia should be encouraged to use above-ground dry storage for all types of nuclear waste. 9.7. Worker Health 9.7.1 Again, not much is known within the trade union movement as to whether or not there are any problems with workers associated with the present nuclear activities. Information available suggests that Indonesia currently follows the permitted radiation doses as recommended by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). 9.7.2 Indonesia may currently employ practises which are recommended by the ICRP, but the problem is that the ICRP recommendations have already been superseded by scientific research showing radiation to be more harmful. Because of the closed nature of Indonesia's nuclear programme, critical information on health matters has not been divulged to the workforce. 9.7.3 Permitted radiation doses are constantly being revised downwards, as we come to understand more and more about the effects of low-level radiation. Such changes often add to the costs of reactors and designs have to be altered to protect workers more effectively. The same is true of nuclear waste management facilities. 10. REGIONAL NUCLEARISATION 10.1 Regional concerns 10.1.1 Four Asian countries presently have official policies of expansion for their nuclear industries. These are Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Indonesia. Some of the claims for these countries, in terms of the numbers of reactors that will be built, are grossly exaggerated. For example, it has been claimed that Japan will build 40 nuclear plants in 20 years and that Korea will build 55 reactors in the next 40 years. 10.1.2 The South Korean Embassy in Canberra has stated that its Government has plans to build 10 reactors in 20 years. In South Korea a coalition of 16 anti-nuclear and environmental groups is protesting against massive expansion of the industry. South Korea has expressed a wish to work more closely with Indonesia on developing energy sources, including nuclear power. South Korea currently relies on Indonesia for all its liquified natural gas imports. (97) 10.1.3 Taiwan which has six nuclear plants had, until recently, deferred plans for a further two because of costs. Within the last month it has been reported (98) that the Taiwanese Parliament had finally given the go-ahead to build another nuclear reactor. 10.1.4 The difference in the figures given above, between projected and actual orders, are because industry hopes often far exceed the technical and economic capabilities of countries. 10.1.5 Japan, for example, is now facing growing public unrest about it's nuclear programme (exacerbated by lack of space). Last year Taiwan had major riots over the siting of a radioactive waste dump and has recently faced massive protests over the siting of a nuclear power plant.(99) South Korea has also had problems raising money for its nuclear projects. 10.1.6 Malaysia has already expressed an interest in developing nuclear power. Last year IAEA officials held talks in Kuala Lumpur on the first stages of a nuclear programme. There are possibilities that Malaysia and Indonesia would share the nuclear power scheme. (100) 10.1.7 The nuclear industry has identified Asia as their new market. That nuclear power is a bankrupt technology in the 'west', is not something which is discussed in countries such as Indonesia. Naturally enough, the officials and diplomats of developing countries are persuaded that power and prestige come through acquiring the most up-to-date technologies - at no thought to expense and risks. 10.1.8 We live in a world where the possession of nuclear power technology at the least, and nuclear weapons, still confers great status. That the UN Security Council's five permanent members are the five big nuclear weapons states (China, France, Britain, the US and the former Soviet Union) is just one example of this. 10.1.9 A number of countries have helped nurture Indonesia's desire for nuclear power. Support for this, from a non-nuclear state like Australia, is not as surprising as it might first seem. Even within this country there are strong institutional pressures to promote the nuclear industry worldwide - from within government-owned organisations and private business. It appears that short term financial gain is, for some, the motivation of supporting the Indonesian programme. 2. Connections - an example 10.2.1 The link between Australian mining companies and the Indonesian programme runs via Japan. Kansai Electric, whose subsidiary is carrying out the feasibility study for the Java reactor, is partner in the Japan-Australia Uranium Resources Australia Project Ltd., which has a 10% stake in Energy Resources of Australia - operator of the Ranger uranium mine in Australia's Northern Territory. Ranger is the third largest uranium mine in the Western World. The senior managing director of Kansai, Masuo Shibata, is also president of JAURD and a director of Energy Resources Australia. (101) 10.2.2 JAURD is under contract to purchase 907 tonnes of uranium oxide from Ranger each year, 35 per cent of Ranger's total production in 1990-1991. These contracts have provided some financial insulation for Ranger from falling demand for uranium that has seen prices drop dramatically over the past decade. Anticipating a future improvement in sales, Energy Resources Australia purchased the world's largest undeveloped uranium deposit at Jabiluka in the Northern Territory of Australia, for $125 million in August 1991. 10.2.3 The owners of Ranger have said that a delegation from Indonesia's nuclear company visited the site last year. They told the Australian Bulletin (102) that any sales from Australia would be split 50-50 between the Ranger mine and the South Australian uranium mine at Roxby Downs. 10.2.4 Roxby Downs, which also supplies Kansai, has already received influential backing in political circles, to pursue a more aggressive sales technique in Asia. In April 1991 a delegation of managers from Western Mining Corporation, Roxby Downs' owners, were accompanied by Dr. John Hewson, head of the Federal opposition Liberal Party in Australia to Taiwan. Hewson explained that although Taiwan is not a signatory to the NPT, the Liberals hoped that a bilateral agreement on safeguards between Australia and Taiwan would facilitate uranium sales to that country.(103) 10.2.5 The Liberals, and their National Party coalition- partners, have indicated they will greatly increase Australia's total involvement in the nuclear industry, possibly considering a nuclear reprocessing plant, a high- level waste encapsulation plant (using the Australian technology Synroc) and possibly even opening an international nuclear waste dump in one of the country's desert regions. 11. THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY - ITS ROLE AND CAPABILITIES. 11.1 Indonesia's credibility within the world community, its trade in nuclear technology, expertise and fissile/fissionable materials will be greatly aided by IAEA approval. The IAEA, as the primary international promoter of nuclear power, is a key factor in Indonesia developing a full scale nuclear industry. Conversely, the IAEA needs to see an expanding nuclear industry in order to keep the image of a healthy industry alive. The IAEA does not want to be seen to be a nursemaid to a decrepit and dying technology. 11.2 Numerous pro-nuclear states claim their programmes are safe on the basis that the industry is overseen by an independent IAEA. It is never mentioned that the IAEA can only gain entry to inspect a country's nuclear facilities - for safety purposes or otherwise - at the invite of that country. They have no statutory right of entry by themselves. On the weapons safeguards front, the IAEA can only seek access to those facilities listed as safeguarded by the host nation. Further, they can only go in search of fissile materials, but have no control over the actual machinery used to produce such materials. The wide ranging investigation that the IAEA recently took in Iraq was made possible because it was backed by a special UN resolution and covered by Iraqi ceasefire agreements. Under normal procedures the IAEA would not have those powers. 11.3 The IAEA's role as an active supporter of nuclear power and watchdog of nuclear weapons materials (but not the technology) has been heavily criticised in the recent past, particularly because of its handling of the Iraqi nuclear programme. The following extract from a Greenpeace International briefing on the IAEA explains. 11.4. "3: The present attitude of the IAEA to Reactor Safety" 3.1: The conflict of Interest in the IAEA Statute There is a fundamental conflict of interest in the responsibilities and functions laid down for the IAEA in its statute of 1957. Article II, concerning the objectives of the Agency, and all but one section of Article III, concerning its functions, explicitly charge the organisation with the task of actively promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.... Article III elaborates on Article II, detailing functions: * To encourage and assist nuclear research (Article III A 1) * To consider the needs of the Third World for nuclear power (Article III A 2) * To foster nuclear information exchange (Article III A 3) * To encourage and assist in nuclear training (Article III A 4) Only under Article III A (6) is there mention of any sort of obligation on the issue of nuclear safety: "To establish and adopt... standards of safety for protection of health and minimisation of danger to life and property.." (Article III A) 11.5 It is clear that this latter requirement, and the other objectives and functions of the IAEA, are profoundly conflicting. In no other area of society is it expected that an organisation entrusted with the encouragement and promotion of an activity can also effectively monitor, regulate and, if necessary, restrict that activity. Why should this be so of the nuclear industry?"(104) 11.6 Developing countries are eager to get in line with First World countries in the engineering and scientific fields. Nuclear power companies, who often hold the patents on the 'softer' nuclear related technologies, sell this technology as the precursor to moving with a full scale programme. 11.7 Discussions between uranium companies and buyers are facilitated by the IAEA, which indulges in a number of activities aimed at promoting nuclear power. In 1990 the IAEA hosted a conference in Canberra to which fifty specially selected journalists from Australia, New Zealand and Asian countries were invited. Members of environment groups and Parliamentarians were excluded from this gathering. The conference was labelled a 'public information seminar.' 11.8 Mr. Djali Ahimsa, Director General of BATAN and Mr. Iyos Subki, BATAN's Deputy Director General presented a paper at this conference.(105) Thus, with the help of the IAEA, the Indonesian Government will be able to claim it has spoken at public fora on its nuclear programme. Of course, many vital questions went unasked in Canberra. 11.9 In the case of Indonesia, which is now engaged in a number of nuclear projects, it is being suggested that it is a logical step to go forward with nuclear power. This is promoted on two levels. The general population is encouraged to think of nuclear power/activities as benign - the agricultural and medical uses are quoted. It has been said of the research reactors that preclude large scale power programmes that "we are given the cuddly baby animal, before we see the snarling parent!" Industry assistance, by way of shared technological and engineering programmes, is given to the fledging nuclear power state. In this way a country becomes part of the favoured and protected cabal. Other forms of electricity production do not enjoy such expensive sales promotions. The only type of energy system which has its own global lobby is nuclear power. The IAEA has no duty to look at what is most suitable for a country's energy needs. 11.10 One of the major problems facing the IAEA is that it is running short of money. Late in 1991 a number of newspapers and industry journals carried stories of the impending financial headache for the IAEA. The failure of the USSR to pay its $20 million 1991 contribution, has led to the IAEA claiming there would be 13% cutbacks in their 1992 budget. The USSR formerly contributed 10% of the IAEA budget. Other late or non-payers had caused the IAEA to draw on its reserves, which are now spent. Funding is tight, but the workload of the IAEA's role is rapidly expanding. With new signatories to the NPT, IAEA safeguards work is increasing and, as commercial reactors in Eastern Europe come under closer scrutiny, the IAEA is playing a role in attempting to upgrade and ensure those units safe operation. The inspection of Iraqi facilities after the Gulf War also caused a major drain on funds. (106) 11.11 Even before the recent financial crisis the IAEA's spending on safety was not massive. "Of a total income to the IAEA in 1985 of US$117.31 million, only US$9.51 million were allocated to nuclear safety and radiation protection (8.1%) and only US$4.51 million solely for the safety of nuclear installations (3.8%). Even considering the technical assistance budget itself, amounting to US $122 million between 1980 and 1984, only US $14 million were allocated to nuclear energy safety (11.4%). When placed in the context of the sums of money involved in the global nuclear power industry, this sum is all but insignificant. (107) 12. PROLIFERATION 12.1 "Few popular and misleading ideas have proved more resilient than the belief that there exist clearly distinguishable good 'atoms for peace' and bad 'atoms for war.' In fact the US nuclear policy for much of the first three decades after Hiroshima nurtured this misconception by actively promoting the development of civilian, and presumably safe, nuclear technologies with little regard for their military or dangerous implications. Nevertheless, the raw materials and technology for the production of nuclear weapons and civilian nuclear power are essentially the same "(108) 12.2 Daniel Skubik, of the Division of Asian and International Studies, School of International Business Relations of Griffith University, Queensland, has written extensively on nuclear technology transfer. In his paper, Business Patterns in Nuclear Commerce and Nuclear Proliferation (109) he wrote "Similarly misleading is the notion that the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), commonly understood to be the cornerstone of any viable non- proliferation regime, places a significant check on the transfer of nuclear technologies between states. Opened for signature in July 1968 the NPT actually provides a counterproductive trade-off: the State Parties are committed not to transfer or received "nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices" (Articles 1 & 11); but this pledge comes at the price of formal recognition that "research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes" is an "inalienable right" of all parties, accompanied by an explicit undertaking by Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) to assiduously pursue "the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy" with Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) as well as "potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions" (Articles IV & V).' 12.3 As suggested by Paul Leventhal, an associate of the Nuclear Control Institute in Washington D.C., "the non- proliferation system is really a proliferation system. The very treaty and safeguard regime helps to promote the spread (of nuclear weapons)." (110) 12.4 There are serious concerns by the NNWS that the NWS have made no concrete steps towards reducing their nuclear stockpiles, as promised in Article VI of the Treaty. 12.5 Equally important is the concern that the NNWS' believe the NWS are withholding useful nuclear technologies from the developing work. The suspicion that technology transfers have not been as readily forthcoming as promised found expression in the words of Malaysia's Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir: when Malaysia signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Pakistan in 1984, Dr. Mahathir declared that "Western countries who control nuclear technology will not give it to us on a golden plate and, therefore, the developing countries must cooperate in this field to help each other."(111) 12.6 The irony of this is that by restricting nuclear technology transfer the developed world forced the less- developed Malaysia to co-operate with Pakistan - which has publicly admitted to pursuing a nuclear weapons project by covet means. 12.7 As with environmental and safety safeguards, there is no 100 per cent guarantee that military safeguards can, or will, work. 12.8 It is not believed that the Indonesian Government has anything other than peaceful intentions for its nuclear power programme. However, the world is becoming extremely cautious of the spread of nuclear technology because of the dual-use capacity of much of that technology. 12.9 Even within Japan there is scepticism over Indonesia's nuclear plans. In discussions with the Japanese Official Development Agency, Japanese groups (112) heard that the Japanese Government "would deal with it cautiously since the safety and nuclear proliferation issues are involved in the nuclear development." 12.10 Such concerns, no matter how offensive they might seem to the Indonesian authorities, are justified. The Indonesians will have to be incredibly forthright and open on every aspect of their nuclear programme if they are to gain trust. 12.11 For Australia to export uranium to Indonesia it would have to conclude a safeguards arrangement with the IAEA. Indonesia is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and, like Australia, is a signatory to the Regional Cooperative Agreements for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology. 12.12 The flaws in the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty - the primary international safeguard - are well documented. They include allowing countries to design , develop and assemble the non-nuclear parts of nuclear weapons. Inspections of nuclear facilities occur only once or twice a year with advance warning being given. 12.13 These problems are acknowledged by many within the nuclear industry itself. A number of Governments are taking unilateral action on tightening controls on dual-use technology and have called for the IAEA to do so themselves. 12.14 Despite this the IAEA have failed to take definite action.(113) The IAEA does not believe that it has the authority to endow the agency with supranational powers. There is still concern within the IAEA as to how it will undertake special investigations, such as those carried out in Iraq following the Gulf War. 12.15 The US Congress has also debated imposing strict new controls on the transfer of dual use technology. These moves are being opposed by the Bush administration, which is claiming such moves would undermine the present safeguards regime and NPT. (114) The current battle is seen as a fight between the interests of commercial operators who want to retain freedom to export technology and governments worried about proliferation. The moves by Congress are in keeping with the IAEA's actions to strengthen its charter. 12.16 France, too, has moved to increase the control over the transfer of dual-used technology, as has Britain (115). Both countries have, however, previously allowed the export of technology and knowledge which has been used in proliferation activities. France, for example, acted a conduit for US technology which was subsequently used in the secret Israeli nuclear weapons programme. 12.17 Rumours currently circulating about Soviet nuclear scientists 'selling themselves' on the world market have led to even more concern. Some 50 nuclear ex-Soviet scientists are reported to have 'signed up' for the rebuilding of the Iraqi nuclear programme. (116) Syria is also reported to have recruited Soviet nuclear specialists. (117) Malaysia, too, has gone on record as saying that it is seeking to hire Soviet nuclear scientists.(118) 12.18 The IAEA is naturally reluctant to admit the many shortcomings of its own charter. As we have seen it is a key player in promoting nuclear power, an industry whose technology it claims to be able to safeguard from military abuse. Nucleonics Weekly (119), one of the key industry journals has commented 'The agency has long said its safeguards are no guarantee against proliferation of weapons material or technology, but the proposed special inspection measures would enhance the IAEA's ability to find violations of safeguards obligations.' Han Blix, director of the IAEA has said that use of information gathered from outside the agency, from national intelligence agencies, is a "crucial measure". The use of such information to justify on-the-spot inspections would probably be rejected by most countries involved in the nuclear industry. 12.19 The former Director of the Division of Public Information of the IAEA, Mr. Yashuhiko Yoshida has publicly criticised the Agency. He has said "the increase of (IAEA) inspectors cannot prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons because the IAEA cannot send an inspector to a country without the country's approval." (120) 12.20 Many people are now confused about the IAEA's powers, particularly after the Gulf War and the action the Agency took on Iraq. The IAEA only had powers to force entry into Iraqi facilities because it was supported by a special UN Security Council resolution which covered the Gulf War. 12.21 Post-Gulf War discussions, in which the Agency has sought to increase its powers of "search and secure" (for fissile materials) are hampered over questions of sovereignty - that is the right of nuclear nations to refuse entry to a quasi-autonomous inspection force. This matter is not yet resolved. 12.22 Suspicions of the IAEA are further fuelled by its record on dealing with countries such as Iraq and Israel. The IAEA reassured the international community that Iraq did not pose a security threat as a possible nuclear weapons state. Contradictory statements, from different members of the IAEA inspection team, have still not clarified how close Iraq was to getting a bomb. 12.23 Nucleonics Week summed up the argument thus: 'Some sources think the reports of how close Iraq was to making a bomb - which have varied from a few months to 10 years and are re-run with each new IAEA disclosure- plus the multiple "revelations" and denials of alleged supplier companies, may muddy the waters so much that, if the truth finally does come out, the public won't be able to recognise it.'(121) 12.24 Equally, the IAEA has no power to take action against those corporations which supplied the Iraqis with the technology and technical information on which they founded their uranium enrichment programme. 12.25 On Israel the IAEA has been shown to be powerless. Some would go even further. Yoshido has said "In addition, the fact that Israel is pushing the development of nuclear weapons is an open secret among us, but the IAEA has left it alone. While the nuclear weapons states open their nuclear facilities for peaceful use to safeguards-inspection in order to evade the critics from non-nuclear weapons countries, the facilities for military purposes have been hidden behind a secret curtain." (122) It is believed Israel now has up to 100 nuclear weapons. 12.26 The above will surely give rise to concern amongst those who understand that the whole of the Asian region is now criss-crossed by nuclear dealing. 12.27 The US Government is discouraging India from selling a research reactor to the Iranians. (123) This has angered the Indians, who have pointed out that the US did not oppose the offer by Argentina to sell nuclear technology to Peru and Algeria. 12.28 The currently used Iranian reactor, of 5 MW, was supplied by the US in 1967. China has also supplied Iran with nuclear technology. The US moves to stop the reactor sale are seen by many as yet another US-led 'insult against Islam", with America being accused of dual standards over its partnership with Israel. Adding to the confusion is the IAEA's statement that they have given a conditional all-clear to the Iranian nuclear programme (124). The IAEA did add that their findings are based on inspection of a limited number of facilities at a specific point in time. Thus, they have underlined one of the major criticisms levelled at the Agency in the past - that is that safeguards clearances are of a very limited guarantee. 12.29 The view that many of the complaints made by the US come from a racial and/or Western world bias is not unique to Iran. The chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Agency has said "It is all right when Argentina supplies nuclear reactors and not all right when India does? Perhaps only the white man has the right to supply nuclear reactors and we should confine ourselves to selling garments and leather and iron." (125). 12.30 That remark may seem unreasonable, but is an indication of how the technical have-nots view the technical-haves. Further, it is a constant source of worry that the IAEA seeks to promote the acquisition of seemingly wonderful technology, while at the same time the Agency is unable to control the end use of it. 12.31 The Indonesian move towards a full-scale nuclear programme comes at a time when the possibility of mini-Cold Wars - between regional superpowers - is increasing. This is most certainly true of the Pakistan and Indian situation where neither side seems to be easing in its aggression to the other. 12.32 Indonesia may find itself drawn into this conflict, even if only at a diplomatic level. In his paper on nuclear technology transfer (126) Skubik notes that Indonesia may become an independent conduit or export source of nuclear expertise and equipment. He wrote "in this regard, one should draw important distinctions and attention to analysis in this export or transhipping/ re-export capability. The first type of technology transfer is much less of a proliferation problem, than is the transfer between Third World states which is effectively transfer not between states but between First World subsidiaries located in those Developing Countries: a recent transfer between Brazil and Argentina, for example, is less evidence of transfer of technology from one state to another, than it is of MNC intra-company transfer (from a KWU subsidiary in Brazil to its sister KWU subsidiary in Argentina). No new capabilities clearly flow from such movements of expertise or sensitive nuclear related items." 12.33 Skubik then goes on "the second type of transfer is more worrisome and better represents that potential problem in the Southeast Asian context. Indonesia has nuclear cooperation links with Malaysia, and through Malaysia with Pakistan, and is discussing such links with Iran (127). The point is not that we need fear some sort of 'Islamic bomb'. But like a different transfer of technology involving Argentina - this time as the exporters rather than the importer, Argentina's transfer of technology to Algeria indicates we should take careful notice of transfers between indigenous atomic energy authorities where the importing countries cannot or will not undertake international obligations to use nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes only. Thus, one can too well imagine Pakistan - now under bans from North America and European exporters - continuing its nuclear weapons program with the aid of developing Indonesian expertise early next century. Indonesian incentive, like that of Argentina, would in great measure be economic as well as political: such cooperation would promise some level of prestige and independence from First World suppliers, as well as supplying opportunities to earn overseas dollars from ready, friendly purchasers." 12.34 China is also supplying Pakistan with nuclear technology, following a US $500 million deal signed in December. (128) Although IAEA-safeguarded the scheme, for a civil nuclear power plant, will doubtless raise concern in many quarters. China has been forced to admit its behind-the- scenes transfer of nuclear technology to both Algeria and Iran. China is being encouraged to join the nuclear fold on a more formal footing and the country's signing of the NPT will be ratified in early 1992. 12.35 Pakistan has said it will only sign the NPT if India does. India has already tested nuclear devices, the first test was in 1974. Despite two decades of relative isolation in the nuclear field, and complete withdrawal of US help since 1990, Pakistan has recently felt able to announce - officially - that it now has nuclear weapons making capability. (129) 12.36 The stand-off between Pakistan and India is similar to that between North and South Korea, where claim and counterclaim have been made over the past few years. North Korea's possible and potential nuclear weapons programme has been widely debated within the past few months as the US increased pressure on the country to open its facilities for inspection. North Korea has signed the NPT within the past few months, but wrangles over inspection agreements still lead many to suspect that North Korea is pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. (130) 12.37 The current debate over Japan's plans to import and stockpile plutonium has led to suspicion that Japan is beginning to consider a nuclear weapons programme. Newspapers across the world have carried articles questioning and even openly condemning the shipments. There is no doubt that the one-tonne consignment of plutonium that will leave Cherbourg in late 1992 will raise many fears - both old and new. Warnings on reprocessing spent nuclear fuel for Japan were given many years ago. Ex-US President Jimmy Carter halted commercial reprocessing within the US as a signal to stop the march towards the plutonium economy. Similarly, pressure was put on the Japanese to suspend their pilot reprocessing programme. Both the French and British Governments have, so far, remained quiet on this issue even though Japanese fuel is reprocessed in UK's Sellafield plant and the French facility at La Hague. Japan is now building a full-scale reprocessing facility near Rokkasho on the main Japanese island of Honshu. 12.38 Despite the denials of the Japanese Government as to the peaceful nature of their nuclear programme the suspicions are on the increase. Japan will send an armed ship to escort the plutonium-carrier, something which is already firing fears of Japan's interest in becoming a military power again. This is particularly true in Europe, where there was also scaremongering over the reunification of Germany leading to a possible resurgent of the country's military strength. 12.39 Much of the current play on public prejudice is based on Japan's economic strength, which is greatly envied. Japan's past military aggression is long-remembered, particularly within the Asian region. Japan's plutonium deal might well be used by neighbouring states as an excuse to increase or continue their nuclear programmes. Regardless of the possible military threats of the Japanese plutonium trade the environmental threat is very real. 12.40 Within Australia itself there are very ambiguous feelings towards both Indonesia and Japan. Past memories of military attacks from Japan and future fears - particularly from the 'Asian region' - continue. Australia feels isolated and vulnerable, being so physically separated from its allies of Europe. Recent political moves towards greater economic and political cooperation with Asia have helped reduce some of these fears, but it will be long time before they disappear. 12.41 A secret report of the Office of National Assessment, leaked in September 1990, indicated the sorts of concerns that Australia has about the Asian region. The report noted: that the US had twice stopped Taiwan developing a nuclear weapons capacity; the development of weapons programmes by both Pakistan and India; South Korea's past interest in nuclear weapons programme (presumably ended when the US sent nuclear weapons there instead) and the development of inter-ballistic missile programmes in the region.(131) 12.42 The report noted that "Indonesia's reactions to the growth of Indian military power - and Jakarta's nuclear links with Pakistan - need watching". President Suharto knows that international respectability is a prerequisite of national development and behaves accordingly. So, Indonesia is sensitive to international pressure against proliferation, from both the US and others, including Australia. Indonesia has, however, warned against any interference in its internal affairs. (132) 12.43 Indonesia has steadily acquired the technology to deploy strategic ballistic missiles (133). The report 'Ballistic Missiles in the Third World', from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies noted that such technology was to be used for the launching of satellites and that it was not thought that Indonesia had any military intentions. However, the report did note that development of the technology invariably included a military use, which would be of strategic importance to Indonesia in the long-term. 12.44 As late as February 1992 the London-based Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies was warning of the threat from increasing Third World acquisition of ballistic missile technology. (134) 12.45 Numerous papers have detailed the ever-increasing arms expenditure of the developing countries in the Asia Pacific region. Whether this is because countries now want to increase their own defences as the superpower umbrellas are closed, is not clear. It is evident, however, that the Asian region is becoming a major market for arms dealers and that could eventually lead to increased regional tensions. (135) Japan is a major exporter of arms into this area of the world, with five Japanese companies in the top 100 arms-trading corporations. Only one other Asian company makes it onto the top 100 list. 12.46 Thus we see, the nuclearisation of the Asian region, in both civil and military terms, is growing rapidly. Changing political situations, the North v. South technological gap, the pressure for individual nations to seek their own 'security' and the desperate need for cleaner power sources have conspired to spread nuclear technology. 12.47 The Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter of November 1991 (136) contained both an editorial and an article indicating much improved relations between Australia and Indonesia. The article explained how Indonesia should not be perceived as a military threat. The killing of protesters in East Timor in the same month patently changed many people's attitudes on Indonesia. The Defence Reporter's February 1992 edition (137) carried a much more cautious editorial, suggesting that Australia would be wrong to let down its guard. Although all military journals seek to justify their own government's defence expenditure, the change of opinion did represent a real change towards Indonesia. Of course, East Timor is not in any way connected with the nuclear programme, but that sort of incident exposes of the all too fragile nature of diplomatic relations. 12.48 The majority of independent observers insist that Indonesia is not a militarily aggressive country. It is said that whatever problems Indonesia has, they are internal and would not lead to external aggression. It therefore follows, it is said, that Indonesia would have no reason to pursue a nuclear weapons programme which would be financially draining, environmentally hazardous and diplomatically problematic. 12.49 There are a number of nations within the Asian region who will not view the Indonesian nuclear programme in a relaxed and friendly fashion. History has shown us that too much secrecy and deception have been practised by the Western superpowers and those who have sought to follow them. Indonesia's nuclear programme will add to tensions within the Asian region. 13. ASSOCIATED POLITICAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES 13.1 Developing countries have every right to be suspicious and angry about interference in their efforts to raise their standard to living, which in this case is equated with a much bigger electricity generation programme. The First World has caused the current greenhouse-threat and instead of aiding developing nations with state-of-the-art renewable and alternative energy technology they offer the Third world nuclear power - which they know is not wanted by most western populations. 13.2 Within every country that has nuclear power there are vocal and active anti-nuclear groups who draw their membership and support from across the political and social spectrum. Within non-nuclear states are many environment groups working towards stopping the nuclear industry spreading any further. Danish groups protest against Swedish and German nuclear plants. The Irish Government is considering legal action against the UK Government over the operations of the Sellafield reprocessing plant. Luxembourg has protested against the Cattenom plant in France. Portugal has complained to Spain about its nuclear plants. Both the Austrian Government and people have protested against nuclear plants in Germany, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. 13.3 Indonesia is known to support the idea of a nuclear weapons free zone in South East Asia. In the IAEA Canberra 1990 presentation by the head of BATAN (138) the state philosophy of Pancasila was noted as important as it lays down the foundation in which Indonesia has to "contribute to the world peace by developing international relations to increase mutual understanding and mutual respect, decrease friction among nations and to strengthen cooperation in technical, economic, social and cultural fields". 13.4 Despite this apparent openness there is general trepidation within Indonesian society when it comes to discussing nuclear power. Many believe the laws within Indonesia, which relate to security matters, which could be applied to those who openly express and encourage anti-nuclear sentiments. 13.5 There is growing concern within Indonesia that recent moves by the Government indicate a clamp-down on many aspects of opposition to the Government. A controversial immigration bill has been passed which has provisions to effectively bar citizens the government deems to be disloyal from returning home and potentially rendering them stateless (139). The main supporters of the bill are ABRI (the Indonesian armed forces) who automatically hold 100 seats in the Indonesian lower- house. Representativees of the ruling Golkar Party have said of the bill that "Golkar agreed because we believe that the definition of human rights should be made within the Indonesian context, not through Western eyes. We reject individualism, which puts too much emphasis on individual freedom." It was thought that the ban, which was originally raised two years ago, would be dropped as a result of Indonesia taking a more relaxed stance on civil liberties. 13.6 Tensions have recently been heightened by the Government ban on Indonesian NGO's receiving money from the Dutch government. The restriction on NGO funding is a direct result of the Indonesian government's dissolution of IGGI. The advocacy group, INGI, (the International NGO Forum on Indonesia) has received particular attention. 13.7 Mr. Rudini, is his capacity as Minister for the Interior, issued the following statement: " The Indonesian Government on 24 March 1992 conveyed to the Dutch Government its decision to halt all aid in the form of loans and grants from the Netherlands to Indonesia and not to give any new aid." "In accordance with this step by the Government, all social organisations and institutions, such as NGOs, whether in the form of foundations, organisations or other institutions; professional associations; consumer organisations; legal aid institutes; social organisations; religious organisations; or similar agencies, are hereby forbidden to receive aid from the Dutch government or aid from any Dutch NGO which receives funds from the Dutch government." " Social organisations and institutions which violate this determination will be penalised in accordance with existing legislative regulations." "In view of the above it is not relevant for social organisations and institutions to participate in INGI." "Herewith this statement, to be made known and implemented as necessary in a responsible manner". Jakarta, 24th April 1992 Minister of the Interior.' (140) 13.8 The attacks on advocacy functions of NGOs should be seen separately from the cutting of Dutch aid (government money). The government is just making use of their decision to refuse aid from the Dutch as an excuse to silence NGOs that are critical of the Indonesian government. As can be seen from the above statement by the Minister of the Interior, the consumer association is clearly mentioned, even though they are not receiving funding from Holland (government or NGO). It should also be noted that the paragraph on INGI is really forced into that statement (it does not have any link with the previous paragraphs) even though historically INGI was set up by Dutch NGOs in cooperation with Indonesian NGOs. A number of Indonesian NGOs, particularly human rights organisations, will face severe financial problems because of this ban. 13.9 This funding ban also links in with the ban on travel into and out of Indonesia. President Suharto is angry at what he sees as Indonesian NGOs taking liberties in airing anti- government views at INGI conferences.(141) In 1989 INGI and the Indonesian government clashed when INGI lobbied the World Bank and Japanese aid agencies to link funding a dam-project with compensation for displaced farmers. The action resulted in a better deal for the farmers, but embarrassed and angered the Indonesian government. (142) 13.10 Some groups, such as INSAN (Basic Human Right Information and Study ) are already blacklisted within Indonesia. General Rudini has warned NGOs against "selling out the country". They have been requested to formulate a code of ethics which would provide a basis for cooperation and relations with the government. The formula, should allow the government to "exercise its supervisory task flexibly while preventing NGOs from betraying the country." (143) 13.11 There have been other restrictions on the right to meet. In April newspapers carried reports on the Indonesian government stopping a meeting of intellectuals in Jakarta. The Democracy Forum, set up in 1991, was told it was violating the law, but it was not told which law. (144) They had asked for the necessary permit, but it was refused. 13.12 Admiral (ret'd) Sudomo, Minister Co-ordinator for Political and Security Affairs, announced that an implementary regulation would soon be enacted placing NGO's within the terms of Law No 8 on Social Organisations of 1985. 13.13 Sudomo has said "Everyone under the sun must want to be regulated by that law. If an NGO doesn't want this, then it will have to dissolve." The law requires all 'social organisations' to submit to interior ministry supervision. It gives the government wide powers to suspend or ban organisations if they are judged to endanger national interests or stability. The law also makes it mandatory for all social organisations to adopt Pancasila (the state philosophy) as their 'sole foundation'. The law has not been strictly applied to NGO's until this time as they are not considered 'social organisations'. Sudomo said that many NGOs have breached the conditions laid down in the 1985 law, for instance, in receiving funds from abroad without first consulting the government. NGOs can be disbanded for receiving money from abroad and helping foreign bodies without the knowledge of the government. (145) Sudomo has been very critical of the NGO's, accusing them of receiving large amounts of foreign money, saying that some groups had been given up to US$500 million! 13.14 There is no doubt that the East Timor massacre has had an impact on the way in which NGO's, particularly those with international links, are viewed. The above paragraphs show that government clampdowns are not arbitrary, but seem to be part of a concerted effort to stifle debate within Indonesia. 13.15 General Try Sutrisno, Commander of the Armed Forces (ABRI), who has been nominated to take the vice-presidency, (146) has gone further than most in condemning NGO activity. He has said, "We need to publish a list of disturbing NGOs and the men behind them should be banned from going abroad". He has also gone so far as to say that NGOs which "vilify" Indonesia "must be shut down and taken to court because this is subversion." (147) 13.16 Once again, INGI has been linked into this. The law referred to by both Rudini and Sutrisno is known as ORMAS (the Social Organisation Law). It is, however, worrying to read of Sutrisno's reference to "subversion", as the law covering such issues - the anti-subversion law - carries much more severe penalties than the social organisation legislation. The anti- subversion law (Presidential Decree No 11/1963) permits the death penalty for anyone who engages in subversive activities, including undermining the authority of the state, disseminating feelings of hostility and distorting or deviating from the ideology of Pancasila. The death penalty is most frequently applied to people under this law. (148) 13.17 INGI, amongst other international organisations, has been critical of the nuclear industry within Indonesia because of the environmental and financial risks. Its most recent aide memoire calls for positive energy alternatives to be considered. How this will be viewed by the Government is not known. Whether equally prescriptive measures might be used against people who oppose nuclear industry expansion is speculative. What is certain is that the government is moving to restrict or even stop the activities of a number NGOs. 13.18 Even more worrying is Law No. 31/1964, which specifies the death penalty for those who reveal secrets related to Indonesia's atomic energy programme. (149). It is not known whether or not this law has been repealed, but investigations are being carried out to establish the exact situation on this act. 13.19 Lieut. Col. Yuswan Hadi of the Central Java Local government assembly, has said that there were no signs of opposition in Ujung Watu (the town near to the reactor site), but the competent authorities must remain on their guard.(150) 13.20 Research and Technology Minister Habibie, who also oversees Indonesia's defence industry, has said, "We have learned that there are no significant anti-nuclear power movements as have appeared abroad. We are sure that the public can accept nuclear energy as an alternative power source as of the beginning of the 21st century."(151) Both these views are contrary to the very real concerns expressed by Indonesians about the proposed nuclear plans. 13.21 The nuclear industry has proven to be very secretive worldwide and cover-ups have placed workers, the public and the environment at risk. Any matter which threatens the integrity of a nuclear reactor within Indonesia are matters which concern the whole South East Asian region. This means that workers who are worried over nuclear safety should be able to freely report their fears to independent authorities. Members of the public or Parliament who are concerned should be able to speak out. Any use of anti-subversion laws or atomic-protection laws would be contrary to the well-being of this region. 13.22 Indonesia is becoming a more important player on the world stage. The new chair of the International Labour Organisation is the Indonesian Labour Minister, Cosmas Batubara. Indonesia has also taken over the chair of the Non- Aligned Movement. This Third World forum, set up 30 years ago, has 103 member nations. Indonesia's President Suharto has gone on the record as saying that under Indonesia the NAM would shift its concentration from politics to the economy, 'with a focus on South-South cooperation.' Suharto surprised everyone by saying Indonesia had taken the chair of the NAM to save the organisation from communism. Thus, Indonesia is considered favourably by western nations. Indonesia chairs the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Committee which is seeking to establish a ban on nuclear weapons testing. 13.23 Any country that has nuclear power inevitably draws suspicions. Many would argue that few countries can achieve true democracy and have nuclear power. The argument is that the very presence of nuclear power leads to Government and industry having to engage in cover-ups. If the public knows the truth about nuclear power, the argument goes, they will insist on its closure. It is worth noting that in those countries where the dangers and true economic costs of this industry have been exposed, the closure of nuclear power stations has resulted. The populations of a number of western democracies (Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, the USA and Italy) have effectively halted nuclear power programmes as evidence of problems came to light. In the newly-freed Eastern Bloc countries some of the earliest free activities have exposed the dangers of old nuclear power plants - leading to their closure. In other countries, such as Holland and the UK, the moratoriums now in place are effectively phase out programs. Similarly, open debate will take place in Indonesia if it is felt there will be no serious retribution. 13.24 Within Indonesia there is little public discussion on the Government's nuclear power programme. As we have seen from the section on proliferation, it is not believed that Indonesia is or ever will be a nuclear threat. However, the presence of a nuclear programme could lead other countries to assume a long term military agenda. This, in turn, could make the Indonesian Government more wary of open discussion and so on. Industries which have no military applications, such as solar power and biomass, do not create these social tensions. 13.25 Under normal circumstances all the issues relating to the proposal would be given an airing before any plans to build nuclear plants got under way. There must be no stifling of debate within or outside of Indonesia on this matter. The international community has to ensure that such discussions take place. President Suharto has said that "in a shrinking world we do not to isolate ourselves. Proposals, suggestions and criticisms expressed in an atmosphere of friendship will be respected. Comments and criticisms expressed only to exaggerate our shortcomings in our national development which tend to interfere in our domestic affairs is another matter." (152) 13.26 Prior to the current reticence to speak out, some Indonesian people did voice concerns over the nuclear plan. (153) Local people said that they had been told not to worry about the project, and that they were not aware of any accidents which had happened at nuclear stations. 13.27 Workers have also indicated worries over speaking out if there is a problem. This is true in most industries, where 'whistle-blowing' often leads to dismissal and blacklisting. With something as politically sensitive as nuclear power the Indonesian Government cannot afford to be seen to suppress any concerns. Indonesia has to satisfy both internal and external demands for openness. 13.28 Experience has shown that workers are often frightened to speak out and do not believe that official inspectors are independent. In 1989 Greenpeace released a report (154) which detailed numerous abuses of health and safety regulations within the Sellafield nuclear reprocessing facility. Secret meetings with the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate exposed the fact that even the inspectors are worried to be too adamant in demanding additional safety regulations. 13.29 Given experiences in other nuclear countries there is a justifiable fear over safety, proliferation and public freedom in voicing concerns. Many so-called 'free democracies' behave in an authoritarian manner in order to protect their nuclear industries. It is worth noting that within the majority of nuclearised 'western' countries the important news on worker health, public dangers, radioactive waste disposal and reactor safety comes not from the nuclear industry itself, but from the activists groups, key academics or the media. 13.30 Many western countries have draconian and anti- democratic laws governing discussion of their nuclear facilities. Britain still has an out-dated Official Secrets Act, for which people have been gaoled as late as the mid- 1980s for breaking. Israel held a closed trial for Mordecai Vanunu, an ex-nuclear technician who released detailed information on their nuclear power and weapons programme. France condoned international terrorism by sinking the Rainbow warrior in 1985 in order to protect French nuclear weapons testing. Nuclear companies in the US were implicated in the death of the nuclear whistle-blower Karen Silkwood. In former Eastern Bloc countries those trying to alert the public to nuclear hazards have met with summary executions or internal exile. All over the world nuclear activists have been black- listed for employment, received personal threats and have been the objects of devious surveillance tactics. 13.31 State-to-State relationships are also important on building a proper basis of trust. Japanese and Indonesian relations are cordial, but at the same time strained. The friendship of the two countries is based more on economic and strategic concerns, rather than traditional and natural allegiances. Indonesia depends on Japan for aid, commercial loans and technology. In return Japan has acknowledged Indonesia's control over energy resources and shipping lanes. The scars from the Japanese invasion during the Second World War are, however, as deeply felt in Indonesia as they are in other countries. 13.32 As a special report on Indonesia noted, "the flaws are still too obvious: rough justice for small people in the way of projects, poor performance from many rapidly expanded institutions, widening disparities between the western and eastern halves of the country, continued reliance on patronage for the accumulation of capital, intolerance of criticism, an artificial alignment of political representation." (155). That same article went on to note that there is a growing debate about these questions which is part of the mood that expects improvements in the decade ahead. This will have to be so if the Indonesian government expects to gain the trust of its people and neighbouring nations over its nuclear power programme. 14. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COMMITTEE 14.1 The Australian Government should do all it can to promote ecologically sound and sustainable energy sources within Indonesia. All efforts should be made to encourage and establish alternative and renewable energy projects in Indonesia. Expertise in energy conservation and efficiency should be made freely available to the Indonesian government. 14.2 The Australian Government should encourage other donor nations and first world countries to supply state-of-the-art technology for renewable and alternative energies to Indonesia. Further, help should be given to ensure Indonesia attains the necessary domestic manufacturing base in order to fulfill energy needs. Indonesia should not be made dependent on foreign expertise to pursue the above mentioned energy strategy. 14.3 The Australian Government should suspend any negotiations on nuclear technology cooperation. An inquiry should be held into the scope of the cooperation agreement currently being negotiated. Any involvement of Australian officials in progressing the Indonesian commercial nuclear programme should be halted. 14.4 The Australian Government should not enter into any discussions with Indonesian officials over the sale of Australian uranium for the Indonesian nuclear programme. 14.5 The Australian Government should establish exactly what types of nuclear facilities the Indonesian Government is planning for Central Java. The Australian Government should institigate an inquiry into the possible environmental impacts that the Indonesian nuclear programme could have on Australia and the surrounding region. 14.6 The Australian Government should continue to make strenuous efforts to improve upon the International Nuclear Liability Regime, which is currently under discussion. Further, the Australian Government should publish exactly what insurance/compensation arrangements will exist between the two countries in the event of an accident leading to radioactive fallout impacting on Australia. 14.7 The Australian Government should work to ensure that any law-abiding opposition to the nuclear plans are not suppressed within Indonesia. Inquiries should be made to ensure that repressive restrictions are not used to stifle legitimate concerns. The government should ensure that the law which permits the death penalty for revealing secrets of the Indonesian atomic energy plans have been repealed. 14.8 The Australian Government should make representation to the International Atomic Energy Agency to ensure that any safety concerns, or otherwise, over the Indonesian nuclear programme, are openly debated. Present reporting restrictions which can be used by nuclear nations to veto publication of safety reports must be removed from IAEA inspection agreements. Jean McSorley, Nuclear Campaigns Co-ordinator, Greenpeace Australia. May 1992 The author became Nuclear Campaigns Co-ordinator for Greenpeace Australia in July 1990. Prior to that she spent ten years campaigning on the Sellafield nuclear reprocessing plant in England, with special reference to the environmental impacts of reprocessing, the health effects of low-level radiation, the hazards associated with nuclear waste and the costs of spent fuel management. She has presented evidence to a number of Select Committees and Inquiries. Her book, 'Living in the Shadow' - the Story of the People of Sellafield, was published in January 1990. REFERENCES 1. Paragraphs 2.1 - 2.4 taken from 'Is Indonesia's Nuclear Power Programme Inevitable', Mary Johnston, Melbourne 1990. Mary Johnston was an aid worker in Indonesia for ten years. 2. 'Fossil Fuels' Pollutants Prompting Indonesia to Press for Nuclear Power', Michael Richardson,International Herald Tribune, 8th September 1988. 3. Daniel W. Skubik, Division of Asian Studies, School of International Business Studies, "Business Patterns in Nuclear Commerce and Proliferation, Asian Peace Research Association, presented February 1992. Conference Paper to Peace and Security in the Asia Pacific region Post-Cold War: Problems and Prospects, 31st January - 4th february 1992, Asian Peace Research Association, Christchurch, New Zealand. 4. Nuclear Developments in the Asia and Pacific Region, Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation, July 1990. 5. Proceedings of the IAEA General Conference, 35th Regular Session, September 1991. 6. 'An outline of the nuclear research, development and utilisation programme in Indonesia'. presented at Regional Public Information Seminar, Canberra 27-28 August 1990 by Djali Ahimsa and Iyos Suki of BATAN, Indonesia. 7. 'Indonesia 2010 without nuclear power' by Agus P. Sari, WALHI: Indonesian Forum for Environment. Presented to the International NGO Forum on Indonesia (INGI) March, 1992. 8. 'Jarkarta Energy Conference', Indonesia Development News Nov/Dec 1990. 9. 'Nuke power plant studies to finish in 1991: Official' Jakarta Post, 11th January 1990. 10. 'Public accepts nuclear power plans: Habibie', Jakarta Post, 8th February 1991 11. see reference 1. 12. "Power Struggles" Far Eastern Economic Review, 8th November 1990. 13. 'Ring the Alarm Bells Louder', Mary Johnson Inside Indonesia, March 1990. 14. See reference 8 15. Sudarsono, Budi, 'The future of Nuclear Power In Indonesia, Energy 1984 9 (10). For hydro figures see 'Indonesia looks to energy options', Australian Financial Review, 24th October 1978. 16. see reference 1 17. 'Our role in Indonesia's Nuclear Ambitions', Australian Society Jan-Feb 1992. 18. see reference 4 19. "Power Struggles, Far Eastern Economic Review, 8th November 1990. 20. Indonesia, Energy In Europe, January 1992. 21. Kyodo News, 10th February 1992. 22. 'Fortune from Adversity' Far Asian Economic Review, 19th April 1990. 23. 'The current and future role of coal in meeting the energy demand for power in Indonesia', A. Andoyo, Director of Electric Power Programme Development Department of Mines and Energy, Indonesia. Papers for presentation at the International Conference on Coal, the Environment and Development: Technologies to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 18-21 1991. 24. see reference 7 25. see reference 12 26. 'Renewable Energy Won't Cut Asian Fuel Bills Quite Yet', Reuter, 1st April 1991. 27. (55) N. Rader et al., 'Power Surge: The Status and Near- Term Pontential of Renewable Energy Technologies' (Public Citizen, Washington,DC, May 1989). 28. (56) Wind Energy in Denmark; Research and Technological Development, 1990 (Ministry of Energy, Danish Energy Agency, Copenhagen, Denmark, 1990). Based on levelised cost of 0.334 Dk/kWh, and an exchange rate of US$1 = 6.273 Dk. 29. (57) B. Keepin and M. Barrett, 'Critique of UK IPCC Case Study,' June 1990. 30. (58) J. Ogden, R.H. Williams, and M. Fulmer, Cogeneration Applications of Biomass Gasifier/Gas Turbine Technologies in the Cane Sugar and Alcohol Industries (Center for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 1990). 31. (59) See Rader et al n.19. 32. (60) R.L. San Martin, Environmental Emissions from Energy Technology Systems: The Total Fuel Cycle, (US Department of Energy, Washington, DC, April 1989). 33. (61) Global Warming - The Greenpeace Report, 1990. Chapter 13 'Nuclear Power and Global Warming,' Bill Keepin, ref. 61 - Note that this is equivalent to baseload electricity generation. 34. (62) The Potential of Renewable Energy: An Interlaboratory White Papers, United States Department of Energy, SERI/TP-260-3674, DE90000322, Washington, DC March 1990 - Appendix G. 35. (63) J. Ogden and R.H. Williams, Solar Hydrogen: Moving Beyond Fossil Fuels (World Resources Institute, Washington, DC October 1989). 36. (63) Ibid. Page 19. 37 see reference 7 38. (64) Calculated using approximate empirical values of US$3,000 per kW installed (1987 $) , 20 per cent per year nominal fixed-charge rate (including capitalised interest during construction), 0.65 capacity factor (which is optimistic for US plants), and 1 cent/kWh each for fuel operation and maintenance, and net capital additions (data are from Komanoff Associates, New York, USA). This calculation gives busbar cost (the costs before the electricity enters the grid). A delivered kWh costs about 5 per cent more, due to grid losses incurred in transmission and distribution. Such losses are much higher in developing countries - up to 40 per cent (this is not accounted for in the scenario). Note that electricity saved through end-use efficiency is automatically 'delivered', because it is already one site. Thus, strictly speaking, the analysis should compare the cost of efficiency savings with the cost of delivered electricity, but this is not done here (which means that the results in Figures 13.2 and 13.3 are biased slightly toward nuclear power.) 39. (33) See e.g. H. Geller et al Annual Review of Energy (1987), vol. 12, p. 357, where the weighted average costs of electricity-saving measures in Table 4 is 2 cents/kWh. A detailed study of the residential sector in Michigan showed that 29 per cent of electricity forecast for the year 2005 could be saved at an average cost of 2 cents/kWh. The average cost of the first 75 per cent of savings is only 1.1 cents\kWh: F. Krause, A. Rosenfeld, and M. Levine, Analysis of Michigan's Demand-Side Electricity Resources in the Residential Sector (Lawrence Berkeley Lab, CA, April 1988). 40. (34) See ref. 33 in 39 above, p. 305. 41. 'World Status Report - Post Chernobyl, The World Nuclear Industry in Disarray,' Greenpeace International, April 1991, based on information in the International Atomic Energy Agency 1990 Handbook and industry journals. 42. see reference 33 in reference 39 above. 43. (23) Using data from Nucleonics Week, 4th June 1987. 44. (24) In developing countries, plant capacity factors have tended to be low, which would means that even more installed capacity might be required in practice. 45. (25) B. Keepin and G. Kats, 'Greenhouse Warming: Comparative Analysis of Nuclear and Efficiency Abatement Strategies', Energy Policy (Dec. 1988), vol. 16, no. 6, pp 538-61 46. (26) J. Van Domelen, Power to Spare: The World Bank and Electricity Conversation (The World Wildlife Fund, Washington, DC, 1988). (Note references no.27-40 and 42-46 are taken from the chapter referred to in ref. no. 33 above. Numbers in brackets indicate the reference numbers within the chapter itself). 47 see reference 40 48. Power in Europe 17th August 1989. 49. see reference 4 50. see reference 3 51. see reference 22 52. The Australian, February 15th 1992. 53. 'Japan vows to help Indonesia restore environment', Kyodo Press Agency, 1st May 1991. 54. Mitsubishi and Westinghouse: N-Power Co-op,UPI 23rd March 1992 55. see reference 4 56. 'Chained to Reactors' The Economist, 2nd February 1991 57. Combating the Greenhouse Effect: No Role for Nuclear Power, J.K. Leggett & P.M. Kelly, Greenpeace London, 1989. 58. see reference 2 59. Indonesia: Government Chooses Japanese Firm for Feasibility Study of Nuclear Plants. BBC Monitoring Service, Far East, 29th May 1991. 60. News Watch, Citizens Nuclear Information Network, Tokyo, June 1991. 61. 'Capital flight to Singapore Inside', Indonesia, October 1991. 62. see reference 22 63. Asiaweek listing, 24th January 1992. 64. see reference 22 65. ibid 66. ibid 67. Focus - Indonesia 1992, Far Eastern Economic Review, 2nd April 1992 68. 'Jakarta Puts west on notice over aid', The Australian 27th March 1992. 69. Australia's relations with Indonesia, Submission to the Inquiry by the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee, by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 18th February 1992. 70. The Cost of Nuclear Power, 4th Report of the UK House of Commons Select Committee on Energy, 1989. 71. Forbes, 2nd February 1985). 72. Vibro, 1990, p.20. 73. 'Nuke Power & Quake Zone', Japan Associated Press 18th November 1991. 74. 'Osaka residents file reactor suit', Far Eastern Economic Review, 24th October 1991. 75. Nucleonics Week, 14th March 1991. 76. 'Japan's nuclear safety committee scrutinising 'final' Mihama-2 report', Nucleonics Week, 12th December 1991. 77. Chernobyl - Unique safety valve for a reactor nuclear explosion?, Dr. Don Arnott and Commander Robert Green RN (Ret'd). Presented to the UK Nuclear Free Zones Authority seminar on Chenrobyl March 1992. 78. 'Power Politics Behind Closed Doors', The London Guardian 9th November 1990. 79. 'Philippine Chernobyl?', German. C. Galian, ENS, Manila, 6th April 1992 80. See reference 2 81. There are too many articles and reports on the impact of Chernobyl to list here. For some basic reading a briefing, Chernobyl: Four Years After (plus appendices) by Andy Stirling for Greenpeace UK is available. 82. Greenpeace Briefing paper on Chernobyl, April 1991. 83. For an idea of the scope and range of contamination see 'Chernobyl: How The Cover Was Blown', New Scientist, p. 34-54, 23rd April 1987. 84. Windscale 1957 reactor Fire, a report from the British National Radiological Protection Board, March 1983. 85. Chernobyl Five Years After, S. Belayer, A. Borovoi, V. Olkov, A. Gagarinski, Nuclear Europe Worldscan, March/April 1991. 86. J. McSorley, Evidence of the House of Commons Committee on Chernobyl, April 1988. 87 ibid 88. 'Bid to allay nuclear fear', Australian Associated Press in the Melbourne Age, 1st February 1992. 89. World Watch Paper 72, 'Reassessing Nuclear Power - the fallout from Chernobyl', March 1987. 90. 'Cost of Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster Soars in New Study', Wall Street Journal, 29th March 1990. 91. Suara Pembaruan, 3rd December 1991 92. 'Indonesia - no nukes plans yet', Kyodo News Agency, 20th February 1992. 93. Australian Hansard, 9th April 1991. 94. Synroc Study Group, Progress Report, August 1991. 95. Greenpeace Australia's response to the US Department of Energy's FONSI (Finding Of No Significant Impact), on HEU fuel imports, August 1991. 96. The 14th Consultative meeting of contracting parties to the London Dumping Convention, 25-29 November 1991 at the IMO, London. Annotation and Comments by Greenpeace International on the Agenda of the Meeting, Greenpeac, November 1991. 97. Reuters, 6th May 1991. 98. 'Taiwan to build 4th nuclear plant', Reuters, 20th February 1992 99. 'Taiwan: Anti Nukes Protests', Reuter, 26th April 1992. 100. see reference 3. 101. Australian Society, January-February 1992. 102. 'Uranium sales to Indonesia proposed', The Australian Bulletin, 10th December 1991. 103 'Hewson considers sale of uranium to Taiwan', The Australian 27th March 1991 104. Greenpeace briefing paper on the IAEA and Safety, Thursday, 11th September 1986. 105 see reference 6 106. 'Without Soviet funds IAEA faces cash shortfall in 1992', Nucleonics Week, November 14th, 1991. 107. Figures quoted are from the IAEA board of Governors Document: "The Agency's Programme for 1985-6 and Budget for 1985", dated 4th April 1984. 108. William Potter, Creating a Database on International Nuclear Commerce, UCLA, Centre for International and Strategic Affairs, Working Paper No. 59, September 1987, page 1. 109. see reference 3 110. How the West Gave Saddam the Bomb, The Australian 7-8th December 1991, (quoted in ref.3) 111. see reference 3 112. see reference 60 113. IAEA Governors defer decisions on expanding safeguards powers, Nucleonics Week, 12th December 1992. 114. 'House-Passed Nonproliferation Bill Awaits Senate Committee Action', Nuclear Fuel, 11th November 1991. 115. 'France, UK, Launch Full-Scope Safeguards on Nuclear Exports', Nucleonics Week, 3rd October 1991. 116. Reuters, reported in the Sydney Morning Herald, March 2nd 1992. 117. 'Soviet nuclear experts lured to anti-west camps', The Australian, October 15th 1991. 118. 'Malaysia To Seek CIS Help in Nuclear Technology', Reuters, 21st February 1992. 119. see reference 113 120. 'What is the IAEA For?' Yoshido, article in Chuokoron, October 1989. 121. 'Speculation rampant while IAEA compiles Iraqi helpers list', Nucleonics Week, 10th October 1991. 122. see reference 120 123. 'US to ask New Delhi to back off on research reactor offer to Iran', Nucleonics Week, 21st November 1991. 124. 'IAEA mission gives Iran conditional nuclear clean slate,' Reuters, 15th February 1992. 125. see reference 123 126. see reference 3 127. ibid 128. 'Nuclear Ambitions', Far Eastern Economic Review, 23rd January 1992. 129. 'Pakistan Admits to A-bomb Capability,' Sydney Morning Herald, 10th February 1992. 130. 'Koreas Fail on Nuke Settlement', Reuter, 1st April 1992. 131. 'Alarm at nuclear spread in Region', The Australian, 3rd September 1990. 132. 'Suharto says "stay out of our internal affairs",' The Australian Financial Review 22nd April 1992. 133. 'Indonesia moves towards ballistic missile capability', Sunday Age, Melbourne, 4th November 1990. 134. 'Experts fear Third World Missile Race', 17th Reuters, February 1992. 135. Asia/Pacific Arms Transfers, Patterns and Problems, Pacific Research, August 1991. 136. 'Living with Indonesia' Asia Pacific Defence Reporter, November 1991. 137. 'Living with Indonesia (contd)', Asia Pacific Defence Reporter, February-March 1992. 138. see reference no. 4 139. 'Passport control', Far Eastern Economic Review, 26th March 1992. 140. Statement of the Minister of the Interior, in his capacity as the person responsible for guiding internal policy about the ban on receipt of Dutch aid by Social Organisations and Institutions, Mr. Rudini, Indonesian Minister of the Interior, 24th April 1992. 141. 'Exile critics', Inside Indonesia, March 1992 142. 'Lobbying the donors', tFar Eastern Economic Review, 24th August 1989. 143. Jakarta Post 20/1/91 144. Forum Meeting Banned, Sydney Morning Herald, 21st April 1992. 145. 'NGO clampdown', Inside Indonesia, March 1992 146. 'Parties back general for Indonesia's No. 2 post', Sydney Morning Herald, 25th April 1992. 147. Jakarta, Jakarta 14-20/12/91 148. Death By Firing Squad, Inside Indonesia, 14th April 1988 149. Ibid. 150. Indonesian daily, Suara Merdeka, 28th August 1991. 151. Jakarta Post 18th December 1991. 152. 'Behind closed doors, Malpractice and Incidents at Sellafield', Greenpeace 1988 153. 'Protest grows over Indonesia's nuclear power project', Kyodo New Agency, 21st March 1991. 154 See reference 132 155. See 22.