TL: A BLOCK TO A TEST BAN: CHINA'S NUCLEAR TESTS AND THE TEST BAN TALKS SO: GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, (GP) DT: 1995 SUMMARY China has conducted 40 known nuclear tests since its first test in 1964. The most recent test was on June 10, 1994, and at least one test is predicted in the next two months. China is the only nuclear weapons state still conducting nuclear tests. The U.S., Russia, France and Britain have observed a moratorium since 1992. China is currently participating in talks on a comprehensive test ban treaty at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and has said it supports the conclusion of a treaty no later than 1996. However, its insistence on excluding so-called 'peaceful' nuclear explosions (PNEs) from the ban has been on of a number of issues that have held up negotiations significantly. It appears that China wishes to finish the current weapons development programme and maintain an option for further safety testing under the guise of PNE testing. CHINA'S TESTING PROGRAMME Testing takes place at the Lop Nor test site, approximately 265 kilometres south-east of Urumqi in the Xinjian region. Since testing began in 1964, China has conducted one test on average every 284 days. China has used its 40 nuclear tests to develop the world's fourth largest nuclear weapons arsenal. It includes approximately 450 nuclear weapons of at least five different types, with a cummulative yield of 250 megatons, or around 16,000 Hiroshima bombs. China's current testing programme is thought to involve warheads for two new missile systems, one for deployment in the late 1990s, and one around 2010. The latter may carry several warheads. China is also developing a new sea-launched ballistic missile (JL-2) for deployment on their second generation strategic nuclear-powered submarine. The chief design laboratory for Chinese nuclear weapons is the Ninth Academy at Mianyang (Sichuan) or the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP). Plutonium production for weapons purposes, which has taken place at two reactors, in Jiuquan (Gansu) and Guangyuan (Sichuan), reportedly ceased in 1991. However a new plutonium facility is scheduled to open in the mid- 1990s. Peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) are currently permitted under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Partial Test Ban Treaty. It was originally envisaged that PNEs could be used in large scale construction and engineering projects, and both the U.S. and Russia conducted PNEs for this purpose. India claimed the first and only test it conducted in 1974 was a 'peaceful' test. However, such tests are indistinguishable from military tests for verification purposes, and would therefore render a comprehensive test ban inoperable. TESTING AND DISARMAMENT TALKS In early 1994, it was hoped that the major provisions of a CTB would be agreed before April 1995, when the future of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is decided. However, when the Conference session ended in August, the question of 'peaceful use of nuclear energy and peaceful nuclear explosions' was one of many unsettled items in the 106 page draft text. Informal meetings between negotiators will continue until the CD resumes in January 1995 but it is widely believed that there is little chance of any conclusion of the major provisions of a CTB by April. The failure to make progress on a CTB has been a significant dynamic in discussions on the future of the NPT. In the preamble to the 1970 NPT Treaty, a comprehensive treaty extending the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty was envisaged, along with other disarmament measures, 'at the earliest possible date'. Progress on a CTB has since been the most significant litmus test for the non-nuclear states to measure the commitment of the nuclear weapons states to disarmament. In 1980 and 1990, review conferences of the NPT failed to reach consensus on a final statement because of the lack of progress on a CTB. In December 1993, the non-aligned members of the CD called in a statement for a 'final text' of a CTB to be agreed during 1994. The failure of the nuclear weapons states to agree a CTB before the NPT extension decision begins in April 1995 could seriously jeopardize the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It would certainly undermine the call by the nuclear weapons states themselves for indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. China's desire to exclude 'peaceful' nuclear explosions from a comprehensive test ban has been one of a number of significant factors in the slow progress made at the negotiations. China has also called for 'no first use' of nuclear weapons and other security assurances to be included in the test ban, which is widely seen as a delaying tactic. Along with issues raised by the other nuclear weapons states, these have contributed to a draft text which after eight months of negotiation is still entirely in 'square brackets' with none of the key issues agreed. Other factors proving obstacles to the negotiations are British and French insistence on linking a successful test ban with indefinite extension of the NPT; a U.S. call for an opt out clause ten years after the ban came into force; the British and French desire to continue 'safety' tests to ensure the reliability of their nuclear arsenals; and U.S. calls for very small yield 'hydro nuclear' tests to be excluded from the ban. PROSPECTS FOR A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT) There are several scenarios now open. One scenario, unlikely given the current negotiating impasse, is that increasing pressure from the non-nuclear nations and the potential to destroy any agreement about the future of the NPT, will encourage the nuclear weapons states to 'cut their losses' and agree a CTB within the Geneva Conference on Disarmament by April. Another scenario is that a ban could be agreed in another forum excluding China. The non-nuclear states, led by Indonesia as chair of the Partial Test Ban Amendment Conference, might call for a re-convening of that conference, which currently excludes France and China as they are still not signatories to the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Finally, short of an actual treaty, the four other nuclear testing nations (USA, Russia, France, and Britain) may simply agree in early 1995 to an extended moratorium lasting, say, 10 years during which the details of a treaty would have to be settled.