TL: THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT AND THE COMPLETION OF KHMELNITSKY 2 AND ROVNO 4 NUCLEAR REACTORS IN UKRAINE. SO: GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, (GP) DT: FEBRUARY, 1997. Executive Summary. Due to the stagnation of the Western European nuclear industry in 1994 the European Commission was authorised to help co-finance the construction of nuclear reactors outside the European Union, on the condition that a major proportion of the expenditure was provided by a Community enterprise. As a result for the past 3 years the European Commission has been searching for projects in Eastern Europe which fit their criteria. A number of Soviet designed part built reactors in the region were or are being assessed as potential recipients of these loans notably; Kozloduy 5 and 6 in Bulgaria; Mochovce in Slovakia; Kalinin and Rostov in Russia; and Khmelnitsky 2 and Rovno 4 in Ukraine. In June 1994, within 6 months of the Ukrainian Government's decision to continue construction at Khmelnitsky 2 and Rovno 4 (K2R4), the European Commission declared that the total cost of completing these reactors, as well as an additional reactor at Zaporozhe and the closure of Chernobyl, would cost ECU 1.3 billion ($1.6 billion). The latest estimate for the completion of K2R4 is $1.2 billion with a further $1.4 estimated cost of closure of Chernobyl. The Commission also concluded that after looking at alternatives the completion of the reactors was the cheapest option. It is now transparent that this early estimation of the costs associated with the completion of the reactors has been drastically underestimated and by making such categorical statements the European Commission has had a detrimental effect on the development of Ukrainian energy policy. As a result of this preliminary assessment between 1994 - 97 through the TACIS programme, the European Commission awarded over ECU 30 million in grants for the restart of construction at K2R4, prior to any final decision by the G7 to become involved. In 1994, the European Commission stated that one of the conditions for their involvement in the completion of K2R4 was to enable the reactors to reach full Western safety standards. This safety objective has now been lowered and now the Commission is aiming to have the reactors completed to a standard similar to that designed in the West during the 1970s i.e. without modifications made following the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents. From the preliminary results available it is clear that even this lower standards will not be achieved. Another condition for the involvement of the G7 and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in the completion of K2R4 is that it is part of the least cost plan. To assess this the EBRD established an independent panel to review the economics of completion. This multinational panel have concluded that "K2R4 are not economic. Completing these reactors would not represent the most productive use of $US 1bn or more of EBRD/EU funds at this time". Therefore, the EBRD cannot, under the terms of their Energy Policy assist with financing of the reactors. In addition, as the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) insist on a positive economic assessment it is clear that the European Commission must also stop funding the work to restart the reactors and use the remaining financial resources to decommission the unused facilities. It is no surprise that the EBRD's panel have concluded that the completion of reactors is not the least cost option open to Ukraine as the economics have been in question for a number of years. The only surprise is that the TACIS programme has been allowed to invest so substantially in the reactors prior to any final decision. Of equal concern is that other similar proposals are being prepared for Russian reactors, knowing that economic analysis is likely to produce similarly negative results. There are a large number of alternatives to nuclear power in Ukraine which will enable the rapid and permanent closure of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and remove the need for the completion of K2R4. Already over US$2 billion non-nuclear energy and electricity loans are being prepared by EBRD and World Bank, these must be developed further and expanded upon. As a result of the current situation Greenpeace has the following demands: * That the Ukrainian Government takes note of the findings of the EBRD Panel and abandons the construction of reactors at Khmelnitsky and Rovno. * The European Commission, the EBRD and the G7 formally withdraw from negotiations surrounding the completion of the Khmelnitsky 2 and Rovno 4. * That the member Governments of the countries of the P8 (G7 countries plus Russia) and EU recognise this decision and do not allow it to be undermined by signing bilateral agreements to fund the completion of these reactors, which is not in the economic interest of Ukraine. * That the ability of the European Commission to lend for completion or life-time extension nuclear projects outside the Union should be abandoned. * A comprehensive external audit of the PHARE/TACIS programme should be made. * In order to apply a general rule, 5% of each contract value under any nuclear assistance programme should be used for project evaluation by independent experts. * An energy development plan, as previously requested by the European Parliament, should be drawn up, the objective of which should be the diversification of electricity production sources, the efficient use of energy and the phase out of nuclear energy. * That should the project proceed the project sponsors ensure that there is full public consultation throughout Ukraine and in neighbouring countries. Introduction The European Commission is the largest foreign contributor to nuclear programmes in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, through the PHARE and TACIS programmes. Due to the wide-spread concern on the safety of the nuclear power station at Chernobyl a large percentage of the programme is given to Ukraine. In addition to the PHARE and TACIS programmes, the Commission has the ability to lend considerable resources for the completion of reactors in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, through Euratom. To date, Euratom loans have not been used outside member states of the European Union but the latest proposal is for funding the completion of Khmelnitsky 2 and Rovno 4 (K2R4) in Ukraine. In December 1995, the Government of Ukraine, signed with the European Union and G7 a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which sought the permanent closure of Chernobyl by 2000. The MOU contained over $3 billion in grants ($500 million) and loans for energy projects in Ukraine, including an approximately $1 billion loan for the completion of two part built Soviet designed VVER 1000 reactors, K2R4. This controversial proposal is at a decisive stage, as it is the first time an independent panel, commissioned by the EBRD, has been established to review the economic viability of the completion. Such analysis is key not only for deciding the future investment strategy in Ukraine, but also given the Commission's interest in other reactors, notably Kalinin 3 and Rostov 1 in Russia it has much wider importance. In order to assess their involvement the European Commission and EBRD must ascertain the economic and technical viability of the project, as well as ensuring that there is a full environmental impact assessment. In addition before any decision is taken there must be a comprehensive public participation process, both in Ukraine and potentially affected States, previously interpreted as neighbouring countries. Khmelnitsky 2; Rovno 4. In November 1993, the Ukrainian Parliament gave approval to the Government's decision to overturn its earlier resolution to permanently close the Chernobyl station by the end of 1993 - for a history of the Chernobyl station see annex 1. In addition, the Parliament approved the lifting of the moratorium on the completion of part built reactors in Ukraine. The decision specifically allowed the completion of 5 reactors including: Zaporozhe 6; Khmelnitsky 2; Rovno 4. Within 6 months the European Union offered 400 million ECU Euratom loan for the completion of these reactors, with an additional 100 million ECU grant (see Annex II)over three years through TACIS.1 At the time it was stated that the reason for this decision was :"Therefore the most cost-effective option is to complete some partially constructed nuclear stations which will also increase Ukraine's energy self sufficiency. The Commission has looked at the costs of alternatives, such as updating existing coal fired power stations or new construction, but found them to be more expensive.. _During a recent fact finding mission to Ukraine, the Commission produced detailed estimates of the cost both of closing Chernobyl and of completing the construction of the three power plants_ It concluded that the closure of Chernobyl and the completion of the three new reactors would cost around 1.35 billion ECU"2 The latest figures available, from the Ukrainian Nuclear Society suggest that the cost of completion of K2R4 is $1.2 billion. While the cost for Chernobyl closure are estimated for Units 1-3 to be $1.396 billion 3 and for the sarcophagus approximately ECU 305-1105 million. This would make a total cost of ECU million 2271-3071. PHARE and TACIS Programmes. Between 1992-95 the total expenditures from the PHARE and TACIS nuclear safety programme amounted to 515 million ECU. The expenditures are expected to increase in the coming years, with the predicted 1996-99 budget to be ECU 466 million. Since 1994 the Commission through the TACIS Programme has funded the preparation of the completion of the reactors at Khmelnitsky and Rovno as the Zaporozhe reactor was completed in 1995 and is now operational. In 1994 and 1995 the Commission funded projects aimed at encouraging the completion of R4/K2, totalling over 30 million ECU, see annex III Euratom. In March 1977 the Council of the European Communities agreed on "empowering the Commission to issue Euratom loans for the purpose of contributing to the financing of nuclear power stations"4. Initially, this was restricted to nuclear facilities inside the Union5 and was later given a fixed ceiling of ECU 4 000 million.6 However, in March 1994 this was changed "to authorise the Commission to contract Euratom borrowings in order to contribute to the financing required for improving the degree of safety and efficiency of nuclear power stations in certain non-member states"7The Council was quite clear for one reason for this change."Whereas, following the slowdown in the nuclear energy sector and the changes in nuclear energy policy by some Member States, there will not be a strong demand for the remaining finance from nuclear energy projects in the Community over the next few years". As of the end of 1991, 2.8 billion ECU had been used, from a total lending ability of 4.0 billion. Under Article 1, projects in Eastern Europe would be eligible if they : - relate to nuclear power stations or installations in the nuclear fuel cycle which are in service, or under construction, or to the dismantling of installations where modification cannot be justified in technical and economic terms, - have received all the necessary authorisation at national level and in particular the approval of the safety authorities, - have received a favourable opinion from the Commission in technical and economic terms. In addition Euratom can only fund projects where "a major proportion of the capital goods item or service which is to be financed" must be provided by a Community enterprise.8 Finally, Euratom is only able to lend up to 50% of the total cost of project, unless the project is joint financed with the EBRD when Community funding shall not exceed 70% of the total cost.The first reactors proposed for completion for Euratom financing were at the Mochovce nuclear power plant in Slovakia. In the initial project, Euratom was to fund 25% (366.3 million DM) of the reactors with the EBRD having a similar share. However, due to the high cost of the project and some of the other conditions, the Slovakian government suspended the loan request and are now trying to proceed with other Banks and constructors. The European Commission is presently preparing another loan for the upgrading of unit 5 and 6 of the Kozloduy nuclear power plant in Bulgaria. It is reported that French and Germany contractors will take the lead with additional work being undertaken by United States and Russian companies. Initial reports suggest that Euratom will fund approximately half of the estimated $250 million project. Another reactor being proposed for completion using Euratom funding is the third VVER 1000 reactor at the Kalinin station is Russia. The TACIS budget for 1996 has included a project "Euratom Loan preparation, Activities in relation with the Euratom Loan application for the modernisation, completion of construction and commission of the Kalinin nuclear power unit 3". This study, which cost 250 000 ECU is expected to be completed in 1997, with a decision later this year. Economics : With limited financial resources available to Ukraine, the cost of the projects within the Memorandum of Understanding are a crucial factor in deciding the direction of the country's energy sector. Western bodies who are considering funding K2R4, have all stated that there needs to be some economic analysis for the project to move forward. The most important are :- G7/EU : "Ukraine and the G-7 will work with the international financial institutions as well as foreign and domestic investors to prepare loan-financed projects based upon least cost planning principles for completion of Khmelnitsky II and Rovno IV nuclear reactors_ the investment program will identify least-cost power supply investments to meet Ukraine's future national power requirements in the context of a competitive market based power sector"9. EBRD : "Such projects [Completion and upgrade of nuclear plants] would have to meet the same least-cost criteria (including the review of supply and demand side energy alternatives) as non nuclear projects_"10Council of Europe : "These projects to be eligible they must : have received a favourable opinion from the Commission in technical and economic terms"11.European Parliament : "Calls for least-cost studies to be made a precondition for the granting of aid"12In September 1996, the EBRD announced that it had established an independent Panel to assess whether the completion of K2R4 was necessary to meet Ukraine's demand for cheap power after the closure of Chernobyl station in 2000. The panel, under the Chairmanship of Professor John Surrey of Sussex University submitted its final report to the 4th February to the EBRD, European Commission and the US Government. The panel comprising of 6 energy experts from North America and Europe was to "undertake its role in an entirely independent manner"13. In addition, the terms of reference for the panel called for "no interim reporting by the Panel to the Lenders in order to preserve the impartiality of the Panel's work". The Panel's report was released by the EBRD on the 19th February and concluded. "We conclude that K2/R4 are not economic. Completing these reactors would not represent the most productive use of $US 1bn or more of EBRD/EU funds at this time." The justification for their conclusions were: * Electricity demand has been so reduced by the highly depressed economic situation that there is a large capacity surplus which is likely to last until at least 2010 * The Panel had little confidence in any of the various elements of the estimated costs of completing and operating K2/R4, including waste disposal and decommissioning. * The need for safety upgrades at the existing WWER-1000 stations is pressing. If the safety upgrades increase reliability, the extra output of the existing nuclear stations would make K2/R4 even more unnecessary. * Low energy efficiency in final uses and conversion processes, and high losses in electricity transmission and gas pipelines and district heating schemes, present an opportunity to improve overall productivity, reduce energy demand, and increase effective electricity supply capacity - all at relatively low cost. * Even with the closure of Chernobyl by 2000 it is highly unlikely that there will be the need for additional base load capacity before 2010. Given the conclusive nature of the Panel's findings both the EBRD and European Commission must withdraw from the project. The national Governments of the G7 must take note of the analysis undertaken by the Panel and accept that the completion of K2R4 is not in the economic interests of Ukraine and abandon any bilateral funding proposals. Within the MOU there are over $2 billion in non-nuclear energy and electricity loans for Ukraine, see annex IV. These loans can assist the Ukraine to increased efficiency in both the supply and demand side and help to rehabilitate some existing power stations. These projects more than compensate for the closure of Chernobyl and can be used to guarantee that K2/R4 are no longer needed. Safety : In order to qualify for part funding through the Euratom, any project must "have received all the necessary authorisation at national level and in particular the approval of the safety authorities", and "have received a favourable opinion from the Commission in technical and economic terms".14 The Commission's technical approval was given in December 1996, but, to date the text of the Commissions approval has not been made publicly available. It is unclear what criteria the Commission has taken when giving its technical opinion. When the Commission first proposed that it funds the completion of VVER 1000s in Ukraine it stated "The Commission will insist that they [the reactors] should be completed not just to Russian or Ukrainian standards, but to full Western safety levels instead".15 While the President of the EBRD, Jacque Larosiere, stated that for his institutions active involvement, in this and other nuclear programmes, "The safety of any nuclear plant we would be working on would have to be at the highest existing standard".16 It now transpires this previous standard has been abandoned and instead the Commission's programme will "eventually allow the implementation of a safety level for these two units which is equivalent to the level currently achieved in Western Europe for plants of the same vintage designs"17. This is roughly equivalent to the reactors designed and built in the West in the 1970s, i.e. without modifications and design improvements implemented as a result of Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. This change is due to the results of initial analysis on both the design of reactors. However, to date, much of the most important analysis has not been completed. In particular, the quality of existing erected parts of these installation has not been examined and will not be undertaken until Spring this year. The lack of data on these issues are of grave concern, especially given that problems of past construction is well documented in Ukrainian nuclear power plants. As early as 1994 an international expert group stated "In addition to their design shortcomings, most of Ukraine's nuclear plants suffer from poor quality construction materials, inadequate instruments and control, insufficient attention to maintenance.. "18 . While more recent reports by both the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Goskomatom (the Ukrainian Ministry that overseas nuclear power) reported deterioration of equipment at the sites. Of equal concern is the lack of financial provisions made available in the cost estimate for the repair work necessary. It is reported that budget for repair and replacement at each reactor is only $10 million. As the Panel report, "it is difficult to see how there can be such confidence that no adverse results will be discovered,_At Greifswald, [in former Eastern Germany] where part built WWER 440 units had been abandoned for similar periods, quite significant defects were discovered because of the interruptions to construction"19 It is reported that the latest analysis, undertaken by Riskaudit, shows that over 100 design changes will be necessary. Surprisingly, not all of these recommendations will be implemented prior to the start-up of the reactors, with about one quarter expected to take place once the reactors are operational. This practise adds weight to the supposition that economics and schedule are taking precedence over safety. Most worrying of all is the clear indications that many of the proposed design changes have been grouped by Riskaudit as measures which may lead to problems which are difficult to solve during implementation or studies which may lead to significant consequences, those problems identified include: Multiple failure of steam and main feedwater lines; Procedures and hardware to asses residual lifetime of cables; Insulation material behaviour under loss of coolant accident conditions and replacement of thermal insulation. Ironically, there are a number of additional safety problems at K2R4 which arise due to the late stage of construction. This problem has been noted by the Panel, in particular with the lack of separation of the cable trays. The Panel report that the VVER 1000 designs do not allow the separation of the cable trays. In the Temelin nuclear power plant in the Czech Republic, presently being completed with assistance from Westinghouse, the cable trays have been separated to conform to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission standards, put in place after a cable tray fire at the Browns Ferry plant in 1975. However, for similar modifications to take place at K2/R4 it would "effectively mean tearing down large parts of the reactor building in order to rebuild cable trays, and that while this might be possible, it would cost such very large sums of money that no-one has made such a proposal or calculated a probable cost".20 An additional safety feature not being modified is the Instrument and Control (I and C) system. Once again a comparison can be bade to Temelin where, "the entire Russian I and C system is being replaced with a digital Westinghouse system, at a cost of approximately $300m per unit. For K2/R4, the computers will be replaced, at a cost of the order of $25m per unit but construction is regarded as too far advanced for replacement of the analogue system to be feasible"21. It is clear that the completion of K2R4, will not under any circumstances reach the standard of safety that was initially required by the European Commission. Even the PHARE/TACIS Nuclear safety expert group in their statement from 2nd December 1996, (which was in favour of the completion) have expressed some doubts and concerns. While lack of crucial analysis in key areas, indications of problems with existing construction and problems with the late stage of construction make it extremely unlikely that even the lower safety requirement can be met. In the light of these findings, the only prudent action available to the Commission is to invest the remaining proportion of the TACIS funding ear-marked for K2R4 into the decommissioning of the part built reactors. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and Public Participation Under the requirements of both the European Commission and the EBRD a requirements of the loan is that there is adequate public participation. The public participation process has already begun in Ukraine with public meetings to discuss the scope of the EIA. However, to date there has not been sufficient involvement of interested parties inside or outside of Ukraine. Scoping is a process to identify issues, alternatives and impacts that should be considered when preparing the EIA. It should also be an opportunity to determine the time scale for the public participation process. Finally it should be public to ensure that issues of concern are addressed.22 This need is recognised by the bodies involved in the process. EBRD : "This scoping process will involve contact by the Project Sponsor with representatives of the locally affected public with government agencies, as well as with other organisations. Issues may be discussed at a scoping meeting to which the Project Sponsors will invite selected representatives of such organisations as environmental authorities and municipalities, government departments and NGOs, as well as local groups. For operations involving transboundary impacts the requirements outlined in the Espoo Convention must be followed." European Commission : .."By involving them [interested groups, local communities and the general public] at an early stage, identifying their concerns and reflecting them in the scope of the EIA, scoping can increase the acceptability and credibility of the EIA and the decision-making process and reduce the risk of opposition emerging late in the day causing delays and costs".23European Parliament : " Insists that co-operation in nuclear matters between Member States and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union shall be subject to the following conditions;..d) non-member countries must have ratified the Espoo Convention (cross-border environmental impact assessment);"2425To date, there has not been adequate notification or formal consultation with all groups interested in the scope of the Environmental Impact Assessment, with discussions only taking place in Ukraine and inadequate attempts made to contact and encourage impact from interested parties in neighbouring countries. It is clear that should the completion of the K2R4 continue, there will have to be a thorough notification and scoping process undertaken, not just in Ukraine, but in all potentially affected states. Annex I : History of Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Date Event May 1978 Unit 1 Start-up May 1979 Unit 2 Start-up June 1982 Unit 4 Start-up April 1984 Unit 4 Start-up April 26th 1986 Accident Unit 4 August 2nd 1990 Resolution to shutdown units 1,2,3, by 1995. October 11th 1992 Fire at Unit 2, reactor closes. October 21st 1993 Supreme Soviet of Ukraine Overturns closure proposal. February 23rd 1994 Ukrainian Presidential Decree "Urgent Measures for the Development of Nuclear Energy and Establishing Nuclear Fuel Cycle in Ukraine". This includes restart of Chernobyl Unit 2 in 1995. April 9th 1994 US Department of Energy announce agreement with Ukrainian Government on Shutdown of Chernobyl. April 21st 1994 International Atomic Energy Agency Sponsored meeting On Chernobyl. 31st May 1994 President Leonid Kravchuk, says Chernobyl will continue to operate. 25th June 1994 Heads of States from European Union, call for the Closure of Chernobyl and pledge 400 MECU in loans and 100 MECU in Grants to assist. 9th July 1994 Heads of States from the G7 call for closure of Chernobyl and pledge $200 million in Grants to assist. 13th April 1995 President Leonid Kuchma announces closure of Chernobyl by 2000, if West assists with funding of alternatives, approximately $4 billion. 20th December 1995 G7/EU sign "Memorandum of Understanding" with Ukrainian Government, which seek closure of Chernobyl by 2000, and outlines $2.3 billion funding package. 20th April 1996 President Leonid Kuchma announces the closure of Chernobyl Unit 1, by end of 1996. 30th November 1996 Chernobyl Unit 1 closed 27th December 1996 State Committee for Nuclear Power In Ukraine announce unit 2 will re-open in 1997. Annex II : Allocation of 100 MECU, pledge for 1994-97 as part of the MOU 1. Chernobyl Site 60 MECU Decommissioning 1-3 Support Safety Authorities 2.5 Assistance to Operator 5.0 Construction installations for solid waste treatment 41 Reserve 9 Other Activities (Unit 4, site management) 2.5 2. Completion of Rovno 4 and Khmelnitsky 2 31 Project Management 10 Detailed site inspection/reserve 6 Basic Engineering 12 Support to Safety Authorities 3 3. Non-Nuclear Energy 9 Energy Saving demonstration in the agro food industry 1 Training centre for energy management 1.4 Identification of bankable projects 0.6 Energy saving : Support for setting up an energy saving Schemes 6.0 Total 100 Annex III : Work Undertaken at K2/R4 through TACIS Programme 1994-7 Source: TACIS Amount: 9414 MECU Background: This project is one of the three projects which represent the first tranch (25 MECU) of the European Community contribution to the implementation of the EU/G-7 action plan for the Ukraine's Energy sector Objective: To assist inorganisational aspects and start-up of operations for the completion of three VVER reactors under construction at Zaporozhe, Rovno and Khmelnitsky. Action : To provide assistance to the NPP operator for the establishment of the functional requirements resulting from the adaptation of internationally acceptable safety standards, with specific applications to each site according to present status (3.5 MECU). To provide assistance to the Ukrainian authorities for the licensing of new reactors and in the review of functional requirements resulting from the adoption of internationally accepted safety standards. To support the initiation of urgent work at the NPP sites (8.5 MECU) such as ; assistance to avoid further deterioration; plant inspection and completion of some small scale activities started but not finished due to lack of financing. To finance specialised Russian and Ukrainian institutes participating in the aforementioned activities (1.5 MECU) Source: TACIS 95 Amount: 6.0 MECU Objective: Detailed Site Inspection/reserve Source: TACIS 94-5 Amount: 3.0 MECU Objective: Licensing related assessments for design and operational safety of VVER 100 safety improvement programme and on-site programme of individual plants (including plants under construction).Assistance of Ukrainian Nuclear Safety Agency in assessments concerning VVER 1000 safety improvement programme and construction programme of new plant in conjunction with on-site assistance towards improvements and evaluation of individual plant backfitting programme. Source: TACIS 95 Amount: 8 MECU Objective: This project is a continuation of the action started in 1994. 1) Continued assistance of the Ukrainian Safety Authorities (1 MECU) 2) Support of Ukraine utility (3 MECU). Within the 1994 Action programme a Western Consortium (EdF, Tractable, IVO) was appointed an advisor and project co-manager to Goskomatom with the main task to assist the utility. Annex IV: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Bank, Ukraine's Power/Energy Projects Approval Schedule or under consideration, 1996-1997 : Source G7, September 1996 Lender Amount(Mil.$) Project Schedule - Approval date. World Bank 114 Hydropower Project 1April 1995 EBRD 55.9 Power Market Development Project December1995 World Bank 15.6 Coal Pilot Sector Project May 1996 EBRD 8 Poltavan Oil and Gas Project April 1995 World Bank 316 Electricity Market Development October 1996 World Bank 300 Coal Sector Adjustment Loan October 1996 EBRD 113.2 Starobeshevo Power Plan Rehabilitation November 1996 World Bank 250 Thermal Power Rehabilitation March 1997 EBRD 30 Energy Savings ESCO Project End 1996 World Bank 80 Coal Restructuring Project 1998 EBRD 104 Gas Transit Projectlate 1997 World Bank 150 District Heating Rehabilitation and Energy Efficiency Project 1998 World Bank 100 Gas Distribution Rehabilitation 1998 EBRD 50 Lisichansk Energy Efficiency Project 1997 EBRD 50 Severrodonetsk Energy Efficiency Project 1997 EBRD-World Bank 150 District Heating Projects, Teplokommunergo, Kiev, Lvov 1997 EBRD 50-100 Demand Side Management Programmes 1997 World Bank 200-300 Dniestr Pump Storage 1999 TOTAL 2136.7-2286.7 1 European Council at Corfu, 24-25th June 1994, Presidency Conclusions. 2 Background Document. Solving Ukraine's nuclear crisis - the European Union's Strategy. Memo/94/44, Brussels, June 23, 1994. 3 U.S./Ukraine Evaluation of Energy Options to Replace the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, June 23 1994. 4 Council Decision, 77/270/Euratom, Official Journal of the European Communities, No L 88/9, 6th April, 1977. 5 Council Decision, 90/212 Euratom, Official Journal of the European Communities, No L 88, 6th April, 1977 6 The Decision 23 April 1990, increased the borrowing ceiling from ECU 3 billion to 4 billion. It also stated that when the total value of the transactions reach ECU 3.8 billion, the Commission shall inform the Council, which, acting unanimously, on a proposal from the Commission, shall decide on the fixing of a new amount as soon as possible. 7 Council Decision, 94/179/Euratom, Official Journal of the European Communities, No L 84/41, 29th March 1994. 8 COM (92) 467 Final 9 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Ukraine and the Governments of the G-7 countries and the Commission of the European communities on the closure of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. 20th December 1995. 10 Energy operations policy 7th march 1995, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 11 Proposal For A Council Decision Amending Decision 77/270/Euratom, To Authorise The Commission To Contract Euratom Borrowings In Order To Contribute To The Financing Required For Improving The Degree Of Efficiency And Safety Of Nuclear Power Stations In Certain non-member Countries. Com(92) 467 Final, December 1992. 12 "Resolution on the 10th Anniversary of the Chernobyl Accident", European Parliament, 18 April 1996. 13 EBRD press release "Independent panel to assess Ukraine's energy needs", September 4th, 1996 14 Council Decision of 21 March 1994 amending the Decision 77/270/Euratom, to authorise the Commission to contract Euratom borrowings in order to contribute to the financing required for improving the degree of safety and efficiency of nuclear power stations in certain non-member countries. Official Journal of the European Communities, NO 7 84.41 15 Background Document. Solving Ukraine's nuclear crisis - the European Union's Strategy. Memo/94/44, Brussels, June 23, 1994. 16 Statement of Jacque Larosiere, President of the EBRD, at Sofia Annual Meeting, April 1996 17 Communication from Norbert Jousten, DG1A, 20th December 1996. 18 Ukraine Nuclear Power Sector Fact Finding Mission on Nuclear Safety, 5-8 April 1994, EBRD, World Bank. 19 Supporting Paper for the Ukraine Project, Economic Assessment of the K2 and R4 Nuclear Reactors in Ukraine, Gordon MacKerron, SPRU, February 1997, page 85. 20 Supporting Paper for the Ukraine Project, Economic Assessment of the K2 and R4 Nuclear Reactors in Ukraine, Gordon MacKerron, SPRU, February 1997, page 75 21 Supporting Paper for the Ukraine Project. The Completion of the Temelin Nuclear Power Plant in the Czech Republic. Steve Thomas, SPRU, February 1997. Page 98 22 A Comparison of Seven Environmental Impact Assessment Regimes, United States, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, European Community, The World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Centre for International Environmental Law, 199323 Environmental Impact Assessment, Guidance on Scoping, May 1996. European Commission, Directorate General, Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection, PG 3. 24 Resolution on East-West co-operation activities in energy and nuclear security, Resolution of the European Parliament, 20th September 1996, Official Journal of the European Communities, No C 320/245 25 The Espoo Convention states : Article 2, 6. "The Party of origin shall provide, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, an opportunity to the public in the areas likely to be affected to participate in relevant environmental impact assessment procedures regarding proposed activities and shall ensure that the opportunity provided to the public of the Party of origin.". 14 1