TL: THE 490 FORGOTTEN BOMBS: U.S. AND BRITISH FOREIGN DEPLOYED NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE SO: HANS M. KRISTENSEN, GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, (GP) DT: April 1995 [NOTE: THIS VERSION DOES NOT INCLUDE THE ENDNOTES] Table of Contents I. Introduction II. NATO and Nuclear Weapons In Europe A. The Number of Nuclear Weapons B. Where the Bombs Are C. The Rationales for Keeping Nuclear Weapons in Europe 1. NATO Justifications 2. U.S. Justifications III. Upgrading the Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure IV. The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Foreign Deployed Nuclear Weapons V. Conclusion Abbreviations Endnotes About the Author: Hans M. Kristensen is a research associate with Greenpeace's Disarmament Campaign in Washington. He is co- author of Neptune Papers No. 6 (US Naval Nuclear Weapons in Sweden, October 1990) and No. 7 (Aircraft Carriers: The Limits of Nuclear Power, June 1994). He has written numerous articles and background papers on nuclear weapons issues, including Changing Targets: Nuclear Doctrine from the Cold War to the Third World, Greenpeace International (March 1995). He coordinated the Greenpeace Nuclear Free Seas Campaign in Scandinavia from 1987 to 1991. The author would like to acknowledge the input and contributions made to this paper by William M. Arkin, as well as Stephanie Mills and Joshua Handler of Greenpeace International. 1. Introduction NATO has decided to retain hundreds of U.S. and British nuclear bombs forward deployed in half a dozen European countries.1 But although NATO's North Atlantic Council predicted in November 1991 that arms control agreements would "result in an unprecedented degree of military transparency in Europe, thus increasing stability and mutual confidence,"2 the number and precise location of the nuclear bombs remain cloaked in military secrecy. The role of these nuclear bombs is highly dubious. The Cold War has ended and the threat of a large-scale military attack on Europe has disappeared with the break-up of the Soviet Union and the demise of the Warsaw Pact. Instead, NATO is now tying their mission to vague declarations of "maintaining peace" and "preventing war," as well as to counter the alleged threat from Middle East countries seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. With the future of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to be decided at April's Review and Extension Conference at the United Nations, the commitment of all states to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation will be under close scrutiny. Foreign deployed nuclear weapons are one of the least recognized aspects of nuclear proliferation. The 1970 NPT prohibits the transfer of nuclear weapons to any state, whether a party to the Treaty or not, whether a nuclear-weapons state or not and whether directly or indirectly through an alliance. Yet, hundreds of forward deployed nuclear bombs in Europe are based in non-nuclear countries, some of which allocate and train military personnel in peacetime to deliver the nuclear weapons in times of war. Article VI of the NPT commits the nuclear powers to eliminate their nuclear weapons arsenals. 3 The Treaty comes up for renewal in April-May 1995, and its future will depend upon whether enough non-nuclear countries agree that this promise has been adequately fulfilled. The Clinton Admininstration believes it has taken significant steps towards implementation of Article VI, but the hundreds of forward deployed nuclear bombs in Europe symbolise the inconsistency of the commitment by both the US and European states to their non-proliferation obligations. This report provides an overview of the hundreds of U.S. and British nuclear bombs currently deployed in Europe. It also outlines the stated rationales attributed to these weapons by NATO and the United States, and it discusses their implications for the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I. NATO AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE The period of 1991-92 saw major reductions in forward deployed land-based nuclear weapons in Europe. In September 1991, President Bush announced the withdrawal of all U.S. ground- launched nuclear weapons and naval nuclear depth bombs from overseas. 4 Britain and Russia also responded with similar steps, and the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Taormina, Sicily, in October 1991, endorsed an 80 percent cut in tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. 5 After the reductions of the 1991-1992 period, however, little scrutiny was paid to the continued deployed of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Instead of proceeding towards a denuclearized Europe, NATO instead has reiterated its commitment to maintaining forward deployed nuclear weapons. At a North Atlantic Council meeting in Rome in November 1991, the NATO heads of state announced a new Strategic Concept which concluded that, "the presence of ... US nuclear forces in Europe remain vital to the security of Europe." The meeting agreed to "maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces in Europe" and keep them up to date where necessary. 6 Two types of nuclear bombs are currently forward deployed in Europe: B61s and WE-177A/Bs. The B61 tactical nuclear bomb is deployed by the United States Air Force, and has a selective yield from less than one kiloton to 175 kilotons. The B61 exists in three versions: Mods-3, -4, and -10. The Mod-10 is a converted W85 nuclear warhead which was previously deployed in Europe on Pershing II missiles but was withdrawn under the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) agreement. 7 The United Kingdom deploys the WE-177A/B nuclear free-fall bomb. The A variant has a yield of up to 200 kilotons, the B variant up to 400 kilotons. 8 The nuclear bombs are assigned to A-7, F-4, F-16, F-16, F-111 and Tornado aircraft. The United States has dual-capable F-16 Falcons deployed at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, and Aviano Air Base in Northern Italy, and rotates F-16s from bases in the United States to Ramstein Air Base (Germany) and Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. It also deploys F-15E Eagles and F-111 Ravens at RAF Lakenheath in the United Kingdom. U.S. B61 bombs are also assigned to Belgian F-16s at Kleine Brogel Air Base, German Torandos at Buechel Air Base, Italian Tornados at Ghedi-Torre and Rimini, F-16s at Volkel Air Base in the Netherlands, and Turkish F-104 Starfighters and F-4 Phantoms (and possibly also F-16s) at Balikesir Air Base and Murted Air Base. Greek ex-U.S. Navy A-7 Corsairs at Araxis Air Base are also thought to be assigned U.S. B61 nuclear bombs. Britain deploys eight squadrons of Tornado planes with WE-177A/B bombs at RAF Bruggen in Germany. A. THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS The precise number of foreign deployed nuclear bombs in Europe remains classified, but estimates indicate that it involves nearly 500 nuclear bombs. About a dozen are British WE-177A/B bombs while the remaining 480 are U.S. B61 nuclear bombs. Most foreign nuclear bombs are stored in Germany, Italy, and Turkey, each of which is thought to host some 120 weapons. Britain stores 110 U.S. nuclear bombs. The three smaller European "nuclear" host countries, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Greece, are each estimated to store 10 or less B61 nuclear bombs. 9 U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch told the U.S. Congress in 1994 that the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) would maintain the "current strength" of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe. 10 The arsenal peaked in 1967 at 7,200 warheads and declined to approximately 4,300 in 1987. 11 Shortly after the U.S. announced the removal of all ground-launched nuclear weapons from Europe in September 1991, the number of nuclear bombs was reported to be some 1,400, while a senior NATO official predicted "significant reductions" below that level. 12 At the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) meeting in Taormina, Sicily, in October 1991, the NATO defense ministers decided to reduce the number to about 700 in the next two to three years. 13 By August 1992, the reduction had brought it down to approximately 970, 14 and the number had further declined to about 700 as of Spring 1994. 15 When the NPR was announced in September 1994, the U.S. stockpile in Europe had been cut by 91 percent, leaving nine percent of the level at the height of the Cold War, 16 corresponding to some 630 warheads compared with the 1967 level. 17 The Washington Post and The Times of London reported the NPR left roughly 480 nuclear bombs in Europe, 18 while other reports ranged from approximately 300 19 to "several hundred" bombs. 20 B. WHERE THE BOMBS ARE Seven European countries host foreign nuclear weapons. They includes Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, and United Kingdom. 21 Six of these nations are participants in secret programs (called "Programs of Cooperation") where their equipment is certified to deliver nuclear bombs (the exception is the United Kingdom, which has its own nuclear bombs). 22 An Allied Command Europe Nuclear Operations Plan is published by SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe). 23 A total of 14 European bases store forward deployed nuclear bombs (see table 1). The U.S. nuclear bombs are stored at 13 bases. Five of these are U.S. Air Force bases, while eight are operated by the host country's armed forces. Britain has eight nuclear-capable Tornado squadrons based at RAF Brggen, Germany, that are thought to carry the WE-177A/B nuclear bomb. The combined explosive power of all the forward deployed nuclear bombs in Europe is estimated at 88 megatons at its maximum yield, corresponding to some 6,830 times the explosive power of the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima. Most nuclear yield is thought to be stored in Germany (21.7 megatons), while Italy and Turkey each store some 21 megatons. The United Kingdom stores 19.3 megatons, while the Netherlands is thought to host 1.8 megatons of explosive power. Belgium and Greece store less than that. Over the last 10 years, the number of nuclear air bases in Europe has been reduced by almost 50 percent, from 23 in 1985 to 14 in 1995 (see table 2). The reduction has been most dramatic in Germany and Turkey, where five and two nuclear bases, respectively, have lost their nuclear capability. Italian nuclear air bases, however, have not been reduced. This reflect a shift in focus of NATO nuclear planning from the former "central front" and Eastern Europe to the Middle East and beyond, requiring a southern European posture. 24 Since 1992, U.S. nuclear bombs have been removed from one British base (RAF Upper Heyford) 25 and two German bases (Memmingen and Norvenich), and the total number of U.S. bombs in these two countries reduced from 625 to about 220. However, two F-16C squadrons previously based at Ramstein Air Base in Germany have been moved -- along with their designated nuclear bombs -- to Aviano in northern Italy, which now serves as the main nuclear support facility for this new southern focus. The United States signed a memorandum of understanding with Italy on 30 November 1993, permitting the basing of two squadrons F-16s of the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing (renamed the 31st as of 1 April 1994) at the Aviano Air Base. The first F-16s were scheduled to move from Ramstein Air Base in Germany in April 1994, and discussions are continuing to ensure the successful conclusion of an Aviano technical agreement. 26 C. THE RATIONALES FOR KEEPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE Only a few years ago the purpose of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe was to deter a Soviet conventional attack on Europe and provide nuclear warfighting capabilities. But with the break-up of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact this rationale has disappeared. Throughout the early 1990s, NATO has formulated new rationales for keeping U.S. and British tactical nuclear bombs in Europe. The rationales are more general and imprecise in nature and not tied to one specific enemy, and include providing "the ultimate security," concern over proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, prevention of wars, and "burden sharing" within NATO. 1. NATO JUSTIFICATIONS The question of air-delivered nuclear bombs in the European theater was taken up at the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in Taormina, Italy, in October 1991. 27 The meeting decided that 700 hundred nuclear bombs would remain in Europe, and the final communique specifically pointed to "the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which remains a matter of great concern." 28 The conference communique concluded: "Nuclear weapons will continue for an indefinite future to cover their essential role in the general strategy of the alliance, since conventional forces alone cannot ensure the prevention of war." 29 At a press conference after the meeting, NATO General-Secretary General Manfred Woerner added that despite the changes in Eastern Europe the danger of nuclear proliferation and Iraq specifically, meant that "it would not be reasonable to renounce all nuclear weapons and to denuclearize Europe." 30 Woerner added: "Nuclear weapons will never be disinvented. That is why I do not foresee a situation where we will denuclearize Europe. These weapons provide the ultimate guarantee of our security." 31 The recommendations from the NPG meeting were endorsed by NATO heads of state and government at their subsequent meeting in Rome in November 1991. The NATO leaders approved a new Strategic Concept which also pointed to the threat from proliferation, specifically in the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East. 32 However, they also added another and much more general justification for the nuclear weapons: "to preserve peace, and prevent war or any kind of coercion." 33 The threat of a large- scale military attack on European territory had disappeared, the leaders concluded. Instead, economic, social, and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes were likely to be the new risks to NATO security. Since "conventional forces alone cannot ensure the prevention of war," the new Strategic Concept expanded the potential role of nuclear weapons to all sorts of conflict scenarios: "Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risk of any aggression incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace." 34 The NATO state leaders therefore agreed to "maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces in Europe," and keep them up to date where necessary. The numbers would be significantly reduced compared with Cold War levels, but the Strategic Concept concluded that nuclear and conventional forces "are essential to Alliance security and cannot substitute one for the other." 35 At the Rome meeting, the Defense Ministers also approved a 30- page document, known as MC-400, detailing NATO strategy for conventional and nuclear forces in the post-Cold War era. The document concluded that the NATO alliance now faced risks from instability in a variety of areas, including the former Soviet Union and the Middle East, and provided military guidance for implementing the new strategy. The alliance's nuclear arsenal was mainly a political weapon, MC-400 reiterated, but added that they could be used selectively to end a conflict, by convincing an attacker in a selective way to end a conflict by confronting him with overwhelming costs if continuing the war. Nuclear weapons would be used especially on an initial strike, in a way that is "constrained, discriminate and measured," the document says. Targets would include high-priority military targets, especially on an enemy's home territory, using either nuclear aircraft bombs or missiles launched from ships and submarines. 36 Following the Rome meeting, articles written by NATO officials began to appear in a variety of papers and magazines explaining the new direction. In an outline of NATO's nuclear strategy, entitled "Nuclear Forces -- The Ultimate Umbrella," British Air Chief Marshal Sir Brendan Jackson wrote that Third World nuclear proliferation was even "more chimerical" than the threat from Russian nuclear weapons. 37 The communique from the NPG meeting in Brussels in November 1994 also expressed concern over proliferation, pointing to "the growing risks to Alliance security interests" posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and related technologies to more countries. 38 The reference to proliferation as a justification for keeping nuclear weapons matches a trend in the nuclear weapons states towards increasingly linking the role of nuclear weapons to countering the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by more countries. 39 This development of counter proliferation strategies under which Third World nations will be added to the possible list of nuclear weapons targets is an expansion -- not a reduction -- of the role of nuclear weapons. It therefore undermines the Non-Proliferation Treaty's objective of the elimination of nuclear weapons, and makes security assurances pledged by the nuclear weapons states look meaningless. Other rationales for retaining nuclear weapons in Europe relate to maintaining Alliance solidarity. One relates to the principle of burden sharing within NATO. Deploying nuclear weapons in a number of European countries gives these nations both the declared benefits and risks associated with having nuclear weapons on their territory. 40 Another suggestion is that European NATO allies traditionally have welcomed nuclear deployment cooperation programs because of the access it grants to U.S. nuclear planning. Without this admittance, future nuclear planning in the Alliance might take place on a more restricted basis. 41 2. U.S. JUSTIFICATIONS When the U.S. pulled its ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons out of Europe in 1991-92 and left several hundred air- delivered nuclear bombs behind, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev suggested that the bombs should be removed from forwardly deployed airfields. 42 At first, U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney seemed intrigued by the proposal and a senior defense official told The Washington Post that NATO would study where the new storage sites might be located. 43 But in a speech to the NATO North Atlantic Council a few days later, U.S. chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, rejected the proposal, saying he wanted to "hedge against our having guessed wrong and the world's not turning out to be quite as nice a place as we prayed." One way of hedging was to keep nuclear bombs in Europe. "The essential nuclear linkage remains in the form of our dual capable aircraft," Powell said. 44 At the time, U.S. Air Force officials stated off the record that they would have preferred to remove all the nuclear bombs from Europe, but that they were forced to leave some behind for political reasons to help maintain U.S. influence in NATO in the future. Furthermore, a complete U.S. nuclear pull-out would have meant that the only nuclear weapons in Western Europe were British and French, leaving those countries exposed to demands for further nuclear disarmament. 45 Since then, nuclear weapons proliferation concern has become a prominent U.S. rationale for retaining nuclear bombs in Europe. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested already in March 1991 that tactical nuclear weapons "could assume a broader role globally in response to the proliferation of nuclear capability among Third World nations." 46 At the NATO summit in Rome in November 1991, the United States signed on to the Alliance's new Strategic Concept linking the presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NPR, which was completed in September 1994, examined the role of U.S. forward deployed nuclear forces and concluded that nuclear bombs would continue to be stored in Europe "as part of our commitment to the Alliance." 47 Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch told Congress that the "non-strategic nuclear forces we maintain [in Europe] have both military purposes and very important political purposes with respect to the NATO alliance."48 In his briefing, Deutch provided a chart entitled the "Adjusted Nuclear Posture." The chart listed three or four Alliance commitments served by nuclear weapons in Europe, including "deter attack on allies" and "maintain [non-strategic nuclear force] capabilities." One or two other roles were classified and deleted from the public record. 49 Deutch outlined the change that has taken place: "There was a time when the military purpose of the non- strategic nuclear forces in Europe was to assure that we could blunt a conventional Russian Soviet attack, if it were to break through into Europe. That was the purpose of the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. That need, that military requirement, has disappeared because the Soviets do not exist and the Russian no longer have the military capability to mount that kind of conventional attack. So the military purpose of the non-strategic nuclear forces is changing. On the other hand, the political purpose of those weapons to maintain within the alliance shared responsibility for nuclear forces and make sure the Europeans know that they can rely in a serious way on our nuclear forces as well as our conventional forces is an important element in understanding what changes are possible and that pace of changes with respect to non-strategic nuclear forces."50 Russian non-strategic nuclear forces were not presented by the NPR as a rationale for keeping tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. But Deutch did express "great concern" about the disparity between Russian and U.S. non-strategic nuclear forces, and pointed out that "most of the non-strategic nuclear weapons in Russia are located at distances which can easily be delivered against European targets."51 During the congressional hearings on the NPR, Deutch insisted that the political value of tactical nuclear weapons as a commitment to NATO remains high, but he admitted considerable uncertainty over the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe: "I believe we still have a very long diplomatic road to travel to understand better with NATO what the role is of nuclear weapons in NATO. Indeed, one of the most important outcomes of the Nuclear Posture Review was this notion about how we're going to address non-strategic nuclear weapons, of which the NATO question is one. ... we have to, over time, re-look at this question, with respect to NATO." 52 The NPR emphasized the international nature of U.S. nuclear forces. In his annual report to the President and the Congress from February 1995, Defense Secretary William Perry stated that, the United States extends the deterrent protection of its nuclear arsenal to its allies. "A very progressive aspect of US nuclear posture, is that it is, in part, an international nuclear posture. The NPR strongly supports continued commitment to NATO and Pacific allies.... Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of [air-delivered tactical nuclear bombs], which are not covered by START I and START II." 53 Specifically, Perry explained: "... maintaining U.S. nuclear commitments with NATO, and retaining the ability to deploy nuclear capabilities to meet various regional contingencies, continues to be an important means for deterring aggression, protecting and promoting U.S. interests, reassuring allies and friends, and preventing proliferation." 54 The reference to "preventing proliferation" is thought to relate to the concept of so-called extended deterrence. By extending nuclear forces to other countries, the United States believes it helps dampen incentives these nations may otherwise have to acquire nuclear weapons for their own security. European allies helped shape the future U.S. nuclear arsenal by providing justifications to the NPR to retain nuclear weapons in Europe. "With input from allied countries," Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch stated in 1994, "we concluded that there continues to be a nuclear element to NATO's defense posture and that the US will sustain its commitment to both NATO and Pacific allies." 55 According to Defense Secretary Perry: "Alliance commitments and the unique characteristics of nonstrategic nuclear forces were primary considerations in the NPR's consideration of what the [non-strategic nuclear weapons] force structure should be." 56 Most recently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reiterated the role of tactical nuclear bombs is Europe. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, stated before Congress in February 1995, that the bombs will be maintained in Europe, "to protect our allies," 57 and the newest JCS's National Military Strategy states: "We still need to maintain a mix of forward deployed and deployable nonstrategic nuclear weapons, both to provide deterrent coverage over our allies, and because extended deterrence, in many cases, is a decisive factor in our nonproliferation effort."58 III. UPGRADING THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS INFRASTRUCTURE Upgrades to support the deployment of nuclear bombs in Europe continue to be made. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reported in March 1991 that, "the proliferation of nuclear weapons means that US nuclear forces will require C3 [command, control and communication] systems with increased capabilities." One system being fielded is the MILSTAR/SCOTT satellite system which will improve the command, control, and communication (C3) in relation to non-strategic nuclear forces. 59 Following the U.S. decision in September 1991 to reduce tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, NATO officials told The Washington Post that a NATO program for installing new bunkers for the remaining air-delivered bombs at air bases in Europe was underway. 60 General George A. Joulwan, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command, told Congress in March 1994, that part of changing the U.S.-NATO Infrastructure Program from Cold War priorities to "meeting emerging readiness requirements in the theater" included funding "Command and Control Systems for the security of residual nuclear weapons." 61 The NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting in Brussels in November 1994 "reviewed the process of adoption of NATO's nuclear posture to the new security environment." This included restructuring tactical nuclear forces and updating and adjusting consultation and planning procedures in support of the nuclear posture required by the Strategic Concept. 62 IV. THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND FOREIGN DEPLOYED NUCLEAR WEAPONS NATO's routine integration of non-nuclear countries in nuclear planning, and the presence of hundreds of forward deployed nuclear bombs in non-nuclear NATO countries, has serious implications for the integrity of the international non- proliferation regime. As non-nuclear members of the NATO Alliance, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey take part in widespread collective nuclear defense planning, in approving deployment and modernization of nuclear arsenals, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces, and in command, control, and control arrangements. All of the non-nuclear NATO countries which host nuclear weapons on their territory (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey) have signed the 1970 nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Under the Treaty they pledge: "... not to receive the transfer ... of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly...." 63 Likewise, as nuclear weapons states party to the NPT, the United States and Britain have committed themselves "... not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly...." 64 U.S. forward deployed nuclear weapons in Europe are extensively integrated into the military infrastructure of the countries that host these weapons. Nuclear cooperation agreements exist with Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey to allow national pilots to deliver U.S. nuclear bombs with their own planes in times of war. No transfer of nuclear bombs or control over them are intended "unless and until a decision were made to go to war, at which the [NPT] treaty would no longer be controlling." 65 In peacetime, however, these "non- nuclear" nations train and prepare to be capable of carrying out their assigned nuclear mission. The United States and the nuclear host countries argue that because direct "transfer" of control of the nuclear weapons would only take place in wartime, there is no breach of the Non- Proliferation Treaty as such. But while it may not represent a strictly legal violation, it certainly contravenes both the objective and the spirit of the Treaty. It endorses "non- nuclear" countries adopting "surrogate" nuclear roles on behalf of nuclear powers. Criticism of such a narrow legalistic reading of the treaty has been raised at NPT review conferences in the past. During the second review conference in 1980, for example, non-nuclear weapons states complained that the deployment of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear countries and in international waters was contrary to the nuclear non-proliferation objective of the Treaty. 66 Delegations also expressed the view informally that further sophistication of nuclear weapons in Europe and concomitant doctrines for their use might require transfer of control over such weapons to members of the military alliance. The Second Review Conference failed to adopt a consensus declaration at the end of its work, partly attributable to the tensions created by the impending deployment of new nuclear weapons by the U.S. and Soviet Union in Europe. V. Conclusion The continued forward deployment of hundreds of U.S. and British nuclear weapons in Europe contravenes both the spirit and the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is out of tune with international efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities to more countries. A paramount objective of the international non-proliferation effort under the NPT is to prevent the creation of more nuclear weapon states. Yet, the forward nuclear bombs in Europe are permanently based on the territory of "non-nuclear" countries. In fact, these "non-nuclear" host countries assign and train national military personnel in peacetime to use the nuclear weapons in times of war, and the "non-nuclear" countries are actively involved in nuclear war planning as part of their membership of NATO. Clearly, the forward deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe severely blurs the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear countries. Ironically, the non-nuclear European states which permit nuclear weapons on their soil are also among the most prominent calling for indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT. Yet, pledging to retain U.S. and U.K. nuclear bombs for the "foreseeable future" and refusing to commit to their elimination will not contribute to a successful outcome at April's NPT Review and Extension Conference. The NPT's failure in the last 25 years to bring about the elimination of nuclear weapons is a key reason for many other non-nuclear states to argue for only limited extension of the NPT, linked to a programme for nuclear disarmament, including elements such as forward deployed nuclear bombs. For NATO countries to claim the "benefits" of a "nuclear umbrella" of U.S. and British forward deployed nuclear weapons are essential for their security, but insist that other nations cannot pursue the same option reflects a fundamental contradiction in their non-proliferation policy. It also impedes the development of a universal and non-discriminatory non-proliferation regime. Upgrading and modernisation of the foreign deployed nuclear weapons infrastructure in Europe clearly undermines the NPT's objective of nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons. Developing new "counter proliferation" strategies for nuclear weapons is also an expansion, not reduction of the role of nuclear weapons, directly contrary to states' NPT Article VI disarmament obligations. Furthermore, forward deployed nuclear weapons in Europe are an obstacle to wider application of Article VII of the NPT, which promotes nuclear weapons free zones. For the United States to base nuclear in countries like Italy, Turkey and probably also Greece, at the same time that U.S. foreign policy is actively promoting a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East, clearly reveals the contradictions within such a policy. Finally, in terms of military application, the forward deployed nuclear weapons in Europe have lost all credibility. The threat that these weapons were initially designed and deployed to counter has vanished, and NATO has been unable to present credible new missions other than dubious rationales such as "countering proliferation" and "preventing wars. In fact, nuclear weapons clearly have no role in the conflicts besetting Europe and its borders today; neither can they claim any effective mandate in "countering" proliferation. Instead, they continue to pose an environmental risk and proliferation incentive for others. Nuclear weapons are thus a burden, not a solution, for the new challenges facing Europe today. As a means toward further reducing the role of nuclear weapons, as a refutation of the importance of nuclear weapons for national status and prestige, and as a measure of their commitment to non-proliferation in the run-up to the April-May Review and Extension Conference of the NPT, NATO members currently accepting foreign deployed nuclear weapons on their territory should request that all such weapons be removed and dismantled as a matter of urgency. Moreover, non-nuclear states whose armed forces are involved in nuclear weapons missions should discontinue such programs. ABBREVIATIONS C3 Command, Control, and Communication NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NPG Nuclear Planning Group NPR Nuclear Posture Review; a 1994 review of U.S. nuclear forces NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty NSNF Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces RAF Royal Air Forces WEU Western European Union Endnotes: