TL: MISSING GREENLINKS: Examination of the Commission's guidelines for a decision about trans European Networks and proposal for an ecological restructuring SO: Francios Meienberg and Matthias Schickhofer, Greenpeace Austria and Greenpeace Switzerland (GP) DT: June 1995 The transport sector plays a crucial role in the climate issue: even today 25% of CO2 emissions in Europe are generated by transport and most analysts predict further increases. The increase in transport and transport emissions is caused by economic and social developments and also by an improved infrastructure. A clear set of priorities that favors less environmentally damaging transport systems is essential if current trends are to be reversed and CO2-emissions lowered. Greenpeace has made a detailed analysis of the Commission's proposal for the establishment of "joint guidelines for the construction of a Trans European Network", and has drawn up a list of recommendations for ecological modifications. It is now up to the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers to press for decisive changes aimed at redirecting the Commission's proposal towards an ecology-minded supply policy. Francois Meienberg Matthias Schickhofer Greenpeace Switzerland Greenpeace Austria Postbox Greenpeace EU-Unit; Rue de la Tourelle 37-39; 1040 Bruxelles Phone ++32-2-280 14 00; Fax ++32-2-230 84 13 Contents 0 Summary: missing greenlinks 1 Preliminary remarks 2 Introduction: principles for a sustainable mobility 3 Lack of evaluation 4 Lack of priorities and objectives 5 Economic inefficiency 6 New peripheries? 7 Private Financing and its problems 8 Insufficient citizen's rights 9 Literature 0 SUMMARY: MISSING GREENLINKS The Commission's proposal for a "joint decision by the European Parliament and the Council regarding common guidelines for the construction of a Trans European Network" contains fundamental flaws that need to be eliminated. Although the European Parliament, in its decision of May 18, 1995, has already agreed on a number of ecological improvements in some sectors these changes have yet to be approved by the Council and, in a final version, by the European Parliament once again. Greenpeace's has identified the following fundamental weaknesses in the Commission's proposal: - The environmental impact of the plan has not been analyzed. Provisional estimates put additional CO2 emissions caused by the Trans European Networks at 15-18% abo= ve current forecasts of +42% by 2010. This means that an overall increase of 60% in the transport sector is becoming a definite probability. Such an increase runs counter to the EU's stated objectives regarding climate protection. - The proposed projects lack a clear assessment of the extent to which they are efficient, environmentally feasible, intermodal, and in the best interest of Europe. In actual reality they are no more than the sum of the different national infrastructure plans. - The selection criteria for the projects are inadequate. The environmental criteria are not spelled out. A project-related environmental impact assessment cannot do justice to the strategic nature of TEN; it does not take into account the global effects of TEN, nor does it allow for a comparison between different strategic alternatives. The economic selection criteria for TEN are equally flawed. - The proposal fails to give clear priority to environmentally sound means of transport. Too much weight continues to be placed on airports and motorways even though rail and coastal shipping are competitive over long and middle distances. - TEN put far too much emphasis on new transport links and corridors despite the fact that many of Europe's transport problems are caused by insufficient integration of existing transport systems, by numerous technical incompatibilities and logistic difficulties, and by distorted market conditions for competing transport systems. The proposal as put forward by the Commission channels financial resources and energies in the wrong direction. - Owing to the lack of clear criteria there is a real danger that TEN will expand in an uncontrolled manner. No systematic effort was made to determine the most environmentally sound and cost-effective alternatives. As a result, public funds are not used to their best advantage - and the proposal is unlikely to have the effect of stimulating regional economic development as hoped for by the Commission. - Regional repercussions are not being properly considered. Instead of promoting greater regional cohesion, TEN will probably increase the marginalization of outlying regions and create new peripheries in the wake of new high-speed intercity links. - The emerging partnership between private investors and the state - indispensable for the funding of TEN - may lead to the formation of new bureaucratic-industrial complexes that will diminish the influence of parliaments and reduce the possibility of broad-based democratic intervention. As a result, the TEN-projects will become less acceptable and legitimate while conflicts and confrontations will gain in intensity. In some countries this is already happening. - The Europeanizing of infrastructure policies will create new losers in regions affected by increasing through traffic but deriving little or no economic benefit from it. The balance between regional and centralized European interests will be threatened. For these reasons the changes suggested by the European Parliament in its decision of May 18, 1995, represent the absolute minimum of what is required to ensure a more selective, rational, and environmentally sound approach to European transport policy and must not be tampered with. It is essential that the entire Parliament should support and actively promote these principles throughout its negotiations with other bodies in the EU. The following amendments, proposed by the EP-Transport Committee in January 1995, are particularly significant. They were supported by Greenpeace before the EP-vote. 1. The Committee's proposed amendment for a better analysis of environmental impacts: This proposal should be specified further. It should call for a Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment (SEIA). Important elements of an SEIA are its medium-term character, the investigation of direct, indirect, local, and global effects on the environment, and the use of intermodal modelling. SEIAs should be conducted in the early stages of a project if they are to have any influence on the planning process. Projects which are only part of an overall plan should not be approved without an SEIA. All future revisions of the overall plan must be in accordance with the SEIA. 2. The amended proposal requiring individual project budgets to state definite priorities regarding the choice of transport modes. This proposal is crucial for the advancement of environmentally sound transport systems, although a truly effective promotion of sustainable mobility would require a still more dramatic set of priorities. Eventually, 85% of all funds for Trans-European links should be invested in environmentally sound modes of transport and their interfaces (ports, intermodal transfer points, the development of uniform technical standards, traffic control systems for rail transport, etc.) 3. The amended proposal designed to promote coastal shipping, also deserves support. Coastal shipping, actually one of the least environmentally damaging modes of transport, has been neglected by European transport policy in the past. Furthermore, the following measures are crucial to the implementation of a selective approach: 4. The European Parliament and the Council of Ministers should request a complete cost- effectiveness study for each individual project. Such a study must take into account the external effects, including the dangers of global climate change, and the problems of new traffic generated by new transport links. 5. The EP and the Council of Ministers should insist on the implementation of an 'integrated transport programme'. A major feature of this type of planning is the integrated cost comparison between different alternatives. In many cases improved organisation and logistics will prove to be far more efficient solutions to transport problems than new road construction. Besides, the very need for mobility can be reduced in many ways that do not interfere with the basic activities of everyday life (shopping, leisure, work, communication). Before sealing the fate of Europe with yet another layer of concrete, the European authorities would be well advised to conduct a thorough and comprehensive investigation into possible alternatives. Slowing down current rates of mobility increase by means of economically sustainable measures might be cheaper in overall economic terms than the traditional politics of trying to keep up with a growing demand. Lowering the overall economic cost of transport by making transport more efficient appears to be the fundamental alternative to lowering the transport cost of business by building ever faster transport links. 6. European transport planning requires more democracy. The European Parliament must insist on the right to participate actively in all preparatory activities of the different intergovernmental working groups. Working groups should admit not only representatives of the various road building lobbies but should include environmental experts as well. The larger European interest in rapid transport links must be counterbalanced by a strong community perspective. Therefore, local rights of participation and intervention must be extended. Introducing the right of non- governmental organizations to file suit would allow environmental organizations to act directly on violations of European environmental rights directives (e.g. environmental impacts assessment, protection of birds guidelines, guidelines for the protection of habitats). The European Parliament should be careful to prevent the planned measures to speed up the implementation of TERN from infringing on the right of local populations to participate and intervene in decisions affecting them. The Council of Ministers, too, must make an increased effort to bring more democracy to European infrastructure planning instead of focussing on the implementation of large scale projects. Strict European minimum standards for citizens rights must be established to protect those who will bear the brunt of the new long-distance links. In its resolution of May 18, 1995, the European Parliament approved the following ecological amendments: - A strategic environmental impacts assessment for the entire TEN-Programme must be submitted by July 1998. - All TEN-Projects must be in accordance with EU-environmental legislation. - Of the total of funds earmarked for priority projects the EU as a whole should invest no more than 25% into road building and no less than 40% into rail transport. - Every project must be subjected to a corridor analysis. - A cost-effectiveness study that includes environmental aspects must be conducted for each project. Unfortunately, no explicit mention is made of external costs. Yet, at the same time the EP also agreed to add 15 more motorway projects to the list of Trans- European road networks, including the highly controversial and unreasonable road link through the French Vallee d'Aspe. This decisions run counter to the environmental objectives and criteria as stated in the TEN-treaty and must be revised. 1 Preliminary remarks The Commission's proposal "for a joint agreement by the European Parliament and the Council on common guidelines for the construction of a Trans-European Network" will be discussed by both Parliament and Council (of Transport Ministers) in the course of 1995. According to art.129d,1 the European Parliament has a right to participate in the decision-making. It thus bears a special responsibility for one of the most far-reaching decisions concerning the future of Europe. With its veto power and its strong position in the Mediating Committee it is clearly in a position to influence the development of this infrastructure programme. The Commission also submitted an update in March 1995 which includes the findings of the Christophersen Group and reflects the changed shape of the EU after the admission of three new member states. The "table proposal" will need to be discussed in depth, as well, lest the new participation rights of Parliament, instituted after Maastricht, degenerate into a mere farce. 2 Introduction: principles for a sustainable mobility 1. Europe is currently living beyond its means. Its environmental debt to less developed countries and future generations has grown considerably in the last few decades. The current discussion on sustainable development is intended to reverse this trend. Sustainability in terms of ecology means (Whitelegg 1993; Pearce et al. 1089; Kageson 1994): - Renewable resources should be exploited no faster than they regenerate. - The principle of equity between generations demands that the rate of exploitation of non-renewable resources such as oil does not exceed the rate of development of the environmentally sustainable technologies or substances intended to eplace them. - Emissions must not exceed the natural adaptability of the environment. Special care must be taken to avoid irreversible damage. 2. The transport sector is a major cause of the approaching climate disaster. It generates approx. 25% of all greenhouse gases. Many forecasts take it for granted that this number will increase to over 50% by 2010 (Samaras 1994, Michaelis 1994). According to the most recent EU-study the transport sector will eventually account for 80% of the increase in CO2 emissions . Effective climate protection without fundamental changes in the transport sector is impossible. Without such changes increases of several degrees celsius in average temperatures, accompanied by substantial natural disasters will become a distinct possibility. The economic and social cost of such developments are beyond the scope of current forecasts (OECD 1992i; OECD 1993b; Enquete Kommission Klima 1992b). To prevent such disastrous developments an overall reduction of CO2 emissions of 40% by 2010 was deemed necessary by the European Parliament in its report on the EC-Commission's Green Book on "Transport and Environment", published in 1992. In its resolution on the White Book, the European Parliament specifically called for a 20% reduction for the transport sector by 2005. According to IPPC-estimates an 80% reduction by 2050 will be necessary. The EU has committed itself to stabilising CO2 emissions between 1990 and 2000 - further reductions are to be discussed. 3. But the transport sector produces other kinds of irreversible damage as well: noise, land use, the imperilment of valuable habitats, and toxic emissions harmful to humans and the environment. They must be avoided. 4. Technological solutions for the reduction of toxic emissions only have a limited effect, as does the policy of a progressive shift to less environmentally damaging modes of transportation - no matter how radical its implementation (Samaras 1994; Hey et al.1992). Top priority must be given to policies that reduce the increase in mobility by rendering the European economy more transport-efficient and by seeking ways of satisfying social and economic needs with less transport. 5. Against this backdrop, any policy that continues to increase overall mobility is environmentally irresponsible and must be stopped. In the short term certain conflicts between the objectives of the community - striving for greater economic and social cohesion, trying to consolidate the European market and promoting sustainable growth - and those of an ecological transport policy will be unavoidable. Still, solving such short- term conflicts at the expense of a sustainable long-term perspective would be terribly shortsighted. The standard by which all projects of the Trans-European Networks must be judged is the extent to which they systematically contribute to the creation of synergies between mobility-saving and economic objectives of development, and the extent to which they serve to promote the twin goals of ecological precaution and economic cohesion. Infrastructure improvement needs to be selective: guided by a sense of balanced regional development within the Community and with a clear bias in favor of the least environmentally damaging means of transport. The parallel construction of competing traffic networks should be avoided. 6. The concept submitted by the EU Commission definitely fails to meet these standards. The Trans-European Networks are conceived to adapt to the growing demand for mobility and will generate still more traffic by virtue of their inherent accelerator effect. Its objective is to lower cost by facilitating mobility. Not only will this lead to a further increase in overall emissions - despite the built-in relative shift to more environmentally sound modes of transport - but it will also have far-reaching effects on regional development within the EU. The position of the centers will be consolidated, the links between them will be improved while outlying regions, more than ever, face the risk of further marginalization and impoverishment. 7. The Trans-European Networks thus generate new losers, new conflicts, and new ruptures within the Community. The only way to avoid this it to fundamentally revise the current concept. A reasonable concept for the Trans-European Networks must be based on precise and complete data regarding its projected environmental and economical impact. The European Parliament should use its strong position to demand clear priorities and a more selective approach based on comprehensive data. 3 Lack of evaluation The Commission's proposal on common guidelines for the Trans-European Networks (Kom (94) 106) of April 7, 1995, develops a general framework for a European coordination of national infrastructure policies. It designates major corridors for traffic links of European importance. It defines criteria and procedures for individual projects but leaves the planning, financing and implementation of individual infrastructure projects under the authority of the national governments. The guidelines are equally binding for projects directly or indirectly supported by European institutions (Commission, European Investment Bank). Thoughout the nineties, the various European institutions will provide support funds on the order of approximately 10 billion ECU per year (see chart, from: EC-Commission 1994b), and total spin-off investments generated by this sum will be many times more. By the year 2010, it is estimated, investments in the Trans-European Networks will have surpassed the 400 billion ECU mark. The Commission's proposal fails to give a clear overview of costs and priorities, nor does it furnish a comprehensive list of data regarding the lengths and dimensions of the required new and upgraded transit links. At best it projects target values. Only the description of the 34 priority projects identified by the Christophersen-Group is slightly more detailed. What does emerge from the Commission's proposal is this: - the existing road network is to be expanded by about 1/3 from 43'000 to 58'000 km; - 10'000 km of new high-speed railroad links are to be built, - 57 intermodal transport links are to be upgraded to meet European minimum standards; - 26 inland waterways are to be enlarged to accommodate ships exceeding these dimensions: length 80 m, width 9,5 m, depth 2.5 m, height 4.4 m; - an unspecified number of airports, seaports, transfer points for intermodal transport are to be enlarged or modernized; - traffic control and management systems for aviation, road traffic and railroads are to be installed and promoted. The only up-to-date and somewhat detailed figures contained in the Commission's proposal relate to the 34 priority projects identified by the Christophersen-Group. These projects will require an investment total of approx.147 billion ECU, distributed as follows: - 97 billion ECU or 71% for high speed networks and intermodal traffic - 28 billion ECU or 20% for motorways - 5 billion ECU or 4% for waterways - 7 billion ECU or 5% for airports and - ca. 8-10 billion ECU for seaports, transfer points and traffic management systems. One minimum requirement for any assessment of the Trans-European Networks proposal consists in the availability of specific information regarding the estimated investments required, the lengths of the transit links scheduled for construction or upgrading, and a detailed description of other measures planned The criteria used for the selection of plans and guidelines are inconsistent and do not hold up under scrutiny. Various intergovernmental working groups simply compiled a list of national transport plans and dream projects conceived by national transport planners and lobby representatives. Despite the absence of any serious selection procedure to determine which projects are truly in the interest of the Community, this haphazard compilation of national projects is now about to receive a "European seal of approval". The quality of national infrastructure planning, especially in the environmental dimension, is highly uneven throughout the Community. A premature labelling of projects as being "in the greater European interest" runs the risk of influencing or even precluding critical discussion on the national level. The Trans-European Networks constitute a psychological factor in this context that should not be underestimated. No single project, nor, for that matter, the network as a whole should receive a European seal of approval unless they meet certain well defined criteria. It is the duty of the European Parliament to draw up rigorous ecological and economic minimum requirements for the Trans-European Networks or any part thereof. This is particularly important because under present conditions environmental concerns are clearly underrated: while national infrastructure planners are meeting in EU-working groups to discuss a considerable expansion of existing infrastructure capacities, the representatives of environmental interests are relegated to the national level. If infrastructure policy is to become a European affair then the integration of the environmental dimension must not be left to the national level. Inevitably, this would result in an imbalance at the expense of the environment. To this day, no systematic analysis of the ecological impact and the overall "efficiency" of the Trans-European Networks has been performed. Similarly, the networks' impact on economic development and on the situation of peripheral regions have been superficially investigated at best. Existing risk estimates of the impact of infrastructure investments should be sufficient cause for concern. By shortening travel time improved infrastructure links enlarge the circle of destinations that can be reached within a given time. Acceleration by means of new transport links lowers transport costs and generates new traffic. New traffic generates more environmental damage. Moreover, infrastructure investments are crucial in determining the competitiveness of different modes of transport. Summarizing his review of 50 studies dealing with the effects of infrastructure investments on traffic, Selz (1993) comes to the conclusion that, although traffic increases are primarily a function of income development and economic growth, there is nonetheless a clear correlation between supply-side improvements and new traffic. Selz distinguishes between so-called 'primary induced traffic' resulting from shorter travel times and 'secondary induced traffic' resulting from changes in site preferences on the part of businesses and individuals. Most studies put the elasticity factor at -0.50 and -1, which means a 1% shortening of travel time leads to a traffic increase of 0.5 to 1%. For West Germany, Selz estimates that between 1960 and 1990 some 40% of a 267%-overall-increase in traffic can be attributed to improved road access. On some lines, high-speed trains have shortened travel times by as much as 50%. The average speed of freight transport by road has almost doubled in the last few decades. In Austria, growth rates on newly constructed motorways were almost 50% higher than on other roads (Knoflacher 1991: 6f). Meier (1989), in his study on induced traffic, arrives at results of a similar magnitude. He estimates growth rates of more than 30% for new motorways. Growth rates for certain individual road links are no doubt even higher. Even the recently published report of the Standing Advisory Committee for Trunk Road Assessment (SAC-TRA) to the British Government concludes that "induced traffic can occur, probably quite extensively though its size and significance is likely to vary widely in different circumstances" (concrete action, 3 -1995: 10). But even in relation to the entire network and the total volume of traffic induced traffic is significant. The German Federal Transport Network Plan of 1992 calls for 500 km of new motorways and a capacity build-up from 6 to 8 lanes of traffic over a total of 2190 km of motorway. This amounts to an approximate increase in overall capacity of 15% over existing motorway capacity (4,5% in new construction, 10% in added capacity). According to estimates of the German Federal Environment Office this build-up will cause 10% of induced traffic as yet unaccounted for in current traffic forecasts and an additional 7% of CO2 emissions. (Gorissen et al. 1992). A trend scenario compiled on behalf of the EC-Commission in 1992, covering possible trends in economic growth, number of cars, energy use and driving patterns, predicts a rise in traffic- related CO2 emissions of 42% by the year 2010. (Samaras 1994). Naturally, this scenario uses traffic patterns based on past infrastructure policy. Yet as we have seen, one objective of TEN is precisely to raise the total volume of infrastructure investments (see Stevens/Michalski 1993; Roy 1994; EC-Commission 1993c). Therefore, significant additional effects resulting from factors still unaccounted for are very likely. A rough calculation of the magnitude of additional CO2 effects might look like this: Assuming reaction parameters similar to those used in the German Transport Network Plan the mere capacity build-up of the European highway network by 1/3 might induce additional traffic growth rates of 20% to 25% accompanied by an extra 15% to 18% in annual CO2 emissions by 2010. In all likelihood the overall increase in CO2 will be more like 60%, as against the 42% predicted by the Community's experts. By all accounts, this is a conservative estimate since the effects of additional motorways are considerably lower in countries like Germany with a dense network already in place than in countries which are only just beginning to implement their own far-flung motorway programmes. At the end of 1994, the Commission commissioned a study on additional traffic induced by the Trans-European Networks. The results of this study must be used for an environmentally- minded revision of the programme. The car industry has some favorite sets of figures which are really misleading. One is that CO2 emissions will decrease by 40% as a result of an improved flow of traffic (see Baum 1994). A better flow of traffic does improve the specific emissions factors of cars stuck in traffic - emissions per kilometer driven do go down. However, the environmentally relevant question is how many vehicle-kilometers would otherwise be stuck in traffic. As for the proportion of kilometers driven on congested highways, it turns out that the figure is fairly small when compared to the total volume of traffic. The effects of infrastructure investments on the competitiveness of the different modes of transport are considerable. Parallel investments in all modes of transport intensify competition for gains in quality and speed and generate new mobility but they do nothing to promote the least environmentally damaging modes of transport. An earlier Greenpeace study (Dead End Road) comparing data from different countries showed that environmentally sound modes of transport capture a larger share of the total transport volume in countries that combine a modern rail system or a relatively dense network of waterways with relatively poor motorways, than in countries that either neglect the former or promote all modes of transport indiscriminately. Another survey of pertinent studies (Baum 1992) shows that unbalanced supply-side improvements of rail traffic have considerable effects on the modal split. The TGV doubled its market share on the Paris-Lyon run to 30% of the total while the ICE improved its market performance by more than 50% in some important corridors. Simulation analyses comparing situations of parallel improvements with situations of motorway neglect (Eckey-Horn 1992; Knoflacher1991) showed - not surprisingly - that rail growth rates are considerably higher in the latter case, even though some detour road traffic seemed inevitable. With freight traffic, the rule appears to be an increase of up to 4% in road-bound freight traffic for every 10% cut in transport time - a considerable shift from rail to road, in other words (Baum 1992). All these studies indicate that the Trans-European Networks will have a considerable environmental impact that must not be neglected. Nevertheless, the development of methods for strategic environmental impact assessments (SEIA) to examine short- and long-term, direct and indirect, regional and global effects of transport routes is still in its infancy (see OECD 1994a). A review of methods, announced by the EC-Commission in August and September 1994, is still outstanding, as is a comprehensive investigation of the Trans-European Networks. So far, only the European High-Speed Network has been subjected to a SEIA (Mens en Ruimte 1993). The environmental dimension emerging from this scenario is no cause for optimism. The planned expansion of the European High-Speed Network will increase CO2 emissions by 26%; 30% are more likely according to one trend scenario. This result alone suggests the following conclusion: although the emphasis of European infrastructure investments in the context of the priority projects designated by the Christophersen-Group is on rail traffic there will be no great environmental benefits. This is because one fourth of expected rail transport growth rates will come from new traffic and another unspecified percentage will be the result of switch-over traffic from conventional rail systems. In some crucial ways, however, this study might very well serve as a methodical reference for an "SEIA of Trans-European Networks". For one thing, it allows us to draw up the following minimum requirements for an SEIA: - An SEIA needs a medium time-frame of more than 20 years for a reliable assessment of the decisions involved - A scenario method should be applied which allows for a comparison of different options. The choice of scenarios is of supreme importance. The scenarios that Mens en Ruimte selected for his study were one-sided; there was no scenario for supply- side improvements in conventional rail traffic, nor, for that matter, a scenario predicated on the desirability of avoiding further increases in traffic altogether. As a result - when compared to the other selected scenarios - the study looks relatively encouraging in environmental terms. All scenarios should include a "minimizing variant" based on the active reduction of environmental damage and the implementation of climate protection objectives in the transport sector (see Knoflacher et al. 1991, OECD 1994a) - The study should demonstrate effects on land and energy use, on air pollution, noise, safety and the "modal split". It should consider global and indirect effects as well as regional impacts (dangers to valuable habitats, separation effects). - The study should consider environmental effects of additional traffic caused by supply- side improvements. - It should include "corridor analyses" that investigate the effects on certain corridors. The object of such analyses is to determine the substitution effects at work between different modes of transport in the event of both parallel and unilateral expansion of transport modes. In the face of such minimum requirements of method the amended proposal nr.8 of the European Parliament is too weak. The Commission has promised an "investigation of long- term environmental impacts" which is to form the basis for a review of this decision. (KOM(94) 106:7). The European Parliament and the Council of Ministers should be very specific about the questions they want the SEIA to answer. Crucial elements of an SEIA are its medium-term character, the investigation of direct, indirect, local, and global environmental impacts, the implementation of a scenario technique with a minimizing variant, and of corridor analyses to examine the effects on environmentally sound modes of transport. An SEIA must be performed early on if it is to influence the planning process at all. Priority projects should not be approved prior to an SEIA. The SEIA should become the legally binding guideline for future priority project revisions. It should also be used with traffic control systems. Article 5 of the Commission's proposal "for the consideration of environmental aspects in the planning and expansion of the network" must be revised and specified. The economic assessment of the Trans-European Networks is insufficient with respect to both business and overall economic aspects. Projects of common interest do require a cost- effectiveness analysis. However, as a study for the Commission shows (EURET 1994; see also: OECD 1994b) the technical standards and the quality of such analyses are very uneven. As the study points out, there are monetary and qualitative elements in a project assessment. Some environmental damage can be quantified as "external costs" and some cannot. There are numerous studies about the deferred environmental and social costs of traffic that need to be integrated into cost-effectiveness analyses. There are advanced methods in this field (Hanley/Spash 1993), even though the full monetarization of results seems out of the question. Projects of common interest require a comprehensive cost-effectiveness analysis. A review of the EURET-study also reveals that the underlying discount rates applied to different modes of transport and different countries vary widely. Discount rates are used to calculate the current value of future costs and income. Capital-intensive, low-depreciation projects are less profitable at high than at low discount rates. Different discount rates can thus considerably distort the choice of priority infrastructure measures. A comprehensive cost-effectiveness analysis that includes deferred environmental costs is crucial to the informed setting of priorities and to the promotion of a selective approach. The European Parliament and the Council of Ministers should therefore include among their proposed revisions the demand for a comprehensive cost-effectiveness analysis that includes external effects. 4 Lack of priorities and objectives Community objectives of the Trans-European Networks include economic growth, promoting the domestic European market, economic and social cohesion, and cooperation with third countries (KOM(94) 106:6:8). The Commission's idea is to provide for "efficient, environmentally sound, safe, and sustainable transport". The emphasis, therefore, is not on competition between modes of transport but on complementariness and the use of comparative advantages. (KOM(94) 106:6). In fact, the Commission's proposal postulates a "multi-modal perspective", i.e. the integration of different modes of transport according to their individual strengths into a "single virtual network" (see ERT 1992a) The vision is of an alliance of national transport nets that would be "inter-operable". Last but not least, there is the promise of a special effort to include peripheral regions Vision and reality, however, are far apart. In its proposal, the Commission creates the illusion of a "rational, goal-oriented approach" which is sorely absent from real life planning. Regardless of the solemnly proclaimed goals and priorities in articles 2-5, actual plans include numerous projects and transport links with no apparent connection to the general objectives of the proposal. Contradictions and inconsistencies abound. - Attempting inter-operability means, first and foremost, harmonizing the technical standards of national systems, or at the very least reating compatible interfaces. Network plans are poorly suited to this task. The same is true for the technological alignment of minimum quality standards on the Trans-European network of intermode transport. - In trying to link modes of transport, the strategic emphasis must be placed on selecting intermodal transfer points. Instead, the Commission's proposal focusses on the definition of corridors. A network of transfer points for intermodal transport is absent from the report. The Trans-European network for intermodal transport has been upgraded considerably from the Commission's original proposal of 1992 (Kom 92/230; EC - Commission): the number of links was raised from 30 to 57. The 30 priority links are estimated to cost 2 billion ECU - now even if 57 links should double or triple this figure, the amount of money - or the percentage of total cost - earmarked for investment in "intermodality" is ridiculously small (the report contains no precise figures) - There is no evidence, in the proposal, of priorities relating to environmental concerns or to optimizing the comparative advantages of different traffic modes. No one seriously disputes the comparative advantages of railroads over long-distances. Why, then, the Trans-European road network should be more tightly knit than the Trans-European railroad network is anyone's guess. The report provides no answer. According to the principles of subsidiarity and of comparative efficiency which the Commission claims to follow, the main advantage of the road network is at the level of local fine-distribution, and is thus primarily a regional and national concern. - The proposal's original claim to avoid the construction of parallel infrastructures in areas of relatively little traffic has already failed in part. In northwestern Spain and in northern Portugal two parallel motorways to Valladolid are being built through sparsely populated regions. - This pattern of parallel road and rail infrastructures, of expanding high-speed networks and airports clearly emphasizes a very capital-intensive capacity upgrade (Scanlink, Pyrenees-motorway, etc.). The danger exists, not only of another mobility leap generated by transport policy, but of the production of excess capacities that will place a financial burden on the European transport network. This, it goes without saying, would run counter to the proposal's principle of a "cost-effective transport network in overall economic terms". (see chapter "Economic inefficiency"). These deficits and contradictions are explained by the fact that the Trans-European Networks are European only in appearance. In reality, they are just a loose compilation of national plans, each based on different criteria and with a different set of priorities. Lumped together in the Commission's proposal they are about to receive a certificate of approval for being in the common European interest. For ecological and economic reasons some kind of explicit rationale is necessary to avoid wasting large amounts of money on an oversized and very capital-intensive infrastructure. What is needed, above all, for a Trans-European infrastructure policy is a discussion about goals and criteria - especially in the environmental dimension which was badly neglected in the Commission's proposal. Environmental concerns do get an occasional mention here and there but on the whole they are insufficiently considered. Numerous demands made by the European Parliament in earlier resolutions on the Green Book ( in: Official Journal C 284/164 of Sept.18, 1992), and the White Book (in: Official Journal C 44/53 of Jan.14, 1994) were passed over by the Commission's proposal. Even the most recent amendments proposed by the EP are lacking in the way they restate some of the earlier arguments. One major environmental objective is that European infrastructure policy should contribute to the lowering of energy consumption levels and CO2 emissions. A significant amount of resources will probably be invested, over the next decades, in the transport sector and, theoretically, this is a rare opportunity to make substantial sustainable investments in energy efficient transport systems. Therefore, the environmental criteria and objectives on which the Commission's proposal will be based should be far more specific. A second objective, stated early on by the EP, is to optimize the use of existing infrastructure capacities before any new construction is started. Both, European inland shipping and railroads still have considerable unused capacities that could be tapped into by adjusting certain parameters, or simply by means of better organization (e.g. diminishing the speed differences between trains). Existing air and road transport infrastructures, as well, are nowhere near being used to capacity. By adopting suitable measures such as road-pricing these reserve capacities could be put to good use. (for a systematic analysis see: Nijkamp et al. 1994) The third objective stated by the EP is to give precedence to the least environmentally damaging transport modes. No such preferential treatment exists today. The ambitious British, French, Spanish, and German motorway programmes were included in the current proposal without prior examination of their environmental and economic consequences. As the Piecyk-Report to the EP points out, the current network plan includes 126 road links, as compared to 11 rail connections and 56 links for intermodal transport.. The 34 priority projects identified by the Christophersen-Group do give precedence to environmentally friendly transport modes but they are only one part of the overall package. In December 1994, the Council of Environment Ministers dismissed a proposal calling for modal priorities. The approved amendment of the European Parliament is therefore all the more remarkable; with its proposed allocation pattern of at least 40% rail and no more than 25% road is certainly a step in the right direction. Applied to the infrastructure budgets of the EU, as in fact the EP demands, this allocation pattern marks a radical shift in favor of environmentally friendlier infrastructures, particularly in countries on the European periphery. Unlike the Commission, the European Parliament also emphasizes transport hubs and transfer points (amendment 40). Such measures are important in view of improving the competitiveness of environmentally sound transport modes. Priorities should be specified further and more clearly biased in favor of environmentally sound transport modes. Except in regions on the periphery, the Trans-European network of motorways should not be expanded. Ports for coastal shipping should be upgraded whereas expansion plans for airports in major European economic centers should be abandoned for reasons of climate protection. Transport policy should be based on the following priority/allocation pattern: 50% rail, 10% road. 25% intermodal and ports for coastal shipping, 10% inland shipping, and 5% airports. Fine-tuning of priorities will result from a comprehensive evaluation based on rational criteria. Preferential treatment should be given to coastal shipping. Neglected in the past, coastal shipping is not only an environmentally low-impact mode of transport but has an important role to play in the integration of the Community's old an new peripheries (e.g. the Scandinavian countries)(see Elshols 1994). Special attention should be paid to measures promoting the logistic integration of coastal shipping into the transport chain. This includes modern transfer facilities and efficient rail links to ports. 5 Economic inefficiency The Commission's White Book on "Growth, Competitiveness and Employment" (EC- Commission 1993c: 82f) defines the essential economic functions of TEN as follows: - "Directly and in the short-term new employment opportunities will be created through the proposed large-scale projects and their lasting positive effects on industrial production in Europe." - "The existing networks no longer meet the needs of the domestic European market. This shows in a decline of competitiveness" With the recession over, attempts to justify TEN as a short-term measure to stimulate employment were bound to fail. Even the infrastructure institute the European industry, ECIS, admits: "It is worth recalling that the whole process of selecting large projects for special treatment started as the response to a recession which is now over. That response moreover was always unrealistic given the lead times of the projects in question."(ECIS update, January 1995: TENS after Essen). But even its long-range effects on the national economies are being called into question. Arguing that the benefits of TEN go well beyond immediate cost-effect considerations, an ECIS-discussion paper (Roy 1994) invokes overall benefits to society and calls for a macro- economic analysis to complement existing cost-effectiveness analyses. Roy points to several macro-economic models by Aschauer and Mundell - originating in the US but with a global scope - that seem to prove how increased government spending on infrastructure investments triggers considerable economic growth rates. However, even European Investment Bank economists have questioned the realism of these models (Girard/Gruber/Hurst 1994; Gruber 1994; Hurst 1994). The correlations alone are dubiously high - presumably a 1%-growth in infrastructure investments will result in a 0.3% - 0.6% economic growth. Applied to the Swedish economy, the models even predicted a 1% increase in the national product. These results are considered unrealistic. Hurst estimates that the reaction would more likely be in the 0.01-0.02%-range! Even advocates of the model concede that it does have a fundamental methodological flaw. The link between infrastructure investments and economic growth is merely a correlation. As for cause and effect, the reverse order might be just as true: In times of strong economic growth governments will be more inclined to invest in traffic infrastructure than in times of weak growth. Even advocates admit that "there remains the distinct possibility that the association between infrastructure investment and productivity growth is indicative of a reverse causation from the latter to infrastructure spending " (quoted from: Roy 1994: 32) So much for that argument. Roy (1994) goes on to investigate another, equally weak argument: public investments in transport infrastructure lower transport costs and raise the productivity of the transport industry. If these productivity gains are passed on in the form of lower prices for transport users, the productivity of the latter also rises, resulting in improved competitiveness and economic growth. Aside from the obvious flaws of this equation - will productivity gains really be passed on?, do lower costs really lead to growth? (for a criticism of this simplistic assumption see Padoa-Schioppa 1987), the sobering fact remains that transport costs account for less than 1% of production value(!) once the very high cost of logistics is subtracted (Kohlhaas/Ewers 1994: 132ff). Besides, the economic utilization threshold of roads diminishes in proportion to their "ubiquitous distribution" (Hurst 1994; 68) This also explains why some studies come to the conclusion that the cost of public infrastructure investments is higher than the reduction of private costs that they achieve. In reality, the argument developed by Roy and the ECIS is nothing but a thinly veiled and relatively inefficient form of subsidies for the transport sector and for industry in general. Finally, Roy (1994) also develops an argument he calls the "consumer rent". A new bridge (signifying the elimination of a transport obstacle) lowers transport cost and increases transport demand. The differential between increased traffic and lower cost can be considered a "consumer rent". Negative environmental impacts are polemically reduced to a lesser view from the front porch (Roy 1994: 36). Since deferred environmental costs rise in proportion to the total transport volume, Roy's consumer rent is mostly a redistribution mechanism for the benefit of high mobility transport users at the expense of the less mobile parts of the population and of all those directly affected by global climate dangers. Roy's ecological blindness only underlines the necessity of considering deferred ecological costs in any cost-effectiveness- analysis. The whole range of arguments put forward by TEN-advocates in reality boils down to the old Keynesian tenet that public investments promote economic growth. As economists of the European Investment Bank found out, the size of public investments is less important than their quality(Girard/Gruber/Hurst 1994: 14), or in economist terms: their capital productivity. Transport infrastructure investments with high capital costs are particularly prone to over- sizing, over-capitalization, and, therefore, low capital yield, unless investments are selective, based on strict assessment criteria and on a thorough examination of alternative options. None of the proposed plans fulfill these criteria. The other key argument of the Commission - the dimension of existing networks being insufficient for the needs of the European market - suffers from the same weakness. On a political level, the Commission concludes that the criteria of transport efficiency have so far been neglected; on a practical level, however, it decides to eliminate the problems of an expanding domestic market by creating new problems. This may not be efficient policy but the reflex behind it is certainly familiar: if the demand outgrows the supply, increase the supply- in this case the European transport infrastructure. This 'philosophy' ignores that its strategy is bound to fail. According to Down's "fundamental law of traffic congestion", capacity increases generate the incentive for additional traffic which leads to more congestion (Perl/Han 1994). This strategy paralyses all intelligent responses of transport users to transport obstacles. Bottle necks may indeed slow down certain technological developments but, more importantly, they generate incentives for technological, organizational and logistic innovation that might lead to more efficiency in transport.. Here are some examples: - because their just-in-time supply system was at risk, several of German automobile manufacturers have shifted a considerable portion of their supply system to the railroads, - a large German car manufacturer revamped its supply organization in a German metropolis. The company introduced a system of collecting supplies as needed and thus increased the overall utilization rate of its transports from subcontractors to main assembly plant. - deteriorating traffic conditions in inner cities are the prime cause for the dynamic development of city logistics - Switzerland's 28 ton-limit for trucks has contributed significantly to the increase in intermodal transport in Europe. Nearly half of all European intermodal transport is Trans- Alpine. - Due to the lack of a road link to continental Europe, environmentally low-impact ship transport is crucial to Scandinavia's foreign trade. Numerous bottlenecks on the European transport systems are not caused by lack of transport links and infrastructure projects but by insufficient utilization of existing capacities, by incompatible technical standards, by breaks in the chain of logistics that prevent the full development of intermodal traffic, and by a combination of insufficient economic incentives and market distortions that prevent the efficient utilization of existing transport links. Consequently, Nijkamp et al. (1994) no longer speak of "missing links" but of "missing networks". They don't view infrastructure as a mere matter of investment but also of the management and organization of transport flows (Frybourg/Nijkamp 1995). New motorways, besides being the most expensive option available, are hardly a remedy for congestion resulting from breaks in the logistic chain (e.g. lack of harmonization at transfer hubs, insufficient development of fine distribution at intermodal transfer points, lack of logistic services in ports). One of the crassest examples of a bottleneck are the dismal European and national policies regarding ports. The extraordinary extent of European coasts is a virtually untapped potential for the transnational and sustainable transport of goods. Owing to the short-sighted fears of influential major ports over market shares this potential has been neglected in the past. Efforts aimed at optimizing existing capacities and eliminating bottle-necks must not concentrate on traffic links (so-called "hardware") alone but should take in questions of organization, informational support, environmental parameters and financial obstacles. In other words, what is needed is a multi-dimensional optimizing strategy. Traffic control systems make environmental sense if they serve to avoid the construction and build up of motorways or the expansion of railroad infrastructure capacities. But frequently the same objectives can be attained with alternatives that are considerably more cost-efficient. Besides, today such systems are mostly used to increase the volume of traffic by improving and speeding up the flow of traffic. Similarly, road pricing systems most often serve to finance new motorways. All in all, traffic control systems tend to promote traffic instead of reducing it (ZE4ngl 1995). They mostly function as a very expensive congestion deferment device. Optimizing strategies are important in order to satisfy a growing transport demand at optimal environmental cost. However, they are not sufficient in themselves to create a context for a transport-efficient economy. Their role is at best a transitional one in the service of more far- reaching concepts.. The "least cost or integrated planning"-approach has a wider scope (Philpott/Boyle 1994; Bergmann 1994). The concept was first used in the energy sector where it demonstrated that strategies aimed at reducing energy use can be more cost-effective for the energy companies than traditional supply-side expansion in response to growing demand. The cost of fuel and new facilities is higher than the investment cost for energy-saving technologies or products. "Least cost planning" was introduced in the energy sector in order to exploit this economic potential (see Leprich 1991). This approach is now being tested for the transport sector as well. Some first principles have been developed in this context (Philpott/Boyle 1994): - The standard is "access" to certain purposes (work, leisure, distribution of goods) rather than mobility as such. Mobility is merely a means to achieve certain goals and not a goal in itself. This opens new perspectives on how to achieve goals with a relative minimum of mobility. - Central to this concept is the cost-comparison of all options. Rather than evaluating individual projects separately for their cost-effectiveness, a comparison is made between various options that provide access. This ties in with the idea of evaluating different options in the context of an SEIA. - Zoning and land use must be taken into consideration as important factors which can both generate or prevent a demand for mobility. In other words, the scope of ITP is not restricted to transport policy proper; it also affects other policy sectors that generate or prevent transport demand. - ITP is a market-oriented tool - i.e. it respects the preferences of transport users and thus serves as a corrective to all top-down planning. ITP starts out with an analysis of transport needs, then compares the different options available to satisfy these and finally proceeds to develop investment plans on the basis of its findings. ITP thus favors a "selective approach" to transport investment policy. A policy aiming for a transport efficient economy must go beyond mere traffic planning. Transport policy today faces much the same problems that confronted energy policy 20 years ago (Peake 1994). Until the energy crises came along, it was pretty much a universally accepted article of faith that a growing economy depended on growing energy use. Dissociating energy use from economic growth has since proved possible. It was recognized that existing and growing needs could be satisfied with less energy. Gradually this insight is finding its way into the transport sector as well (see e.g. Danish Ministry of Environment 1993; Peake 1994). There are numerous development trends and possible measures to lower transport demand. Some examples are listed below: - The economy has been undergoing a process of "dematerialization" in recent years. As a consequence, transport weight is growing at a much slower rate than the economy (Ihde 1984). The new development model proposed in chapter X of the Commission's White Book, based on more efficient use of energy and resources combined with a decrease in the taxation of working income, could further promote these trends. - Geographical proximity is making a partial comeback as a production factor. Just-in-time supply planning, market proximity, facilitating direct communications/negotiations, lowering of transaction costs are just some of the considerations that encourage this development (see von Gleich et al. 1993). Also, regional siness clusters and regional business networks with synergy and spin-off effects due to close geographical proximity are increasingly influencing the selection of production sites (Porter 1989). - The economy is undergoing a structural shift towards "differential quality production": scale output and global markets are no longer the only production objectives, as customer-induced differentiation, flexibility, and a shift from price-based to quality and technology-based competition are gaining in importance. (Gleich et al. 1993). - The emergence of a new type of logistics and of new communications technologies is opening up a considerable potential for avoiding physical transport and traffic by substituting communications and a better utilization of vehicles, respectively. By means of telematics, for instance, it is possible to print a supra-regional newspaper simultaneously in different locations, thus cutting down drastically on delivery miles required (Boes 1994). In the machine building industry the mailing of construction and production data to regional production facilities is standard practice. Decentralized bottling based on a uniform recipe has determined Coca Cola's site concept for years. (see Boes 1994). - For reasons of ecology and quality, consumer movements prefer regional products requiring minimal market transport, especially where food products are concerned (see Meienberg/Forni 1994; BF6ge 1993; Schleicher-Tappeser u.a. 1992). - New developments in regional planning and zoning are abandoning the idea of scattered communities that generate large amounts of traffic in favor of a concept known as "decentralized concentration" (see Bergmann et al. 1993; BFLR 1993; Rossberg 1993): numerous important functions of daily life are concentrated in small to medium geographical centers in an effort to cut down on traffic. - In this context an instrument known as "traffic impact study", designed to analyze the impact of state policies on traffic developments, is increasingly attracting attention (Schmidt 1993 for the German BMV). A consistent implementation of such studies also helps to avoid traffic. Many of these promising trends are being undercut by a policy that systematically promotes the dissolution of real space, the removal or overcoming of natural obstacles in geographical space, and of all else that might stand in the way of unrestrained mobility. (see Hesse 1992 and 1993; Heinze 1992). Overall acceleration and the lowering of transport costs are the twin aims of this policy which thus creates the very problems associated with transport growth in Europe. Add to this the lowering of transport costs resulting from sinking fuel prices and the deregulation of freight traffic. The current concept of the Trans-European Networks is creating still more incentives to disregard distance as a factor in decisions regarding personal mobility and the choice of production sites. According to Holzapfel (1994; 1992), a majority of cross-border traffic takes place between neighboring countries, is, in other words, cross-border regional traffic. Yet the TEN-project tries to mobilize enormous sums for investment in long-distance transport although current demand in no way justifies such efforts. Clearly, the TEN-project in its current form is a move informed by politics - to improve conditions for the totally unrestrained international mobility of goods and services and to promote European integration - and not by economic sense which demands that resources be used efficiently. This only indicates once more that the Trans-European Networks are out of proportion and unwarranted by any existing demand. All the more reason, then, to chose a selective approach based on nothing but strict, environmentally-qualified economic criteria. (SEIA; KNA; ITP). Before sealing the face of Europe with yet another layer of concrete, alternatives should be studied, systematically and comprehensively. Slowing down the current growth of mobility by means economically sustainable measures, might be more cost-efficient in overall economic terms than the traditional policy of adjusting to growing mobility. Lowering overall transport cost by increasing transport efficiency is emerging as the fundamental alternative to lowering the business cost of transport by accelerating the speed of transport. This requires a thorough analysis of transport chains (see BF6ge 1993) to establish the transport requirements over the total life cycle of a product, as well as business transport requirements and possible alternatives. BF6ge demonstrates in his study that a different choice of suppliers can significantly alter the transport intensity of products. Also, companies should consider transport streams when making transport-related decisions. Of course, transport must be perceived as a problem before any of this will happen. The elimination of bottlenecks slows down innovation leading to a transport-efficient economy. Speed limits, adequate social standards, weight limits, and the full accounting of external costs (Kageson 1994) are just some of the instruments that serve to bring out the character of transport as a commodity that cannot be exploited indefinitely (on the effects of environmental taxes in the transport sector see Kohlhaas/Ewers 1994, or, slightly more optimistic, Romerskirchen et al. 1991). 6 New peripheries? One of the objectives the Trans-European Networks presumably hope to accomplish by providing a comprehensive infrastructure is to diminish the disparities between the various regions in order to promote the economic and social cohesion of the European Union. The expansion of the road network, in particular, is perceived as a "[...] dynamic vector of homogenous development between the center and the regions [...]" (Motorway Working Group 1993, p. 98) Whether TEN - or any other supra-regional transport investment program - will actually achieve this objective is highly questionable. The underlying assumption that there is a positive correlation between economic growth in the different regions and the expansion of traffic infrastructure is based on the classical site theories which are considered fairly out of date nowadays. Infrastructure plans are not deduced from larger regional economic goals, and the specific problems of individual regions and the specific effects of new and added construction on these regions have not been analyzed The optimism of the programme's advocates concerning the expected positive effects on regional economies, inasmuch as they do not merely relate to the immediate employment-effects of infrastructure investments, derives from theoretical considerations known as the integration- or-development-theory and the bottleneck-theory. Improved regional integration/development and the related lowering of transport costs will provide expansion opportunities for companies already operating within the region and will attract new business (see Kaufmann 1983; MFCller 1992, Frerich 1974). In this way, infrastructure investments operate as "indirect production effects" that lower costs or increase productivity. Considering, however, that transport costs make up only a very small fraction of total production cost, such expectations seem clearly inflated:"by and large businesses do not consider transport costs to be an important factor as they average only 3-5 % of operating costs" (ECMT 1991, after Whitelegg 1994); moreover, once the cost of logistics is subtracted transport accounts for only 1% of production cost (Ewers/Kohlhaas 1994). Therefore, a further decrease in transport costs will barely make a dent in the cost structure of businesses (Rietveld/Nijkamp 1993). No doubt structural interventions or policy measures affecting overall prices will be much more effective than additional infrastructure investments (declining utilization threshold). Also, the impact on different sectors of the regional economy is varied: "some will be helped, some will be hurt" (Girard/Hurst in EIB 1994, p.16) At best, such marginal gains in production cost will benefit large supra-regional companies, whereas regional businesses with a less advantageous internal cost structure will be pushed out of the market, much to the detriment of the endogenous economic structure of the region. The bottleneck-theory focusses primarily on a region's unused potential and is based on the assumption that infrastructure shortcomings represent obstacles that slow down regional economic development by preventing the efficient use of certain production factors. (see Klemmer 1981). Eliminating infrastructure bottlenecks makes the region more accessible and chances are that its unused development potential is activated for the benefit of the entire economy. (EURET1994). Again, studies show that the effects of additional infrastructure investments on the economy decline as the overall density of transport networks increases, and are marginal for most regions (in-depth: Lutter 1980; Whitelegg 1994 for UK; see also 'Regional Studies', July 1994, containing studies on several countries). Author Geographical scale Infrastructure Conclusions Botham (1980) 28 zones (UK) Changing nature of highway Small centralizing effect on employment Cleary & Thomas (1973) Regional level (UK) New estuary crossing Little relocation but changes in firms' operation Dodgson (1974) Zones und the North (UK) New motorway Small effect on employment Judge (1983) Regional level (UK) New motorway Small effect on employment Mackie et al (1986) Regional level (UK) New estuary crossing Small overall effect Fritsch & Prud'homme (1994) National network (France) Parts of major road network completed 1973-89 Some effect on productivity of established firms; no evidence of attracting private investment Evers et al (1987) Regional level (Netherlands) High speed rail Some effects on productivity Balduni (1972) Mezzogiorno region (Italy) Construction of Autostrada del Sole Attributed with creating 53.000 jobs 1958-70 but fails to take into account other aid measures to this depressed region Bonnafous (1987) France Introduction of high speed TGV rail Facilitated development but small overall impact ECMT (1975) Europe infrastructure development Slight impact from new links connecting equally developed regions Studies of development impacts of road investment source: EURET 1994, p. 51 (adapted from Button (1993) with additional references) According to studies by Lutter/Putz (1992) all regions on the scale of the NUTS-3-level of European regionalization have qualified road links to the European long-distance road network and virtually all regions are accessible by rail. Regional integration in terms of European long- distance transport is basically assured. Differences do exist with respect to the quality of regional links, as expressed in the geographical situation of the different regions within Europe and in the quality of available traffic infrastructure. As a rule these differences are not sufficient in themselves to explain the site preferences of companies/industries in a European context. (Lutter/Putz 1992). Differences in density and quality most notably exist on the level of intra- regional networks. Considering the relatively low investment resources of peripheral and economically weak regions these differences are likely to become more pronounced as time goes on. (see Vickermann 1995). As a result, effects induced by eliminating bottlenecks and upgrading long-distance links should be viewed in context and are difficult to predict since regional economic development depends primarily on general economic aspects and site-specific factors, and only to a lesser degree on the general transport situation (Lutter/Putz 1992). "The regional impact of new infrastructure is complex to identify, and the impact on employment could be perverse" (Girard/Hurst 1994). Positive development impulses resulting from better access to European high-speed transport systems and an improvement of overall transport relations are most likely to occur in economically strong peripheral regions where improved accessibility effects coincide with a high level of established economic performance (Lutter/Putz 1992, p.634), and on the peripheries of large agglomerations (see Gleich et al. 1993). Minor effects are predicted for economically strong central regions, since their continuing development is limited by other factors (Lutter/Putz 1992). As for economically weak regions, they may conceivably fall even farther behind in development precisely because of improved access: they will be exposed to the superior economic clout of businesses from large agglomerations (Knop 1976) and they might experience a draining effect resulting in a loss of both businesses and labor (Lutter 1980). A study of 12 European countries shows that a new link "between an area of concentration and an undeveloped region improves the flow of traffic not in one direction but in two. This entails a risk of competition from outside and of draining of resources from the underdeveloped region." (Blonk 1979 nach Whitelegg 1994). For example, the construction of the motorway linking northern and southern Italy did not promote local economic development in the south, but made the south even more economically dependent on the industries in the north (ECMT 1992). Measures intended to promote the independent development of poorer peripheral regions are frequently subverted or at least partly canceled out by infrastructure investments. Only rarely do the two complement each other in the desired way. Even direct or indirect employment benefits resulting from infrastructure investments are a mixed blessing. For one thing they are often short-lived, and for another, the funds invested in infrastructure might have been more effectively used to create employment in other, more permanent ways. Investments in transport infrastructure should be aimed at closing the gaps in the regional nets because, as we have seen, improvements of long-distance links often run counter to regional transport needs. Improvement of regional road networks should not concentrate exclusively on promoting access to long-distance road systems but - in the spirit of intermodality -should seek to optimize the links between different transport modes (Vickerman 1995). Regarding the removal of bottlenecks in large population centers as envisioned by TEN, it is important to note that capacity problems in existing long-distance networks are mostly caused by intra-regional transport (Transport 2000 plus), whereas infrastructure problems - with the exception of holiday traffic - are confined for the most part to points where local/regional traffic streams intersect with transit routes. Solutions to these problems must be attempted on the basis of regional corridor studies; the negative effects of interregional transport on specific regions, on the other hand, should be reduced by measures that promote intermodal traffic. Infrastructure measures in regions on the periphery must be carefully analyzed for their possible regional effects and aligned with endogenous development objectives and development measures in other sectors. One-sided upgrading of long-distance links may further drain poor regions of people and resources and increase the disparities within the European Union. In large population centers, on the other hand, regionally generated bottlenecks should be eliminated by means of integrated transport policies and regional land-use planning. A simple expansion of capacities will not eliminate any of the problems related to transport and the environment in the long run. There is no cause for new construction or large scale upgrading of motorways - not on the periphery, nor in highly populated central regions. In both places the regional economy will not derive significant benefits from such investments. The beneficial effects of high-speed networks are restricted to a select number of cities. Businesses in such locations will profit from increased participation and utilization opportunities in different sectors of supply and demand. Highly prized site factors such as opportunities for face-to-face contacts will benefit inordinately. (Steinbach/Zumkeller 1992). Again, these networks are designed for the almost exclusive benefit of already dominant centers while whole regions alongside these high-speed links will suffer environmental damage and even a possible loss of access to metropolitan areas because trains will not stop there anymore. The findings of Holliday and Vickermann (1990, p.459) confirm this. On the subject of the TGV they have this to say: "The role of the TGV is to exploit the development of existing metropoles, it is not to create new centres of economic activity; and this role is only fulfilled under certain limiting conditions." (see also ECMT 1992). Communications and relations between metropolitan areas will be strengthened while the relative quality of access in all other regions will of necessity deteriorate. High-speed networks between metropolitan areas widen the gap between a limited number of big city beneficiaries and all other regions. Unless high-speed networks and regional networks are closely linked in the near future the disparities within the Union will continue to grow, with more and more regions relegated to the status of peripheries. 7 Private Financing and its problems The primary goal of TEN is to increase infrastructure investments. After a significant drop in the eighties, the nineties were to become the decade of renewed investment efforts. (see OECD 1993h). However, budget restraints continue to prevent a rise in investments. For example, the full financing of 14 priority projects is still only partly assured. In 1992, the Commission did persuade governments to increase the various EU-budgets, but lack of funds continues to be an impediment. For some time, private financing seemed like an attractive way out of this impasse but the difficult Eurotunnel experience and aborted attempts at private financing in Spain and France (ECIS Expert Group 1994) have had a sobering effect. Indeed, the fully private financing of infrastructure projects might have some interesting effects: - Cost assessments and, therefore, cost-effectiveness analyses are taken more seriously if private enterprises undertake the risks; - aware of the high-risk nature of infrastructure investments private investors tend stay away from overly ambitious projects in favor of cost-effective solutions (KAY 1993); - very high fixed costs require higher user fees than public roads. Tolls on the privately financed Spanish motorway system were so high that demand stagnated while motorists increasingly sought out alternative routes. Purely private models of financing have since been abandoned. Instead, the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) is proposing public-private partnerships. As is customary in such partnerships the public sector's role is to give guarantees, insure losses, and provide a safe legal context - in other words, guarantee private investors an adequate return on their capital (see European Roundtable of Industrialists 1987; 1992a) The danger exists, of course, that losses will be socialized whereas profits will go to private investors. But the ERT's proposals go beyond mere financing. The idea is to set up a privately-organized management for infrastructure planning, based on "virtual networks" made up of public and private decision-makers who would channel the planning process from its earliest stages. The important thing here is to guarantee the participation of all important decision-makers right from the start. The reality, of course, is that by the time the public and the different environmental organizations are invited to join the debate, these "virtual networks" have been engaged in dialogue for a long time. They have defined their priorities and have developed strategies to subvert and neutralize criticism. They will be deaf to objections from another camp. Parliaments will find it difficult to exercise their democratic control and an early public debate on the effects of infrastructure projects will hardly be possible. With its proposal for a decree concerning a "Declaration of European Interest" (KOM (93) 115, in OJ C 124/14 of May 6 1993) the EC-Commission has not entirely failed to provide an opening for public intervention but the time-limit it provides for is very short. Apparently, public involvement from the earliest possible moment was not intended. The European Parliament and the Council must be very careful to preserve fundamental democratic rights of participation in the face of developing public-private partnership in the Transport sector. It is worth bearing in mind that undemocratic procedures diminish the acceptability of the projects and may cause violent conflicts. 8 Insufficient citizen's rights Transport policy is becoming a European issue. European interests such as the full development of the common domestic market and the further promotion of European integration are becoming more important. However, the Europeanization of infrastructure policy does pose a threat to the adequate representation of local and regional needs and interests. It is clear that, while the environmental cost of new long-distance transport routes will be heaviest at the local and regional level, others, for the most part, will reap the benefits of this development (for theoretical considerations on this point see Binswanger/Wepler 1993). Every move that extends the European influence on transport policy requires a corrective mechanism to guard the interests of the lower levels. Numerous studies concerning the obstacles encountered by efforts to speed up infrastructure construction take issue with the rights of the affected populations to object to certain developments, and there is no shortage of ideas on how to streamline the legal processes involved in planning. Most of these ideas have one thing in common - they seek to diminish the rights of citizens to have a say in matters that affect them. The opposite should be done. High on the list of urgent measures to strengthen democratic participation is a European guideline ensuring the right of environmental organizations and citizen's groups to file suit collectively. European environmental laws have frequently been violated in the past (most notably SEIA-guidelines and bird protection guidelines). For one thing, any enforcement control worth its name demands the decentralization of the right to file suit, as implicit in the concept of the right to file suit collectively. In many countries this right is already an effective part of the law, whereas in others plaintiffs are still required to submit evidence of their "individual concern" before being awarded the right to file an objection. It is in the nature of infrastructure projects that they are of more than individual concern. Other important instruments that need to be strengthened include the right to be heard and the right to object in matters of transport planning that violate the environment and the interests of those affected. As corrective and counterweight to the increasing Europeanization of infrastructure policy such rights are essential. Democratic rights of direct participation must be improved on the European level as well. Preparations for the Trans-European Networks took place among groups of experts behind closed doors. The "Motorways Group", for instance, which is in charge of preparing the European Motorway Network, includes government officials and representatives from all the powerful European road traffic lobby groups. It does not include members of the European Parliament, nor of the various national parliaments, nor any representatives of environmental organizations. Discussing among their own kind only, the motorway planners remained undisturbed by any outside criticism. The other preparatory groups were equally closed. Eventually, the lack of democracy in transport planning will come to haunt those who are trying to press ahead without regard for the public interest. In some countries the conflicts sparked by motorway construction projects have already escalated considerably. The lack of legitimation and transparency in the early planning stages is taking its toll in the form of more and more violent conflicts at different project sites. It is the responsibility of the European Parliament and the Council to finally bring democracy to the process of transport planning for Europe and to involve all interested parties in the planning stages that lie ahead. This is above all important with regard to the future development of 'Strategic Environmental Impact Assessments' and 'Integrated Transport Planning Methods' which must be taken out of the hands of the transport bureaucracy and placed squarely at the center of an open, pluralistic and democratic debate. 9 Literature Baum, H./Pesch, S./Weingarten, F. (1994): Teilstudie B/III: Verkehrsvermeidung durch Raumstruktur. Guterverkehr. In: Enquete- Kommission "Schutz der Erdathmosphaere" des Deutschen Bundestages (Hrsg.): Studienprogramm: Band 4 Verkehr. Teilband 2., Bonn: Economica Verlag.. 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