TL: GERMAN WASTE IN ESSEX (GP) SO: Greenpeace International DT: Unknown Keywords: toxics hazardous waste trade greenpeace groups reports uk europe germany problems gp / Greenpeace Waste Trade Scandals Recycling Series Ban the Waste Trade Case Study No. 1 CONTENTS: THE SCANDAL THE DISCOVERY THE WASTE - WHAT IT IS THE DEAL THE FINAL RESTING PLACE THE LAW PROCEEDINGS LESSONS LEARNED? APPENDIX 1 APPENDIX 2 GERMAN WASTE INTO ESSEX WASTE TRADE SCANDALS GREENPEACE CASE STUDY NO. 1 SERIES RECYCLING The Greenpeace waste trade scandal series has been created in an effort to provide legislators, journalists and public officials, with behind-the-headlines case studies as to what actually happens in today's flourishing hazardous waste trade "business". It is our sincere hope that given good information, good decisions will be made to prevent the transboundary movement of hazardous waste. DATE: November 1989 - August 1990 THE DEAL: Hazardous waste, amounting to about 470 tonnes, was collected from a number of different sources in Germany and shipped to England. It was brought over by two waste brokers, Controlled Residue Processing in Wales and Terra Consult in Hamburg. Some consignments were exported as goods, others as non-ferrous metals for recycling. There was probably no intention of recycling the waste. It was stored in two warehouses (in Essex and in Reading) before being sent on for disposal. Other loads, imported by the same companies and with no transfrontier waste shipment documentation, were sent directly to a landfill site in Essex. THE WASTE: The 470 tonnes of waste consisted of a variety of substances. About 10 tonnes were laboratory chemicals, paint thinners, sealants, anti-fouling paint residues and solvents. About 45 barrels contained impure 111-trichlorethane and about another 50 barrels contained toluene. Mixed solvents were also exported. THE HAZARD: toxic, flammable, carcinogenic, contamination of ground-water. ORIGIN: Kertess, Hanover; Devalit, Deenst; Hans Jung, Duesseldorf; International Farbenwerke, Hamburg; Biesterfeld Chem. Industrie; Farbenfabrik M.Wilckens, Glueckstadt; Morton International, Bremen; Vaselinwerke Schuemann, Hamburg; DEA Mineralol AG, Hamburg; Teroson GmbH, Heidelberg; Grillo-Werke, Duisburg. PERPETRATORS: Controlled Residue Processing, UK; Terra Consult, Germany; Tiedemann Staedereinigung, Germany. MIDDLEMEN: Lloyd Forwarding, Essex, UK; Fairfield Packaging, Reading, UK; Collier Industrial Waste Ltd., Warrington, UK; Cory Waste Management, Essex, UK; Recycling-Centrum Seevetal, Germany. ULTIMATE FATE: Some of the waste was disposed of at a landfill site in Essex - the Cory Waste Management site in West Thurrock. Most of the waste was returned to Germany. From there part of the waste was sent on to Poland. A consignment of 60 tonnes was forwarded from Essex to Poland. Some of this waste was accepted to be re-sold whilst other wastes may be returned to England. LEGAL LOOPHOLES EXPLOITED: EC Directive Transfrontier Shipment of Hazardous Waste Regulations (Non-Ferrous Metals loophole). LESSONS LEARNED 1 Waste moves along a path of least resistance. Germany > UK > Poland. 2 It's easy to misrepresent wastes as goods especially if recycling is claimed. 3 Waste traders like to play the "double profit" game. First they are paid for waste "disposal", then for "goods". 4 Unscrupulous dealers will jump through any loophole given them. 5 It's easy to lose account of where waste goes and ends up. THE DISCOVERY ON 14 AUGUST 1990, COLLIER INDUSTRIAL WASTE LTD, A WASTE TREATMENT FIRM IN MANCHESTER, AGREED TO ACCEPT CERTAIN PAINT RESIDUES FROM A WASTE BROKER IN WALES, CONTROLLED RESIDUE PROCESSING LTD (CRP). THEY WERE NOT TOLD THAT THE WASTE - CLASSIFIED AS "SPECIAL WASTE" - HAD COME TO BRITAIN FROM ABROAD. 1 On 22 August, Colliers received a fax from CRP advising them that 30 big bags of the waste would arrive on 24 August. Colliers phoned CRP to say that they were fully booked and could not accept the delivery but were told that the vehicle was already on its way and could not be stopped. The waste arrived on 23 August, accompanied by the standard S.17 consignment note for "special waste" (a form that is issued under the Control of Pollution Act for pre-notifying the transportation of certain wastes) and a statement of dispatch from a firm in Essex, Lloyd Forwarding (Shipping & Transport) Ltd. of West Thurrock.2 Colliers had only dealt with CRP in South Wales; there had been no mention of Lloyd Forwarding Ltd. Lloyd, in fact, is a storehouse company and has no licence to handle hazardous waste. The words "Shipping & Transport" appended to the firm's name on the statement of dispatch made Colliers suspect that the waste had actually been imported. They inquired with the driver of the lorry who said that he had been told the waste was from Germany. So Colliers rang the general manager of CRP, John Bellamy, who eventually admitted that the waste had indeed been imported from Germany.3 Colliers refused to handle the waste, since it was not accompanied by a Transfrontier Shipment consignment note and they informed the Greater Manchester Waste Disposal Authority (G.M.W.D.A.). An inspector from G.M.W.D.A. came to Colliers on that same day and approved their decision not to accept the waste. He issued a S.17 consignment note, on an emergency basis, to enable the waste to be returned to Lloyd in Essex.4 The G.M.W.D.A. then contacted Essex County Council.5 Pollution Control Officers from Essex County Council began an investigation. They visited Lloyd's warehouse in West Thurrock where they found more than 200 tonnes (best estimate 206 tonnes) of imported hazardous waste including contaminated solvents. It transpired that waste had also been stored at another warehouse in Reading, known as Fairfield Packaging and that the same importers, Controlled Residue Processing in Wales, had sent material directly from the port to a landfill site in Essex. Essex County Council sat on the issue for some days, then put out a press release. On Monday 3rd September, Radio Essex, accompanied by a campaigner from Greenpeace, visited the West Thurrock warehouse and reported the case. BBC and ITV television news also reported the affair. In August 1990, before the scandal broke, Controlled Residue Processing, the importers of the German waste, asked Lloyd to send three loads (3 x 20 tonnes) of dyes and sealants to an address in Poland. These were sent as goods with a Dangerous Goods Note. The destination address on the DGN was: Grot Spolka z.o.o. Ul Studencka 28 Zarnow 72 - 111 Poland (Grot is the name of the company. Spolka means company; z.o.o. is the equivalent of Ltd.) Here, according to Rainer Braune, the director of CRP, the materials were to be resold. He said they were in the same condition as you might find them in a hardware store.6 The destination given on the DGN, was Zarnow, a small town not far from Szczecin. The first load consisted of 163 drums and 1 palette of sealants; the second load, 39 palettes of sealants; and the third load was an unknown quantity of mastik. This is according to the DGN, but there were probably also dyes in the loads. Greenpeace informed the Polish environmental authorities who investigated the matter. They decided to accept the mastik but were contemplating the return of the rest of the waste to Britain. The Waste - What it is. THERE WERE ABOUT 470 TONNES OF WASTE IN TOTAL CONSISTING OF: . laboratory and household wastes . paint thinners ù sealants . anti-fouling paint residues ù solvents . 111-trichloroethane ù toluene ù chlorine and sodium related compounds ù acids and alkalis The waste discovered at the Lloyd warehouse was contained in about 600 barrels and 50 huge sacks and comprised a variety of substances. About 10 tonnes of it was made up of laboratory chemicals, paint thinners, sealants, anti-fouling paint residues, catalysts and solvents.7 About 45 barrels contained impure 111-trichloroethane and a further 50 barrels or so contained toluene, both of which are flammable and toxic solvents. The other warehouse, Fairfield Packaging stored about 104 tonnes of catalyst and paint waste.8 There were another 107 tonnes of catalyst, paint and laboratory waste which was sent directly to the Cory Waste Management site in Essex.9 60 tonnes of the waste that had been stored at Lloyds had already been sent on to Poland before the waste was discovered by Essex County Council. TOXIC PROPERTIES OF THE WASTE Laboratory and household hazardous wastes: These are said to be toxic wastes collected from schools and households which would undoubtedly be a mixture of different chemical compounds. This may include acids and alkalis as well as heavy metals such as lead and mercury. The predominant component would probably be organic solvent wastes. These may or may not be chlorinated. Chlorinated solvents may be volatile and contaminate water. Non chlorinated solvents may also be volatile and possibly flammable. If landfilled either of these could be released to the atmosphere or water. Paint thinners: These would be turpentine or white spirit wastes which are made up of hydrocarbons such as terpenes and petroleum oil derived components. These would be volatile and certain components would be flammable. The waste may also contain paint residues if it has been used for cleaning purposes which could incorporate a range of pigments and other materials of unknown toxicity. Sealants: It is uncertain what this waste would contain. Antifouling paints: Anti-fouling paints contain toxic biocides to effectively perform the task of preventing organisms from growing on the hulls of boats. Other anti-fouling paints are generally based on heavy metals such as copper. In a landfill these heavy metals could also leach into waterways and pollute surface or ground waters. Solvents: Unchlorinated hydrocarbon solvents may include aromatic compounds such as benzene, toluene, xylene, aliphatic compounds such as hexane and heptane and alicyclic compounds such as cyclohexane. Many of these are likely to be volatile and possibly flammable. Exposure to these may initially cause irritation of skin, eyes and upper respiratory tract. Acute exposure (a large dose over a short period of time) to aromatic hydrocarbons can cause headache, drowsiness, nausea and general central nervous system disruption. The most important uptake route for humans is usually via air and food with water being relatively insignificant. Epidemiologic Al studies have led to the conclusion that benzene causes leukemia and others may also have long term carcinogenic effects. 1,1,1 - Trichloroethane: This is a widely used solvent which has been identified on many occasions as a contaminant in water and is generally present in low concentrations in the atmosphere. Acute exposure to 1,1,1 - trichloroethane causes central nervous system depression which leads to dizziness, nausea, vomiting, lack of coordination and many cases of death have been reported as a result of occupational exposure or solvent abuse. Chloroethanes have been associated with causing cancer in animals and they are known to adversely effect a wide range of human organs. Toluene: Toluene has been shown to harm the foetus in animal experiments. Chlorine and sodium containing compounds: It is extremely difficult to predict the effect of these as it could encompass a huge range of compounds, many extremely hazardous. Acids and alkalis: Accidental release of either large amounts of acidic or alkaline substances will kill flora and fauna in water. Another problem, which may be more serious, is that acid may decrease the pH of water in surrounding soil and landfilled area. This may cause the breakdown of landfilled containers and thus release the contents into the environment. Acidic conditions will enhance the release of heavy metals from the solid to dissolved phase.10 THE DEAL 'The trouble is that a lot of these things are done on trust. If someone tells us they are carrying non-waste products, we believe them. The customs officials in the ports may make spot checks on cargoes but they cannot search every container.' THE GENERATORS THE WASTE ORIGINATED FROM VARIOUS SOURCES IN WEST GERMANY. ù 12 tonnes of it was from the Hanover premises of Kertess, a manufacturer of cleaning products which had gone bankrupt in 1987, leaving behind barrels of contaminated chemicals. These included several chlorine and sodium-related compounds and a variety of acids. The responsibility for disposal of this waste fell to Hanover city council which owned the land. According to the head of Hanover's environment protection department, Gerhard Meyer, the material was left lying around unlabelled, and mixtures of chemicals had been thrown together into plastic sacks.11 Chemical recycling plants in West Germany were offered the job of removing the material but no-one wanted to clean up the mess left by a company which had become notorious for its pollution of ground water at another plant in Hanover.12 In 1988, the authorities in Hanover invited waste disposal firms to put in tenders. The contract went to Recycling-Centrum Seevetal, who agreed to deal with the material in accordance with West German and EC laws on hazardous waste. Their first plan, to ship the chemicals to the Netherlands and Britain, had to be abandoned because they failed to get the necessary authorization from the receiving countries.13 Recycling-Centrum Seevetal then decided to store the materials in a temporary storage facility at Brunsbuettel, near Hamburg until they had stockpiled enough to export. The Brunsbuettel storehouse was managed by the Tiedemann Staedtereinigung (sanitation) company run by Herr Tiedemann and Herr Juergens. In April and May 1990 the Kertess site in Hanover was finally cleared and the waste was sent, in four loads, to Tiederman Staedereinigung. Herr Tiedemann, the managing director of the company, confirmed receipt of the chemicals and that they were clearly label led as hazardous waste. About 115 barrels were delivered in June and July alone. All this was done with the consent of the authorities.14 When the waste began to be transported to the UK in the spring, however, it was sent as goods rather than as waste, and no EC transfrontier waste shipping documentation was filled out. In fact, the Tiedemann Staedtereinigung, who arranged for the shipment of the material, sent the authorities no information at all. Herr Looft of the Schleswig-Holstein Water and Coast Authority only found out how Tiedemann had misrepresented the waste when Herr Tiedemann showed him a Dangerous Goods note from his file where the waste was described as non-ferrous metal residues.15 "It seems clear there was an infringement of the regulations and that a wrong declaration was made," said Herr Looft. "The trouble is that a lot of these things are done on trust. If someone tells us they are carrying non-waste products, we believe them. The customs officials in the ports may make spot checks on cargoes but they cannot search every container."16 ù Another source was a firm called Devalit Plastik, Deenst, Germany. This company advertises itself as "Neue Wege in der Kunstofftechnologie" - artificial fibre technology. Devalit's director, Herr Menger, said that in April or May 1990, he had sold dry residues from painting processes to a waste broker called Terra Consult (see below). Terra Consult told him the wastes would be incinerated in a "special plant" in the UK.17 ù A further source was International Farbenwerke, Hamburg. Executive director Adolf Meyer, told Greenpeace that he delivered 13 tonnes of liquid residues from lacquer/enamel production to Terra Consult on 28 February 1990 and another 18.8 tonnes of the same waste on 2 May. He paid Terra Consult DM 16,479 for this waste - about DM 875 per tonne.18 ù Another source was waste from school chemical laboratories and collected hazardous household waste, 4 drums of which came from Holzminden, just outside Hanover. The waste disposal authority there collects toxic waste from households and from school chemical laboratories. They sent about 100 tonnes of these wastes to a Hamburg firm, Sondermuell Entsorgung und Recycling (SER). Of this 100 tonnes, SER sent 20 tonnes to the firm Tiedemann. 80 tonnes were sent to another company called Plump in Bremen. Four barrels of this waste were later found in West Thurrock. Herr Penn of Terra Consult said he himself had seen the packaging of barrels of the Kertess waste at the port of Brunsbuettel on 8th June.19 The waste was packed into two 20 ft containers. According to Herr Penn all the labels were marked "Kertess" and he said he didn't know how the municipal waste from Holminden had got mixed up with the consignment emanating from Kertess.20 OTHER SOURCES: ù Biesterfeld Chem. Industrie, Hamburg. ù Farbenfabrik M. Wilckens, Glueckstadt. ù Morton International, Bremen. ù Vaselinwerke Schumann, Hamburg. ù DEA Mineralol AG, Hamburg. ù Teroson GmbH, Heidelberg. ù Grillo-Werke, Duisburg. ù Hans Jung, Duesseldorf. THE BROKERS Recycling-Centrum Seevetal 2105 Seevetal 2, Brookdamm 26, Germany (tel. 040 7687054) This company won the contract with the provincial capital in Hannover (Landeshauptstadt) to dispose of the waste from Kertess (see Generators) They sorted, packed and label led the wastes. They also dealt with wastes other than the Kertess waste though it has not yet been ascertained which other wastes. The Landeshauptstadt Hannover do not know whether Recycling-Centrum Seevetal were involved with the export of the waste but they point to their agreement with the firm to prove that they themselves certainly didn't have anything to do with the waste's export. IMPORTERS - KISSING COUSINS All of the wastes were imported by two wastebroking companies: Controlled Residue Processing, run by Rainer Braune and John Bellamy, from a house in Gwent, UK and Terra Consult of Hamburg, Germany. According to Herr Looft of the Schleswig-Holstein authority, CRP and Terra Consult constitute a "Vetternwirtschaft" (or cousin business) because Herr Penn of Terra Consult and Herr Braune of CRP are, literally, cousins.21 They are continually working together. In November 1990 they began exporting mixed solvents from Berlin (Bundesmonopolverwaltung fuer Branntwein) to Kalon Chemicals in Northumberland, UK.22 ù Controlled Residue Processing (CRP) Llanwern, Gwent, Wales (tel. 0633.412707) The warehouse company didn't know at the time how much material was involved or how long it was going to be stored. Nor did they know the waste was hazardous. This company was formed in 1988 and is run by Rainer Braune and John Bellamy. Rainer Braune formed this company after he left Specialist Waste Management, a West London firm which disposed of hospital waste. He had been taken on by that company to develop a trade in West German waste imports but left after this new business failed to materialise.23 It seems unlikely, therefore, that he did not know what he was dealing with when he brought over the waste from Germany that ended up in West Thurrock. CRP and Terra Consult organised the importation of the wastes in cargo containers through Felixtowe, Harwich, King's Lynn, Ipswich and Immingham. Herr Braune claimed that the bulk of the imported material was not waste, but contained useful residues and solvents which could be extracted and sold.24 On 5 April 1991, Rainer Braune was taken to Reading Crown Court charged with theft and perjury. ù Terra Consult Graumannsweg 1, 2 Hamburg 76, Germany (tel. 040.2201031) Terra Consult is the waste broker in Germany which works regularly with Controlled Residue Processing. In this case they acted as brokers between Tiedemann (see below) and CRP. It is run by Herr Penn. They helped arrange for the return of some of the waste to Germany. They are now being sued by some of the generators of the waste.25 THE STOREKEEPERS GERMANY: ù Tiedemann Staedtereinigung GmbH&Co Fritz-Steiger Strasse 45, 2212 Brunsbuettel, Germany (tel. 04852 2076) Run by Herr Detlef Tiedemann and Herr Juergens. The wastes from the Kertess site went first to a company called Recycling- Centrum Seevetal who then used Tiedemann to store these wastes, along with wastes from Holzminden, before sending it on to Britain. UNITED KINGDOM: The waste found at Lloyd was part of a larger consignment or series of consignments. In all, about 470 tonnes of waste were imported by Controlled Residue Processing and Terra Consult. Waste also ended up at Fairfield Packaging in Silchester, Reading, UK. Anne Woodland, who runs the site, stored several loads of waste paint and catalyst for CRP and had been instructed by them to put it into skips ready for collection by the disposal company, Cory Waste Management in Mucking, Essex.26 Waste was also sent direct from the port to Cory Waste Management landfill site in Essex. ù Lloyd Forwarding (Shipping and Transport) Unit 10 A/B, Bay Manor Lane, London Road, West Thurrock, Essex, England This is the company which was found storing the waste. The company, established in 1982, employs 12 people and deals in storing cargo, haulage, forwarding. It is run by Frank Lloyd and Colin Champion.27 They apparently had no contract but merely a verbal agreement, dating from Spring 1990, with Controlled Residue Processing to take a number of consignments of paint products, store and forward them as asked.28 The warehouse company didn't know at the time how much material was involved or how long it was going to be stored. Nor did they know the waste was hazardous. Delivery notes accompanied the waste, and, on occasion, CMR papers (customs forms) and dangerous goods notes but nothing to suggest that the loads included hazardous waste. Lloyd claims they only learned it was hazardous waste from Essex County Council.29 When they were asked if they had not been suspicious of the drums and bags, some of which were leaking or about to break open, they told Greenpeace that they had a load of material coming in every day and could not inspect or verify everything. Still, they were not happy about the condition of the barrels and they rang Controlled Residue Processing to ask them to put the material into new containers. CRP said they would arrange for this. Lloyd said they knew the material was from Germany but had no idea of the source.30 Lloyd claimed never to have dealt with CRP or Terra Consult before. CRP had told them the material was for recycling and resale. "But", said Frank Lloyd, "after the first loads were delivered here, none of it was being moved. I spoke to the company in August and told them we would not accept any more until some had been shifted. Two loads were then shipped out to Poland."31 When they were asked why they had sent the 30 bags to Collier they said they were merely complying with an order from CRP. They did however begin to get suspicious and rang Rainer Braune to ask him to confirm that nothing funny was going on and that this stuff was not hazardous waste. Braune confirmed it.32 ù Fairfield Packaging Culham Mill, Little London Road, Silchester, Reading, Berkshire, England. (tel. 0734 701567) Owner: Mrs Anne Woodland Paint waste and catalyst, totalling some 104 tonnes, was stored here in January 1990 before being put into 17 bins and taken off to be disposed of at the Cory Waste Management landfill site in Mucking. It was sent to Fairfield Packaging and then on to Cory by Controlled Residue Processing. "THE RECYCLERS" . Collier Industrial Waste Ltd. Moss Side Lane, Rixton, Warrington WA3 6EL, England. Colliers, a large waste disposal company in the UK, had agreed to take some 43.5 tonnes of waste from Controlled Residue Processing before it found out that the waste was imported. It accepts waste from abroad and would have accepted the waste from Germany had it been accompanied by the Transfrontier Shipment documentation. Subsequently, the waste was returned to Lloyd. Colliers became aware that the waste was imported only by chance. Since there are two major landfill sites within a short distance of the Lloyd warehouse in Essex, it is not clear why Controlled Residue Limited decided to send waste to Manchester. Possibly, CRP thought Colliers would treat it. However, the waste, dried paint, was probably untreatable. ù Cory Waste Management London Road, West Thurrock, Grays, Essex RM16 lLS, England (tel. 0708 864621) This company took the catalyst and paint waste which was stored at Fairfield Packaging. They landfilled the material save for one last load which they burned on site. They were never paid by Controlled Residue Processing and are still owed œ5,244.33 They were told by Rainer Braune that he did not deal with imported waste and that the waste he was sending them was indigenous.34 This was completely untrue. 110 tonnes of imported hazardous waste was sent directly to Cory in late 1989 and early 1990. No transfrontier waste shipping documentation accompanied the waste. AUTHORITIES INVOLVED GERMANY ù Landeshauptstadt Hannover Abt. Fuer Gewaesser und Abfallueberwachung This is the Hanover authority responsible for cleaning up the waste left by the company, Kertess when it went bankrupt. ù Landesamt fuer Wasserhaushalt und Kuesten (tel.0431 676097 fax 61955 - Herr Looft) and ù Umweltamt tea Landkreises Dithmarschen (tel. 0481 87317 fax 5296 - Dr Stinzing) These are the competent authorities for the Tiedemann activities. ù Umweltamt tea Landkreises Holzminden (tel. 05531 7071 - Herr Scholz) The competent authority for the Holzminden district which collected waste from schools and households and then sent them on to Sondermuell Entsorgung und Recycling in Hamburg some of which then went to Tiedemann and eventually ended up in Essex. ENGLAND ù Greater Manchester Waste Disposal Authority, Blackfriars House, Parsonage, Manchester M3 2JA (tel. 061 832 2909) This was the authority which was first informed of the illegally imported waste. They are responsible for giving the waste disposal company, Colliers, their licence and making sure they abide by it. ù Essex County Council Beehive Lane, Chelmsford, Essex CM2 9SY, England (tel. 0245 355381) John Harrison (retired 31 January 1991), and Tim Sheppard. This is the local waste disposal authority for the area where the waste was stored. It is their responsibility to ensure that waste is not illegally dumped or passed through the county of Essex. They had to arrange for the return of the waste to Germany and for the prosecution of Controlled Residue Processing in Wales. POLAND ù State Inspectorate for the Protection of the Environment, Panstwowa Inspekcja Ochrony Srodowiska (a department of the Ministry for the Environment). Swiatek, Wojciech - civil engineer Greenpeace informed this department of the waste sent there from Lloyds in Essex. They made their own investigation and in October 1990 were considering sending back the waste dyes to the UK. THE MONEY "There is a fortune to be made by illegally importing and exporting toxic waste..." John Harrison, Waste Disposal Officer, Essex County Council.35 There is also a fortune to be made from the legal trade in these wastes. Our information here is obviously incomplete but some of the individual transactions listed below suggest the financial scale of the operations. Terra Consult were paid DM 16,479.75 by International Farbenwerke of Hamburg for taking away 31.8 tonnes of liquid residues from lacquer/enamel production.36 Meanwhile, according to Herr Uwe Looft of the Schleswig-Holstein authority, the Hanover authorities paid 100,000 DM to Recycling- Centrum Seevetal who then paid Tiedemannin Brunsbuettel 70,000 DM to take and store the waste. Tiedemann then paid Terra Consult in Hamburg 51,000 DM plus VAT to take the waste. And this series of deals accounts for only 12 tonnes of the 470 tonnes of waste which ended up in Essex.37 According to Herr Looft, the reason the provincial capital (Landeshauptstadt) of Hanover decided to leave the disposal of the waste material to Recycling-Centrum Seevatal (and subsequently to agree to its storage at Tiedemann's) was that this outfit offered the lowest price. Another company they asked quoted DM 230,000.33 (see also Appendix 1.) THE FATE OF THE WASTE The Final Resting Place MOST OF THE WASTE HAS BEEN RETURNED TO GERMANY THOUGH IT HAS NOT YET BEEN POSSIBLE TO FIND OUT EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED TO IT ONCE IT ARRIVED BACK. QUITE POSSIBLY, IT WAS SENT BACK TO THE UK WITH TRANSFRONTIER WASTE DOCUMENTS, OR PERHAPS TO ANOTHER COUNTRY LIKE POLAND. IT WAS ALMOST CERTAINLY MIXED WITH OTHER WASTES AND IS THEREFORE PROBABLY NO LONGER TRACEABLE. The 12 tonnes that went to Essex from Hanover, via Brusbuttel, is now back in Brunsbuttel. The storage company, Tiedemann, is primarily responsible for the costs of transporting the waste back to Germany and for the costs of disposing of it. If need be, the courts will have to decide who is finally responsible for the costs involved. By the end of November, 170 tonnes had been returned to the producers. In general, the return of the waste was organised by Essex County Council and the German producers with varying degrees of cooperation from Terra Consult and none at all from Controlled Residue.39 By the beginning of April 1991 wastes from three producers remained at the Lloyd site. All these were from the Dusseldorf area. Devalit 33 big bags Dry paint Hans Jung 18 drums solvents Grillo Werke 18 drums solvents/Glue40 Of the material that had been sent to Poland from Lloyd, the mastik was accepted for resale but there was some doubt as to whether the other waste (dyes) would be accepted or if it would be returned. RISKS TO PEOPLE AND THE ENVIRONMENT "These chemicals have been transported through Essex on container lorries without any signs suggesting the contents are dangerous. If there had been an accident involving just one container, then the fire brigade and police would have had no idea what they were dealing with,." said John Harrison, Waste Disposal Officer, Essex County Council.41 According to Uwe Looft of Landesamt fuer Wasserhaushalt und Kuesten, Schleswig-Holstein, it was the storage of hazardous waste, possible spillage and leakage into ground water that represented the main risk.42 The hazardous waste stored at Lloyd was placed outdoors and separated from the rest of the material held there. The site was unlicensed and completely unequipped to handle it. Essex County Council were apparently concerned that the chemicals might leak into the drains and disable the local sewage works. The site had no system of containing any leakage. (see also The Waste What It Is) "In the long run we cannot expect to incinerate, spread and deposit our way out of our problems." This statement by Lone Dybkjaer, the former Environment Minister of Denmark, recognises the frightening fact that all current forms of so called "environmentally sound waste disposal" are not, in fact, environmentally sound. The two most often used methods of waste disposal today, landfill and incineration, are not in fact "resting places" for toxic waste. All landfills will inevitably leak their contents to the ground water or vent their contents to the atmosphere. And solvents incinerators do not decrease the toxicity or volume of wastes. In fact, they alter compounds, creating new toxic substances, increase the volume of waste by dispersing it in the atmosphere, thus contaminating the air we breathe. In this case, if nothing more is done, German waste will contaminate the environment of the UK, Poland as well as Germany. THE LAW "PEOPLE WITH A COMMERCIAL INTEREST IN BOTH THE UNITED KINGDOM AND GERMANY PURSUED, WITH REMARKABLE ENERGY, A LUCRATIVE DEAL WHICH WAS ILLEGAL AS FAR AS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IS CONCERNED...TO GET MORE POSITIVE COMPLIANCE WITH THE REGULATIONS IN FUTURE, OTHER METHODS WILL HAVE TO BE INSTIGATED THAT WILL FRIGHTEN OFF THE MISCREANTS."43 This was the conclusion of the waste disposal officer for Schleswig-Holstein, Uwe Looft, in the light of the scandal under consideration in this paper. Neither he, nor his counterpart in Essex, seriously consider the idea of a total ban: "What is needed is for countries involved in such movements of waste to be more dedicated in the task of ensuring loads are properly identified. If, for example, we were exporting hazardous waste to Germany they would have to rely on us. Therefore we have to rely on other people." John Harrison, Essex County Council. 44 This attitude is typical of how the waste trade has been treated in the European Community. The international legislation controlling the transfrontier shipment of hazardous waste (no matter how inadequate it has turned out to be) was introduced in the first place because a system of trust could not be relied on. Moreover, despite measures to ensure loads are properly identified, wastes still sail through unchecked whilst major loopholes in the legislation exist. This episode has served to highlight some major inadequacies in existing and proposed EC legislation (84/631/EEC) and the various national implementations of it. If we took a generous attitude towards the waste brokers, giving them the benefit of many doubts, we might say that they were confused by the sheer complexity of transfrontier legislation. Certainly, this is what Rainer Braune of CRP said by way of excuse.45 Claiming ignorance of legal complexities is a common excuse of waste traders. Banning the waste trade outright would eliminate this complaint and a host of other easily exploitable loopholes. The following deals only with the weaknesses which have particular relevance to the Essex scandal. PROBLEMS WITH THE EXISTING EC DIRECTIVE International movements of waste are dealt with in the UK by two main bodies of legislation: The Transfrontier Shipment of Hazardous Waste Regulations 1988 and The Control of Pollution (Special Waste) (Amendment) Regulations 1988. These Regulations implement two EEC Directives, 84/631/EEC and 86/279/EEC. They came into force, after a long delay, on 14 November 1988. They apply to England, Wales and Scotland. Directive 84/631/EEC defines hazardous waste as toxic and dangerous waste as defined in the Toxic and Dangerous Waste Directive (78/319/ EEC), with the exception of chlorinated and organic solvents. Ten other substances are excluded from UK TFS Regulations because they are included in the list of substances in the Special Waste Regulations whilst not being included in Directive 78/319. These ten substances are: 1 Acids and alkalis, from uses other than surface treatment and finishing of metals 2 Barium compounds 3 Boron compounds 4 Inorganic halogen-containing compounds 5 Inorganic sulphur-containing compounds 6 Nickel and its compounds 7 Phosphorous and its compounds 8 Silver compounds 9 Vanadium compounds 10 Zinc compounds According to Seth Davies, a technical liaison officer in Wales, "the vast bulk of industrial waste is completely excluded from control under the Regulations."47 This has led to enormous anxiety amongst Waste Disposal Authorities who are supposed to control and monitor imports: "The excepted substances are extremely hazardous, and are not controlled either because they are not included in the Toxic and Dangerous Waste Directive 78/319/EEC or are specifically excluded by the Transfrontier Shipment of Hazardous Waste Directive 84/631/EEC. Control over such a limited number of waste materials imported into the UK is clearly unacceptable."48 "The effect for this Authority is, to say the least, dramatic in that the need to notify has been further reduced so that only one-quarter of the 2200 or more hazardous wastes imported into this country from abroad, mainly Europe, and subject to the terms of the (Transfrontier) Directive in the country of origin, are in fact, controlled by the new regulation."49 Each member state of the Community has had the freedom to decide when wastes containing specified substances become dangerous to the environment. The obvious result has been that there is no uniformity as to what constitutes a hazardous waste. "The definition of hazardous waste does not provide a basis for the consistent application of the controls to the same waste throughout the communities...Member states have not been able to reconcile their different interpretations for the purpose of implementing the Transfrontier Shipment Directive."50 PROBLEMS IN PROPOSED EC REGULATION NO ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS Despite this confusion, it is unlikely that CRP's failure to obtain proper documentation was due to any misunderstanding. The generators of the waste in question regarded it as hazardous waste and both Tiedemann, the storekeeper in Hamburg and Terra Consult, the broker, acknowledged it as such. Herr Braune must have known that these consignments should have been pre-notified and later accompanied by a TFS consignment note. Instead, he brought them over as "goods" which escape this legislation and transported them from UK ports to Essex with only a Dangerous Goods note to accompany them. CRP then treated the wastes as "special wastes" and sent some of it on to Colliers waste disposal site in Manchester with a standard Special Waste S.17 consignment note. The waste which CRP sent on to Poland, however, was again transported as "dangerous goods" and not as "hazardous waste." Another weakness of the national and EC waste transport legislation is that there is no provision for monitoring at the port of entry or exit. We have already noted how these wastes travel led unnoticed as goods. It is also easy to ship them as a less regulated waste such as non-ferrous metals waste or household rubbish. In the Environment Committee Second Report on Toxic Waste, the Chairman, Sir Hugh Rossi, stated that: "....it is possible for special waste to come in with ordinary waste but not designated as such and then possibly to find its way to a cheap landfill site and possibly create hazards. Yet there is nobody, but nobody, at the port of entry who is in a position to say, 'Wait a minute! That's special waste and separately treated."'51 There is no provision in the existing or proposed Transfrontier Shipment Regulations to ensure that WDAs at the port of entry sample and verify the waste that arrives there. Although the Circular accompanying the Regulations says that the competent authority should consult with the WDA at the port of entry before acknowledging the documents, the WDA at the port of entry has no powers to reject a shipment of waste as long as the consignment note has been filled in. So even if the German waste had been properly documented there was no way the WDA could have verified the constituents of the consignment. Local authorities simply do not have the time or the resources to inspect and monitor shipments and indeed there are some authorities in the UK which do not employ so much as a single member of staff to monitor waste coming into their area. Local Authorities cannot really be blamed for this as the costs of monitoring on a regular basis are prohibitive. A full analysis costs up to œ3000 per sample and the results from a professional analysis can take from 10 days to 6 weeks to come through. With so little risk of detection, the financial incentive to misrepresent the waste is enormous. Certain wastes are much cheaper to dispose of than others, and a waste that does not come under the Regulation is cheaper to administer than a waste that does. It is relatively simple for a company to misrepresent waste, get it through the port of detection, the entry and to the waste disposal site without any inspection whatsoever having taken place. This is what happened with the German waste landing in Essex. The WDAs at the port of entry are not authorised to check loads (unless this is specified under the licence for a particular transfer station at the dockside) and neither are customs unless they can show good reason to be suspicious. Even at the disposal site there is no guarantee that the waste will be checked against the description in the consignment note. And if the waste is checked and is found to have been misdescribed and unsuitable for the site there is nothing in the Regulations that stipulates that the waste must be returned to sender. Moreover, the authorities at the port of entry are not informed of the exact date of arrival but are given a time-span, usually a month, within which the shipment will arrive. It is only after the waste has passed through the port of entry that the WDA for the area learns of the exact date of its arrival. The proposed EC regulation now under consideration in Brussels fails to address this fundamental problem of monitoring and enforcement. This problem will be especially acute after the removal of border controls by 1993. The question of what will prevent a consignment of waste from being transported across national frontiers without any notification and documentation when there are no border police, remains unanswered. RECYCLING LOOPHOLES Perhaps the most dangerous new initiative being promoted in the new series of hazardous waste legislation by certain members of the European Council and Commission, is the introduction of dual definitions whereby waste, for recycling or "further use" is treated differently from wastes bound for "disposal". This dangerous distinction not only derogates from the Basel Convention,52 but from past EC legislation as well. In the past directive certain wastes such as chlorinated solvents were excluded from the directive and others such as non-ferrous metals were given loopholes allowing less strict control. Now, the Commission is proposing one overall encompassing loophole whereby wastes bound for so called "further use" can avoid the principles of self-sufficiency and proximity and avoid the notification procedure known as "prior informed consent". On the face of it, this "double dealing" may seem a prudent measure to facilitate recycling. But as we have seen, loopholes are easily exploited by waste traders using the pretext of "further use" to justify transboundary waste schemes where the real reason for waste export is the comparative costs of disposal in parts of Western Europe. Even in legitimate recycling projects where waste is being processed for its intrinsic value, unless there are provisions for repatriation of the resulting residues, all "further use" schemes involve waste dumping. This is due to the fact that nothing can ever be recycled 100% and thus the residual material, often the bulk of the dangerous wastes, will be dumped on the receiving territory. In addition, the transport of such waste remains highly risky and there can be no justification for assuming less strict environmental criteria. For these reasons, Greenpeace feels it is indefensible to retain a dual definition for waste. According to Greenpeace's European Waste Trade Project Director, Jim Puckett, "Hazardous waste recycling can be a very dirty business, but too often, as soon as the word "recycling" is used, people tend to look the other way." In the Essex case, the waste at one point was called non-ferrous metals waste. The former nonferrous metals waste loophole (Article 17, 84/ 631/EEC) is well known and easily exploited. Even waste which is correctly identified as consisting partially of non-ferrous metals waste is very often contaminated with organic hazardous materials and dangerous heavy metals. The UK Department of the Environment' s Hazardous Waste Inspectorate's Third Annual Report (1988) claims that the Inspectorate received continual reports of material that was imported as "recoverable" eventually ending up as "UK" waste: "For example, a major waste disposal company reported that it has lost a regular contract to bring in vanadium catalyst waste, for treatment, to a recovery company in Yorkshire. Shortly afterwards the recovery company approached the waste disposer to take some 60 tonnes of this material as waste. No mention was made as to its non-UK origins. Thus it would not have shown up in any survey looking at imported wastes."53 The Institute of Wastes Management agrees that this practice is on the increase.: "...with those consignments of material there seems to be an increasing proportion of material that is not suitable for recycling and it is effectively coming in simply for waste disposal purposes...Recycled solvent recovery material is not going to be caught by the special wastes regulations at the moment."54 The proposed EC legislation now under consideration, will create the following loopholes for wastes traded within the EC: Loophole: In Article S of the directive to amend 75/442/EEC, the landmark principles of "self-sufficiency" and "proximity" are applied only to wastes bound for disposal. Thus a loophole is created for wastes bound for recycling facilities as the principles of "proximity" and "self-sufficiency" would not apply to wastes bound for "recovery" facilities. Loophole: Article 15 of the proposed regulation to amend 84/631/EEC allows an exemption for requiring the deposit of a surety for wastes bound for "further use" (a surety is a bond guaranteeing performance of contractual obligations). This exemption makes no sense: wastes bound for recycling are no less a hazard than those bound for final disposal. Loophole: The proposed regulation will actually expand the non- ferrous loophole of the existing directive and make its weak provisions applicable to all wastes bound for "further use". In Article 7, the obligation of "prior informed consent" required in Articles 3, 4, and 6, (waste trade within the community) and in the Basel Convention, is ignored as the competent authority of the state of dispatch is not required to be involved and "only in the absence of reasoned objections" Article 7.1 (c) can the shipment take place. The "absence of reasoned objections" is hardly consent! Loophole: More frightening still, "further use" is also given as one of the justifications by which waste will be allowed to be exported to non-EC countries such as Third World destinations or Poland, for example. The Essex case among many others raises real concerns over the above mentioned loopholes. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS The following is a listing of the legal problems revealed by this scandal and some of the existing and proposed waste trade legislation which is attempting to resolve them. "No" indicates the issue remains unresolved. PROPOSED EC LEGAL PROBLEM 84/631 REGULATION BASEL l. There is little ability to NO1 NO2 NO3 monitor and thus catch illegal shipments or shipments of hazardous wastes which are misrepresented as "goods". 2. Stiff penalties to deter NO4 NO5 NO6 illegal shipments of hazardous waste are not required. 3. If a waste trade deal cannot NO7 PARTIAL8 PARTIAL9 be performed according to the contract, there is no authority granted to the victim state or business to demand its re-export. 4. By using a recycling loophole, NO10 NO11 PARTIAL12 considerably less control or scrutiny is required and thus the loophole can be exploited to ship many things other than that which is supposedly recyclable. 5. The producer of the waste NO13 NO14 UNKNOWN15 is not ultimately responsible for its disposal costs and the environmental or other damage that may be caused. NOTES 1. The current directive says absolutely nothing regarding monitoring, enforcement nor does it even define or deal with questions of illegal traffic. 2. All this proposal states is " Member States shall prohibit and severely penalize illegal traffic" (Article 14, par a. 5) No mention of enforcement or monitoring requirements is given. 3. Although Basel does call for Parties to pass laws to both "prevent and punish illegal traffic" (Article 9, par a. 5), it fails to stipulate and require any enforcement regimes or entities. 4. See note 1. 5. See note 2. 6. See note 3. 7. Nothing 8. Article 13, Proposed EC Regulation, is copied from the Basel Convention Article 8. The loophole allowed is that re-export can be avoided if alternative arrangements can be made within 90 days. 9. Ibid. 10. Besides the well known non-ferrous loophole (Article 17) which allows a derogation from the normal prior-informed-consent (PIC) regime of the directive - whereby, simply notification is given, the directive by exclusion from its scope (Article 2, allows massive exemption for chlorinated solvents, organic solvents, PCB's, household garbage, incineration ash, etc, 11. Article 7 (c), of the proposed EC regulation, states that the shipment may be carried out "in the absence of reasoned objections". This is not the consent required by the Basel Convention. Article 7 dealing with waste bound "for further use" defines a regime where no competent authority of the state of dispatch needs to be involved, thus implying an honour system. This is also in derogation of the Basel Convention. In addition, no surety bond needs to be posted for wastes bound "for further use". And finally, recycling is given as one of the justifications by which waste can be exported from the community (Article 9.4 (b)). 12. The Basel Convention only possesses one recycling loophole (Article 4.9 (b)), but it is quite serious. It allows recycling to be used as one of the justifications for wastes to be exported, even if the state of export has the adequate technical capacity to deal with the wastes. There is very little in the directive 84/631/EEC about liability. A separate liability directive is in progress. This applies to the pro-posed regulation as well. 13. Nothing 14. Nothing 15. Bagel left the liability problem to a future protocol. Meetings to develop this protocol have already begun. PROCEEDINGS At the beginning of October, Essex County Council announced that it would bring 16 charges against Controlled Residue Processing. In February, Essex County Council took Rainer Braune to court. Herr Braune pleaded guilty to eight of the 16 charges brought under Section 3(1) of the Control of Pollution Act,1974. After advice from Counsel the other charges were withdrawn. Herr Braune was fined œ4,000 with œ1,000 costs. As Herr Braune admitted before the trial, this was no more than getting his wrists slapped and since he didn't even pay Cory Waste for the work they did for him (œ5,244), he seems to have made quite a tidy profit even after his fine. Given the probability of evasion from the law, the likelihood of ridiculously small fines and the promise of handsome profits even after a conviction, the incentive to exploit legislative loopholes is irresistible to many traders. In Germany, Herr Tiedemann faces prosecution by the Schleswig- Holstein authority for failing to obtain permission to export toxic waste. Certain of the German producers have also begun proceedings to sue Terra Consult.55 How many others involved in this type of activity are not noticed and not prosecuted? LESSONS LEARNED? SECONDARY RAW PROFIT IT IS WELL KNOWN THAT THERE IS A GREAT DEAL OF MONEY TO BE MADE FROM "MANAGING" HAZARDOUS WASTE. AS THE PRESENT CASE SHOWS, A SMART WASTE TRADER CAN PROFIT TWICE FROM THE SAME WASTE, ONCE FROM THE "SERVICE" OF DISPOSING OF IT, AND AGAIN BY SELLING IT TO SOMEBODY ELSE AS A "SECONDARY RAW MATERIAL". Greenpeace's ongoing inventory, tracking every known waste trade scheme, has shown that today, a full 60% of all proposals to move wastes across national boundaries cite some pretext of recycling or "further use". Waste traders exploit the "green" connotations of the word "recycling", using it, or similar words like "treatment" and "processing" wherever possible, especially in their corporate name. They have found that the authorities tend to look the other way when these magic words are used. Businesses involved in these unscrupulous transactions have also been helped by those legislators who have, with the intention of providing incentives for recycling, made loopholes or exemptions in the law for various types of recyclable wastes. These loopholes are readily exploited by illegal traffickers as they usually equate to less scrutiny and control. In the Essex case, the waste was called different things depending on where it needed to go. In Germany it was called hazardous waste. In order to get it into the UK it was at one point designated as non-ferrous waste, to take advantage of a loophole whereby the competent authority in the dispatch country (Germany) did not have to be notified. Other material was simply designated as "goods" in order to get it through the UK ports. Some of the same waste also went to Poland as "goods", probably at a very cheap price. Clearly, governments should not assist the unscrupulous waste traders by creating special provisions and definitions for wastes bound for recycling. It may be desirable to encourage the recycling of wastes at or near the point of generation, but wastes bound for recycling should not be exported. Such allowances leave an open door through which a variety of deadly wastes can pass, putting foreign communities at great risk. Even hazardous waste legitimately intended for "recycling" must be recognised as a form of waste dumping, since most of these supposedly "green" processes leave a hazardous residue which gets dumped on the receiving territory. THE ENFORCEMENT FARCE In spite of all the legislation aimed at controlling the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes, the fact that wastes can be transported so easily as "goods" indicates a terrible lack of enforcement. The illegal shipment to Essex was only caught because one company became suspicious. The problem will become especially acute after 1992, with the absence of border controls. The proposed EC regulation says nothing about enforcement requirements or interstate cooperation, putting the onus entirely on the member states. But can we hope that individual states will take the responsibility or even have the power to track illegal transboundary movements of hazardous wastes? They have not proved able to in the past, and it is unlikely that they will in future without some legislated initiative on an international basis. There is also a clear need for a co-ordinating body or network between state enforcement agencies, to facilitate the communication necessary to monitor and apprehend illegal trade. Intergovernmental bodies such as the European Community must recognise the need for a police agency or network with respect to hazardous waste and possibly other illegal traffic. In lieu of border patrols, such an organisation would have the power to carry out spot-checks and maintain a police data-base on illegal trade. This issue is too critical to be left till a later date. The enforcement gap must be filled within the text of any proposed waste trade regulation. WASTE IS NO "GOOD" It is vital that waste trade regulations aim toward preventing the trade rather than legitimising it. Hazardous waste is no "good". It is a social liability and should be prohibited from world trade just as dangerous drugs, pornography or weapons are prohibited. For these things we do not insist on a "free market" and we do not consider these prohibitions "non-tariff trade barriers". Hazardous waste trade particularly must be eliminated as it exploits economic inequalities, victimising poorer, less protected areas of the globe by offering poison for profit. NO TIME TO WASTE--BAN WASTE TRADE It is a time of waste crisis and there is no time to waste. Most governments now cite waste minimisation as the priority of their waste management strategy. The Basel Convention requires that all transboundary movements of hazardous waste be reduced to the minimum; indeed the latter aim is a key to achieving the former. For as long as corporations and nations are allowed to dump their poisonous effluent in hiding places around the world, no incentive can draw them down a responsible path - the path toward no waste, the path of clean production. Until the path of least resistance leads no further than the production site itself, we will continue to discover such criminal scenes as Koko, Nigeria and Love Canals, as well as a host of scandals like the one exposed in Essex. APPENDIX 1 Summary of waste exported by Terra Consult, Germany and Controlled Residue Processing, UK. (Omitted here .. unscannable) APPENDIX 2 Summary of wastes going to Lloyd Forwarding: 1. Container No: EIMU 201 9920 Waste: paint waste/solvents Amount: 18.9t (76 drums) Arrival date: 17 May, 1990 Documentation accompanying waste: delivery note Source: International Farbenwerke 2. Container No: IEAU 2511 702 Waste: dyes/masktik? Amount: 12t (22 pallets) Arrival date: 21 May, 1990 Documentation accompanying waste: delivery note Source: International Farbenwerke 3 Container No: ex trailer Waste: dry paint/paint and glue Amount: 8.2t (3 bags, 18 drums) Arrival date: 12 June, 1990 Documentation accompanying waste: CMR (customs note), TFS- Non-Ferrous Metals x 2, invoice x 2 Source: Devalit, Hans Jung 4. Container No: WVGU 1062221 Waste: mastic Amount: 12t (108 cases) Arrival date: 14 June, 1990 Documentation accompanying waste: delivery note Source: ? 5. Container No: UMBU 1913751 Waste: mixed chemicals Amount: 5.5t (81 drums) Arrival date: 14 June, 1990 Documentation accompanying waste: delivery note Source: Tiedemann/Holzminden 6 Container No: UMBU 1918856 Waste: mixed chemicals Amount: 5t (50 drums) Arrival date: 15 June, 1990 Documentation accompanying waste: delivery note Source: Tiedemann/Holzminden 7. Container No: WVGU 1062936 Waste: dry paint waste Amount: 11.5t (14 bags) Arrival date: 21 June, 1990 Documentation accompanying waste: delivery note Source: Devalit 8. Container No: Trailer mag 9010 Waste: paint waste Amount: 20t (84 drums) Arrival date: 26 June, 1990 Documentation accompanying waste: delivery note Source: Devalit 9. Container No: SCXU 6140452 Waste: paint waste/solvent Amount: 19.2t (73 drums I pallet) Arrival date: 11 July, 1990 Documentation accompanying waste: delivery note Source: International Farbenwerke 10. Container No: ex lorry Waste: zinc oxide catalyst pellets Amount: 2.4t (11 drums) Arrival date: 17 July, 1990 Documentation accompanying waste: delivery note, TFS - non-ferrous metals Source: Dea Mineraloel 11. Container No: Trailer mag 8609 Waste: nickel/molybdenum catalyst Amount: 23.5t (104 drums) Arrival date: 25 July, 1990 Documentation accompanying waste: delivery note, dangerous goods note, tremcard (ie. data-sheet), TFSnon-ferrous metals, invoice Source: Dea Mineraloel 12. Container No: CONU 3509967 Waste: paint waste Amount: 12.9t Arrival date: 30 July, 1990 Documentation accompanying waste: delivery note Source: International Farbenwerke 13. Container No: GNSU 1103460 Waste: mixed solvents, sealants Amount: 20t Arrival date: 1 August, 1990 Documentation accompanying waste: delivery note, dangerous goods note, tremcard (ie. data-sheet) Source: Teroson 14. Container No: WVGU 1093428 Waste: Trichloroethane, sealant Amount: 20.3t Arrival date: 7 August, 1990 Documentation accompanying waste: delivery note, dangerous goods note, tremcard (ie. data-sheet) Source: Teroson 15. Container No: DFDV 4863828 Waste: paint waste Amount: 18.2t Arrival date: 14 August, 1990 Documentation accompanying waste: ? Source: Devalit 16. Container No: ex trailer Waste: solvents Amount: 3t (18 drums) Arrival date: 14 August, 1990 Documentation accompanying waste: CMR (customs note), Tremcard (ie. data-sheet), invoice Source: Grillowerke 17. Container No: ex trailer Waste: dry paint Amount: 12t (16 bags) Arrival date: 16 August, 1990 Documentation accompanying waste: unknown form Source: Devalit 18. Container No: WVGU 1090028 Waste: mixed solvents, sealant Amount: 21.7t Arrival date: 17 August, 1990 Documentation accompanying waste: delivery note Source: Teroson 19. Container No: TPHU 2900331 Waste: Paint waste, solvents, lacquer Amount: 14.1t Arrival date: 21 August, 1990 Documentation accompanying waste: delivery note, dangerous goods note, packing note Source: International Farbenwerke REFERENCES 1 Collier Industrial Waste Ltd., Press Release, 5 September, 1990. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Mr A.Gould, Colliers, pers. com. 14 December, 1990. 6 Rainer Braune, CRP pers.com. 3 December, 1990. 7 Nicholas Schoon, Hazardous waste was dumped in error . The Independent, 5 September, 1990. Greenpeace eyewitness. 8 Letter from Tim Sheppard, Essex County Council, 4 March 1991. 9 Greenpeace UK. 10 Bibliography Craig, P.J. (1986) Organometallic Compounds in the Environment. Long man, Essex. 368pp. Fawell, J.K. and Hunt, S. (1988) Environmental Toxicology: Organic Pollutants. John Wiley, Chic Hester. 440pp. Royal Society of Chemistry (1986) Organo-chlorine Solvents: Health Risks to Workers. Publication number EUR 10531 EN, of the Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General Information Market and Innovation, Luxembourg. 254pp. 11 Nicholas Schoon, Adnan Bridge, Complex Route of Hazardous Chemical Shipments to Essex. The Independent, 19 September, 1990. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Herr U.Looft, pers. com. 23 November, 1990. 16 Nicholas Schoon, Adrian Bridge, Complex Route of Hazardous Chemical Shipments to Essex, The Independent, 19 November, 1990. 17 Herr Menger, pers. com. 7 September, 1990. 18 Herr Meyer, Intemational Farbenwerke, pers. com. 7 September, 1990. 19 Herr Penn, pers. com. 5 September, 1990. 20 Ibid. 21 Herr U.Looh, pers. com. 23 November, 1990. 22 Greenpeace UK. 23 Nicholas Schoon, Adrian Bridge, Complex route of hazardous chemical shipments to Essex, The Independent, 19 September, 1990. 24 Rainer Brauner, pers.com. 3 December, 1990. 25 Tim Sheppard, Essex County Council, pers. com. 4 March, 1991. 26 Anne Woodland, Fairfield Packaging pers.com. 14 December, 1990. 27 Colin Champion, Lloyd Forwarding Ltd. pers.com. 12 November, 1990. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. 31 Nicholas Schoon, Adrian Bridge, Complex route of hazardous chemical shipments to Essex, The Independent, 19 September, 1990. 32 Colin Champion, Lloyd Forwarding Ltd. pers.com. 12 November, 1990. 33 Ian Ansell, Cory Waste Management, pers.com. 8 April, 1991. 34 Ibid. 35 Thurrock Gazette, 7 September, 1990. 36 Herr Meyer, International Farbenwerke, pers.com. 7 September, 1990. 37 Herr U. Looft, letter to Greenpeace UK, 5 November, 1990. 38 Ibid. 39 Tim Sheppard, Essex County Council, letter to Greenpeace UK, 4 March, 1991. 40 Ibid. 41 Thurrock Gazette 7 September, 1990. 42 Herr U.Looft, letter to Greenpeace, 5 November, 1990. Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 Thurrock Gazette, 7 September, 1990. 45 Nicholas Schoon, Adrian Bridge, The Independent 19 September, 1990. 46 House of Commons Environment Committee, Toxic Waste, Second Report, February 1989 (Q1357), HMSO. 47 Seth Davies, Report of the Regional Technical Liaison Officer presented as evidence to the Welsh Affairs Committee enquiry into Rechem 1990; S.W. Wales Waste Management Group. 48 Memorandum by Walsall Metropolitan Borough Hazardous Waste Unit, House of Commons Environment Committee, Toxic Waste, Second Report, February 1989, HMSO. 49 Ibid, Memorandum by Essex County Council. 50 David Mills, Institute of Wastes Management Symposium, September 1988. 51 House of Commons Environment Committee, Toxic Waste, Second Report, Minutes of Evidence, Q 180. February 1989, HMSO. 52 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, United Nations Environment Programme, 22 March, 1989. 53 Hazardous Waste Inspectorate, Third Report, 1988 ch.4 p.20, HMSO. 54 House of Commons Environment Committee, Toxic Waste, Second Report, February 1989 (Q. 183), HMSO. 55 Uwe Looft, Landesamt fuer Wasserhaushalt und Kuesten, pers. com. 26 February, 1991. ENDS