[] TL: BRIEFING ON IMO VS. NUKE TRANSPORT BY SEA- IMPORTANT AND SO: REMI PARMENTIER , GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, (GP) DT: MAY 19, 1993 Keywords: environment oceans nuclear transport ships agreements / GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL 62ND SESSION OF THE MARITIME SAFETY COMMITTEE (MSC) OF THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION (IMO) (London, 24-28 May, 1993) AGENDA ITEM 12: "URGENT MATTERS EMANATING FROM THE SECOND SESSION OF THE JOINT IAEA/IMO/UNEP WORKING GROUP" GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL'S COMMENTS ON THE CURRENT DRAFT CODE ON THE MARITIME TRANSPORT OF IRRADIATED NUCLEAR FUEL, PLUTONIUM AND HIGH LEVEL WASTE 1.0. Introduction: MSC 62 Must Not Adopt the Current Draft Code 1.1. Under the heading "Urgent Matters emanating from the Second Session of the Joint IAEA/IMO/UNEP Working Group" (Agenda Item 12), the 62nd Session of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), from Monday 24 to Friday 28 May 1993, is invited to consider the Draft Code on the Carriage by Sea of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel (INF), Plutonium (Pu) and High-Level Radioactive Wastes (HLW). 1.2. Greenpeace agrees that issues relating to the safety of nuclear transport require immediate attention, and - as we have repeatedly stated - we are in favour of the urgent adoption of a truly precautionary Code. However, the current Draft Code is clearly not precautionary and the heading chosen - back in December 1992 long before the Second Session of the Joint Working Group took place in the last week of April 1993 - for this Agenda Item (1) indicates an incomprehensible determination to rush into adopting the Draft Code as soon as possible, without due regard for, and the necessary consideration of, all its implications. 1.3. In the opinion of Greenpeace International, the adoption of the Code as now drafted is not urgent, given that it would not affect the current industry practice. Therefore - at minimum - all IMO and IAEA Member States should be given ample opportunity to become fully aquainted with the Draft Code and to assess all its implications, rather than being pressured to approve a very important document that they have hardly had time to consider. 1.4. This opinion is corroborated by the fact that the Draft Code as now written would - if it was to come into effect - allow the transport of unprecedented quantities of INF, Pu and HLW on general cargo vessels, including passenger vessels, instead of restricting the current industry practice. It is our belief that this proposal is unacceptable both from a political and environmental point of view. It is inconsistent with the numerous expressions of concern of many governments and organizations which - in part - caused the creation of the Joint Working Group in the first place. For example, the adoption of the Draft Code would suggest that even the limited precautions taken last year to transport Pu from France to Japan were unnecessary. As a result, that same shipment could be transported on a general cargo vessel together with other goods (possibly hazardous in their own rights), if the Draft Code was adopted. 1.5. Such a prospect is unacceptable, and Greenpeace International calls upon the MSC to reject the current Draft Code, and to reiterate that the purpose of the exercise initiated with the creation of the Joint Working Group last year was not to weaken current safety practice, but - instead - to urgently and immediately enact a stringent precautionary Code. 1.6. A failure to reject the current Code would suggest that the IMO prefers to defend the interests of the very small minority of countries interested in transporting INF, Pu and HLW by sea, than to defend and enhance maritime and environmental safety on the oceans. 2.0. Background 2.1. In response to growing concern around the maritime transport of highly radioactive and radiotoxic nuclear materials, the 60th Session of the IMO's Maritime Safety Committee (April 1992) agreed to convene a technical working group in December of 1992 to assess the adequacy of current safety standards. At the request of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the working group was to meet under the auspices of both Agencies. Subsequently, in October of 1992, the IMO and the IAEA were notified by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) that it too wished to serve as a meeting convener and participant. The IMO's Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) also decided at its 33rd Session (October 1992) to join the Joint Working Group. 2.2. At the first technical working group meeting, at the IMO in December, Mr. Clive Young from the UK Ministry of Transport was appointed Chairman of the Joint Working Group despite his close personal involvement with the most controversial nuclear transoceanic nuclear transport scheme. The IAEA also requested that the next meeting be convened in Vienna at the IAEA in April of 1993. Legitimate concerns were raised about diversity of representation at a meeting at the IAEA in Vienna and about the access and presentation of information to and from a meeting held at the pro-nuclear agency. Despite these concerns, it was agreed that the meeting would be convened in Vienna. 3.0. The Draft Code 3.1. The Code as drafted by the Session of the Joint Working Group convened at the IAEA in April 1993, applies to Irradiated Nuclear Fuel (INF), Plutonium (Pu) and High-Level Radioactive Wastes (HLW). 3.2. It would basically set three categories of nuclear transports based on the radioactivity of the cargo: * "INF 1" would apply to cargoes of INF, Pu or HLW with a aggregate radioactivity up to 4,000 TBq; * "INF 2" would apply to cargoes of INF and HLW with an aggregate radioactivity between 4,000 TBq and 2,000,000 TBq, and Pu transports of between 4,000 TBq and 200,000 TBq; and * "INF 3" which would apply to shipments of INF and HLW containing an aggregate radioactivity beyond 2,000,000 TBq or Pu shipments containing more than 200,000 TBq. 3.3. For each of these radioactivity cargo levels: INF 1, 2 and 3, a different level of ship stability, fire protection, and equipment would be required. In the case of both INF 1 and INF 2 transports, standard passenger ships, ferries and cargo vessels could be used. It is only for INF 3 that transport on passenger vessels would be precluded and more serious safety measures required. 3.4. As noted by the Brazilian delegation during the 2nd Session of the Joint Working Group in Vienna (2) the adoption of these threshold levels for Plutonium would mean allowing the transport of the following approximate quantities of plutonium in Class INF 1 vessels: Pu-239: 1,740 Kg; Pu-241: 1.05 Kg; Pu-240: 475.8 Kg; Pu-242:27,491 Kg. 3.5. For the sake of comparison, the Plutonium shipment which went from France to Japan in 1992 contained some 1,000 kg fissile Plutonium. 4.0. The Draft Code Would Decrease Safety Below Current Levels 4.1. Firstly, it must be noted that the radioactive quantities mentioned in Classes 1 and 2 are extremely large, as noted by the Brazilian delegation in reference to Plutonium. 4.2. For example, the recent explosion at the Tomsk plutonium factory in Siberia, which has been called the most serious nuclear accident since Chernobyl, was reported by Russian authorities to have released 40 curies of aggregate radioactivity. The radioactivity that will be allowed on board Class 1 (INF 1) vessels, including passenger ships and ferries, is more than 2500 times greater than this amount. 4.3. The radioactive limit on Class 2 (INF 2) vessels, 2,000,000 TBq, is a quantity of radioactivity twice as large as was released during the Chernobyl disaster, according to an IAEA report (3). There can be no explanation for placing such massive quantities of radioactive material on board passenger ships, ferries and standard cargo vessels. 4.4. As a general matter, highly radioactive or radiotoxic nuclear materials like INF, Pu and HLW are currently not carried on passenger vessels. In most of the small number of cases that have come to light, protest from maritime authorities and the general public have quickly lead to the prohibition of such transports. Immediate risk to passengers and the public from such materials has been recognized to be simply too great to consider. In addition, in the case of plutonium--the most highly prized of nuclear weapons fuels--there would be a serious security risk in transporting nuclear material on vessels with passengers. Remarkably, the draft code proposed in Vienna would inexplicably introduce and endorse this practice of nuclear transport on passenger ships and ferries. 4.5. Over the years, the transport of highly radioactive or radiotoxic materials on general cargo vessels or cargo ferries has been widely criticized. Calls for the prohibition of such transports have come from regional fora, national governments, trade unions, and environmental organizations. These protests have forced the reduction of such shipments and have lead to the prohibition of such practices in some national and international cases. Despite this evolution towards a safer transport regime, the proposed Draft Code would revert to a shipping practice which has been increasingly rejected. 5.0. The Draft Code Inexplicably Excludes Certain Materials 5.1. The Draft Code suggests definitions for both Pu and HLW which inexplicably exclude dangerous transports of both materials which will otherwise remain outside of the regulatory structure. 5.2. - As covered under the Draft Code, plutonium is defined as "the resultant mixture of isotopes of that material extracted from irradiated nuclear fuel from reprocessing". A number of delegations at the Vienna meeting raised concern over the possibility that former military plutonium--reprocessed from Irradiated Nuclear Fuel or from so-called targets--removed from nuclear weapons destroyed under the terms of arms control agreements could soon be transported by sea. It was however stated that these transports of plutonium would not be covered by the Draft Code. There is no explanation why this plutonium should be excluded from the code and the definition does not clarify this apparent ambiguity. As tens of tonnes of plutonium from nuclear weapons could be made available for transport in the coming years, this is indeed a critical point. 5.3. - As covered under the Draft Code, high level radioactive waste (HLW) is defined as either liquid or solid concentrate waste arising from reprocessing (plutonium separation activities). This definition is clearly partial--HLW does not necessarily come solely from reprocessing. The exclusion, by definition, of other high level nuclear wastes is not logical, nor does it comply with the stated intent of the Code itself. 6.0. The Draft Code Implies Consent for New Nuclear Transports Under Unsafe Conditions 6.1. - As mentioned above, HLW as defined in the draft code includes liquid wastes resulting from reprocessing. Liquid HLW is not currently transported by sea because of the tremendous risk to the environment and public. Despite the fact that the delegates from nuclear states confirmed that they did not transport liquid HLW, these same states demanded that this definition be used. As written, the Draft Code would therefore give consent to the unprecedented transport of liquid HLW despite the fact that such transports are apparently rejected by all parties involved. 6.2. - It is expected that in the next few years, the primary transport of plutonium will take place in the form of plutonium fuel (or MOX). Tens of tonnes of plutonium extracted from reprocessing are likely to be transported in this plutonium fuel form during the next decade alone. As the Draft Code currently stands, this plutonium fuel could be carried on passenger ships, ferries and standard cargo vessels as INF 1 and 2 cargoes. Despite the fact that this plutonium is not less a safety or security risk, the Code would treat it as a less dangerous cargo. 7.0. The Joint Working Group Adopted a Questionable Dynamic 7.1. Greenpeace International has taken part in good faith in the two Sessions of the Joint Working Group, and we are grateful to the many participants who expressed their appreciation for the constructive approach of Greenpeace International. But we believe that it must also be said that the Joint Working Group has been conducted under very questionable circumstances. 7.2. For example, many delegates were very surprised to learn upon their arrival in Vienna on the 26th of April, that an extremely discreet and unpublicized "consultants service meeting" with participants from France, Canada, Germany, the USA, the UK, Japan, Sweden and four IAEA staff members had taken place the previous week in Vienna under the auspices and at the cost of the IAEA. The stated intention of this meeting was to decide in advance the procedure and outcome of the Session which had yet to take place. 7.3. Likewise, whereas a reasonable deadline for submission of documents had been established for the 2nd Session, the IAEA allowed the presentation of a number of bulky documents from countries and private enterprises involved in the transport by sea of INF and Pu well after the deadline, and even after the 2nd Session had started. This regarettable state of affairs did not allow a proper examination of many of these documents (3). 7.4. It was also noted that significant data pertaining to transport patterns, accident histories and environmental analysis, etc requested at the IMO had not been provided, but the IAEA and the nuclear countries which dominated the Joint Working Group chose not to ask for the missing data. 7.5. Finally, all participants were able to note that some proposals - not so favorable to the aims of the IAEA - were given an unfair treatment. This was particularly true of a proposal made by the delegation from Malaysia at the 2nd Session, to include a provision in the Draft Code to prevent the passage of the nuclear cargoes contemplated in the Code through dangerous straits and channel, such as the Malacca Strait (4). 8.0. Conclusion 8.1. The current Draft Code is dangerous and misguided. At the drafting meeting in Vienna, numerous delegates representing the nuclear industry and nuclear nations stated that the code was not based on scientific or technical data, but was instead based on current industrial practice and performance. 8.2. It is quite clear that the Code is not based on a sound scientific analysis but is instead based on the economic necessity of the international nuclear industry. Caught in an increasingly difficult economic environment, the nuclear industry is trying via the IAEA to hijack the IMO Draft Code, and to decrease their costs by downgrading the shipping and safety requirements relating to the maritime transport of nuclear materials. Less safety means smaller costs for the transporters and their clients. 8.3. Unless countries oppose passage of the current draft codm and demand a more serious and safety conscious regime, it is likely that no further review of the Draft Code will occur and that it will enter into force later this year. This would be deplorable and dangerous state of affairs. Footnotes: (1) The heading on Document MSC 62/12, dated 24 December 1992, "Urgent Matters Emanating from the Second Session of the Joint IAEA/IMO/UNEP Working Group", is misleading, given that it refers to the Report of the First Session of the Joint Working Group. (2) "Note Presented by the Brazilian Delegation to the Joint IAEA/IMO Working Group on the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel by Sea" (Number Two), Embassy of Brazil in Vienna, April 1993. (3) "Summary Report on the Post-Accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident", Safety Series 75-INSAG-1, IAEA, Vienna, 1986. (4) This was the case of, for example, "Investigation of Fire on Freight Vessel 'Nord Pas-de-Calais'", Note submitted by the Nuclear Transport Limited (NTL) (Working Paper No 9 and Addendum) and "The Transport of Raioactive Materials. Interim Recommendations for the Application of Environmental Tests to teh Approval of Packaging", submitted by the Uk (Working Paper No 11). (5) "Malaysian Proposal for the Safe Carriage of Irradiated Nuclear Fuel (INF) by Sea", Working Paper No. 24, April 1993. MINOR EDIT NEEDED In para 7.3., the Footnote should be number 4 (not 3). In para 7.5., the Footnote should be number 5 (not 4). The order and numbers of footnotes in the "footnote section" at the end is correct. No change needed there. Plse edit as indicated here, and sorry for this minor editorial mistake.