TL: GREENPEACE BRIEFING: North Sea Interim Ministerial Meeting (IMM) on the Integration of Fisheries and Environmental Issues SO: Greenpeace International (GP) DT: 13-14 March 1997, Bergen, Norway AT A JOINT 'INTERIM MINISTERIAL MEETING' OF NORTH SEA ENVIRONMENT AND FISHERIES MINISTERS NEXT WEEK IN BERGEN THE FATE OF NORTH SEA FISH AND FISHERIES MAY WELL BE DECIDED. VIRTUALLY ALL MAJOR NORTH SEA STOCKS ARE IN DEEP TROUBLE, AND NONE ARE MANAGED ACCORDING TO THE PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH DEMANDED BY GLOBAL AGREEMENTS. TWO YEARS AGO ENVIRONMENT MINISTERS WARNED THAT THE NORTH SEA FISHERIES WERE IN A STATE OF CRISIS, AND SAID THAT URGENT ACTION WAS NECESSARY. AS A RESULT THEY CALLED THIS MEETING. HOWEVER ENVIRONMENT AND FISHERIES MINISTRIES ARE NOW DEADLOCKED, THE EU FISHERIES MINISTRIES AND THE COMMISSION HAVING REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE COMPETENCE OF THIS MEETING TO COME UP WITH SOLUTIONS. HOWEVER THE ORIGINS OF THIS DISPUTE GO BACK OVER TEN YEARS . . Background to the IMM ===================== In the 1980s the marine environment became big news. Over- fishing, chemical pollution, sewage dumping, radioactivity, the offshore industry and pollution from ships all became major issues. Nowhere was this more marked than amongst the countries bordering the North Sea. In response the Environment Ministers of North Sea States started to hold a series of 'North Sea Conferences'(NSC's), coupled with predominantly single-issue 'Interim Ministerial Meetings' (IMM's). These provide an arena for fundamental policy development, via the production of Ministerial Declarations (NSC) or Statements of Conclusions (SoC, from IMM's) that set out a clear timetable for change, coupled with concrete actions. The precautionary principle became established as a central element of international environmental policy at the Second NSC in 1987, and major achievements have included the banning of ocean incineration, the dumping at sea of industrial waste and sewage sludge, and significant reductions in land-based sources of pollution. The Conferences have indeed had a major impact on environmental policy. However the failure to take action on fishing, the most immediate threat to the North Sea, became increasingly embarrassing. The 1990 Third NSC, at the Hague, highlighted concerns that fishing would 'destabilise the marine environment'. Following collaboration to produce the North Sea Quality Status Report in 1993, which once more documented the problems created by fisheries, Environment Ministers warned - at the 1993 Copenhagen IMM - that fisheries management 'should safeguard the sustainability of the North Sea ecosystem as a whole.' But no concrete measures were proposed. Some firm action was supposed to result from the Fourth NSC, held in Esbjerg in 1995. But concrete action was blocked by the EU Commission's DGXIV on the behalf of EU Fisheries Ministries. However the frustration was beginning to show. Paragraph 15 of the Esbjerg Declaration says: "Fisheries management policies must be supported by the political will to make them sufficiently strict, to implement them fully and to enforce them comprehensively. If not, it cannot be expected that fish stocks will be maintained within biologically safe limits or that associated negative effects on other biota will be minimised. Ministers AGREE that it is necessary to redouble efforts to develop sustainable management policies, to implement them fully and enforce them comprehensively, and to seek to deepen and broaden support for sustainable and effectively applied fisheries policies from the public and the fishing industry." In an attempt to focus attention on the fisheries issue it was agreed to hold a single issue Interim Ministerial Meeting on fisheries at Bergen, and it was also agreed that this should be a joint meeting of Environment and Fisheries Ministers. Preparations for the IMM begin ============================== The negotiations for a document such as the Statement of Conclusions represent a major commitment of human and financial resources for the governments and other bodies that take part in the preparatory process. The first negotiating session was held in October 1995. It was clear, even at this point, that the IMM was running into problems. The Esbjerg Declaration says that the IMM was to be held in late 1996, before the all-important EU Fisheries Council Meeting held each December, which agrees quota levels for the following year. But it became clear that the date had been put back to March 1997, effectively setting back any measures for a further year. It also became very apparent that the negotiations were a step backward in open government. At previous North Sea Conferences much of the negotiations took place in open session in front of the NGOs. It was very clear what each countries' position was. This was all to be swept aside. This became very clear from the leaked internal report of the meeting from Alan Simcock, the UK's Head of Delegation: "3. The outcome was greatly eased by the Norwegians having arranged on the evening before the formal meeting began for the heads of delegation to have an informal dinner together. We discussed most of the main issues in the absence of the NGOs and got general agreement on them. All the other heads of delegation pressed the Norwegians to do the same again at future meetings, so that we could have private discussions without the NGOs. I naturally agreed, but refrained from pointing out that these 'informal' meetings that do not (officially) happen are the inevitable result of having agreed that NGOs should participate so freely in our main meetings. The Norwegians showed every sigh of agreeing that this will be a standard pattern. It will be interesting to see how long it is before the NGOs start complaining about their exclusion from these informal gatherings" "4. The main agreement that we reached was that there will be no formal working groups established to prepare material for CONSSO meetings [Committee of North Sea Senior Officials - the 'public face' of preparatory meetings for North Sea Conferences]. Instead, one of the official parties (one of the states, the European Commission, or the North Sea secretariat) will take the lead in preparing the work, consulting those that they think fit in the manner that they choose. This means that all material will come forward without any need for us to defend our position in preliminary formal negotiations, which will give us greater freedom at CONSSO itself." For 'greater freedom' read 'greater anonymity'. It was decided that the 'lead parties' for the preparations for the IMM would be Norway and the European Commission (principally DGXIV, the Fisheries division). The net effect of these decisions was eventually to turn much of the formal preparatory process into a farce. Early drafts of the Statement of Conclusions ============================================ However at first the open discussions gave much of the appearance of previous preparations for Ministerial meetings. By July 1996 the Draft Statement of Conclusions, SoC, drawn up under the guidance of Norway and the Commission, appeared to be taking shape. It contained a large number of concrete actions, for which a space was left for the date by which each measure was to be achieved. In a letter sent by the Secretariat to all participants it was emphasised that the task was now shifting to "proposals on the substance of the draft conclusions with regard to quantitative objectives, concrete strategies and actions and the appropriate time-limits or time-schedules". There were warnings, even at this stage, from DGXIV that formally competence for fisheries, within the European Union, lay with the Commission and that this should be remembered even though they were prepared to enter discussions in a spirit of open-mindedness and co-operation. However, so far as the open debate on the draft text was concerned, there were two main problems. The first was the tone of the opening sections of the text, typified by the use of terms such as 'marine living resources' and 'environmental management', rather than 'fish' and 'environmental protection' in earlier Ministerial Declarations originating from the Environmental Ministries. The second was the issue of concrete goals and deadlines. Some EU Fisheries Ministries began to make it clear that they were not happy with either. Environmental Ministries began to plead to the environmental NGOs that their hands were tied. The NGOs were left to argue that - given past experience - even where there were goals and timelines, these were largely worthless unless these were very specific and identified who was responsible for implementation. The Precautionary Approach ========================== In recent years there had been increasing recognition of the need to apply a precautionary approach to fisheries. In principle the means were well understood. Global agreements, to which all North Sea States are party, such as the UN Agreement on Highly Migratory Species and Straddling Fish Stocks and the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, covered the theory in some detail. Many, including those on national delegations, hoped that the IMM would concentrate on how the precautionary approach would be applied in practice for specific North Sea fish stocks. This would represent a global 'first', in keeping with the tradition of the North Sea Conferences, and justifiable given the dire condition of the stocks. Thus the SoC's section on the precautionary approach was left, pending the results of a special seminar. This seminar, held last September, examined what the precautionary approach would mean for the North Sea, both in general and for typical stocks; namely roundfish (cod and its relatives), herring and sandeels. The seminar, which involved senior figures in fisheries science and management in the North Sea, as well as fishers and environmental NGOs, resulted in a high degree of agreement. Generally the precautionary approach needed be applied urgently, because of the most stocks were already subject to heavy fishing pressure (and, indeed, as now required by global agreement). Yet none of the stocks examined were managed in such a manner. Of the roundfish at least cod and saithe were vulnerable to stock collapse; haddock and whiting stocks (and fisheries) would also benefit from reduced pressure. For herring it was clear that scientists and managers had been consistently over-optimistic about the state of the stock, and had failed to heed the warning of the increasing catch of juveniles (mainly in the industrial fishery for sprat). For sandeels it was likely that the general reduction in their fish predators (due to over-fishing) in the North Sea had to some extent counteracted the impact of industrial fishing. It followed from this that if human consumption species were to recover, industrial fisheries for sandeels would need to be reduced. For birds it was concluded that it would "seem precautionary to close areas [to sandeel fishing] in the vicinity of these colonies to fishing until more is known about sandeel stock structure and the interactions between sandeels and seabirds." The results of the seminar have now been published. From this it can be seen why many participants left with the hope that the corner had been turned, and that when these conclusions were incorporated into the Statement of Conclusions the IMM would become an historic event. Sabotage of the IMM process =========================== But while the seminar was in progress, others were working to destroy the IMM, and the Statement of Conclusions. Because the IMM involved negotiations with a non-EU country, Norway, the EU's secretive 'External Fisheries Group' was meeting regularly to discuss tactics and agree a common line between EU Fishing Ministries and DGXIV. France, which has always been hostile to the North Sea Conferences, had played little role in the IMM discussions - no concrete proposals, but no strong objections either. But it turned out that France, Spain and Portugal (both represented at the External Fisheries Group) were insisting that the IMM should have no impact on fishing policy. There should be no concrete measures, no deadlines; nothing in fact that had not already been agreed elsewhere by Fisheries Ministries and DGXIV. Their attitude was that Environment Ministers were 'sticking their noses' into affairs that did not concern them. They wanted the IMM to be the first and last time that Environment Ministers attempted to intrude on their territory. In a further attempt to wreck the IMM they sought, and got, legal opinion from the Council of Ministers Legal Service that any text of the traditional form 'the Ministers AGREE . . .' could be interpreted as legally binding, even if the SoC had the usual clear statement that it was a political statement that was not legally binding. The legal opinion stated that "it was the contents of the statement and not its form which could be construed as creating obligations, direct or deferred, for the Community, and emphasised that such is the position in international law.' Following further manoeuvring, this position was agreed at meetings of the Permanent Representatives Committee (one step below Ministerial level) on 9th and 11th of October. Decisions by this body can only be overturned by Ministers. Following discussion of the draft Statement of Conclusions at a meeting of the External Affairs working group on 7th October, an internal counter document was produced, demanding the removal of all concrete actions, deadlines and initiatives derived from the IMM. It was scattered with comments such as "Why should fisheries policy be subject to environmental policy and management objectives. We might also consider whether environment policy should be subject to fisheries policy and management objectives." Given that the formal objective of the IMM was the integration of these two policies, it indicated that Fisheries and Environment Ministries were now on collision course. A late rally of Environment Ministries ====================================== At the October 1996 IMM preparatory meeting the Commission dropped its bombshell on the unsuspecting Norwegians and (some) Environment Ministries. They said that the counter-proposals from the External Affairs working group represented the common EU position. The present set-up, involving Environment and Fisheries Ministries could continue, providing that the Environment Ministries did not cause any trouble. If there were any objections then the Commission would insist that it alone negotiated bilaterally with the Norwegians. With the exception of the Belgiums, who throughout had argued the need for clear and strong measures, it turned out that the environment ministries were extraordinarily ill-prepared for this turn of events. Even though they, and DGXI, had clear legal competence, or shared competence at least, for issues such as the protection of biodiversity, the general ecosystem impact of fisheries, and sustainable development, they were legally unprepared for such a battle. The developments embarrassed and infuriated them, but they once more told the environmental NGOs that they were powerless. Some even blamed the environmental NGOs for not doing enough to highlight the issue. During this period, which lasted from October to January, the EU Fisheries Ministries were rampant, and the draft text was reviewed and re-reviewed, with the objective of making the SoC content-free. All remaining concrete measures and deadlines were removed, and it was made clear to the Norwegians that the 'agree' word was also unacceptable. Finally, in late January, it became clear that some Environment Ministries were waking up to the implications of what was happening. Having set up the IMM the stage was set for the signing ceremony to represent the surrender of all authority to the Fisheries Ministries, while the fishing policy that caused the problem remained unchanged. Germany, Belgium and Sweden began to make it clear that the SoC was unacceptable in its current form. One of the surprises of the preparatory process has been the position of the UK. Mr Gummer had been a prime mover for the IMM, arguing at Esbjerg that fisheries was 'the real crisis in the North Sea'; that 'our children would never forgive us if we did not take action', and that 'time was fast running out'. Yet during the IMM preparations the UK DoE were singularly useless, never speaking out for the environment, resulting in protests not only from environmental NGOs, but the UK Government's own nature protection agency, the JNCC (Joint Nature Conservation Committee). Again, when it became clear that Germany, Belgium and Sweden were considering breaking away, the UK Head of Delegation, Mr Simcock, sent them a fax (since leaked) which, while claiming to be a 'like-minded' colleague, sought to pull them back into line. His viewpoint was that they merely had a presentational problem, which the environmental NGOs were bound to pick up on. "If our Ministers are not to be wrong footed, we need to try to ensure that adequate emphasis is given to the progress that we have made." His proposal was to concentrate all of the supposed achievements in a single paragraph which could then be emphasised to the media. It was important that a common line on this was developed: "We had better all hang together, or we shall all hang separately" Fortunately Germany, Belgium and Sweden remained unconvinced. In early February, Angela Merkel, the German Environment Minister, wrote to the other Environment Ministers, setting out the need for concrete measures and timelines, otherwise the SoC would be unacceptable. At the penultimate drafting session in February, the Germans, supported by Belgium and Sweden, made it clear that the tone of the declaration (the use of phrases such as 'living marine resources' rather than 'fish', and environmental 'management' rather than 'protection') was unacceptable. There also had to be concrete actions and deadlines. And issues such as habitat destruction and incidental harm to seabirds, marine mammals and other sealife was not just the competence of Fisheries Ministries, and that this had to be recognised and action taken. Subsequent to that meeting the Commission and the Fisheries Ministries have threatened legal action should any Environment Ministry continue to rebel. But rumour has it that the German Environment Ministry has the backing of the Chancellor's office and intends to stand firm. Certainly they and other Environment Ministries have nothing to gain by giving in, and we would find it very surprising that any would consider signing the current draft SoC and face humiliation. So at the meeting at Bergen on 13-14th March the Ministers are set to play for high stakes; the credibility of both environmental and fisheries policy, particularly the EU's Common Fisheries Policy, is at stake. Greenpeace viewpoint ==================== We believe that the following six points are essential if the Bergen IMM is to be regarded as a success. Each point is followed by an assessment of how the draft text matches up to this need: * an over-arching agreement to implement the precautionary approach in fisheries, as a minimum to follow the format of the UN Agreement on Straddling Stocks and the FAO Code of Conduct. Draft SoC: It has been agreed to implement these global agreements; the problem is that there is no deadline for implementation, which makes it effectively worthless. * replacement of text such as 'living marine resources' and 'exploitation of the environment' to 'fisheries' and 'protection of the environment. Draft SoC: avoids the issue by the use of ambiguous phrases such as 'fisheries and environmental protection, conservation and management'. * concrete action on industrial fisheries in sensitive areas; general application of precautionary approach to all industrial fisheries as a priority. Draft SoC: There is (deliberately) generic language that could cover industrial fisheries, but no concrete action, no timelines, and clearly no intention to act. * concrete action on beam trawling; phase out of tickler chains (responsible for sea bed habitat destruction) by 2002, reduction of discards to acceptable levels. Draft SoC: Again there is generic language that could cover this, but no concrete action, no timelines, and no intention to act. * recovery programme for badly depleted stocks such as North Sea cod. Draft SoC: Suggests that competent authorities should consider recovery programmes (not necessarily implementing them) for cod within two years. * ban the targeting of spawning aggregations. Current SoC: consider restricting excessive (three ambiguous words in a row!) fishing on spawning aggregations.