[] TL: NORWAY: WHALING ON THE DOORSTEP OF EUROPE 
SO: Greenpeace International (GP)
DT: Fall 1993
Keywords: oceans endangered species whaling gp reports europe
politics norway ec iwc /

   Norway's requests for exemptions from EC regulations will   
   undermine hard won conservation achievements firmly backed by 
   the Community.
   GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL

NORWAY, NATURE CONSERVATION AND WHALES

The position taken by the Government of Norway on whales is not
in accord with the principles expressed in Agenda 21 of the UN
Conference on Environment and Development or with the UN
Convention of the Law of the Sea and undermines the work of the
International Whaling Commission (IWC). Norway's current
requests to the EC with respect to EC regulations affecting
whales are intended to further a national policy based on
political needs, supported by inadequate science and which flies
in the face of modern standards of international cooperation.

Press reports from within Norway quote a source in the Prime
Minister's office saying that the decision to resume whaling was
made because polls showed that the governing party was losing
support to another political party in northern Norway. The
decision to resume was announced a week after the poll results
became available.

There is no scientific justification for Norway's whaling. Since
minke whaling began off Norway in 1930, the commercial hunt has
cut the population in half using wide ranging vessels which
often operated far from the Norwegian mainland. The
International Whaling Commission, acting on scientific advice,
designated these whales as a Protected Stock in 1985 and has
maintained that classification ever since. Repeated attempts by
Norwegian scientists to show that the stock is not in a depleted
state have failed. Norway calculated its own estimate of the
population but this employs a series of dubious corrections to
increase the totals far above the numbers actually seen and
gives an estimate which is flimsy at best. The IWC Scientific
Committee accepted Norway's estimate as the "best available" but
has not calculated the numbers itself and concerns have been
raised within the Committee about the way the calculation was
made.

Agenda 21 and the UN Convention on Law of the Sea both provide
that management of marine mammals, including whales, can be
regulated more strictly than that required for sustainable use,
including by a total prohibition on catching. Agenda 21
explicitly identifies the IWC as the responsible international
organisation for the conservation of whales and the management
of whaling worldwide pursuant to its founding charter, the 1946
Whaling Convention. The Convention applies to "all waters where
whaling is prosecuted".

Norway defies the will of the IWC by filing objections. Norway
has objected both to the scientific finding of Protected Stock
status and to the management decision of the moratorium on
commercial whaling. Norway's decision to resume whaling
unilaterally has been criticised in joint statements by the
heads of many IWC delegations including France, Germany,
Ireland, Netherlands, Spain and the UK in 1992 and again in
1993.

Norway's requests for exemptions from EC regulations, if
accepted, will not be a credit to the EC, to its citizens and to
the repeated expressions by the European Parliament for support
for the moratorium on commercial whaling. They will undermine
hard won conservation achievements firmly backed by the
Community.

Norwegian officials have waged a relentless public relations
campaign since 1990 in an effort to portray Norwegian minke
whaling as a small-scale, traditional activity that has done no
harm to the minke whales of the Northeast Atlantic. This
misleading presentation of the facts raises doubts about whether
that is all Norway is interested in pursuing. Some of Norway's
current requests for exemptions from EC regulations provoke
additional questions. Why, for example, when Norway's officials
claim interest only in North Atlantic minke whaling, does Norway
request to be exempted from the EC directive on CITES, in order
to maintain its CITES reservations even on stocks of fin whales-
-the second largest species after the blue whale--in the North
Atlantic and, even more curiously, in part of the Southern
Ocean?

Since there is no solid basis in science or relevant
international agreements for Norway's current position, the
requests for exemptions from the regulations of the European
Community should be refused. These are:

The request to exclude minke whales, fin whales and orcas from
Annex 4 of the Council directive 92/43/EEC on conservation of
habitats of wild fauna and flora.

The request to exclude the minke whale and the fin whale from
articles 2(a) and 3(1) of the Commission regulation (EEC) No
1970/92 of 30 June 1992 amending 382 R 3626 on the
implementation in the Community of CITES.

In addition the Environment council should clarify that Council
regulation (EEC) No 348/ 81 of 20 January 1981 on common rules
for imports of whales and other cetacean products does in fact
prohibit trade within the community on products originating from
the hunting of whales, even if that hunting is permitted by the
national laws of a member state.

Adresseavisen April 16 1993

Front Page:

WHALING SHALL SAVE AP (SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY) IN THE NORTH

Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland is now asked to tidy up
after sources at the Prime Minister's office admit that the
whaling was motivated by party political profile problems in
Northern Norway. The request comes from centrally placed
representatives from various parties. The situation is termed as
very embarrassing. Both parliamentary leader in Kr.F (the
Christian Democratic party Kaare Gjoennes, and Anders Aune from
Finnmark say that Gro now has to tidy up this situation. The
statement about "political pressure" in the North was given in
an interview with NTB (Norwegian news agency).

Continued on page 2:

- TIDY UP THE WHALING BUSINESS, GRO ADMITS THAT WHALING IS
MOTIVATED BY PARTY POLITICS

Centrally placed representatives from different parties now ask
Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland to tidy up after sources at
the Prime Minister's office admit that whaling was motivated by
party political profile problems in Northern Norway. To
"Adresseavisen" the situation is termed as very embarrassing.

It is in an interview with NTB that an unnamed source at the
Prime Minister's office talks about the "political pressure" in
the North and adds: "We felt that there now was a need for a
positive issue in Northern Norway".

In the article NTB mentions the Government party's political
problems in Northern Norway, not least as a result of the EC
fight. And the announcement of the decision to resume commercial
minke whaling was given only one week after an opinion poll
showed that SV (Socialist left wing party) had become Northern
Norway's second largest party.

WEAKENED CREDIBILITY

"If this is an attempt to charm Northern Norway, it is an
extremely high gamble. Both EC's fisheries policy and the
whaling issue can end in a double political somersault for the
Ap-government. But without regard to the truth of the statement
about internal medicinal motivated whaling decision, this is an
embarrassing issue that can harm Norway internationally.
Therefore I take it for granted that the Prime Minister tidies
up," says parliamentarian leader in KrF and member of the
foreign affairs committee, Kaare Gjoennes to "Adresseavisen". 

As others have, Gjoennes reminds us that the statements from the
Prime Minister's office directly undermines the professional and
scientific argumentation that one has relied so strongly on both
here at home and abroad.

"This confirms in an embarrassing way that which many already
have hinted at, namely that the eagerness for something to
market oneself with in Northern Norway has been to hasty so that
the decision was made before one had done ones homework of
obtaining solid alliances abroad. The statements are very
blameworthy. It should be possible to keep ones mouth shut, even
if one had other motives. Think about the damage this can do
regarding the business community and our foreign affairs and
environmental face abroad," says former second-in-command in
Hoyre (Conservative party), now member of the seafaring- and
fisheries committee, Svein Ludvigsen.

"Do you believe the statement from the Prime Ministers office?"

OUGHT TO BE KEELHAULED

"I believe in NTBA playing down of this issue is completely
naive. The person that has made the statement ought to find
something else to do. The question of keelhauling should arise!
That you may well write. First, he ought to seek employment in
the fisheries industry or as whaler, then he would have felt the
hard coastal reality physically," says Ludvigsen. Party
colleague, former fisheries minister Svein Munkejord, does not
want to comment on the statement from the Prime Minister's
office, but is convinced that the government's professional,
scientific arguments hold water.

"Gro ought to tidy up before this develops into a really
embarrassing issue," says Finnmark's representative Anders Aune.

He thinks it is strange that one chooses exactly the whaling
issue as a profile issue in Northern Norway:

- First, it is a difficult issue to market abroad, secondly it
is no great public issue in Northern Norway and thirdly, there
are very few who are employed by this hunt, which also gives
limited financial effects both for Northern Norway and the
country as a whole, Aune points out.

Many of the critical representatives "Adresseavisen" has
contacted, remind us that there is a broad political agreement
in Stortinget about starting minke whaling.


NO SCIENTIFIC JUSTIFICATION FOR NORWAY'S WHALING

The Norwegian authorities and their PR agents confidently assert
that minke whales have recovered since the International Whaling
Commission (IWC) moratorium on commercial whaling went into
effect in 1987 and therefore can be safely hunted. This is not
correct. The graph below (omitted here; unscannable) shows an
estimate of the damage done to the population since minke
whaling began in 1930:

NORTHEAST ATLANTIC MINKE WHALES
PERCENTAGE OF NATURAL POPULATION REMAINING

This graphic was prepared using the IWC's standard population
assessment model. The graphic shows the beginning of a slow
recovery, as predicted by the model, but there is no evidence
that such a recovery is actually occurring. In fact, the IWC's
Scientific Committee said at its 1990 meeting that "the slow
growth rate of whale populations meant that there was no
possibility that a substantial change in minke whale numbers had
occurred since 1986." Full recovery will take many decades.

The Norwegian authorities want to ignore the severely depleted
state of the population. The IWC, acting on scientific advice,
designated these whales as a Protected Stock in 1985, and has
maintained that classification ever since. (This classification
is independent of the moratorium.) Despite repeated attempts to
overturn the classification, Norwegian scientists have been
unable to do so. As recently as the 1993 Scientific Committee
meeting a new, independent analysis from outside Norway showed
that only about 45% of the mature females remain. Nevertheless,
Norwegian officials deny the depleted state of this stock and
focus instead on the number of whales estimated to be in it.
They are fond of saying that there are a large number of minke
whales in the NE Atlantic--86,736 to be exact. But where did
this number come from? How reliable is it?

The figure of 86,736 is a "point estimate" produced by Norway
and reported by the IWC's Scientific Committee at its 1992
meeting for the purpose of conducting further computer trials.
The Scientific Committee simply assumed that Norway's scientists
had done their work properly. They had no choice. They could not
do the calculation themselves because Norway did not make the
raw data available until a year after the estimate had been
accepted. If the complex calculation was done correctly, then
all the scientists can say is that the number of whales lies
somewhere between 61,000 and 117,000.

A review of how this population estimate was calculated reveals
how flimsy it is.

ù First, five minke whales were tagged with radio transmitters
and followed for a day or two to see how often they surfaced to
breath. To see how critical the rate of breathing of these five
whales was to the whole calculation consider the following: one
of these whales breathed more often than the others; data from
this whale was discarded but had it been averaged with the
others, the population estimate would have dropped by 4,000
animals. The excuse given was that the tagged whale was in
Icelandic waters, but Norwegian whalers routinely hunt further
from home than Iceland--as far away as Jan Mayen Island and
Svalbard.

ù Next, 8 vessels cruised the Norwegian sea and the Barents Sea
looking for minke whales, each carrying two observers who
watched a defined strip of water on each side of the ship. A
total of 50 to 60 vessel days of observations were logged and
518 minkes were seen. A calculation from this data would have
given a population of about 30,000.

ù Finally, a survey vessel with two independent pairs of
observers on board cruised through UK coastal waters looking for
minke whales. Watching the exact same strip of water at the same
time, one set of observers saw 63 whales and the other set saw
80. Based on this and the breathing rate, Norwegian scientists
calculated that for every whale they saw, there must be 2.8
within the observed strip that their observers had missed, so
they agreed that they would multiply the numbers found by 2.8 to
correct for this. This gave them a final estimate of 86,700. No
other whale survey prepared for the IWC makes corrections in
this way.

Although minke whales are curious and approach boats (a
phenomenon well known to whalers and one that would cause the
population to be overestimated) no attempt was made to correct
for this. This population estimate is no substitute for a
serious survey effort which actually counts large numbers of
whales instead of employing dubious corrections to increase the
totals far above the numbers actually seen.

Norway's claims of a scientific foundation for their whale hunt
are based on a flimsily constructed population estimate. In
fact, no one knows precisely how many minke whales there are in
the N.E. Atlantic. All indications are that the population has
been cut in half by past commercial whaling, is at less than
half its natural size now, and will take decades to recover.

Norwegian authorities frequently assert that their whaling is
just a matter of managing their own natural resources within
their 200 mile EEZ. They talk about UNCED and Agenda 21 and say
that these agreements, by providing for sustainable utilisation,
have endorsed their whaling. This is wrong.

Both UNCED and Agenda 21 repeat and reaffirm sections of the UN
Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that management of marine
mammals, including cetaceans, can be regulated more strictly
than that required for sustainable use, including by a total
prohibition on catching. The Agenda 21 text reiterates the
UNCLOS requirement that "states shall cooperate with a view to
the conservation of marine mammals and in the case of cetaceans
shall in particular work through the appropriate international
organisations for their conservation, management and study".
Agenda 21 goes on to identify the International Whaling
Commission (IWC) as the responsible international organisation
for the conservation of whales and the regulation of whaling
worldwide, pursuant to its founding charter, the 1946
International Whaling Convention, which applies to "all waters
where whaling is prosecuted.

It could hardly be otherwise. Whales are highly migratory; a
whale that swims through Norway's waters in July may have been
in Portuguese waters off the Azores in December. Consider this
map (omitted here): Norway's commercial hunt in the North Sea in
July/August 1993.

The cluster of catches in the extreme south of Norway's EEZ is
just 14 nautical miles from the Danish EEZ and less than 60 nm
from the German, UK and Netherlands EEZs. It is very likely that
the whales were in one of these other EEZ's just a few hours
before they were caught and, had they not been caught, it is
just as likely they would have moved on to the UK EEZ as stayed
in the Norwegian one. They were closer to Amsterdam than to Oslo
when they were caught.

The migratory nature of whales, recognised by UNCLOS, UNCED and
Agenda 21, makes nonsense of Norway's claims that they are
simply managing their own natural resources. These whales are no
more Norwegian whales than they were Spanish, Portuguese,
French, British, Belgian, Dutch, German or Danish whales as they
swam north.

Norway is defying the will of the IWC in order to hunt these
whales. In 1992 Gro Harlem Brundtland said:

"We need to replace international anarchy by international
governance.... It will become increasingly contradictory to
promise remedy through national measures alone to challenges
which are of an international nature and origin."

By acting to break down international agreements governing
highly migratory species Norway is flying in the face of current
thinking in international affairs and in the brave but sadly
empty words of its prime minister.

NORWEGIAN WHALING
NEITHER SMALL SCALE NOR TRADITIONAL

In the summer of 1993, Norway shocked the International Whaling
Commission, and the world, by restarting commercial whaling
without the IWC's approval. Norway's decision, originally
announced in 1992, provoked an unprecedented response from heads
of many IWC delegations that year, 17 of whom signed a joint
statement expressing their concern that Norway's unilateral
action "may seriously undermine the only international
organisation with authority to manage whaling". A similar
statement, in which 15 Commissioners expressed their "profound
regret at Norway's declared intentions", was issued as the 1993
IWC meeting drew to a close. Norway refused to listen, saying
that its whaling is a long-standing tradition, one which has
never harmed the population on which it depends. Sadly, neither
of these assertions is true.

THE HISTORY

Modern Norwegian minke whaling began around 1930 and for decades
was subject to weak regulations that did little to restrict
operations. No actual catch quotas were set until 1975--more
than 40 years after the start of modern minke whaling in Norway.
Allocation of quotas to the individual whaling vessels did not
occur until 1984, one year before the IWC'S moratorium was to
come into force and more than half a century after the industry
started. The introduction of quotas was generated by the IWC,
not by the government of Norway. As minkes became scarce around
the main hunting area of the Lofoten Islands, the whalers began
to travel further away in search of whales.

The graph below (omitted here) records the true history of minke
whaling off Norway. If it were not for the IWC, Norway would
still be trying to hunt minke whales at a rate of 2,000 a year,
the historical average, depleting the stock even further. As
recently as May, 1993, Norway's minister of fisheries said that
these whales can sustain an annual catch of 2,000 to 4,000 a
year.

THE SCIENCE

With scientific evidence showing that these whales had been
reduced to below 54% of their original size--the IWC'S
protection threshold--the Commission declared them a "Protected
Stock" at its 1985 meeting. In 1991 the IWC's Scientific
Committee, including all Norwegian scientists, confirmed that
the N.E. Atlantic minkes had suffered a significant decline over
the 30-year period 1952-83.

Most recently, a new analysis of Norwegian data presented to the
1993 meeting by an outside scientist showed that the N.E.
Atlantic minke whales have been reduced to a best estimate of
less than half of their original numbers--certainly to well
below the IWCs protection level of 54%--with only 45% of the
mature females remaining. The IWC's Scientific Committee has
never supported Norway's contention that the stock should no
longer be protected. Nevertheless, the Government of Norway
maintains an objection to that classification, allowing their
whalers to hunt this depleted population.

WHALERS CHEAT

In any case, there are no guarantees that Norway's whalers will
respect quotas or other regulations. Violation of regulations
and weak enforcement have plagued Norwegian operations. Norway
never accepted application of the IWC's International Observer
Scheme to its minke whaling operations. Recently published
reports by the few whaling inspectors that were employed in the
period 1980-87 reveal widespread illicit activity in that
period, including serious over-catching. One of these
inspectors, who reported a 25% over catch and other violations
on the vessel "Ulla" which he monitored in 1986, wrote: "The
crew on the 'Ulla' is neither better nor worse than other
whalers...they represent the Norwegian catcher mentality where
there is not enough concern for the ecological balance in the
sea. The commercial interests are put before consideration
towards nature."

Corrupt practices by whalers are not just a thing of the past.
When Steiner Bastesen, head of the whalers' union, was charged
twice this year with illegal fishing activities Norway's
government dropped him from its delegation to the IWC, but he
received a license to catch whales anyway. All the whalers now
have national inspectors on board but past experience clearly
shows that this alone is an ineffective control measure. The
infractions reported in the 1980s were committed by whalers even
though inspectors were on board their ships.

UNCED

In the action program "Agenda 21", adopted at the UN Conference
for Environment and Development, countries endorsed the
principle that if living marine resources are to be managed and
utilised it must be on a sustainable basis. Due to the unique
problems affecting cetaceans UNCED noted that the responsible
international bodies (the IWC in the case of minke whales) could
set stricter regulations--including the prohibition of
exploitation--if desired.

REVISED MANAGEMENT SCHEME

Norway alludes to the draft revised management scheme adopted by
the IWC at its 1992 meeting and suggests that this allows for
the resumption of minke whaling in the Northeast Atlantic. This
is not true. A scientific procedure for calculating catch limits
was agreed but it was also agreed that this is only part of what
is needed to complete a revised management scheme. Not all of
these elements have been completed or agreed. Furthermore, the
Commission's insistence on them is not stalling or
filibustering, as has been suggested. They are necessary
requirements, as the experience of the Ulla shows. Norway was
the only member of the IWC to vote against the 1992 resolution
adopting the draft revised management scheme. A resolution it
co-sponsors with Japan in 1993 on the RMS was defeated because
* sought a back-door legitimisation of Norway's 1993 commercial
whaling plans. The Scientific Committee has not calculated any
quota for the Northeast Atlantic minke whales under the Revised
Management Scheme. This is because the Commission has decided
that the Committee should only calculate quotas when it is
specifically asked to, and such a request has not yet been made.
Whaling nations have a history of treating scientific
recommendations as a starting point for a political process to
obtain the quotas that they want while avoiding responsibilities
such as inspection and public data scrutiny. For the Committee
to name a number would merely serve to legitimise this process.

"RESEARCH" NOT REQUIRED

As well as the commercial hunt, Norway plans to take 136 whales
a year for a "research" program in 1993 and again in 1994. This
programme has been roundly criticised in successive IWC
resolutions, which have noted that Norway's lethal whaling
"research" is not structured in such a way as to provide
information needed by the IWC. The real product of this
"research" is whale meat, and a bit of political peace for Gro
Harlem Brundtland who has been under intensive pressure from
whalers in the North of Norway.

Some "research" catches are allowed in the area around the
Lofotens, where minke whales are most depleted, because Norway
is aware that neither the IWC's old management rules nor its
proposed new ones would permit a commercial hunt in this area.

LARGE SCALE OF OPERATIONS

Norwegian spokespersons are quick to say that the vessels used
average 60 gross register tons and to paint a picture of small
ships operating out of isolated villages. In fact 12 of Norway's
whalers weigh over 100 gross register tons (the Ulla is one of
these) and the largest weighs 310 tons. Many Norwegian ships act
as mini-factories, some ranging many hundreds of miles from
their home ports and staying at sea for weeks at a time;
catching whales, flensing them on board and refrigerating the
products for eventual sale. By the mid-1980's, some of the
richest whaling grounds were off Russia, not Norway. Norwegian
officials maintain that the hunt is for local consumption but
Japanese buyers were in Norway in April, 1993, to negotiate for
export contracts.

Norway's small type whaling is neither small scale nor
traditional, it is simply commercial whaling. It has depleted
the population of minke whales of the N.E. Atlantic. The
Norwegian Government should immediately announce that it is
suspending all commercial whaling, withdrawing its objections to
the moratorium on commercial whaling and to the protected stock
classification and that it will abide by IWC decisions in the
future.

BRIEFING ON NORWAY'S CLAIMS ABOUT ITS COMMERCIAL WHALING

In June 1993 the Government of Norway allowed commercial whaling
to re-open on the N.E. Atlantic stock of minke whales--a
depleted stock that has been protected by the International
Whaling Commission (IWC) since 1985--without the IWC's approval
and despite the IWC's current international moratorium on
commercial whaling worldwide.

Norway's unilateral decision was first announced on the opening
day of the 1992 IWC Annual Meeting and has attracted intense
international criticism ever since, both within the IWC and from
outside.

In defence of its position the Norwegian Government has produced
a series of information sheets and brochures in which it seeks
to justify its decision. In doing so it has made claims that
give an inaccurate picture of the history and nature of
Norwegian minke whaling as well as of the work of the IWC
Scientific Committee and of the Commission itself.

A 1993 study by the Centre for Environment and Development at
the University of Trondheim (1), commissioned by WWF Norway,
concluded that in the Government's publicity campaign "important
information has been left out, and that an inaccurate picture of
the actual facts has been drawn. There has frequently been
little or no correspondence between statements and facts. Little
consideration has furthermore been paid to the insecurity of the
scientific results and the criticism voiced by scientists."

The purpose of this current briefing is to correct the most
persistent of the Government's misleading claims.

SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS

ù The Northeast Atlantic stock of minke whales was protected by
the International Whaling Commission (IWC) in 1985 because of
scientific evidence that 50 years of Norwegian whaling had
reduced the stock to less than 54% of its original size - the
IWC s "protection stock" threshold. Since then, the lWC's
Scientific Committee has never said that this stock of minke
whales is not depleted, that the protection decision was
unjustified, or that the stock is increasing. Analyses submitted
to recent meetings of the Scientific Committee have reconfirmed
the depletion.

ù The most recent stock estimates of 86,700 animals submitted to
the IWC by Norwegian scientists in 1992 does not lift this stock
out of the protection category. Because of the uncertainties
involved in counting whales, this estimate has wide "confidence
limits" of roughly 61,000-117,000, which overlap considerably
with previous estimates including those on which the 1985
protection decision was based.

. Norway's unilateral decision to resume commercial whaling in
1993, regardless of IWC decisions, has attracted strong
international criticism. It was criticised at the 1992 and 1993
IWC meetings in joint statements signed by many heads of
delegations and was condemned in both years in resolutions of
the European Parliament.

. Norway's decision contradicts principles agreed at the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) and
sections of UNCED s "Agenda 21" regarding whales.

ù Norwegian small-type whaling for minke whales started around
1930. "Small-type whaling" is an IWC term meaning the hunting of
smaller whale species from vessels with mounted harpoon guns; it
does not mean "small-scale". Most of Norwegian small-type
whaling is pelagic, with vessels able to travel hundreds of
miles and to stay at sea for days and weeks at a time,
processing the whales at sea and refrigerating the whale meat on
board. Average annual catches were approximately 2000.

. Fifty years of whaling under Norwegian regulations resulted in
the depletion of the stock. Most of these regulations have, in
practice, favoured commercial requirements rather than
conservation ones.

. Violation of regulations and weak enforcement have plagued
Norwegian operations. Norway never accepted application of the
IWC's International Observer Scheme to its minke whaling
operations, and its domestic arrangements were ineffective.
Recently published reports by the few whaling inspectors that
were employed in the early 1980s reveal widespread illicit
activity in that period, including serious overcatching. Yet
Norway was the only IWC member to vote against the 1992
resolution on a Revised Management Scheme, dismissing as
"procrastination" the requirement that among other safeguards,
effective international monitoring and inspection arrangements
be in place before the IWC considers whether or not to lift the
moratorium.

STATUS OF THE NORTHEAST ATLANTIC STOCK OF MINKE WHALES.

"In 1992, the Scientific Committee of the International Whaling
Commission (IWC) unanimously agreed that the best estimate of
the Northeast Atlantic stock of minke whale was 86,700 animals,
and that this stock is in no danger of depletion or extinction."
- "Why Whaling?" Published by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, October 1992.

"There should be no doubt that the Government of Norway supports
the conservation of species, including marine mammals, that are
threatened with extinction or serious depletion. However,
according to the Scientific Committee of the IWC, this is not
the case for the Northeast Atlantic minke whale."
- "The Norwegian Government's decision to resume commercial
small-type whaling in 1993", produced for the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs by NORINFORM, August 1992.

"The results [of the IWC's evaluation of the status of the NE
Atlantic minke whales] proved that stocks were substantially
larger than previously believed and that stocks had been stable
all through the previous 50 years of commercial whaling where an
average of 2000 minke whales were caught."
- Norwegian Government report to UNCED, June 1992.

None of the above statements is correct.

Current IWC management rules, agreed by Norway when adopted by
the Commission in 197 require that stocks reduced to below 50%
of their original size should be protected from commercial
whaling. In 1985 analysis of scientific evidence by members of
the IWC's Scientific Committee showed that the N E. Atlantic
minke whales may have been reduced to as little as 30% of their
original numbers, and the stock was protected by the IWC that
year. Norway made a formal objection to the decision and is not
bound by it. Since then, the IWC Scientific Committee has
several times re-examined the question but has never said that
the protection classification should be changed or that the
whales are not depleted.


The protection classification of this stock was reviewed by the
IWC's Scientific Committee during its 1990 Comprehensive
Assessment of Whale Stocks. Norwegian scientists and others from
whaling countries argued that "the stock level was currently at
more than half of its 1937 level," but others noted that results
of the CPUE analysis "showed that the northeastern stock is
currently reduced to about one third of its 1937 level." (1)

In the 1990 Comprehensive Assessment, the Committee also agreed
that: "...the slow growth rate of whale populations meant that
there was no possibility that a substantial change in minke
whale numbers had occurred since 1986" - the year that the
moratorium came into force. (2) In other words. the Scientific
Committee has never said that the minke whales in the North
Atlantic have increased.

In 1991, following a reanalysis of Norwegian data, the
Scientific Committee - including its Norwegian members - agreed
that the stock had declined significantly during the thirty
years of whaling prior to the IWC's decision to establish
moratorium (3). Despite this unanimous conclusion the Norwegian 
Government claimed the following year to the Rio Conference that
"stocks had been stable all through the previous 50 years of
commercial whaling." (cited above)

An analysis in 1992 of Norwegian CPUE data, taking into account
the new Norwegian estimate of 86,700, confirmed that the stock
is depleted to below the 54% level. (1) A further analysis
submitted to the 1993 meeting of the Scientific Committee showed
that only an estimated 45% of the mature females - the animals
that are most important for the reproductive capacity of the
stock - remain. (5)

Since the moratorium came into force the Scientific Committee
has never said that catches can be taken from the NE Atlantic
stock of minke whales nor has it ever calculated catch limits
for that stock.

The estimate of abundance now given by Norway - 86,700 - was
accepted by the Scientific Committee as part of a wide range
within "confidence limits", reflecting the inaccuracy of such
estimates. The Committee simply agreed that "the estimates...of
abundance and their variances ..were the best currently
available for the 1988 and 1989 shipboard surveys of the
northeastern North Atlantic, and accepted them as such."(6) The
"estimates of ... abundance and their variances" referred to by
the Committee included a total estimate of 86,736, with a
coefficient of variation (CV) of 0.1655. With that CV, the range
of the abundance estimate (with 95% confidence limits) would be
approximately 61,000 to 117,000. This range overlaps with
previous ranges, including those on which the original 1985
decision to protect the stock were based. These were ranges of
estimates centred on the two estimates 44,000 and 60,000, which
derived from different analyses of marking experiments. When the
Committee considered the abundance of the N.E. Atlantic minkes
in 1990 it agreed a range of 43,500 to 114,000.

NOTES
(omitted here; unscannable)

NORWAY'S LEGAL POSITION TO RESUME COMMERCIAL WHALING IN 1993.

"No delegation at the IWC annual meeting in Glasgow questioned
Norway's legal right to resume whaling."
- "Norwegian small-type whaling", produced by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, July 1992.

"The decision is ... consistent with international law and
Norway's obligations under the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling."
- "Why Whaling?", Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October
1992.

"The Norwegian Government's decision is in accordance with the
1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling,
which is based on the principle of sustainable harvesting."
- "The Norwegian Government's decision to resume commercial
small-type whaling in 1993", produced for the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs by NORINFORM, August 1992.

Norway resumed whaling in 1993 under its formal objections to
two IWC decisions: one to the overall moratorium on commercial
whaling, the other to the specific protection of the N.E.
Atlantic minke whales. Thus, while in a strict sense Norway's
position is legally correct, its current whaling activities are
contrary to the objectives and purposes of the 1946
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and have
been sharply criticised as such.

When in 1092 the Norwegian Government first announced its
intention to allow commercial whaling to resume in 1993, heads
of delegations of 17 IWC member states signed an unprecedented
joint statement at the 1992 IWC meeting expressing their "deep
disappointment" at Norway's unilateral decision. They also
stated their concerns that "such action may seriously undermine
the only international organisation with authority to manage
whaling".(1)

At the 1993 IWC meeting another joint statement was signed by
the Commissioners of 14 countries, recalling the 1992 statement
and reiterating their "profound regret at Norway's declared
intentions". The concerns expressed in the new statement were
then verbally supported during the meeting by Commissioners of
another three states, including, for the first time, the Russian
Federation. (2)

The European Parliament approved a resolution on 9 July 1992
according to which the Parliament was "distressed that the
Norwegian Government should have announced its unilateral
intention to allow commercial whaling to be resumed, regardless
of the decisions of the International Whaling Commission
(IWC)...." In "condemning Norway for its decision to resume
commercial whaling" the resolution called upon the Government of
Norway "immediately to abandon its plans to resume commercial
whaling." It also "calls on the [European] Commission to
consider respect for the [IWC's] moratorium by applicant states
to be one of the essential conditions for accession to the
European Community".

The European Parliament passed another resolution on 27 May
1993, in which it again "Condemns the action of the Government
of Norway in resuming commercial whaling...." and "Calls on the
Norwegian Government, at a time when it is involved in
negotiations for accession to the European Union, to reverse its
position and, in particular, to suspend its decision to
authorise fishing for 296 rorquals despite the IWC ban."

Norway's resumption of whaling also provoked a formal
"certification" by the U.S. Secretary of Commerce, Ron Brown, in
early August 1993. In a letter to President Clinton dated 5
August 1993, Secretary Brown explained that his decision was
"based on the fact that the IWC zero catch limit for the
Northeast Atlantic minke whale stock has been exceeded as a
result of the commercial harvest by Norway and, in the absence
of any remedial or mitigation actions, such activity has
diminished the effectiveness of the IWC conservation program."
Under the relevant U.S. legislation, the Pelly Amendment, the
President has 60 days from the date of certification to decide
whether to prohibit the importation of some or all Norwegian
products into the United States.

Over 100 British MPs from all parties signed an Early Day Motion
in November 1992 against Norway's whaling, on the occasion of
Mrs. Brundtland's arrival in Britain to deliver Norway's formal
application for EC membership to Prime Minister Major. The
parliamentary motion stated that the House is "dismayed" by
Norway's "determination to resume commercial whaling in defiance
of a worldwide ban" and is "angered" by the whaling it has so
far conducted under objections and under the guise of scientific
research. The motion called on Mr. Major "to inform Mrs.
Brundtland that Norway must renounce its whaling activities    
before consideration can be given to their application for
membership of the European Community."

Norway's unilateral decision is clearly a contradiction of its
outspoken promotion at the Rio Conference of international
cooperation to resolve environmental problems.

NOTES: (omitted here)

NORWEGIAN WHALING AND UNCED.

"The whaling will be conducted on the basis of fair and
reasonable catch limits, ensuring a stable population of minke
whales and sustainable management in accordance with the
principles adopted at the UN Conference on Environment and
Development."
- "The Norwegian Government's decision to resume commercial
small-type whaling in 1993", produced for the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs by NORINFORM. August 1992.

"These two principles were endorsed at the UN Conference in Rio:
-Commitment to the conservation and sustainable use of marine
living resources. Endorsement of states' right to exploit their
own national resources pursuant to their own policies regarding
environment and development. Norway's environmental policy is
based of these principles. Traditional small-type whaling will
be conducted in accordance with this policy."
- "Why Whaling?", Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. October
1992.

"The fact that the management aspect - which means sustainable
hunting - is so clearly written in the text means that the
Action Plan primarily treats the whales as an exploitable
resource and that Agenda 21 does not support a narrow-minded
protection policy."
- From Norwegian Government report from UNCED [informal
translation], September 1992.

Norway's references to general principles approved at the U.N.
Conference on Environment and Development ignore completely the
specific text that was agreed, by consensus, regarding
cetaceans.

The text, which repeats sections of UNCLOS, reaffirms the
principle that because of their special status under
international law as highly migratory species and as marine
mammals, the management of cetaceans can be more strict than
that of other marine species, including a prohibition on their
catching. (1) In other words, a moratorium is consistent with
UNCED and UNCLOS principles, and is recognised in both
documents.

The Agenda 21 text also identifies the IWC as the responsible
organisation for the regulation of whaling worldwide. According
to the text, "States recognise the responsibility of the
International Whaling Commission for the conservation and
management of whale stocks and the regulation of whaling
pursuant to the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation
of Whaling." (2)

The IWC's global jurisdiction reflects the fact that whales are
highly migratory animals, which regularly migrate through many
200-mile fisheries zones as well as the High Seas. A minke whale
which, for example, feeds in the far north Atlantic in the
summer may migrate as far south as Spain or North Africa later
in the year. (3) The migratory range and distribution of
cetaceans is one of the main reasons that UNCLOS establishes,
and UNCED reaffirms, that "States shall cooperate with a view to
the conservation of marine mammals and in the case of cetaceans
shall in particular work through the appropriate international
organisations for their conservation, management and study". (4)
Norway's unilateral decision to proceed with commercial whaling
in 1993 is therefore entirely contrary to the UNCED agreement.

NOTES: (omitted here)

THE NATURE OF NORWEGIAN MINKE WHALING.

"Norwegian small-type whaling has been conducted for centuries
on a modest scale..."
- "Why Whaling?". Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. October
1992.

"Since it started in about 1930...modern small-type minke
whaling has been subject to increased regulation in keeping with
the growing understanding of the need for ecologically sound
utilisation of stocks. The registration and reporting system
introduced in 1938 was followed in the early 1950s by various
restrictions on the whaling season and on whaling areas, as well
as total quotas and quotas per vessel." 
- "Norwegian Small-Type Whaling". Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
July 1992.

"Norwegian small-type minke whaling bears no resemblance to the
pelagic whaling carried out by Norway and other nations from the
turn of this century until the mid-sixties."
- "Norwegian Small-Type Whaling", Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
July 1992.

As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, modern Norwegian
minke whaling began around 1930. The term "small-type" is an IWC
term which means: "catching operations using powered vessels
with mounted harpoon guns hunting exclusively for minke,
bottlenose, beaked, pilot or killer whales." (1) It does not
mean that the operations are "small-scale". In 1982, the year of
the moratorium vote, 88 whaling vessels were licensed in Norway;
in 1985, following a sharp cut in the quota by the IWC. the
number of vessels dropped to 53. (2)

Most Norwegian small-type whaling is pelagic whaling. Although
the vessels used are much smaller than those that travelled to
the Antarctic most are nevertheless equipped as mini-factories,
able to travel hundreds of miles and to remain at sea for weeks
at a time - some even for an entire whaling season - flensing
the whales at sea and refrigerating the meat. Most Norwegian
whaling occurred in the Barents Sea, stretching eastwards into
the Russian zone (Murmansk) and northwards nearly 1000 miles to
Svalbard, 3-days sailing time away. Part of the 1992 scientific
whaling occurred in these distant areas as well. In 1960
operations spread into the Denmark Strait between Iceland and
Greenland, in 1968 to West Greenland. In the 1970s some boats
went as far west as Labrador on the Canadian East Coast. (3)

Whaling in the Vestfjorden area, near the Lofoten Islands, most
closely matched the Government's image, with "smaller vessels
and different strategies from those employed in offshore whaling
in the Barents Sea. In particular, the short trips, with only
one whale caught and landed per ship..." (4) However, as whaling
expanded "the relative importance of coastal catches decreased
with the expansion of whaling in the Barents Sea." (5) Coastal
catches were reduced from approximately 1000 per year in the
1960s to a couple of hundred in 1970. (6) In contrast, "catches
in the Barents Sea represented ca. 50% of the total catch of
minke whales in the northeast Atlantic during the early 1960s,
this increased to nearly 90% by 1980..." (7) "In the Barents Sea
the boats have tended to be both longer and more powerful than
those used elsewhere" (8)

Regulations but few restrictions.

It is true that Norway had a number of regulations in place but
these did not place effective restrictions on whaling
operations. The consequence of Norway's history of "regulation"
was the depletion of the N.E. Atlantic minke whales and their
subsequent protection by the IWC. Total quotas - by area - were
not introduced into Norwegian small-type whaling until 1975,
following a decision by the IWC. Quotas per vessel were not
introduced until 1984 - one year before the moratorium and more
than half a century after this whaling began. (9)

Seasonal restrictions introduced in the 1950s did nothing to
control the level of catch. Catches soared in the 1950s to an
all-time high of more than 4300 in 1958. The average catch in
the 1950s was 3300, as compared to 2100 the decade before. (10)

Whaling seasons were tailored to suit availability of whales and
needs of the industry. The six-month season applied in 1952
"almost exactly included the period of time in which minke
whales inhabit northern North Atlantic waters"; as a result "the
practical meaning of this decision has not at all restricted the
whaling operations". (11) Shorter seasons later still did little
to restrict operations. In the period 1959-67, when Barents Sea
operations were limited to late spring and early summer, for
example, "the whaling season still coincided with the optimal
whaling period (spring, early summer) [thus] the effects of
these restrictions were probably marginal" (12). The seasonal
restrictions possibly restricted access but "this is unlikely to
have had any serious effect in the Barents Sea and along the
northern coast. The whaling season seems to have been adjusted
to optimise whaling in these areas." (13)

A three-week pause in July, introduced in 1950 and maintained
throughout the whaling years, also had little or no effect on
catches. It, too, had a commercial advantage: "From a commercial
point of view this regulation no doubt was also useful since the
reduced quantities of minke whale meat being brought ashore at
the peak of the holiday season, when most people were away from
home, had a stabilising effect on the prices for whale meat
being sent to the market." (14)

Whaling season restrictions north of 70N and east of 25E - first
used 1961, maintained throughout: "...the whaling season in
these areas seems to coincide with the optimal period for
whaling with respect to climatic and whale migration patterns.."
(15)

A regulation setting a 70-tonne limit of whale meat per vessel
was introduced in 1973, but this was intended simply to "try and
reduce the rather large number of minke whales taken by the 4 or
5 largest vessels, equipped with refrigerators for freezing the
meat at sea". (16)

One aspect of the Norwegian hunt which worried Norwegian and
other scientists was the high proportion of females in the
catch. Their fear was that this would depress the reproductive
rate of the population. In the 1950s about 50% of the catch were
females, with the proportion increasing to 60% during the 1960s.
(17) Although "a series of regulations restricting the whaling
areas and the season were imposed throughout the 1970s in order
to reduce the proportion of females in the catches"...[these] do
not appear to have worked." In fact, throughout the 1970s and
into the early 1980s the percentage in the overall NE Atlantic
catch was never lower than 52% and rose to as high as 67% (18)
In the Barents Sea - where most whaling is done - the proportion
was much higher: close to 90% throughout the late 1970s and
early 1980s.(19)

Delaying the whaling season seemed to help, but there was
clearly reluctance to do too much of thus since "further hangs
to later opening dates for the whaling season will be difficult
if the production of high quality meat is to be maintained. The
fat content of the meat increases with time through the summer,
particularly on the northern whaling grounds, and the market for
fat meat is poor." (20) Professor Lars Wallae, head of Norway's
scientific delegation to the IWC, repeated in an interview with
the journal of the Norwegian Royal Society for the Conservation
of Nature. "Natur & Miljo (summer 1992): "The problem is that
the minke whale gets fat during the summer. Therefore the meat
can get an oily taste which makes the value of the meat lower".

What emerges from this history of "regulation" of Norwegian
whaling activities is that the regulations too often suited the
demands of the commercial aspects of whaling. The Walloe group,
writing of whaling during the period 1948-58, noted that it "was
completely regulated by the market for whale products". (21)
But, as seen above, market considerations influenced later
regulations as well. Because it is a commercial activity, market
considerations will continue to influence any future commercial
whaling in Norway. According to the "Natur & Miljo" article. for
example, "Lars Walloe says that each whale boat needs about 20
whales to get a reasonable profit. About 40 boats will be
interested in participating. That means that 800 minke whales
will become frozen meat. Next year's scientific whaling is
included in this number." There is little compatibility between
such considerations and "the need for ecologically sound
utilisation of stocks". 

Violations of the regulations

Evasion of the regulations and lack of enforcement have plagued
Norwegian whaling. The "Natur & Miljo" article cited above
contains extracts from numerous reports by Norwegian whaling
inspectors to the Fisheries Ministry. The reports were filed
during the period 1980-87, but were held as classified documents
until pressure from the media forced their publication in 1989.
Killing forms required to be filled in by each vessel's crew are
still being held.

Norway never accepted to place its minke whaling operations
under the IWC's own International Observer Scheme. Instead it
enacted a domestic scheme which has been grossly under-staffed
and poorly funded. For the 50 or so vessels in operation in the
mid-1980s, for example, there were never more than 8 inspectors.

Although the published inspectors' reports can give only a very
partial picture of the situation, they nonetheless do reveal
numerous and persistent violations of the rules, particularly
overcatching and use of the banned "cold" or non-explosive
harpoon. That these occurred on the vessels with inspectors on
board raises many questions about what happened on the ones that
were not observed.

The "Natur & Miljo" article describes what it calls a "culture
of tricks" used by Norwegian whalers to circumvent the rules.
The article notes that, based on the information in the
inspectors' reports, throughout the 1980s "the scientists
recognised an increase in the average weight of the hunted
animals....Later it was shown that meat from illegally shot
animals was added to meat from legally shot animals. Some
scientists thought that the under-reporting could be between 15
and 40%" 

Such misreporting is not new. At a 1976 workshop in Oslo on
North Atlantic whale stocks, Ole-Vidar Solvik, then of the
University of Oslo, presented a thesis on the North Atlantic
minke whale, based on official whaling logbooks as well as trips
he himself made on whaling vessels and conversations with the
crews. Solvik reported that his investigations of the logbooks
revealed that a number of the minke whales reported as being
caught around Iceland were, in fact, the much larger sei whales.
He also found that in one case a vessel had caught fin whales
but recorded them as minke whales. He also found that the
logbooks were falsified in other ways. "According to my
sources," he explained, "it has happened that such false catch
reports have been prepared for locations where the vessel has
never hunted. The probability that such work gives a completely
misleading picture of the given ground is therefore high." (22)

When the IWC first applied its management rules to the North
Atlantic minke whales, and Norway was faced with having to set
species-specific catch limits, the move was opposed by Norway's
scientists in the Scientific Committee on the grounds that such
regulations would not be possible to control. Dr Age Jonsgard
wrote in a 1976 paper: "The only way of making effective control
would be to send an inspector on board every vessel. Since so
many vessels are participating in the whaling operations, both
practical and economic problems would make such a regulation
unreasonable and in fact impossible...there can be no doubt that
at least a part of the whalers would...catch more whales than
permitted." (23) He and other Norwegian scientists argued
instead for the system of regulation Norway had been using until
then, i.e. one based on a control of whaling effort such as
numbers of vessels and length of season. But it is no easier
policing this method than a quota-based system. Furthermore,
what the inspectors' reports from the 1980s make clear is that
not even the presence of an inspector on board the vessel will
resolve the problem.

At the 1977 meeting of the Scientific Committee the Norwegian
scientists "unanimously reiterated their concern over the
appropriateness of catch quota regulation for this fishery in
view of the impossibility of introducing an effective control
system." (24) The Norwegian authorities have fined skippers
whose violations were reported and have sometimes denied them
their whaling concessions for particular seasons, but such
penalties appear not to have worked as effective deterrents.

One inspector, Dag Vongraven, who reported the violations
committed by the crew of the whaling boat "Ulla" in 1986 while
he was an inspector on board offered his summary of the problem
in a 1989 interview. "The crew on the 'Ulla' is neither better
nor worse than other whalers...They represent the Norwegian
catcher mentality where there is not enough concern for the
ecological balance in the sea. The commercial interests are put
before consideration towards nature." (25)

In 50 years modern Norwegian small-type whaling managed to
deplete the stock so severely that the IWC protected it because
of evidence that the stock was reduced to below 50% of its
original size. Some scientists think that the stock may be as
low as 30% of its original size. More than 100,000 minkes were
removed from this stock during that time, with an annual average
catch of approximately 2000 whales. Norwegian spokesmen, 
including scientists, have repeatedly, and against the evidence,
told the whalers that this level of catch caused no harm. (26)
They have indicated that, while initial catches may be lower, in
time catches could be raised to historic levels - the same
levels which caused the stock to decline. Not surprisingly, with
such encouragement, the whalers are pressing their government to
allow whaling to return to those levels.

NOTES: (omitted here)