[] TL: THE IAEA FILE A BRIEFING DOCUMENT BY GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL (GP) SO: Antony Froggatt, Greenpeace International DT: September 1991 Keywords: nuclear power iaea greenpeace statements conferences austria europe gp / [part 1 of 8] Prepared for: The General Conference of the IAEA, Vienna, 16-20 September, 1991 "The Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose." (Article II of the Statute of the IAEA) INTRODUCTION: THE IAEA FILE AND THE AGENCY'S GENERAL CONFERENCE The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created 35 years ago primarily to promote nuclear power, which appeared then to offer a cheap and safe energy option for all. But nowadays even nuclear advocates do not claim that nuclear power offers a complete and entirely satisfactory solution to world energy needs, and the mainstream energy debate has left nuclear energy behind. It is time to recognize that the IAEA's promotional function with regard to the nuclear industry has concealed serious environmental problems and has aided the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the prevention of which is the other much needed, but contradictory, function of the IAEA. The "IAEA File" is published to coincide with the IAEA General Conference, and illustrates several recent cases in which the IAEA has exerted undue and inappropriate pressure on the international community in defence of the interests of the nuclear industry. In some of these cases, this has involved serious misrepresentation of issues and facts which would otherwise have proven unfavourable to the nuclear industry. With the attention directed at the Gulf war and its aftermath, the role and performance of the IAEA have been this year under unprecedented public scrutiny. The early promises of the nuclear age have been supplanted by its reality: political and environmental insecurity. Greenpeace is of the opinion that Article II of the IAEA's Statute, which sets out the objectives of the Agency, should be updated, and that any reference to the promotion of nuclear power should be withdrawn. [Greenbase Inventory October 27, 1991 ] =======[#]======= [] TL: THE IAEA FILE A BRIEFING DOCUMENT BY GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL (GP) SO: Antony Froggatt, Greenpeace International DT: September 1991 Keywords: nuclear power iaea greenpeace statements conferences austria europe gp / [part 2 of 8] Prepared for: The General Conference of the IAEA, Vienna, 16-20 September, 1991 ANOMALY OR ANACHRONISM ? THE CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES OF THE IAEA Article II of the statute of the IAEA charges the organisation with the principle responsibility of promoting nuclear power. Subordinate to this is the obligation to enforce measures to prevent the diversion of civilian nuclear materials or technology to military uses. Whatever one's confidence in IAEA "safeguards", it cannot be disputed that the likelihood of clandestine diversions of nuclear materials to weapons use will rise with any increase in the activities of the world nuclear industry. The responsibility of the IAEA to promote nuclear power is thus in profound conflict with its obligation to inhibit the military uses of nuclear technology. The IAEA came into being in 1957, twelve years after the first use of atomic energy in war. In the aftermath of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, at the height of the cold war, there was a climate of sincere determination that nuclear technology should have more to offer than death. Optimistic projections were made for the benefits of atomic energy, such as electricity becoming "too cheap to meter". It is these particular historical circumstances which have led to nuclear power becoming the only energy technology to have its own promotional inter-governmental agency. After more than thirty years, experience has taught some hard lessons. With the annual number of reactor closures now exceeding the number being brought on line, the economic performance of nuclear power has failed the early expectations. The problems of nuclear waste management remain unsolved. Claims that the probability of nuclear accidents would be infinitesimally small were tragically refuted at Chernobyl. At the same time, the energy debate has moved on. The linear relationship between economic growth and energy consumption has been broken. Advanced technologies have become available which enable radical improvements in energy efficiency. In some countries, renewable energy technologies such as wind power are now competing with conventional sources. Whatever one's view of the merits of nuclear power, the idea that it promises a panacea for world energy problems has been abandoned. The optimistic hopes for atomic energy which informed the unique promotional role of the IAEA are discredited and outdated. With their demise, the IAEA itself has now become an anachronism. Promotion or Regulation? Only very brief mention is made in the IAEA statute of any responsibility for ensuring safety or the protection of health (Article III A(6)), and no reference at all is made to the environment. As is the case with IAEA safeguards against the military use of nuclear technology, the Agency's rudimentary regulatory obligations are subordinated to its primary promotional function. The IAEA is simply empowered to make recommendations. Its standards generally represent the lowest common denominator of national practice. Nevertheless, with increasing concern over the hazards posed by nuclear reactors and the transport of radioactive materials, the Agency has sought to present itself as a neutral and active regulatory body, a role which is much required in the world today. At the time of the establishment of the IAEA, many states set up their own national bodies, such as the Atomic Energy Commission in the USA, the Atomic Energy Authority in the UK, and France's Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique. Like the IAEA, these agencies originally embodied both promotional and regulatory functions. However, with the passing of time, it became apparent that the nature of the risks posed by nuclear technology warrant more effective regulation. It was realised that an institution charged with the task of promoting an activity cannot be expected to be an effective regulator. As a result, specialist regulatory bodies have since been established, such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the USA, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate in the UK, and the Service Central de Surete des Installations Nucleaires in France. Although criticisms persist, at national level the institutional responsibilities to regulate and to promote nuclear activities have been formally separated. The IAEA is thus anomalous in retaining a dual promotional and regulatory function. Any claim that the Agency can act as a neutral or effective global regulator conflicts with the Agency's own statute and with established practice at national level. The IAEA bears the legitimacy of the United Nations, and yet serves the interests of a single industry. It embodies the outdated notion that nuclear power offers a uniquely promising solution to world energy demand. It retains a dual regulatory and promotional role of a kind which has been abandoned at national level. Yet, much has changed since the Agency was established in 1957. Atomic energy has failed to fulfil the early expectations. More sophisticated policies have been adopted towards energy problems, relying more on increasing efficiency in use, than ever- increasing production. New technologies have become available which offer energy supplies at competitive cost, and with lower environmental penalties than threatened by fossil fuels or nuclear power. Because of its promotional function, the IAEA has become a political anachronism and an institutional anomaly. [Greenbase Inventory October 27, 1991 ] =======[#]======= [] TL: THE IAEA FILE A BRIEFING DOCUMENT BY GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL (GP) SO: Antony Froggatt, Greenpeace International DT: September 1991 Keywords: nuclear power iaea greenpeace statements conferences austria europe gp / [part 3 of 8] Prepared for: The General Conference of the IAEA, Vienna, 16-20 September, 1991 IAEA CHERNOBYL PROJECT: ALLEGIANCE TO THE COVER-UP Every time a major nuclear accident takes place or is revealed to the public, the nuclear industry makes a giant effort to convince the public that the health and environmental impact are being grossly exaggerated, while at the same time attempting to undermine the scientific and technical credibility of those who might disagree. This was evident on a number of occasions, most notably the 1957 fire at the Windscale plutonium fabrication plant which caused very significant radioactive pollution in the UK, the Irish Sea and throughout northern Europe; as well as further incidents at Kyshtym in the Soviet Union in 1957 (not revealed until 1976); and, in 1979 at Three Mile Island in the US. On the other hand, when a report is favourable to pro-nuclear policies it is euphorically promoted, often regardless of its scientific or statistical credibility. This was the case with the Rasmussen Report published in 1974, pledging that the risk of an accident causing death to 10 people was estimated to be once every 250,000 years per reactor ! In the case of the 1986 Chernobyl accident, the scale of the effort to hide the impact has been proportional to the scale of the accident, and in response to this unprecedented accident the IAEA undertook a special Chernobyl Project whose findings were presented to a closed conference in Vienna in May, 1991. Over the past five years the nuclear industry throughout the world has been trying to convince the public that the Chernobyl accident had severe but manageable consequences. "At the global level, even the consequences of Chernobyl are not so large". This statement by Mr. Leonard Bennett, an IAEA official, reported in Nucleonics Week (7/3/91) is in line with the policy of distortion of facts adopted by the IAEA through its history. The IAEA failed utterly to respond adequately to the numerous signals indicating over the period 1986-1990 a cover-up by Soviet authorities. Siding wholeheartedly with the USSR nuclear industry, the Agency collaborated with the attempt to depict true victims of Chernobyl as self-interested, anti-state, irresponsible agitators. The failure to question the fact that all public information was classified and restricted by central government illustrates clearly the Agency's unwillingness to establish the truth. The IAEA deserves criticism for taking at face value the explanation of the accident provided by the Soviet Union at a post-accident review meeting held in Vienna in 1986 a few months after the disaster. The official line, then endorsed by the IAEA, that the accident was due to human error rather than design-flaws of the RBMK reactor is now thoroughly discredited and well documented publically. But the fact that the operators of the reactor bore less responsibility for the disaster than did the design was known to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR only in February of 1990, and the IAEA agreed with the design-flaw opinion only after the Soviet government had itself taken this view. The IAEA took a completely uncritical attitude to the Soviet explanation, and only addressed the question when a jailed operator wrote a passionate plea directly to the Agency's Director General Hans Blix, asking for absolution through an inquiry carried out by the IAEA. This painful episode points to a fundamental problem with the Agency: it cannot function as an objective and independent watchdog on nuclear safety as long as the Secretariat is not willing to openly criticise and disagree with the policies of certain States. The International Chernobyl Project of the IAEA was set up in part to provide a "historical portrayal of the events leading to the current situation". While a lot of effort was put into developing new models of collective health incorporating the stress and psychological trauma inherent to the current situation, no attempt whatsoever was made to document historically the secrecy and lies told to the victims by their government. Yet, this latter is a prime source of the stress which has gotten so much attention. The International Chernobyl Project continually points to stress and psychological factors, but blames this entirely on the victims' ignorance of the harmlessness of radiation, rather than on the actual cause of the problem. Another function of the International Chernobyl Project was to provide an "evaluation of protective measures" taken in the affected region. Here again, the study takes a totally technocratic viewpoint, assessing dose levels and evacuation criteria without once mentioning that the authoritarian and secretive manner in which these decisions were taken contributed substantially to the social and psychological impact of the accident. Again, criticism of the Soviet government is avoided at the cost of the truth. According to People's Deputy Ms. Alla A. Yaroshinskaya, representative of the Zhitomir district in the Ukraine, the Chernobyl Commission of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR was not even consulted by the IAEA project. Similarly, the IAEA ignored the recommendations of the present Minister of the Environment of the Ukraine, Mr Jurij Scherbak, who provided the IAEA team a list of independent scientists who could take part in the study, when he was still the head of Zeleny Svit (Green World), the large and well-respected environmental organisation. [Greenbase Inventory October 27, 1991 ] =======[#]======= [] TL: THE IAEA FILE A BRIEFING DOCUMENT BY GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL (GP) SO: Antony Froggatt, Greenpeace International DT: September 1991 Keywords: nuclear power iaea greenpeace statements conferences austria europe gp / [part 4 of 8] Prepared for: The General Conference of the IAEA, Vienna, 16-20 September, 1991 The key elements of the IAEA Chernobyl report were as follows: a) there were no health disorders that could be directly attributed to radiation exposure. There were no indications of an increase in the incidence of leukaemia and cancers; b) there were significant non-radiation related health disorders in the populations of both the surveyed contaminated settlements and control settlements; c) the accident had substantial negative psychological consequences in terms of anxiety and stress due to continuing and high levels of uncertainty, relocation and other measures; d) early evacuations undertaken by the authorities - in cases which could be assessed by the project - were broadly reasonable and consistent with internationally-established guidelines; e) protective measures taken or planned for the longer term, although well intentioned, generally exceed what would have been strictly necessary from the point of view of radiological protection; f) official procedures for estimating doses were significantly sound. The methodologies used were intended to provide results which would not under-estimate the doses; g) measurements and assessments carried out under the project provided general corroboration of the levels of surface contamination for caesium as reported in the official maps made available to the project teams. However, the report is not an epidemiological or an environmental impact study. The most glaring problem of the report is the fact that the 100,000 victims who were evacuated from the 30-km zone and the 600,000 emergency workers known as "liquidators" are excluded from the scope of the study. Seven hundred thousand highly irradiated people are just simply ignored in a study purporting to be about the radiological impact of a nuclear accident. The IAEA Chernobyl Project was mainly concerned with reviewing official Soviet data. Very little of the evidence gathered is original scientific research. The purpose of the project was to provide analysis of the available data and to discover whether it could be used to draw scientific conclusions, but overall the conclusion appears to be that there is insufficient data on health effects to draw any valid scientific conclusions about overall health impact. As for protective measures, the IAEA has clearly lined up with the Soviet central government in stating that - all in all - mitigative measures were carried out in a proper and timely fashion. This view contrasts very sharply with the views of hundreds of thousands of victims, for whom the Chernobyl disaster has been a continuing nightmare of bureaucratic confusion and secrecy, and the domination of the government's response by the Soviet and international nuclear industry. Contrary to the idyllic picture of happy villagers welcoming the IAEA experts during their field missions in the region -a picture presented in an official project video on the first day of the IAEA conference, the IAEA representatives were in fact virtually chased out of more than one village by townspeople outraged that the government of the USSR would send an agency which promotes the further development of nuclear power to assess their plight. The level of distrust of central government data and assurances in the Chernobyl region is extremely high, and the IAEA's conclusions were greeted in the same way. In this respect, the IAEA has in fact contributed to increasing the social and political impact of the accident by hardening the division between the people and the "experts" from the government. [Greenbase Inventory October 27, 1991 ] =======[#]======= [] TL: THE IAEA FILE A BRIEFING DOCUMENT BY GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL (GP) SO: Antony Froggatt, Greenpeace International DT: September 1991 Keywords: nuclear power iaea greenpeace statements conferences austria europe gp / [part 5 of 8] Prepared for: The General Conference of the IAEA, Vienna, 16-20 September, 1991 TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENTS OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES: IAEA OUTMANOEUVRES UN ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME ON REGULATION The transboundary movement of hazardous wastes has been one of the most prominent international environmental issues of the late 1980s. Widespread concern over this issue, in particular in developing countries, was triggered when numerous attempts by northern industries from the chemical, pharmaceutical, nuclear and other sectors began to ship and dump their wastes in the territories of developing countries. In response, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) convened a series of Working Groups on the transboundary movements of hazardous wastes, which later led to the negotiation, drafting and signature of the Convention on the Control of the Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes, known as the Basel Convention, signed in Basel in March 1989. During the process of negotiations which led to the signing of this new convention, many countries specifically expressed their concern over the transboundary movement and subsequent dumping of radioactive wastes, and calls were made to ban the movements of radioactive wastes from industrialized to developing countries. Instead of demonstrating understanding for these legitimate and widespread concerns, and responding adequately by assisting the process in reaching a satisfactory mechanism to prevent the uncontrolled movements of radioactive wastes, IAEA representatives at the Basel negotiations refused to acknowledge that there was any problem, and were reported to be exerting pressure on the UNEP Secretariat to prevent radioactive wastes from being covered by the convention. IAEA's tactics in this instance included deliberate misrepresentation of the facts: their argument for excluding radioactive wastes from the control mechanism under discussion was that the IAEA itself was already providing such a control mechanism, whereas the truth is that - under its safeguards mechanism - the Agency controls only the transboundary movements of fissile materials that might end up in the fabrication of nuclear weapons, but that no IAEA mechanism of any sort controls the transboundary movements of most radioactive wastes. After the Agency's first argument to exclude radioactive wastes was rebutted, they pledged that they would establish a comprehensive control mechanism under the umbrella of the IAEA, but never did. It was on this premise, though, that many countries signed the Basel Convention in March 1989. A year and a half later, at its General Conference in September 1990, the IAEA adopted a Voluntary Code of Conduct on the Transboundary Movements of Radioactive Wastes, which - as its name indicates is only voluntary and only a code of conduct, rather than the promised and much needed, binding control mechanism. As a result, Article 1(3) of the final text approved in March 1989 in Basel by the Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Global Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes reads that: "Wastes which, as a result of being radioactive, are subject to other international control systems, including international instruments, applying specifically to radioactive materials, are excluded from the scope of this Convention." After the Basel Convention was signed, many countries remained deeply unhappy and frustrated by the fact that the agreed upon text reflected the lowest common denominator, and was not adequately addressing the issue. In particular, anger was expressed with regard to the fact that the Basel Convention is a control mechanism providing a legal basis to legitimize "waste trade" (little more than a prior notification procedure), and even as such did not even cover radioactive wastes. Africa, prime target of the "waste dumpers", was the place where criticism of the Basel Convention was most widely expressed. Because the Basel Convention resulted in a global agreement which was the reflection of the lowest common denominator, in 1990 the Organization of African Unity (OAU) organized a series of meetings of legal and technical environmental experts to draft a regional legal instrument to complement and supplement the Basel Convention in the region. In January 1991 in Bamako, Mali, the African Convention on the Ban on the Import of All Forms of Hazardous Wastes into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movements of Wastes generated in Africa (known as "the Bamako Convention") was signed. This regional convention is much more far reaching than the Basel Convention: in particular it bans the import of wastes into Africa, and includes without ambiguity all radioactive wastes within its definition of hazardous wastes. However, the IAEA is prepared to see, and apparently to encourage, the export of radioactive wastes to Africa in order to facilitate the world's nuclear industries despite the continent's desire not to become a dumping ground. To this end, the IAEA, following the preparation of the draft of the Bamako Convention, sent to the OAU a letter in which the Agency suggests that here again radioactive waste should be excluded from the scope of the convention: "The distinct nature of radioactive waste and its regulation, and consistent with the approach adopted by the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, the Working Group might consider deleting para 2 of Article 1 as well as other references to radioactive or nuclear waste presently contained in the Draft Convention, (Also in Annex 1, Waste streams). The development of a regional Convention that covers radioactive waste might complicate the implementation of a global instrument - be it a code or a convention - applicable to radioactive waste. The significance of a global instrument to which both senders and recipients of waste would be committed could not be overemphasized." The fact that, repeatedly, the IAEA has tried - even on occasions resorting to misinformation - to exclude radioactive wastes from any global or regional agreement regulating the transboundary movements of hazardous wastes is only explained by its permanent biased attitude towards nuclear power. In this case, the IAEA has clearly considered that its mandate to "seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy..." as spelt out in Article II of its statute gave it a mandate to undertake any action to keep open all possible disposal routes for radioactive wastes - including dumping them in the Third World, and regardless of the political, social, economic and environmental context. This is very a frightening stance indeed, if it is to be a reflection of IAEA's attitude on all environmental and public safety issues, especially with respect to their representation of the needs of developing countries. All the developments which have taken place since the adoption of the Basel Convention have confirmed how the IAEA is out of touch with current political realities on the issue of radioactive waste dumping, and how it has blatantly over-looked the needs and expectation of developing countries. Not only does the Bamako Convention specifically ban the import of radioactive wastes within Africa, but Article 39 of the Lome IV Convention between the EEC and their former colonies from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP), adopted in March 1990 states that: "The Contracting Parties undertake, for their part to make every effort to ensure that international movements of hazardous waste and radioactive waste are generally controlled, and they emphasize the importance of efficient international co-operation in this area. With this in view, the Community shall prohibit all direct or indirect export of such waste to the ACP States (...)" Finally, the goal of a waste trade ban was adopted by the Seventh Ministerial Meeting on the Environment of Latin America and the Caribbean, in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad & Tobago in October 1990. The Ministers present at this meeting adopted the Action Plan for the Environment of Latin America and the Caribbean in which they agree to: "protect the region by prohibiting, under any circumstances, the entry from outside the region of all types of hazardous, toxic and radioactive wastes and implement monitoring and control mechanisms for the safe transport, treatment and disposal of wastes generated from within the region." Clearly, the Third World has spoken in an unequivocal manner, and it cannot continue to be ignored on this issue by the IAEA. [Greenbase Inventory October 27, 1991 ] =======[#]======= [] TL: THE IAEA FILE A BRIEFING DOCUMENT BY GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL (GP) SO: Antony Froggatt, Greenpeace International DT: September 1991 Keywords: nuclear power iaea greenpeace statements conferences austria europe gp / [part 6 of 8] Prepared for: The General Conference of the IAEA, Vienna, 16-20 September, 1991 IAEA INTERFERES WITH THE ACTIVITIES OF U.N. MARITIME SAFETY ORGANISATION Maritime safety is internationally regulated by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), a UN specialized agency with headquarters in London. In order to try and improve maritime safety as well as to decrease the impact of shipping on the marine environment, the IMO Council is advised in particular by its Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) and its Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC). As part of this mandate, the IMO is presently reviewing the safety criteria required for the transport of spent nuclear fuel by purpose-built and non purpose-built ships, but on May the 6th, 1991, IAEA's Director General Dr Hans Blix directed a letter to the Secretary General of the IMO, Mr William O'Neil, in order to: "strongly request that (...) full account be taken of the excellent safety record of the transport of radioactive material". The transport of spent nuclear fuel has been a major issue of maritime safety for over a decade, and the IMO is only fulfilling its task by reviewing the safety features of such transports. Nuclear fuel burned in nuclear power plants in Japan, Switzerland, the FRG, Italy, Sweden and Netherlands - amongst others - has been transported by sea to the nuclear reprocessing plants of Sellafield (UK) and La Hague (France). Currently, a dozen voyages are made annually between Japan and Europe, across the Pacific ocean, the Panama canal, the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean. The environmental hazards inherent to the transport of spent nuclear fuel have been the subject of a long scientific and technical controversy, and it is thought that a fire on board a vessel full of nuclear spent fuel - which could affect the cooling system for the heat-generating highly radioactive material - could have unprecedented consequences. Some transports are taking place on vessels specially built (purpose-built ships), but spent nuclear fuel from Switzerland, Germany, and the Netherlands bound for reprocessing at Sellafield, is still transported on a French passenger ferry boat, the "Nord-Pas- de-Calais" between Dunkerque and Dover. Those most favourable to a preventive approach to environmental protection believe that the transport by sea of spent nuclear fuel should be banned all together, whereas another "school" suggests that it should be restricted to purpose-built ships. In his letter to the Secretary General of the IMO, IAEA's Director General, concerned with the fact that IMO's Sub- Committee on the Carriage of Dangerous Goods proposed additional requirements for the carriage of spent nuclear fuel on purpose- built and non-purpose ships, states that: "a leading principle in the Agency's Regulations is that radioactive material should be safely moved by any mode of transport and without unnecessary delay. Consequently, no special safety features are attributed to the conveyance and no specific provisions are required. On the contrary, safety is built-in to the design of the package and demonstrated through performance testing". The notion that material should be moved safely but without delay is inconsistent. The mode of transportation of any dangerous material - whether it be by rail, road, air or sea - must be taken into account by necessity, regardless of the additional safety features such as the design of packages. And the IMO is right to consider the acceptability of all modes of maritime transportation, in line with its mandate to enhance maritime safety worldwide. Clearly, any mode of transportation has specific and particular accident parameters and circumstances which must be taken into account. It is puzzling to see the IAEA attempt to prevent the IMO from fulfilling the task that it was created to do. As a matter of fact, at least one prominent IAEA-member state with a significant nuclear industry involved in the maritime transportation of spent nuclear fuel - Japan - maintains a policy of requiring that spent nuclear fuel when it is transported by sea, and regardless of it being packaged in IAEA certified casks, must only be carried in specially designed ships. Likewise, the US, another IAEA member state, requires that -if the transport of plutonium by air is considered - the safety features must be tested under conditions identical to those of a plane crash at full speed from cruising altitude. This constitutes another obvious example where the dangers inherent to a particular mode of transport are being fully taken into account. Concerns expressed at IMO about the dangers of maritime transportation of spent nuclear fuel were supported by the collision between earlier this year in the Mediterranean near Livorno, between the ferry Moby Prince and an oil tanker: the subsequent fire on board the ferry burned for approximately 45 hours at a temperatures reportedly in the range of 1000 degrees celsius, whereas IAEA tests for fire damage to casks are currently conducted for up to 30 minutes at a temperature which does not exceed 800 degrees Celsius. A fire on the French ferry "Nord-Pas-de-Calais", currently involved in the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and registered at Lloyds' Register of Shipping as a "Passenger/RoRo Cargo/Ferry" like the Moby Prince, could therefore possibly cause an accident of an unprecedented nature, if the situation was not controlled in time. The avoidance of such situations is perfectly within the mandate of the IMO. This is another case where IAEA's promotional function with regard to nuclear power is preventing it from co-operating in good faith with another member of the UN family. If it was primarily concerned with public safety rather than with "seeking to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy", the Agency could assist, rather than try to prevent, the IMO and other UN agencies to achieve the highest safety standards. [Greenbase Inventory October 27, 1991 ] =======[#]======= [] TL: THE IAEA FILE A BRIEFING DOCUMENT BY GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL (GP) SO: Antony Froggatt, Greenpeace International DT: September 1991 Keywords: nuclear power iaea greenpeace statements conferences austria europe gp / [part 7 of 8] Prepared for: The General Conference of the IAEA, Vienna, 16-20 September, 1991 GULF WAR ILLUSTRATES INADEQUACY OF IAEA'S SAFEGUARD SYSTEM With the events of the Gulf War, the credibility of the IAEA has been under greater scrutiny than ever before. The bombing by the US Air Force of the Iraqi nuclear installations -- which were operated under a regular IAEA inspection regime -- was a violation of an IAEA resolution adopted in 1985 which forbids attacks on nuclear facilities which are dedicated to 'peaceful purposes'. Most importantly, it revealed that the US government, the main promoters of the IAEA at its foundation, lacks any confidence in the Agency's nuclear safeguards. The Agency's capacity to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons is in question. It has been claimed that the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was one of the key elements that encouraged the military coalition led by the US to start the war in January, 1991, before all the diplomatic attempts to resolve the conflict had perhaps been exhausted. Too little attention, though, has been brought to the fact that one of the roots of the Gulf War lies with the existence of Article II of the IAEA Statute by which the Agency must "seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of nuclear power", and Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) by which Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWSs) are guaranteed access to the same nuclear fuel cycle which can be used to make weapons. For many years several IAEA member states (the FRG, Portugal, Brazil, Italy, the UK, the USSR and France) have been selling nuclear technology and materials to Iraq with the blessing of the Agency. Iraq is a party to the NPT; its compliance is officially reviewed by the IAEA through regular inspections of its nuclear facilities. Likewise, all the countries, except France and Brazil, who helped Iraq building its nuclear programme, were parties to the NPT. These nations therefore were expected to insist on safeguards for their material and technology. The Agency repeatedly 'confirmed' that no diversion of fissile nuclear material had occurred from the civilian to the military programme, but today the world is convinced otherwise. Although no-one could reasonably pretend to have had no knowledge Iraq's military build-up and Saddam Hussein's nuclear dream, the IAEA by its actions maintained the fiction that safeguards work, and that the 'peaceful' atom can be controlled. The relatively advanced state of the Iraqi weapons programme has shown that the existing safeguards regime operated by the IAEA is no certain means to ensure that the proliferation of nuclear weapons does not take place. A major reason for this failure is the fact that the IAEA is bound to promote technology while monitoring fissile material; the Italian 'hot cells' used to separate plutonium in Iraq, for example, were unsafeguarded. The Agency suffers from a conflict of interest because its active programmes to proliferate nuclear energy throughout the world make its safeguarding task ever-more complex and impossible. In fact, while it may condemn the Iraqi violation of the NPT, the IAEA is bound to defend the right of the Iraqi state to possess nuclear technology which can be used to produce nuclear weapons material. Unless this situation is remedied adequately and quickly, the safeguards system administered by the IAEA will continue to lose credibility, and the threat from nuclear proliferation will increase dramatically in the years to come. The first steps are: - eliminate the promotional function of the Agency entirely; - transfer all budget monies from promotion to safeguards; - global negotiation of a phase-out of all nuclear technology and a stronger safeguards system which covers all relevant nuclear technology; - transference of global intellectual and financial resources from civil nuclear power to energy efficiency and renewable sources, in a programme paying heed in particular to the needs of the developing world. The continuation of the NPT will be reviewed in 1995, when it is 25 years old. This upcoming process represents an opportunity to look at the performance of the IAEA in preventing nuclear proliferation, and to improve the existing non-proliferation regime. For the moment, Article IV of the NPT provides that Non Nuclear Weapons States party to the Treaty will receive, through the IAEA, assistance to benefit from the peaceful use of nuclear power. Not only is the offer of nuclear technology outdated and obsolete, as well as environmentally unacceptable to most countries, but it has proven - with the Iraqi and other cases - to be in direct conflict with the spirit and aim of the Treaty, which is to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons in Non Nuclear Weapons States and the vertical proliferation of such weapons in Nuclear Weapons States. Unless the world community identifies, acknowledges, and recognizes the causal link between Article II of the IAEA Statute, and the failure to prevent nuclear proliferation in the last twenty-five years, and undertakes to reform the objectives of the IAEA, the future of the non-proliferation regime will meet scepticism and contribute to world insecurity. [Greenbase Inventory October 27, 1991 ] =======[#]======= [] TL: THE IAEA FILE A BRIEFING DOCUMENT BY GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL (GP) SO: Antony Froggatt, Greenpeace International DT: September 1991 Keywords: nuclear power iaea greenpeace statements conferences austria europe gp / [part 8 of 8] Prepared for: The General Conference of the IAEA, Vienna, 16-20 September, 1991 REFERENCES - Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), (Vienna: IAEA, June 1980). - Les Jeux de l'Atome et du Hazard, by JP Pharabod and JP Schapira, Calmann-Levy ed., (Paris: 1988). - The IAEA and World Order, by Lawrence Sheinman, (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1987). - The Greenpeace Book of the Nuclear Age - The Hidden History, The Human Cost, (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1989). - Nucleonics Week, 7/3/91, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991). - The International Chernobyl Project, International Advisory Committee Technical Report (unedited final version), (Vienna: IAEA, May 1991); and The International Chernobyl Project, An Overview (Vienna: IAEA, May 1991). - "Chernobyl: Past Secrecy, Grim Future", in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XLII, no. 17, (1991), p. 13. - "The Chernobyl Accident: Current Vision of its Causes and Development", by authors of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy (USSR), Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering (USSR), All-Union Research Institute of Nuclear Power Plants (USSR), State Ctte. on Safety Supervision in the Atomic Industry (USSR), and Institute of Nuclear Power Safety Development (USSR), in Proceedings of the International Conference on Nuclear Accidents and the Future of Energy: Lessons Learned from Chernobyl, April 15 - 17, 1991, (Paris: SFEN/ENS, 1991). - "Radioactive Contamination in the European Part of the USSR as a Result of the Chernobyl Accident -- A Literature Review, Interim Report", by Dr U. Fink/Gruppe Oekologie Hannover and Dr A. Wenisch/Oestereichisches Oekologieinstitut Vienna, (Amsterdam: Greenpeace International, 1991). - International Trade in Wastes, a Greenpeace Inventory, 5th Edition, (Washington DC/Amsterdam: Greenpeace International, 1990). - Global Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes (Basel Convention), (Nairobi: U.N. Environment Programme, 1989). - African Convention on the Ban on the Imports of All Forms of Hazardous Wastes into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movements of Wastes generated in Africa (Bamako Convention), Bamako, Mali, 30 January, 1991, (Adis Abeba: Organisation of African Unity, 1991). - "Some Comments and Observation on the Draft African Convention on the Ban on the Import of All Forms of Hazardous Wastes into Africa and the Control of Tranboundary Movements of such Wastes generated in Africa", Pan-African Conference on the Environment and Sustainable Development, organized by the OAU in Bamako, Mali, January, 1991. - Fourth ACP-EEC Convention, Council of the EEC, Brussels, March 1990 (ref. no. ACP-CEE 2107/90; Brussels: EC, 1990). - "Action Plan for the Environment of Latin America and the Caribbean", Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, 22nd-23rd October, 1990. - Letter by the Director General of the IAEA to the Secretary General of the IMO, 6 May 1991, distributed by the IMO at the meeting of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), May 1991. - Import/Export of Irradiated Fuel and Radioactive Wastes to and from the UK, by Large and Associates, Consulting Engineers, (London: Greenpeace UK, 1990). - "A paper-thin fiction blew up with the Iraqi reactors", by John Willis, published in the International Herald Tribune, 15 March, 1991. - Letter, dated 13 February 1991, from D. Kyd, Director of Public Information, IAEA, to John Willis, International Nuclear Power Project Coordinator, Greenpeace, ref. no. 230-N4.11.41. - "Experts are certain Iraq has bomb technology", by Leonard Doyle, published in The Independent, 16 July 1991. - Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Defense Committee, UK House of Commons, 6 March 1991. - "High risk of political fallout", by Frank Barnaby, published in The Guardian, 1 February 1991. - "The Gulf War and the NPT", lead editorial in Nature vol. 349, 21 February 1991. ENDS[Greenbase Inventory October 27, 1991 ] =======[#]======= [] Date: FRI 13-SEP-91 15:36:13 GMT Subject: Important: footnotes for '"IAEA on Chernobyl" ---------- 1 IAEA Bulletin, 1986 (vol.28, no.2, p.64) 2 IAEA Bulletin, 1986 (vol.28, no.2, p.8) 3 IAEA Bulletin, 1986 (vol.28, no.3, p.65) 4 IAEA Bulletin, 1986 (vol.28, no.3, p.5-6) 5 IAEA Bulletin, 1986 (vol.28, no.3, p.10) 6 H. Blix, Address to the participants of the All-Union Conference in Kiev, May 1988 IAEA TECDOC 516, p.14 7 IAEA Bulletin, 1986 (vol.28, no.3, p.9-11) 8 Levi 1991 9 Burkhart & Crompton 1991, p.30 10 IAEA Bulletin 1983 (vol.25, no.2, p.51) 11 IAEA Safety Series No.94, Vienna 1989, Foreword 12 Burkhart & Crompton 1991, p.30 13 Paretzke 1988, p.142 14 IAEA Safety Series No.75-INSAG-1 (p.78-81) 15 New Scientist 24. February 1990 16 IAEA Safety Series No.75-INSAG-1 (p.51-52) 17 IAEA Bulletin, 1987 (vol.29, no.4, p.7) 18 IAEA TECDOC 516 p.13 19 The International Chernobyl Project - An Overview; p.3-4 20 IAEA Safety Series No.75-INSAG-1 (p.80) 21 IAEA Safety Series No.75-INSAG-1 (p.67) 22 IAEA Bulletin, 1987 (vol.29, no.4, p.7) 23 IAEA TECDOC 516 p.217-228 24 IAEA Bulletin, 1987 (vol.29, no.4, p.19-24) 25 IAEA Bulletin, 1987 (vol.29, no.4, p.24) 26 IAEA TECDOC 516 p.162 27 The International Chernobyl Project - An Overview; p. 28 The International Chernobyl Project - An Overview; p.23 29 The International Chernobyl Project - An Overview; p.22 30 Radioaktivitaet in Oesterreich, BMfG 1991 31 The International Chernobyl Project - An Overview; p.27 32 The International Chernobyl Project - An Overview; p.32 33 The International Chernobyl Project - An Overview 34 The International Chernobyl Project - An Overview; p.32 35 The International Chernobyl Project - An Overview; p.55 36 The International Chernobyl Project - An Overview; p.1 37 The International Chernobyl Project - An Overview; p.55 38 The International Chernobyl Project - An Overview; p.42 39 The International Chernobyl Project - An Overview; p.44 40 The International Chernobyl Project - An Overview; p.43 41 The International Chernobyl Project - An Overview; p.43-44 42 IAEA TECDOC 516 p.229 43 IAEA TECDOC 516 p.16 44 Sinclair 1988 45 Foreword International Symposium 'Enviromental contamination following a major nuclear accident', IAEA, Vienna October 1989 46 IAEA Bulletin 3/1988, p.10 47 IAEA Bulletin 3/1988, p.16 48 Sinclair 1988 49 Nuclear Power Performance and Safety, 1987, IAEA-Conference, foreword 50 IAEA TECDEC 516, p.14 51 IAEA Bulletin 3/1988, p.5 52 IAEA Bulletin 3/1988, p.5 53 Paretzke 1988, p.142