TL: OP-ED: NUCLEAR AGE MILESTONE AHEAD
SO: STEPHANIE MILLS, GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, (GP)
DT: 1995

With the Cold War over, nuclear weapons seem to have dropped off
the global concern list.  But next week, each member country
meet at the United Nations in New York with the other 167
countries that are members of the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), and debate nuclear disarmament as hotly as at any
time during the Cold War.

This year will mark the 50th anniversary of the nuclear age,
heralded by the nuclear bomb which destroyed the city of
Hiroshima.  It has been 25 years since countries agreed to try
to end the nuclear threat by negotiating the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.  But far from halting the growth of nuclear
arsenals or stopping the spread of nuclear weapons since it was
signed in 1970, the number of nuclear weapons has dramaticaly
increased.    Moreover, the list of countries capable of
producing nuclear weapons, or said to be acquiring a rudimentary
nuclear capability has grown.

The future of the Treaty and the reasons why it has failed will
be at the heart of the debate in New York next week.  Many non-
nuclear nations argue that the responsibility rests primarily
with the nuclear weapons states - the US, Russia, France, China
and Britain.  The Treaty commitment they made to eliminate
nuclear weapons has been largely ignored: not only has the number
of nuclear weapons expanded greatly since the Treaty was signed,
but new weapons continue to be designed, developed and deployed. 
In spite of the end of the Cold War, the nuclear weapons states
have so far failed to agree to a nuclear test ban, have not
committed to any further reductions in nuclear stockpiles, and
will not agree to a legally binding pledge not to target non-
nuclear nations with nuclear weapons. 

Moreover, the five nuclear weapons states continued insistence
that nuclear weapons are essential to their security has led
other countries to believe that acquiring - or the threat of
acquiring - nuclear weapons is a strong political lever.  In the
case of North Korea that lever seems to have worked.  With 
nuclear weapons states arguing that nuclear weapons are neither
legitimate nor effective national security guarantees for others
while holding onto their own, this situation seems doomed to
continue.

In regions of tension this dynamic is particularly dangerous. 
Israel's clandestine nuclear arsenal for example, can clearly be
seen as an impetus to Iran's reported interest in building a
basic nuclear capability.  While US and Israeli intelligence
claims may be overblown and self-serving and Iran denies any
interest in a nuclear weapons programme the situation highlights
the way in which all nuclear "deterrents" are potential
provocations and justify the case for acquisition by others.

The Treaty's second major flaw has been its promotion of the
"peaceful atom".  Any nuclear power provides countries with the
technology and materials needed to acquire a nuclear weapons
capability.  Nuclear inspections by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) fail to guarantee that nuclear material from
civil nuclear programs is not diverted to weapons programs.  In
fact, the IAEA gave a clean bill of health to Iraq shortly before
its nuclear weapons program was exposed during the Gulf War.

The Treaty undermines its overall objective by legitimising, for
example, the commercial production of plutonium.  Currently, the
nuclear industry is enjoying a plutonium boom with some 550
tonnes of commercial plutonium to be produced largely by France,
the UK, Japan, Germany and Russia compared with an estimated 257
tonnes of military plutonium by the year 2010.

Plutonium has a half-life of 24,000 years:  to believe that there
is no risk of any of the commercial stockpile being diverted into
a nuclear weapons programme during that time is naive.  Yet the
industry continues to play nuclear roulette, moving shipments of
plutonium and highly radioactive waste around the world thereby
creating an unprecedented environmental and proliferation threat.

A shipment of plutonium waste from France to Japan  in February,
the first of many of its kind, will significantly step up the
nuclear industry's plutonium racketeering.

A decision  on the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will
be made this year.  The nuclear weapons states' call for it to
be extended indefinitely in its current form would legitimise
nuclear weapons and the production of plutonium for an indefinite
future.  Instead, the Treaty needs to be made more effective by
agreement to a firm timetable for nuclear disarmament and a ban
on all plutonium production.  There is already approximately
100,000 nuclear weapons worth of bomb-making material in the
world, and more than enough nuclear weapons to destroy the planet
many times over.  This year offers an historic opportunity to
revolutionise our thinking on nuclear issues.  It is time to
return to the original logic of the NPT -- that the only true
non-proliferation regime is a world free of nuclear weapons --
and to begin the difficult but essential journey towards a
nuclear-free future.