TL: NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN SOUTH KOREA SO: Josh Handler, Hans Kristensen, Greenpeace International (GP) DT: March, 1994 Keywords: greenpeace reports gp military fareast / Nuclear Weapons and South Korea prepared by: Josh Handler, Hans Kristensen Greenpeace International (GP) March 1994 The end of the Cold War brought some hope to North East Asia that the tensions that had be set the region since the end of World War II could finally be laid to rest. U.S. forces were being drawn down, the Soviet Union was withdrawing from Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, the European oriented INF treaty also affected nuclear missiles in Asia as well. In the wake of the attempted coup in the Soviet Union in August 1991, the U.S. even reversed its long-standing commitment, and announced it would withdraw its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea. However, the process of reducing tensions and military armaments has stalled. Thorny questions remain around disputed sovereignty of the Kuril and Spratly islands, separately involving Russia, Japan and China. Major U.S. non nuclear forces are still forward deployed in the region, and the U.S. nuclear umbrella still extends over South Korea and Japan. Most noticeably, the Korean peninsula is still heavily militarized. North Korea's nuclear program raises fears in the region that it aspires to have nuclear weapons. Other nations worry about Japan's civil nuclear program which also raises long- term questions about Japan's intentions. Even South Korea's civil nuclear program raises proliferation concerns. Meanwhile the continued presence of Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons in the region, and the ease with which the U.S. could redeploy weapons to the region, encourage non-nuclear nations in Northeast Asia to think atomic diplomacy may be a useful solution to their security problems. Nuclear weapons do not, however, increase a nations security. Possession of nuclear weapons leads to greater tensions, and more calamitous consequences if nation's miscalculate each others intentions; something that is all too easy to do. Finally, nuclear weapons come at a horrendous financial, environmental, and health costs. Vast tracts of the United States and Soviet Union will be polluted for 1000s and 1000s of years by radiation released by accident and design from bomb making factories and reactors. Some $150-$300 billion is estimated to be needed to clean-up the nuclear weapons sites in the U.S. alone. Thousands of workers and people living near nuclear sites were secretly exposed to radiation, hazarding their health. Clearly, in the case of Northeast Asia there is a need to lessen tensions and build confidence, and not start a nuclear arms race. To accomplish this, at minimum, the United States should declare that it will never again deploy nuclear weapons in the region. This declaration should be combined with mutual inspections of U.S. nuclear weapons facilities in South Korea to reassure the population these weapons have indeed been removed as officials have stated. There should also be inspections of facilities in North Korea to verify that there no nuclear weapons in North Korea. These inspections should include NGOs, to insure their reliability and credibility. Insuring the Korean peninsula is free of nuclear-weapons would do much to reduce tensions and would be an important first step. But obviously further steps would need to be taken. Next the nations of the region should put greater pressure on the declared nuclear powers to work for a goal of global nuclear disarmament. Only this will insure no nuclear weapons are ever introduced to the region from the outside. Thirdly, there needs to be a new energy deal for the region where nuclear-plants are abandoned, making use of instead greater energy efficiency and renewable resources. Finally, reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel must be stopped, and existing spent fuel and plutonium stocks put under international control. These inspections should include NGOs, to insure their reliability and credibility. Chronology of Withdrawal of US Nuclear Weapons from South Korea During 1989-1991, the fall of the Wall and better relations with the Soviet Union in Europe began to raise questions in Asia about the possibility of ending the Cold War in the Pacific. Particularly the necessity of keeping U.S. nuclear weapons in Korea began to be questioned. However, the Gulf War and the United Nations' efforts to dismantle Iraq's secret nuclear weapons program in spring 1991 fuelled U.S. fears of nuclear weapons proliferation. Soon worries about North Korea's nuclear ambitions replaced concerns about Soviet aggression in the region. Some argued a withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons, the presence of which in South Korea was an open secret, would be a good way to reduce tensions on the peninsula and move forward relations with Pyongyang. As of July 1991, however, the Bush Administration, felt their should be no linkage between U.S. nuclear weapons and North Korea's nuclear program; North Korea should not be developing nuclear weapons under any circumstances. When South Korean president Roh Tae Woo visited Washington in July 1991, the Bush Administration flatly rejected adjusting its nuclear arsenal in South Korea as part of any deal to bring the North Korean nuclear program under control. The attempted coup in Moscow in August 1991 unexpectedly set in motion the steps which would lead to the complete withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from the region. U.S. concerns over "loose nukes" in the USSR prompted President Bush to propose bold unilateral disarmament initiatives on 27 September, which included cutting strategic nuclear arsenals, taking nuclear bombers off alert, withdrawing tactical nuclear weapons from the U.S. Navy, and eliminating land-based nuclear missiles and artillery projectiles from overseas bases. This initiative also applied to the some 60 Army nuclear artillery warheads and 40 B61 Air Force nuclear bombs the U.S. had in South Korea at the time of the President's speech. Seoul was seemingly surprised by President Bush's proposal, since the South Korean government had not been consulted in advance about his speech which had been seen by the Americans as more of a gesture toward the Soviet Union. Official reaction was slow in coming. Two weeks after President Bush's announcement, rumours began circulating in the South Korean media that Seoul was considering declaring itself nuclear-free when the U.S. withdrawal had been completed. "It is known that the government is considering declaring non-existence of nuclear weapons in South Korea jointly with the U.S. government," the South Korean newspaper Chosun Ilbo quoted an unidentified government source saying. Second-thoughts about the need to withdraw all U.S. nuclear weapons from Korea began to appear. As the nuclear artillery projectiles began leaving from Kunsan Air Base south of Seoul, the Washington Post reported on 12 October that the U.S. had decided to leave the B61 bombs behind for the time being. Leaving some nuclear weapons in South Korea while at the same time insisting North Korea could not develop nuclear weapons made little sense, and already by 19 October, U.S. government officials had told the New York Times that the aircraft bombs would also be withdrawn. The decision had been taken, the officials explained, in part to persuade North Korea to permit international inspection of its nuclear facilities, and in part because the U.S. military no longer thought the nuclear bombs were necessary to defend South Korea. Less than 10 days later, Seoul and Washington government working groups agreed in principle to a pull-out plan removing all nuclear weapons from the peninsula probably by April 1992. A South Korean government source told the newspaper Segye Times the weapons would be moved to either Hawaii or Guam for storage or moved further back to the U.S. for disposal. While accepting the nuclear weapons could be removed, South Korean military planners insisted the country should remain under the U.S. nuclear umbrella despite a withdrawal of land-based tactical nuclear weapons. "Such world military powers as the United States, the Soviet Union and China which are equipped with nuclear weapons have direct interest in the Korean Peninsula," a November 1991 South Korean Defense Ministry white paper said. "So we should continued to be under the protection of U.S. nuclear umbrella." North Korea's first response to the rumours was that it would still feel threatened by U.S. long-range nuclear weapons that could reach North Korea from elsewhere. On 1 November Reuters reported an article had appeared in the official North Korean daily Rodong Sinmun ridiculing the U.S. for talking about removing nuclear weapons from South Korea while maintaining its nuclear umbrella over the area. "It is only too natural that we mentioned this U.S. 'nuclear umbrella' for South Korea," the article said, adding that "they would continue to threaten us with nuclear weapons in the future. Under such conditions," the paper said, "the U.S. nuclear threat to us would not be dispelled, even though nuclear weapons are taken out of South Korea." For a couple of weeks, the North Korean government maintained the position that inspections of its nuclear facilities would not be allowed as long as South Korea remained under the U.S. nuclear umbrella of sea and air-launched nuclear weapons. But in a major policy shift on 26 November, Pyongyang announced it would allow inspection of its secret nuclear installations if Washington allowed inspections of its bases to guarantee that all U.S. nuclear weapons were withdrawn from South Korea. While officially welcoming President Bush's 27 September initiative, North Korea stated that it would "sign the nuclear safeguards accord, when the United States begins to withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea." Two days later, on 28 November, the South Korean Yonhap news agency reported South Korea and the U.S. had agreed to pull out U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea by the end of the year and to declare that the South was free of nuclear weapons during President Bush's scheduled visit to Seoul in early January 1992. "North Korea's announcement [to allow inspections if U.S. nuclear weapons were removed from the South] prompted the two allies to advance the schedule to removing nuclear arms deployed with the U.S forces in Korea," a South Korean government source told the agency. While one South Korean official said "our government can confirm the withdrawal," U.S. military officials continued not to comment on the report, saying: "We neither confirm nor deny the existence of nuclear weapons here at any time." Yet news about denuclearizing South Korea were difficult to keep secret, and the New York Times reported from Seoul on 11 December that it had virtually been an "open secret that American military forces here have been racing to dismantle what for three decades constituted the last line of defense against the North: An arsenal of more than 150 atomic weapons." By mid-December, South Korean government officials privately told reporters that the U.S. had completed its planned withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea, and on 18 December 1991, the South Korean President, Roh Tae Woo, publicly declared that there were no U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea. "As I speak, there do not exist any nuclear weapon whatsoever anywhere in the Republic of Korea," he said. After President Bush's visit to South Korea in early January 1992, the New York Times reported on 15 January that the U.S. had agreed to an unusual public statement that all bases in South Korea are nuclear free and that they could be open to inspection. Two weeks later, on 30 January 1992, North Korea signed an agreement with United Nations' International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna for safeguard inspections of nuclear facilities. "We will fully and loyally fulfill this agreement," pledged Hong Gun-pyo, vice minister of North Korea's Atomic Energy Industry. The accord would need to be ratified by North Korea's parliament as well. ENDS