TL: REPROCESSING PLUTONIUM - A DEAD END TL: REPROCESSING PLUTONIUM - A DEAD END SO: Karen Richardson, Greenpeace International, (GP) DT: February 15, 1996 Keywords: environment nuclear power weapons plutonium waste uk/ While producing electricity, nuclear power stations create plutonium. The plutonium is contained in the irradiated nuclear fuel (INF) resulting from operating a nuclear reactor. In some countries, the INF is chemically dissolved in "reprocessing plants", where plutonium and uranium are separated from the other radioactive waste products contained in the fuel. While plutonium has been primarily used for the construction of nuclear weapons, numerous attempts have been made to use plutonium as a fuel in nuclear reactors. In addition to the separated plutonium and uranium, reprocessing generates a tremendous volume of nuclear waste. Some of the nuclear waste is discharged directly into the air, ground and sea, creating direct short and long-term risks to the environment and public health. At the same time, chemicals, equipment and other materials involved in reprocessing become contaminated by the radioactivity released from the reprocessed fuel. In the end, reprocessing generates a volume of waste as much as 189 times greater than that contained in the original irradiated fuel. The radioactive discharges from reprocessing plants endanger human health and the environment. Discharges from the UK's Sellafield reprocessing plant have made the Irish Sea the most radioactively contaminated sea in the world. There is simply no safe dose of radiation. It can cause leukaemia and other cancers. It also believed to lead to a wide range of other health effects ranging from heart disease and genetic defects to asthma and allergies. Plutonium is one of the most radiotoxic and dangerous substances in existence: a single microgram smaller than a speck of dust, can cause fatal cancer if inhaled or ingested. A sphere of plutonium, smaller than a tennis ball, could be used to fuel a nuclear bomb which could kill millions of people. THE FAILURE OF PLUTONIUM AS A SOURCE OF ENERGY During the 1960's and 1970's, the nuclear industries in a number of countries were concerned about the price and quantities of uranium available for nuclear fuel. Out of this concern was born the idea that plutonium produced by nuclear reactors could be reprocessed and used in a new generation of Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR). These reactors were supposed to produce power, while also creating more plutonium than was used originally as a fuel. This Fast Breeder Reactor technology has failed. Despite grandiose plans of the original FBR programmes (France was to have six of these reactors on-line by 1985; the former Soviet Union was to have 12), no FBR has operated successfully in the West, and only Russia and Japan continue developmental programmes. The Superphenix in France is the only large-scale FBR in the west which the nuclear industry is still desperately trying to salvage. Persistent technical problems have continued to plague the Superphenix since it began operating in 1986 and it is continually being shutdown. The reactor has been labelled by the French press as a 60 billion franc piece of nuclear waste. On December 8th 1995 the Prototype FBR Monju, located on the west coast of Japan, had one of the most important accidents in the history of FBR development. Between 1-3 tonnes of liquid sodium, a highly corrosive material used to cool the reactor, leaked from the secondary circuit. Although there was no release of radioactivity, Japanese officials admit that there was a risk of an explosion. The shock waves sent through the public, nuclear industry and government in Japan are profound. Japan's plutonium programme is now under public scrutiny as never before. However, the political and financial momentum built up over forty years in support of Japan's use of plutonium, means that the Monju accident will not inevitably lead to a change in policy. The German FBR, Kalkar never generated anything but controversy. After 16 years of construction and 7 billion marks of investment, Kalkar was permanently closed in 1991 never having operated. DESPARATION OF A FAILING INDUSTRY The costly failure of the FBR programme has obliterated any justification for the highly pollutative and exorbitant expense of reprocessing irradiated nuclear fuel. The nuclear industry has therefore had to try to find another rationale for having spent hundreds of millions of dollars, pounds, deutsch marks, francs and yen on retrieving plutonium. It has had to find another use for the plutonium. The solution proposed by the nuclear industries in Europe and Japan is that plutonium should be used in conventional nuclear reactors -- reactors that were not designed for such fuel. Nuclear reactor fuel, containing both uranium and plutonium is known as mixed oxide fuel (MOX, or plutonium fuel). The use of plutonium fuel in a conventional reactor requires engineering changes the core, affecting everything from standard operations to emergency shut-down procedures. According to industry officials, a plutonium core, which would be created by using plutonium fuel, 'is characterised by a potentially more adverse response to accidental events'. This means that accidents are likely to become rapidly severe and may lead to melt-downs or even explosions. The FBR and plutonium fuel programmes were born out of concern that supplies of uranium were dwindling and that prices would skyrocket. In fact, the uranium market is now characterised by low prices, while reprocessing, FBR and plutonium fuel programmes have achieved extraordinarily high costs. Plutonium fuel production is clearly unjustified on technical, health and safety, and economic bases. THE LINK WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS The primary use of separated plutonium has always been in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The crossing of the boundary between the civilian use of nuclear technology into the military arena is one of the most disturbing aspects of the nuclear age. But it is hardly surprising. The very first, crude nuclear reactors were specifically built in the 1940s and 1950s in order to produce plutonium for the US, former Soviet Union and British bombs. Only later were they adapted to produce heat for the generation of nuclear electricity. As nuclear technology spreads around the globe so does the risk of nuclear proliferation. Nuclear weapons can be constructed using plutonium from military or civilian sources. Ultimately, the only way to stop nuclear weapons production and proliferation is an international accord banning the production and use of plutonium and other fissile materials.