TL: REVOLUTION! END NUCLEAR AGE (GP) SO: Greenpeace International DT: November 1994 Keywords: nuclear weapons proliferation bans greenpeace newsletters gp military plutonium trade politics us uk / ------------ Revolution! (GP) end the nuclear age Greenpeace newsletter on nuclear non-proliferation issues Number 1 * November 1994 CONTENTS Counter proliferation strikes back Illegal plutonium trade exposed Show-down at NPT predicted Secret US-UK deals revealed News Briefs Fifty years after the first bomb: time for a new deal Last month's Chinese nuclear test in the Lop Nor desert did more than rock the Richter scale to a reading of 6.1. The 40-150 kiloton explosion on October 7 also helped blast hopes for swift agreement on an international comprehensive test ban treaty - a treaty which has now waited for more than 30 years to be concluded. Earlier this year it was hoped that the major provisions of a test ban would be agreed before April 1995, when the future of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is decided. However, China's on-going test programme, and its demand to exclude 'peaceful use of nuclear energy and peaceful nuclear explosions' from the ban was just one of a number of obstacles to blame for the lack of progress when test ban talks broke up in August. The US demand to exclude very small nuclear tests from the ban and to have an opt out clause 10 years after any test ban came into force are also unsettled items. The British and French, like the Chinese, also hope to continue 'safety' tests to ensure the reliability of their existing nuclear arsenals. A comprehensive test ban, called for when the NPT was signed in 1968, has been the most significant litmus test for the non- nuclear states in measuring how genuine the nuclear weapons states' commitment to non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament really is. Under increasing pressure from non-nuclear nations, it is possible but unlikely that the nuclear weapons states will decide to 'cut their losses' and agree a test ban before April. They may not, and risk the wrath of non-nuclear nations frustrated at the refusal of the nuclear weapons states to make progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. Whatever the result, it is hardly surprising that after 25 years, many non-nuclear nations want to see any extension of the NPT clearly linked with a timetable on disarmament. Without the incentive of possible expiry of the Treaty to focus their attention, it is likely that the nuclear weapons states will continue to ignore the majority's aspirations for a nuclear-free world. Nearly fifty years after the first bomb was 'tested', with devastating consequences on the city of Hiroshima, the decision on the future of the NPT offers an historic opportunity to revolutionise our thinking and begin to create a new security and energy deal for the 21st century. We can choose the original logic of the NPT - that the only true non-proliferation regime is a world free of nuclear weapons - or face a nightmare scenario of a nuclear free-for-all. The responsibility for action sits primarily with the nuclear weapons states. It is their addiction to nuclear weapons which drives the proliferation dynamic; their belief that bombs confer status that undermines development of a more equitable relationship between North and South, nuclear and non-nuclear. The NPT has also promoted nuclear power and commercial plutonium production - the very technology necessary to create nuclear weapons - which is now seen as a failed, expensive and dirty technology. The tragedies of Hiroshima and Chernobyl; the billions - $20 billion in the US alone this year spent globally on nuclear weapons; the legacy of radioactive contamination and state secrecy can be rejected if we have the political will to do so. Denuclearisation, based on a decade-long programme of action to eliminate nuclear weapons and the means of making them, could begin immediately. Along side it a new energy deal - a 'Solar Proliferation Treaty' - based on energy efficiency and renewable energy could be agreed. This would replace the NPT's promise of open access to nuclear power. A dream? Perhaps. But unless we move to make it a reality we face a potential nightmare of nuclear proliferation over the decades to come. A nuclear-free world is feasible if our leaders have the vision to think beyond the constructs of the Cold War. It is our job, as citizens, to help them step out from the nuclear shadow. Showdown on nuclear treaty predicted A call by non-aligned countries for the nuclear weapons states to agree a timetable for nuclear disarmament was blocked by Western countries. THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES and the nuclear weapons states look set for a show-down next year after a meeting of the nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) ended in stalemate in Geneva last month. A call by non-aligned countries and other countries including Indonesia, Mexico and Sri Lanka for the nuclear weapon states to agree a timetable for nuclear disarmament was blocked by western countries. The meeting also failed to agree an agenda for the NPT Extension conference in April, 1995, and the nuclear weapons states refused to begin substantive discussion about the performance of the Treaty. Calls by developing countries for an independent legal analysis of the treaty and comprehensive information on nuclear technology export controls were also put on hold. As a result, the intensive efforts by the United States to get a consensus around permanent extension of the Treaty look doomed to failure. The Third World countries - led by Nigeria, Mexico, Indonesia, Iran and Egypt - want a target date set for nuclear disarmament, a nuclear test ban and binding assurances they will not be targeted by the nuclear weapons states, before they agree to make the Treaty permanent. The nuclear weapons states, except for China, have argued that the Treaty - 25 years old next year should be extended indefinitely. The US and other western countries have been lobbying heavily in developing countries for indefinite extension. US special ambassador to the NPT, Thomas Graham, told a briefing in Geneva that failure to extend the Treaty indefinitely would mean the nuclear weapons states would not be able to maintain the momentum of disarmament. In reply, Ambassador Miguel Marin Bosch of Mexico argued that indefinite extension would set in stone the legitimacy of the nuclear weapons states forever, and give carte blanche to them to continue building new weapons. Several options exist for the NPT: a single period extension, or a number of fixed periods linked to progress on disarmament. While the majority of western countries support indefinite extension, the non-aligned states who form the bulk of parties to the NPT, have by and large not yet publicly stated their favoured option. Egypt has cited indefinite extension as 'illogical' given the nuclear weapons states failure to abide by the Treaty, while Indonesia argued that the Treaty had fundamental shortcomings which must be addressed by a comprehensive review of the Treaty's performance before any decision on its future was taken. Another meeting of the 165 countries which are members of the NPT will take place at the United Nations in New York in January. In the meantime, intense discussion in capitals is likely to take place as countries develop their views on the extension decision. Illegal trade in supergrade plutonium exposed AT A PRESS CONFERENCE in September, Greenpeace exposed the transfer of sensitive military nuclear technology from the US to Japan, which has helped Japan develop bomb-grade plutonium in violation of the US's own non-proliferation laws. In a lightening about-face, the US Department of Energy called for a halt to further transfers from the end of September before Greenpeace's press conference was even over. The transfers to Japan included a broad range of technical data, experience, personnel and technology from at least five US nuclear weapons production sites. The transfers have been essential to the planning and development of a controversial reprocessing plant, known as the 'Recycle Equipment Test Facility' (RETF) at Japan's Tokai nuclear complex which will separate extraordinarily pure, supergrade plutonium. The RETF, scheduled to begin construction imminently, will be capable of separating enough plutonium over ten years to build approximately 70 nuclear weapons. The RETF will separate plutonium from nuclear material irradiated in Japan's two plutonium fast breeder reactors, Monju and Joyo. Breeder reactors pose a significant proliferation risk because they create or 'breed' plutonium in their operation. The secret transfers, begun under the Reagan Administration in 1987, were in violation of the US 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act and a US-Japan Agreement on the 'peaceful uses of nuclear energy' which was being negotiated even as officials were arranging for the transfer of the sensitive technology. They also run counter to the Clinton Administration's goal of tightening up on the production of nuclear weapons material. Greenpeace has demanded a halt to all US collaboration with the RETF that the facility is not constructed, and that all unlawfully acquired sensitive nuclear technology is returned. For copies of the Greenpeace report 'The Unlawful Plutonium Alliance', contact Karen Richardson at the Greenpeace International nuclear unit, Cannonbury Villas, London, N1 2PN. Tel. +44 71 354 5100 or Tom Clements, Greenpeace USA, +1 202 391 2506. THE US HAS REASSERTED its commitment to indefinite possession of nuclear weapons, and retained the option of nuclear attack on non nuclear nations in a recently announced Nuclear Posture Review. In spite of the call for a new stance in the post-Cold War environment from some US officials, President Clinton endorsed the Review's rejection of any dramatic cuts or new negotiations for nuclear disarmament. The retention of a policy of 'last resort' use of nuclear weapons in the face of nonnuclear attack will enrage non-nuclear weapon's states who see binding assurances that they will not face nuclear attack as an unfulfilled promise of the NPT. The proposed use of nuclear weapons to counter weapons of mass destruction and even conventionally armed missiles was earlier raised in the form of a 'Defense Counter proliferation Initiative' by the then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in December last year. This has been controversial within the Clinton Administration because long-standing American policy states that the US will not threaten any country with nuclear weapons unless it is a nuclear power or 'allied' with a nuclear power. Critics of military counter-proliferation strategies argue that the threatened use of force undermines the international spirit of cooperation essential to maintain the norm of non-proliferation. However, the shift to 'counter proliferation' appears to be occurring at the level of military doctrine. A new global- oriented Joint Intelligence Center has been established with the task of assessing the threat of chemical, biological and even conventionally armed weapons. The Center would monitor forces and analyse targets, Congress was told in April 1993. Changes in the basing of nuclear bombers in Europe also reflect the 'counter proliferation' concern. Nuclear planning is increasingly focusing on Middle East and Third World scenarios, and F-16 nuclear squadrons have been moved from Germany to northern Italy to act as nuclear support for a new southern focus. Meanwhile, in Britain, Ministry of Defence planning justifies the development of new weapons systems on the basis of a potential missile threat to Britain from the Third World in ten years' time. Announcing a study into new anti-missile defence systems in August, the Ministry said it would 'examine options, costs, technical risks and timescales with particular emphasis on the emerging Third World threat'. France's nuclear doctrine is also increasingly orienting itself toward the Middle East and Northern Africa, analysts say. A new strategy of conventional retaliatory strikes, specifically tailored for a deterrent role vis-a-vis the Third World, has also been developed. This calls for long range (400-600km) air-to-surface missiles carrying sizeable conventional warheads with precision targeting against so-called 'governmental' targets and other high-priority targets. The blending of French conventional and nuclear doctrines threatens to draw nuclear weapons into future regional conflicts either directly or by prompting regional 'aggressors' to acquire their own nuclear weapons. THE US WILL help the UK develop new nuclear weapons until 2004 under a recently amended agreement, Greenpeace has discovered. Even though on-going nuclear modernisation violates both countries' obligation under the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to disarm 'at an early date', the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defense Agreement was updated in May this year to provide assistance to the UK Trident nuclear submarine programme. The Trident system will be both a qualitative and quantitative upgrade to the ageing Polaris system, increasing Britain's firepower at a time when the US and Russia are cutting their strategic nuclear weapons. Each Trident submarine will be capable of carrying 128 warheads with a yield of 150 kilotonnes. In contrast, Polaris submarines are only capable of carrying 32 warheads with a yield of 40 kilotonnes. Under the new amendment, enriched uranium, special nuclear material and nonnuclear parts of atomic weapons necessary to develop and improve the UK's atomic weapon design, development or fabrication capability, may be transferred until December 31, 2004. The nature of the collaboration between the two countries - an executive agreement which has escaped the scrutiny of both the US Congress and the UK Parliament - has also highlighted the weaknesses in Articles I and II of the Treaty. These articles ban collaboration between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states but has been interpreted by the US and UK to allow joint activities. Copies of the US-UK agreement, which are not officially available in the UK, along with the report, 'A Special Relationship', can be obtained from the Greenpeace International nuclear unit, Cannonbury Villas, London N1 2PN, Tel.: =44 71 354 5100. RUSSIA PROVIDES RATIONALE FOR US NUCLEAR MODERNISATION The US Nuclear Posture Review names the threat of a resurgent Russia with current nuclear arsenals intact as the major rationale for maintaining and modernising US nuclear weapons. The US Department of Energy says the capability to build nuclear weapons in future 'without underground nuclear testing or fissile material production' will be maintained by refabricating old weapons and producing new variants of existing warheads. Secretary for Defense William Perry said deeper reductions would be 'imprudent' and that the post-Cold War environment required a nuclear deterrent to 'hedge against an uncertain future'. In contrast, President Yeltsin of Russia called for further disarmament and a five power treaty on nuclear weapons with the aim of their eventual elimination at the United Nations in late September. FORGOTTEN BOMBS IN EUROPE There are 480 US nuclear weapons still based in Europe, more than most experts had believed, the Pentagon announced in September. This means about half of all US deployed non-strategic nuclear bombs are still based in Europe, with the rationale of deterring attack on US allies there. The US bombs are based in Belgium, Turkey, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Some critics have argued that such basing contravenes the spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which in Article I calls for nuclear weapons states not to transfer to any other state nuclear weapons or control over such weapons either directly or indirectly. ATOMIC LAKE SWIMMING CLUB SEEKS MEMBERS Nuclear scientists examining the health consequences of nuclear testing for people around test sites at a NATO research workshop in Russia last month illustrated their sensitivity to things radioactive by establishing an 'International Atomic Lake Swimming Club'. The atomic lake was produced by a nuclear explosion and is about 300m diameter by 150m deep. It stores freshwater for use in Kazakstan, according to the 'Scope- Radtest' newsletter produced by the International Council of Scientific Unions. LIGHT WATER REACTOR NO FIX FOR KOREA US promises of light water reactor technology to North Korea will not solve the problem of nuclear proliferation in the region, according to Greenpeace. The proposed two 1000 megawatt light water reactors will result in a dramatic increase in the amount of plutonium produced by North Korea. The present five megawatt reactor near Yongbyon has an estimated capacity of up to 6.6 kilograms of plutonium a year. Once the light water reactors are in operation they will have a production capability of 500 kilograms annually. Less than five kilograms is required to fashion a nuclear weapon. The new reactors will be supplied by an international consortium and are expected to be built by a South Korean company using US Westinghouse designs. In return, North Korea will stop all nuclear activity within a month - including closing its suspected nuclear reprocessing facility and stopping construction of two new reactors. It will dismantle its existing reactors when the new US light water reactors have been supplied - in eight years time. And it will agree to international safeguards inspections of existing facilities in five years times, and place in dry storage spent fuel rods taken from its existing five megawatt reactor. LEAKED PLANS LINK SWISS TO RUSSIAN PLUTONIUM INDUSTRY Greenpeace has released a leaked nuclear industry document showing Switzerland has plans to send nuclear waste to Russia for storage or reprocessing. Hard currency from the deal would be used to construct a new plutonium reprocessing plant at Krasnoyarsk-26, a secret Russian military plutonium production complex. The Krasnoyarsk site has been one of the former Soviet Union's most secret nuclear weapons production installations for over three decades. As plutonium production and separation still continue at Krasnoyarsk, the Swiss contract would effectively underwrite continued nuclear weapons production in Russia. It would also support the construction and operation of a new reprocessing plant at Krasnoyarsk, named RT-2. In addition to Swiss contracts, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy has also held discussions on reprocessing contracts with South Korea and Iran. Vital statistics (omitted here; unscannable)