TL: SELLAFIELD & BOMB, UK CIVIL PLUTONIUM SO: Greenpeace UK DT: January 17, 1994 Keywords: nuclear power plutonium bombs military weapons proliferation links uk europe sellafield greenpeace gp reports / SELLAFIELD AND THE BOMB: CIVIL PLUTONIUM IN THE BRITISH MILITARY PROGRAM A Greenpeace Report London/New York, 17 January 1994 David Lowry (independent consultant), Pete Roche (Greenpeace UK), and Shaun Burnie (Greenpeace International) "The (NPT) Conference ... affirms the great value to the nonproliferation regime of commitments by the nuclear weapon States that nuclear supplies provided for peaceful use will not be used for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive purposes. Safeguards in nuclear weapon States pursuant to their safeguards agreements with IAEA can verify observance of those commitments." Final Declaration: Review of the Operation of the Treaty and Recommendations, point 6, NPT/Conf.III/64/I, Geneva, August 27 September 21, 1985. INTRODUCTION The Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has often been criticized as discriminating in favor of the official nuclear weapons states (NWS), and against the majority of parties to the Treaty who do not have nuclear weapons. Since the NPT entered into force in 1970, this criticism has focused primarily on the NWS maintenance and build up of nuclear weapons and their failure to halt nuclear weapons testing. Given the record of the NWS over the past twenty years this is criticism well deserved. However, a less reported, but equally important discrimination that was deliberately incorporated into the NPT, is the right of NWS to use civilian nuclear materials, including plutonium, in their nuclear weapons program. Of course, evidence that such activities have been conducted are extremely difficult to obtain. After all, it is not in the interests of the NWS to highlight the interrelationship between civilian nuclear technology and materials and nuclear weapons. However, evidence has slowly emerged over the past few years, and as recently as January 1994, that in the case of the United Kingdom nuclear material, including plutonium, has been diverted from civil to nuclear military programs. This paper will focus on the UK, where it is now admitted that on 571 occasions, the government and British Nuclear Fuels Limited, have since May 1979, taken plutonium and other nuclear materials out of international safeguards control for 'national security' reasons. For a number of reasons it is indeed timely that such information should now be emerging. Firstly, the world is about to witness the massive expansion of the civilian plutonium trade; and secondly, the future of the NPT is to be decided in 1995. Through the remainder of the 1990s large scale plutonium separation facilities are due to be opened in the UK, France and Japan. Such is the magnitude of these facilities that by the year 2010 they will separate more plutonium than exists within the entire global nuclear weapons arsenal. The most immediate threat is the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant, THORP, which coincidentally has permission to begin radioactive discharges on the opening day of the second NPT Prepcom, January 17th 1994. The proliferation danger posed by commercial plutonium reprocessing, has been known for many years. The disclosures that plutonium from civilian reactors has entered nuclear weapons programs, and that this includes material from nonnuclear weapon states, in particular Japan, should be sufficient for those who are genuinely committed to nuclear nonproliferation to demand an immediate halt to all reprocessing. The NPT process up to 1995, provides an ideal opportunity for parties to the Treaty to challenge those countries who are threatening to proliferate thousands of nuclear weapons worth of plutonium around the planet. THE HISTORY Today, the Sellafield nuclear waste handling and reprocessing works in West Cumbria, United Kingdom which also includes the Calder Hall plutonium production reactors each operated by British Nuclear Fuels (BNFL) plc on behalf of the British Government, has both a civil and military role. When the Sellafield establishment was planned in 1947, its primary purpose was to provide plutonium for the British nuclear bomb project, which it succeeded in doing, producing the first British bomb to be test exploded in 1952. In 1964, a Magnox reactor reprocessing plant, B205, was opened to take both military (unsafeguarded) and civil (designated for safeguards) Magnox spent fuel. In the early 1970's plans were laid to build another reprocessing facility, THORP. It was designed to handle both the second generation British Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor (AGR) fuel and the thermal oxide (PWR/BWR) fuel that provides the energy source for the majority of the world's commercially operated reactors (1). Because the Magnox reactor is fuelled with natural uranium, it is one of the preferred reactor types in the context of plutonium production for nuclear weapons. No enrichment is required, and the high content of uranium isotope 238, yields significant quantities of plutonium with the 239 isotope - ideal for weapons purposes. It was undoubtedly for these reasons that the UK chose the Magnox route to nuclear weapons. It is topical to mention that the reactors planned for operation by the government of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) are of the Magnox type. Indeed it has been reported that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was informed by DPRK officials that they had based their reactor design on the UK magnox reactors (2). The UK only sold two Magnox reactors, one to Japan in 1958 known as the Tokai-1 plant with a power output of 159 MWe; the other to Italy, known as the Latina plant, with a power output of 153 MWe. Though the Latina plant is now closed, the Tokai-1 plant is expected to operate throughout the 1990s. The spent fuel from these two plants has been routinely shipped to the UK for storage and reprocessing at Sellafield. THE PRODUCTION AND DESTINY OF PLUTONIUM REPROCESSED AT SELLAFIELD The stockpile of plutonium designated for safeguards stored at Sellafield amounted to 68,500 kilograms as of March 31st 1992, the latest date for which official figures are available (3). This total comprises 30,500 kg of unextracted plutonium in spent fuel storage ponds; 1,500 kg of plutonium in the process of extraction; and a further 36,500 kg of separated plutonium oxide in storage. Of the 30,500 kg of the unextracted plutonium, 20,500 kg owned by BNFL's overseas customers, is awaiting reprocessing, primarily at THORP. The Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) which operated civil Magnox reactors stated in January 15 1983, "No plutonium produced in CEGB reactors has been applied to weapons use either in the UK or elsewhere" (4). This statement was refuted shortly afterwards by the first Chair of the CEGB and builder of the Sellafield complex, Lord Hinton, when he stated, "I am absolutely certain that statement is incorrect...I don't know whether they should get permission for a PWR at Sizewell or not but what is important is they should not tell bloody lies in their evidence" (5). On March 20 1986, Lord Marshall of Goring, the then Chair of the CEGB and now the head of World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), stated that plutonium from civil reactors had "...gone into the defence stockpile in the early years of Magnox reprocessing, up to 1969" (6). In addition it has been confirmed that about 7,000 kg of UK plutonium, perhaps as much as 2,900 from civil reactors, has been sent to the United States under the Anglo-American barter arrangement dating from 1958/59, that required the U.S. atomic authorities to put it to military purposes (7, 8). The then Secretary of State for Energy who authorized the construction of THORP in the late 1970s, during the 1980s when out of office became increasingly aware that he had been mislead whilst in government. He concluded in December 1983, that, "every British nuclear power station has been a nuclear bomb factory for the U.S."(9). The public impression given by the nuclear industry, UK government and safeguards agencies, is that civil nuclear materials are safeguarded against military use. However, in a written reply to the UK Parliament in March 1983, the Department of Energy explained this was not in fact the purpose of safeguards, rather it was, "to encourage the widespread adherence to the NPT by demonstrating that non-nuclear weapons states would not be placed at a commercial disadvantage from the application of safeguards. The offer was implemented through the UK-Euratom-IAEA safeguards agreement that entered into force on 14th August 1978, the so- called Tri-partite Agreement. The agreement specifically provides under clause 14, for the withdrawal of nuclear material from the scope of the agreement for national security reason. If such withdrawals are made, the safeguards authorities are notified." It added that "withdrawal from safeguards are not permitted if the material is subjected to civil end use restrictions under agreements with supplier counties" (10). This would appear to protect imported spent fuel at Sellafield from military use, but as is explained below, this is not so. The NPT was configured in such a manner that NWS would retain the right to withdraw civilian nuclear material from safeguards for military purposes. In this respect the UK government was merely exercising its right under the Treaty. The same right is available to any other nuclear weapon state that is officially recognized by the NPT. This is particularly relevant to France, as it, like the UK, has a large civilian plutonium program. In fact it was reported in late 1992, that France may already have utilized Japanese plutonium in its nuclear weapon program (11). Unfortunately, there is no indication that any of the nuclear weapon states intend to renounce the right given to them by the NPT. When one considers what the likely reaction of these same nuclear weapon states would be to countries such as the DPRK or Japan demanding similar rights, it is clearly an indefensible position. Furthermore, it remains unclear as to whether there have been subsequent arrangements made whereby client states of THORP have requested that the UK renounce its rights under the 1978 Tripartite Agreement. On 11 January 1994, the UK Parliament was told that on 571 occasions civil nuclear material had been withdrawn from safeguards (12) The Minister responsible, Tim Eggar, said that "The majority of these involved either the temporary withdrawal of material transferred to MOD sites for processing before being returned to safeguards at civil sites, or, in the case of permanent transfers to MOD sites, the withdrawal from safeguards of material such as depleted uranium for source shielding or small amounts of other nuclear materials for R&D or analytical purposes." The Minister failed to account for all the withdrawals - the fact is that the UK military is entirely permitted to put this material to weapons use. In October 1984 BNFL reluctantly revealed that from 1 January 1973, when the UK joined the European Community, including the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), it had excluded safeguards inspectors from the most sensitive areas of Sellafield, on the grounds of national security. This remains the practice today. BNFL also admitted that for economic and operational reasons it had routinely co-processed safeguarded (civil) and non-safeguarded (military) plutonium at the B205 Magnox reprocessing line, regardless of the reactor of origin of the spent fuel (13). The important management criteria for BNFL was the burn-up rate of the fuel, not the origin or safeguard status of the spent fuel. BNFL sought to justify this practice by declaring that the inputs and outputs of plutonium to the B205 plant were subject to 'verification' but not 'inspection' safeguards. A ministerial statement to the UK Parliament in March 1986 described the way in which BNFL operationally decided upon how it would apportion its customers' plutonium. "The products of co-processing were allocated by dividing the total pro-rata to the quantities of uranium and plutonium in the incoming safeguarded and unsafeguarded fuel." (14) In other words, BNFL would return to Japan an agreed weight of plutonium and uranium (and fission products), although of course the material returned to Japan would not necessarily be the same that was within the original spent fuel elements. On 4 June 1986, a formal announcement was made by the then UK Minister for Energy, Peter Walker, which indicated that from January 1987 full inspection access would be possible and that "the co-processing of civil and non-civil material will phase out during 1986 and thereafter separate civil and non-civil reprocessing operations will be carried out sequentially rather than simultaneously (15). Despite the official announcement of June 1986 that co-processing was due to halt and that EURATOM would be given full access to Sellafield for its safeguard inspections, subsequent questions to Ministers in the UK Parliament and Official of the European Commission by MEPs indicate that the announcement was misleading and that in regard to the application of safeguards, many details still required to be resolved. The current position remains unclear. It is not certain yet that the requirements of the relevant European Commission directive, 3227/76, on application of safeguards have been met in full, although the UK Government persist in giving the impression they have (16). A conclusion that may drawn from this situation is that unless customers specify otherwise, BNFL are entitled to allocate pro- rata the weight of plutonium to customers after co-processing, but not necessarily the quality of plutonium. This enables BNFL to swop isotopes of plutonium, retaining the plutonium with isotopic composition of high purity and substituting lower purity plutonium. In this way, even if customer countries or companies are returned the expected weight of plutonium, BNFL could gain by retaining all the most valuable grade of material. REPROCESSING OF NON-UK SPENT FUEL AT SELLAFIELD: IMPLICATIONS FOR CLIENTS OF THORP As an example of the proliferation threat of civil reprocessing, and the use of plutonium from non-UK reactors, it is appropriate to examine how BNFL have handled Japanese spent nuclear fuel in the past at Sellafield. Japan has the largest non-UK contract for reprocessing services at THORP; it is also publicly commits itself to not assisting nuclear weapons development. Even before Japan shipped back its first consignment of Magnox fuel from the Tokai-1 plant to Sellafield in September 1969, the UK Parliament had been told by the then Prime Minister Harold MacMillan in July 1958, that "the UK's agreements with Italy (Latina reactor) and Japan provide for consultation between the contracting parties to determine in what respects and to what extent they desire to arrange safeguards in the agreements to be administered by an appropriate international agency - the agreements provide for the consultation as to what would be the most appropriate way of policing these agreements" (17). Subsequently it appears that neither the Japanese nor Italian governments objected to the BNFL practice of co-processing and pro-rata quantitative allocation of plutonium. In so doing, both Japan and Italy permitted the UK to gain militarily from their civil nuclear programs. If so, this is clearly a serious breach of non-proliferation commitments by all the countries. If the issue was not so serious, there would indeed be some irony with regards the predicament Japan currently finds itself in vis a vis its relations with North Korea. For it seems probable that quantities of plutonium produced in a Japanese operated, UK supplied Magnox reactor, and reprocessed at Sellafield, assisted Britain's nuclear weapons program. This must have been done with the knowledge of the Japanese government and nuclear industry. And yet, Japan is currently leading the international criticism of the DPRK's suspected nuclear weapons program, based upon plutonium produced in Magnox reactors similar in design to UK reactors, and hence like the Tokai-1 facility. Furthermore, Japan actually received large quantities of plutonium before becoming a party to the NPT. By the time Japan joined the NPT in 1976, it had received from the UK 260 kilograms of fissile plutonium between 1970-75 in 8 air consignments and 1 sea shipment. All of the plutonium was said to have originated in Japanese reactors, and was hence being returned not sold (18). However there is clear evidence that this is not the whole truth. Details have emerged of a special consignment of plutonium produced in the UK Wylfa Magnox, ordered by Japan for apparent use in its breeder research program (19). This plutonium was shipped in the early 1970s, before Japan joined the NPT, and as it originated in a UK reactor comprised a sale not a return of Japanese owned plutonium. It is not known what the isotopic concentration of this material was, neither is it known why it was necessary for the UK to operate a reactor specifically for Japan, when that country had already sent plutonium to the UK for reprocessing. One possible explanation is that the plutonium sent to the UK from the early operations of Tokai-1 was of such high quality, in terms of plutonium 239 content, that the UK military used it in its nuclear program. Japan requiring similar quality plutonium for fast reactor fuel fabrication requested a shipment, which at the time could be only met by operating a UK reactor. There are many questions that still need to be answered. The Japanese government, committed to more openness in plutonium matters, has an opportunity to allay fears that Japan has been complicit in helping nuclear weapons proliferation. CONCLUSION Clearly the international trade in plutonium is inseparable from nuclear weapons proliferation. The case of the UK nuclear weapon program feeding off civil plutonium reprocessing is only further confirmation of this relationship. By using its rights as a nuclear weapon party to the NPT and other so-called nonproliferation arrangements, the UK has been able on nearly 100 occasions to withdraw material from civilian safeguards. It is unlikely that the UK is alone in exercising this discriminatory right; and indeed there is evidence to suggest that France has also operated similarly. In both countries, Japan has been a complicit partner in helping their military program. With the prospect of THORP opening in the coming weeks, and an additional plant in France before long, the implications are ominous. Not least for the clients of these facilities, all of whom are non- nuclear weapon states, and yet may in the future be directly assisting nuclear weapon development. The UK government still give assurances that THORP will not be an additional proliferation or security risk. Even as recently as 11th January 1994, it was asserted that "any potential proliferation risks associated with the operation of THORP are satisfactorily met by the existing safeguards arrangements to prevent theft, sabotage and diversion" (20). Leaving aside the inability of safeguards even if applied comprehensively, to account for large quantities of plutonium, the so-called MUF; this statement hardly addresses the question of legalized withdrawal as permitted under the NPT. For the UK government and BNFL it is doubtful if they would see this as diversion, more likely it would be exercising its right as a nuclear weapon state. There remains the question of whether safeguards as applied to THORP, as a designated civil plant, would permit withdrawal of plutonium from non-UK stocks. The UK Government clearly implies that the withdrawal clause 14 of the 1978 Tripartite safeguards treaty will not apply (21). However, the UK has indicated no intention to renounce its legitimate right under the NPT to withdraw civil material from safeguards. The clients of THORP if they are genuinely concerned about nuclear nonproliferation are in an extremely difficult position. The fact is it is likely that there will not be individual campaigns of one country's spent fuel; for example, German origin fuel, Japanese fuel, and UK fuel, could all be run through the facility at the same time. Any other number of combinations could apply to all clients of THORP (the other clients being the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland). BNFL will continue to operate on a pro-rata basis. If the UK, for whatever reason, wishes to withdraw materials from safeguards, unless separate campaigns are run, the client will not be able to guarantee that its material is not used for nonpeaceful purposes. Over the first ten years of operation, THORP is expected to separate some 50,000 kgs of plutonium with up to 70 return shipments to the countries of origin each year (20) including more than 1 flight per week to European destinations (21). The the scale of operations, the large quantities of plutonium involved, and that in general spent fuel reprocessed at THORP will not be done on a country-by-country basis, has major implications. In the context of the 1995 NPT Conference, it would be highly appropriate for THORP's clients to question the intentions of the UK government, with regards military diversion of civil nuclear materials. Further they should demand that the UK's right to withdrawal of civil plutonium for military purposes should be renounced. Otherwise, on past record, in the future the UK could use plutonium from countries as diverse as Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany, Spain, and so on, in its military program. RECOMMENDATIONS UK-SPECIFIC: 1 - The British Government should disclose full details of all withdrawals of nuclear materials from civilian safeguards, including amounts, isotopic composition, and purpose of withdrawal. 2 - The UK should commit itself to a policy of no diversion of plutonium from civilian stocks, whether national or overseas. 3 - Publication of full safeguards details as applied to nuclear materials currently at the Sellafield site. 4 - THORP should be closed down. INTERNATIONAL: 1 - All nuclear weapon states should renounce their rights under the NPT and other safeguards arrangements to withdraw nuclear materials from civilian safeguards. 2 - The United States and the UK should disclose full details on quantities, isotopic concentrations, and use of plutonium from the Sellafield site. 3 - A fissile materials cut-off, which would ban separation and use of all plutonium and other fissile materials, whether for civilian or military purposes, should be negotiated urgently. REFERENCES: (1) Conroy, C. What Choice Windscale: the issues of reprocessing. FoE/CONSOC, 1978. (2) Nuclear News, North Korea's Nuclear Power Program Revealed, July 1992, p.2. (3) UK Department of Trade and Industry press release, P/93/51, dated 4 February 1993. (4) CEGB's evidence to the Sizewell B, Pressurized Water Reactor Public Inquiry. CEGB/P/1, November 1982. (5) Lowry, D. Reflections on Britain's Nuclear History: a conversation with Lord Hinton. Energy Research Group, Open University Paper ERG 048. (6) Transcript of 'TV Eye' Program, "Sellafield and the Bomb". Thames Television, 20th March 1986. RECOMMENDATIONS (7) Much of the Sizewell Inquiry examination of the plutonium issue was devoted to this, as was the lead proof for the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND/P/1) by Dr R.V. Hesketh, a former CEGB nuclear fuel research scientist. (8) Barnham, Hart, Nelson, and Stevens, 'Production and destination of British civil plutonium' Nature, Vol. 317, September 19, 1985. (9) Benn, T. Proof of Evidence for the Sizewell B Inquiry, NUM/P/2, December 1983. (10) Moore, J to Skeet, T. Official Report, 9 March 1983 col. 404-405 (UK Parliament). (11) Schneider/Takagi, 'Japanese Plutonium in French Nuclear Weapons Program?, citing a declassified U.S. Central Intelligence Agency assessment of French reprocessing, Wise Paris and CNIC (Tokyo), November 26, 1992. (12) Eggar, T to Smith, L. Official Report 11 January 1994. See also Goodlad, A. to Thomas, D.E. Official Report 9 June 1986 col. 54. (13) Sizewell Inquiry Transcript 274, 16 October 1984. (14) Official Report 11 March 1986, Col. 362 (15) Statement by Peter Walker, Official Report 4 June 1986, Col. 595. (16) The detailed problems in interpreting how the EURATOM safeguards agreement has been implemented are canvassed in Lowry, D. "Public and Private Plutonium: Reprocessing the Truth". CND 4. Proof of Evidence to the Hinkley C Public Inquiry, April 1989. (17) MacMillan, H. To Stonehouse and Noel-Baker, Official Report 3 July 1958, Col.1582 (18) Source of the information is the Japanese Science and Technology Agency, via the Citizens' Nuclear Information Center, Tokyo. See also Lean, G. "British Plutonium sent secretly to Japan fuels arms race fears," Observer, 9 May 1993. (19) Moore, J. to Skeet, T. Official Report 9 March 1983, col.401. (20) Hogg, D. to Jones, I.W. Official Report 11 January 1994 col.40. (21) Eggar, T. to Smith, L. Official Report 11 January 1994. Col.18. (22) Helliwell, P. Plutonium Proliferation, Terrorism. WBMG/EPIC, July 1993. pp 9-11. (23) Barker, F. The International Transport of 'Civil' Plutonium. National Steering Committee of Nuclear Free Local Authorities, July 1993. p.11. =end=