TL: ILLEGAL NUCLEAR TRANSFER, JAPAN - US SO: Greenpeace International DT: September 8, 1994 Keywords: nuclear weapons military technology transfer us japan fareast illegal greenpeace reports gp / ----------------- ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY: U.S. TO JAPAN (GP) SEPTEMBER 8, 1994 GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, PLUTONIUM CAMPAIGN Telephone: 202-319-2506 This paper summarizes Greenpeace's findings regarding the illegal transfer of reprocessing data and technology from U.8. nuclear weapons plants to Japan. The paper will also discuss the international implications of these transfers for nuclear nonproliferation policy. INTRODUCTION Since 1987, the United States Government has provided significant assistance to the Japanese government's program for the development and construction of a new plutonium separation or "reprocessing" plant. This collaboration has involved the transfer of a broad range of technical data, experience, personnel and technology from at least 5 of the U.S. government's nuclear weapons production sites. Involving "Sensitive Nuclear Technology" (SNT), these clandestine transfers have been in direct violation of the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978, the cornerstone of U.S. non- proliferation law. In addition, SNT transfers are directly prohibited under the terms of the "Agreement Between the United States and Japan Concerning the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy" of 1988. The data and technology transferred to Japan has been essential to the preparatory research and development as well as the operation of a technologically-advanced and controversial reprocessing plant. This plant, misleadingly named the "Recycle Equipment Test Facility" or "RETF", scheduled to be built at Japan's Tokai nuclear complex, would separate quantities of extraordinarily pure, or "super-grade" plutonium from nuclear material irradiated in Japan's two plutonium Fast Breeder Reactors, Monju and Joyo. Breeder reactors present a unique proliferation risk as they have the ability to create or "breed" plutonium in their operation. Previously, breeder reprocessing technology has only been developed and applied by nuclear weapon states. Once constructed, the RETF could be used to reprocess enough "super-grade" plutonium over a ten year period to build approximately 70 nuclear weapons. Super-grade plutonium is defined as plutonium with between 2-3% plutonium-240, leaving an extremely high-content of plutonium-239, the material of choice for nuclear weapons. Given its military potential, operation of the RETF would constitute a major proliferation risk and would further destabilize relations in Northeast Asia. With construction due to begin on RETF in September 1994, numerous disturbing questions are raised about U.S. and Japanese commitment to an international nuclear non-proliferation regime: * How is it that the U.S. can break its own laws against transferring Sensitive Nuclear Technology (SNT) and expect that other countries will not follow the same example? * How is it that Japan can expect its neighbors, like North Korea, to desist from developing reprocessing technology if Japan continues with the development of the most advanced reprocessing technology capable of separating the highest quality plutonium? With a crucial meeting on the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to be held in Geneva from September 12-16, 1994, both the U.S. and Japan will need to decide if the proliferation risks of nuclear collaboration in the plutonium fuel cycle are greater than the benefits of a combined dedication to unyielding and consistent nuclear non-proliferation. True commitment to nuclear non-proliferation demands a termination of plutonium reprocessing programs. VIOLATION OF U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION LAW In 1987, under the Reagan Administration, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Power Reactor and Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) of the Japanese government entered into a collaborative research and development program regarding "technology for breeder reprocessing". This far-reaching collaboration was formalized in a "Memorandum of Agreement for Joint Collaboration in the Field of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Liquid Metal Reactor (LMR) Reprocessing Technology" which was executed by the DOE (January) and PNC (June) of 1987. This agreement on collaboration on the RETF program was signed under a larger "umbrella" agreement of 1979 which covered DOE/PNC cooperation on breeder reactors. This umbrella agreement remains, for now, in effect until the year 2000. The RETF agreement was signed into effect for a 5-year period though the option existed for it to be extended further. In connection with the RETF agreement, numerous additional agreements have been signed between the DOE and PNC which have allowed for specific collaboration on and transfer of information or technology related to the plutonium fuel cycle. It is inexplicable that Administration officials in the Executive Branch, DOE and State Department chose to sanction this collaboration despite the fact that it was in clear violation of the legal framework enacted to control the transfer of Sensitive Nuclear Technology (SNT). In 1978, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) was promulgated in order to enact stronger domestic and international controls on nuclear materials and technology. As part of the NNPA, new controls and requirements were set up for the control of materials or information deemed to be SNT. In order to ascertain the status of SNT, the NNPA created a determination based on objective, technology-based standards. Information or technology is SNT if it is: 1. not available to the public, 2. important to the "design, construction, fabrication, operation or maintenance of a...nuclear fuel reprocessing facility", and 3. shall not be designated as "Restricted Data" (material already restricted under the Atomic Energy Act). In 1987, while the U.S. was negotiating with Japan the "Agreement Between the United States and Japan Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy", the intentions of the NNPA were taken into account via a clause which promised that "sensitive nuclear technology shall not be transferred under this Agreement." In line with the NNPA, the U.S./Japan Agreement defined SNT as information "not available to the public" and "important to the design, construction," etc. of reprocessing. With Congressional approval, the U.S./Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement entered into force in 1988; all on-going nuclear cooperation between the U.S. and Japan were immediately covered by the terms of this agreement. In 1987, Reagan Administration officials were therefore simultaneously involved in closing on agreements which contradictorily provided for and prohibited the transfer of SNT to Japan. At this time, Administration officials flaunted the law and mislead the Congress in briefings intended to gain Congressional concurrence on the U.S./Japan Agreement. It is clear that Congress was not notified during debate over the U.S./Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement about the RETF agreement stipulating transfer of SNT. Since 1987, a number of government officials have remained active in overseeing and extending collaboration as specified in the RETF agreement without drawing attention to the clear violation of the U.S. law and treaty. Subsequently, the Bush Administration oversaw the signing of additional technology transfer arrangements under the DOE breeder umbrella agreement. The Clinton Administration has apparently taken little action to terminate and/or reverse the agreements it has inherited. Such inaction is inconsistent with the stated non-proliferation policy of not encouraging civil use of plutonium. THE TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY The 1987 RETF agreement appears to have been a culmination of cooperation between the DOE and PNC on breeder reprocessing technology. While the original breeder agreement generally laid out the parameters of this collaboration, the RETF agreement specified the terms and nature of the actual information or technology to be transferred. In effect, the DOE provided PNC with information and technology developed over decades of operation of reprocessing facilities operated for the production of materials for nuclear weapons and even operated these facilities as test grounds for the development of technological aspects of RETF. In particular, advanced breeder reprocessing information and technology has been transferred in the following crucial areas: - "Head End Technology" used for the initial and difficult processes of disassembly, shearing, and dissolution of the core and blanket material coming from the Monju and Joyo breeder reactors. - "Advanced Solvent Extraction Systems and Process Automation" which are crucial in the separation of plutonium in the reprocessing plant. Of great concern, "centrifugal contactors" essential to speedy isolation of a pure plutonium stream were developed and hot-tested at the Savannah River Plant's F-Canyon military reprocessing plant before the technology was transferred to Japan. - "Advanced Remote Technology" for processing and sampling the highly radioactive and radiotoxic nuclear materials flowing through the sealed plant. - Design optimization of the facility itself relating to the effects of radiation and other factors on the operation of the plant. The DOE's Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in Tennessee played a central role in providing and facilitating the transfer of information and technology to the PNC. Collaboration on the part of the ORNL, which is operated for DOE under contract by the Martin Marietta Corporation, involved the provision of information and technology developed at the lab. For example, ORNL shipped to PNC Fuel Disassembly System hardware for incorporation into the RETF. According to DOE, collaboration with PNC in robotics and processing continues. In addition, information, testing experience and technology have also come from the following DOE nuclear weapons materials production sites: Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, the Argonne National Laboratory at Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) in Idaho, Hanford in Washington State, and, as mentioned above, the Savannah River Plant (SRP) in South Carolina. At Hanford, fuel and blanket assemblies have been irradiated in the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF) under conditions like those in the Monju reactor in order to do research into dynamics which could effect the reprocessing of such material. While some of this fuel apparently remains at Hanford, some has been moved to INEL/Argonne for further research or storage purposes. Additionally, the RETF appears to be the realization of a breeder reprocessing facility which was constructed but never operated at Hanford. On a more practical basis, collaboration has also involved dual financing of DOE/PNC projects and/or has involved the transfer of PNC personnel to DOE facilities and vice versa. For example, both DOE and PNC have contributed $5 million each year to work at ORNL. In the case of personnel transfers, it would appear that DOE personnel have worked at the Tokai nuclear facility, where research for the RETF has been ongoing, as recently as 1993. JAPAN'S SUPER-GRADE PLUTONIUM COMPLEX The RETF will be used by Japan to reprocess core and blanket material from Japan's Monju fast breeder reactor (FBR), and the blanket from Joyo FBR. The RETF is therefore the critical facility which will allow Japan to separate the super-grade plutonium which is produced in the Joyo and Nonju reactors but can only be reprocessed with considerably advanced technology. While the Japanese government maintains that this process is crucial for research into future energy production, neither the FBRs nor RETF itself can be justified on the basis of economics or energy production. The experimental Joyo FBR went critical in 1977. Having been loaded with uranium core assemblies and blanket material for plutonium production, the reactor, as of March 1993, had produced a total of some 880 kilograms of plutonium. The Honju FBR went critical in April of 1994. Monju has been constructed at a price of some 600 Billion Yen ($6 Billion)-- which makes it some 5 times more expensive than a conventional reactor. The reactor will produce very little, if any, energy-- its primary purpose is plutonium production. If Monju operates according to plan, the reactor will produce some 144 kilograms of plutonium a year. Some 70 kilograms of this yearly output will be super-grade plutonium produced in the Monju's breeder blanket. The plutonium coming from Monju's blanket on a yearly basis could be used to construct some 23 advanced nuclear weapons, though the capacity of RETF will prevent separation of this much material yearly. Construction at the RETF is scheduled to begin in September 1994 and is expected to be completed by the year 2000 at an overall cost of some 120 Billion Yen (some $1.2 Billion). The plant is projected to have a yearly throughput of some 6.3 tonnes of irradiated FBR core and blanket material and an output of approximately 20 kilograms of super-grade plutonium each year. The RETF will be the world's only dedicated FBR reprocessing plant outside the nuclear weapon states. In addition the RETF will be far more sophisticated and efficient than those operated in the past by the nuclear weapons states. From a nuclear non-proliferation stand-point, the RETF is a suspicious and unjustified facility. Given the fact that Japan has already contracted for the separation of tens of tonnes of plutonium in Europe for statedly commercial purposes, there is no justification for additional plutonium to be separated at RETF. In addition, we believe no country has ever produced and/or used super-grade plutonium for commercial or civilian purposes. The expense and risk involved in producing and separating such material could be justified for another purpose: the construction of nuclear weapons. CONCLUSIONS In the course of collaborating with Japan in developing the plans for the construction of the RETF, the U.S. government has violated its own domestic law. In addition, the U.S. government mislead the U.S. Congress about its negotiations with Japan around the U.S./Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. Having signed the U.S./Japan Agreement, the U.S. government immediately and consequently violated that agreement by continuing to transfer prohibited Sensitive Nuclear Technology (SNT). On its side, the Japanese government has violated the U.S./Japan Agreement by requesting and receiving SNT which that agreement directly prohibits. In addition, both countries have acted and may continue to act in ways which seriously undermine and jeopardize the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. By transferring DSNT to a non-nuclear weapon state, the U.S. has further reduced its credibility in nuclear non-proliferation affairs. In the run-up to a decision on the future of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear weapons (NPT) in 1995, it is a loss of credibility it can ill-afford. By receiving this information and technology, and in forging ahead to build a facility which is not justified on a civilian or commercial basis, the Japanese government is seriously undermining its credibility as an NPT signatory. Taken together, the collaboration around the RETF may lead a number of countries to question why they should abide by the NPT and support its extension after May of 1995. THE U.S. SHOULD: - Stop all collaboration on the RETF and other Japanese plutonium reprocessing and use programs; - Immediately request the return of all information and technology transferred to Japan illegally under the RETF and subsequent agreements; - Request of Japan that the RETF not be constructed and should make it clear that non-compliance with such a request will lead to suspension of consent rights granted under the U.S./Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement; - Conduct a comprehensive, public review of its nuclear cooperation agreements and should bring these agreements into harmony with national and international non-proliferation standards. JAPAN SHOULD: - Terminate its plana to construct the RETF, with a return of illegally acquired technology and information to the U.S.; - Terminate further plans to separate and use all plutonium, whether super-grade or weapons-usable. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD - Immediately negotiate a total halt to separation of plutonium whether designated for civilian or military purposes.