TL: U.S. SENATE TESTIMONY ON RUSSIAN NUKES AND DISARMAMENT SO: Josh Handler, Greenpeace International (GP) DT: March 13, 1996 Keywords: environment nuclear weapons military testing agreements politics conferences / Testimony for the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on Threat Posed by the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction by Joshua Handler Coordinator Greenpeace Disarmament Campaign Washington, D.C. ph. 202/319-2516 FAX 202/462-4507 13 March 1996 1. Introduction: Greenpeace Disarmament Campaign First, I would like to thank the Committee for this opportunity to testify on the important matter of the situation with nuclear weapons, fissile materials, and radioactive materials in Russia. Greenpeace, as you may know, is a large international environmental and disarmament organization with over four million members in over 100 countries around the world (over one million in the United States). We have been active for twenty-five years on environmental and nuclear disarmament issues, and have offices throughout North and South America, Europe, including Russia and Ukraine, and the Pacific. One of our major concerns is nuclear weapons and military and civil nuclear-power plants. We oppose this technology and seek its eventual elimination for a variety of important reasons: the environmental dangers posed by nuclear accidents, the vexing nuclear waste problem, the economic costs, the possibility of nuclear war, and the antidemocratic secrecy that surrounds nuclear technology. Just as significant to our perspective is that more reasonable and safer alternatives to solving disputes between nations and addressing the world's electrical energy needs exist or could be readily developed. It may be of interest to the Committee to know that Greenpeace's origins lie in attempts by Vancouver activists to stop U.S. plans to test nuclear weapons on Amchitka island in the Aleutian Islands in the early 1970s. Since then, Greenpeace has had active campaigns to eliminate nuclear-weapons and nuclear- power at sea and to promote a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Right now, after a very powerful set of protests against French nuclear testing in the South Pacific in 1995 and early-1996, we are working hard in Geneva and around the world to insure a CTBT is achieved. We have protested China's continued testing program and are concerned that Russia has yet to sign on to a 0-yield CTBT. We are also worried that the Clinton Administration's plan to conduct several underground sub-critical tests at the Nevada Test Site, the first in June and the second in September, could gravely undermine efforts to get a CTBT ready for signing this year. The first test is currently scheduled to take place in mid-June just before the Conference on Disarmament finishes its crucial second session, and could undermine the last minute efforts to agree to a final treaty text. It is quite possible that the Russian nuclear weapons test on Novaya Zemlya in mid-January that was reported in the Washington Times, and quasi-confirmed by Secretary Perry during his congressional testimony, was a test similar to the ones the United States has planned. The reported Russian test raised concerns here, and illustrates the need for the nuclear weapons states to forgo such underground testing and shut their test sites. These steps would ease the verification problem for the CTBT, and would send a strong signal to the rest of the world that the nuclear weapons states are committed to a strong CTBT regime. 2. Greenpeace Disarmament Activities in the Soviet Union and Russia Greenpeace opened an office in the Soviet Union in 1989. Since February 1990, I have been to Russia over a dozen times. My trips have ranged from one week to four months and I have spent a total of some 18 months living and working there. Most recently, I spent the greater part of the 1994-1995 "academic year" living and working out of Moscow, supporting Greenpeace's work on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference. During these visits, I have had the opportunity to travel to several of the closed areas of the former Soviet Union, including: in the North, the Murmansk area, which contains the Northern Fleet headquarters and several major bases of the Northern Fleet, and Severodvinsk where nuclear submarines are constructed and; in the Pacific, the areas around Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, Vanino/Sovetskaya Gavan, Komsomolsk-na-Amure, and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii where nuclear submarines are based or constructed. I have also travelled to St. Petersburg to visit Russian nuclear submarine design bureaus, to Obninsk to attend a conference on plutonium disposal, and to Kazakhstan. Other members of my organization have travelled in central Russia to the areas around the nuclear facilities in Chelyabinsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Tomsk. And, of course, Greenpeace Russia has an office in Moscow that actively works on civil and military nuclear issues. The purpose of my visits was to investigate problems in the Soviet/Russian submarine force, the future of Russian nuclear forces, and promote our work on nuclear disarmament. As part of this work, I have sought to engage a wide variety of Russian government officials, military officers, military-industrial complex managers, reporters, specialists, and local officials and environmentalists in a dialogue about arms control and nuclear disarmament, military-environmental problems, and the possibilities for defense conversion. Since the fall of 1991, when the problems of lost nukes and loose nukes were first was raised, I have spent some time on these questions when the opportunity availed itself. Greenpeace remains the only publicly identified organization ever to have been solicited to obtain a nuclear warhead from the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1991, prior to the attempted coup, we were approached to see if we wanted to get a nuclear warhead from the Soviet forces stationed in the former East Germany. The motivations for this deal were "pure", i.e. no money or personal advantage was involved. The individuals who offered to provide us with a warhead simply felt getting a us warhead would make a larger statement about the dangers of nuclear weapons and the need to get rid of them; and, that was our goal as well. Since Greenpeace's experiences in the former Soviet Union have been a bit unique and unusual, it is my pleasure to share some of the results of our activities and some observations about the situation with nuclear materials in Russia today. However, before I begin, it should be noted the problems for nuclear safety, control, and the proliferation of nuclear materials and technology posed by the disintegration of the former Soviet Union are not unique. These problems are as old as the nuclear age. France's help was instrumental to the Israeli bomb program. India's bomb-making capability grew out of Canadian provided-nuclear technology. A collection of western European companies greatly aided the Iraqi bomb program. China seemingly is playing an important role in the Pakistani program. In the case of North Korea, it is instructive to consider the assessment from a recently declassified Office of Naval Intelligence survey of the proliferation potential of countries around the world from 1960: South Korea: The nuclear energy program of South Korea will be greatly limited by lack of technical ability and the need for more basic economic projects first. The first reactor in South Korea will be a 100-kilowatt U.S. Triga Mark II research reactor recently constructed at an Atomic Energy Institute 10 miles northeast of Seoul. South Korea will have a very limited nuclear capability for the near future. North Korea: North Korea has one of the least advanced programs in the Soviet bloc. On 7 September 1959 North Korea signed an atomic aid agreement with the USSR under which it will receive Soviet assistance in establishing a research center with a nuclear reactor, betatron, cobalt 60 source, and laboratory for nuclear research. North Korean scientists and technicians will receive training in the USSR. North Korea has participated in the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research at Dubna near Moscow since 1956 and will be the eleventh nation to receive a Soviet reactor. |The Soviets were undoubtedly spurred into this action by the commencement of a U.S. project to build a nuclear research center near Seoul, South Korea, in July 1959| [emphasis added].[1] Other countries with substantial nuclear infrastructures have faced or are facing similar problems in keeping track of nuclear materials. As you may recall, for many years, some suspected that Israel had received its bomb materials from a diversion of 94 kgs of enriched uranium in the early 1960s from the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation (NUMEC) of Apollo, Pennsylvania, near Pittsburgh. The question of the missing uranium went unresolved for over 10 years. It is small consolation that it was finally determined the missing uranium was spread around the site and may have contaminated a nearby river.[2] 3. Our experiences with Loose Nukes in Russia In the case of Russia, I would like to break the problem of "loose nukes" into several parts. There has been too much loose talk about loose nukes in Russia. Several related but distinct categories of this problem have been confused in the public debate. As a result some problems have been obscured while some successes have gone unnoticed or have been undervalued. Moreover, some disarmament possibilities are being ignored due to these misunderstandings. a. The general security and safety of radioactive materials Leaving aside the question of fissile material security and control, it must be remembered that in general the control of radioactive materials was poor in the former Soviet Union. The nuclear industry in the West has had some well-publicized disasters, but still the Soviet Union managed to go one better, with major accidents at Chelyabinsk and Chernobyl complimented by massive dumping of radioactive materials into river systems and the Arctic and Pacific oceans. But aside from these major catastrophes, there are many stories of minor ones that are instructive to your inquiry, since a critical question is not the diversion of tons of materials but how smaller amounts will leak out. You may recall in the period of 1989-1991 there were many reports in the Soviet press about small radiation sources being discovered in playgrounds, in building materials, in downtown Moscow, etc. In 1992, we had some very interesting conversations with specialists in Khabarovsk in the Far East who had some first-hand experience with this problem. In a "Report On the Radiation Situation In the Khabarovsk Kray," dated June 6, 1992, the Geological Association "Tayozhgeologia" which was conducting radiation surveys of the Khabarovsk Kray noted that the following serious sources of radiation had been found (keep in mind that background readings are usual measured in micro-roentgens, and thus the levels described below are well-above background, and some boarder on being quickly lethal): Among the other most serious contaminations, we may mention 10 cancer groups found at one of the dachas near Bolshoi Aeroport as well as the sources of ionizing radiation detected on the territories of military units in the vicinity of Yuzhniy District and Krasnaya Rechka. |The readings of gamma-radiation exposure dose of spot sources reached 50 Roentgen/hour|.... In 1990, an aerial gamma survey of Komsomolsk-na-Amure (262 square km) was done. As a result, in Komsomolsk-na-Amure's outskirts (the settlement of Silinskiy) there was found three high-level sources of ionizing radiation -- |each of them reading 30 Roentgen/hour|. Two of the sources were found in the yards of apartment buildings, the third one at a dump in the vicinity.... Total amount of radioactively contaminated areas detected in a walking survey in Khabarovsk is thirty-nine, including a spot source |(exposure dose 3.5 Roentgen/hour)| in Yuzhniy District near to the shop "Optika," aeroclub DOSAAF (38 spots caused by a bunch of instruments with permanent luminous mass), a contamination of the ground with the isotope cesium-137 at the steam station for train cars in Zheleznodorozhniy District, and others.... Carrying out the survey on the highway Vladivostok- Blagoveshensk, on the area of settlement Londoko a powerful spot source of ionizing radiation -- a capsule with partially damaged casing |(exposure dose 100 Roentgen/hour)| -- was found at a roadside dump... [emphasis added]. During our visit with the specialists we toured a clean-up site in the city at a military sanatorium on the edge of the city. The sanatorium had an abandoned bathhouse. The waters in the bathhouse were made mildly radioactive with radium. Unfortunately, somebody had dropped a vial of radium containing several curies of radiation outside bathhouse some 20 years ago. The contamination had migrated even as the city grew up around the site, and people had planted potatoes in a plot next to the site. Now the specialists were engaged in removing the contaminated soil from the ground. Another example of this casual approach to "small" radioactive safety problems we have had, is with nuclear-powered lighthouses in the Far East. This problem was first brought to my attention during a visit to Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii in 1991. The Soviets were great enthusiasts for all sorts of applications of nuclear technology and these lighthouses were widely deployed in coastal locations along the Pacific, Arctic, and Baltic coasts (and probably in other locations as well). The lighthouses are powered by RTGs (radio-isotopic thermal generators; a sort of nuclear battery similar to the ones used by U.S. satellites) containing a powerful Strontium-90 source.[3] A local newspaper had written a story about these "Kamchatskii Chernobyls, "and how people would picnic, shoot-at, or generally vandalize the batteries which were not otherwise guarded or fenced-off[4]. We had the opportunity to examine one of these batteries near Vladivostok in 1992. We found it to be relatively accessible to the public and a strong source of radiation. We subsequently learned that 124 were spread up and down the Pacific Coast. A 125th was lost from a helicopter in the Tatar Straight and not recovered.[5] With a record of control of radioactive materials like this, it is not surprising to find Shamil Basayev's Chechen fighters easily put a radioactive cesium source in Izmailovsky Park in Moscow in late November 1995. One of the conclusions of the Tayozhgeologia report is particularly germane and brings me to my next topic. The authors stated: Analyzing the types and places of detected sources of radioactive contamination, it is fairly easy to make a conclusion that their main "suppliers" are military units and enterprises related to aviation. b. The security and safety of military controlled radioactive materials Our investigation into the problems of the Russian submarine fleet suggests the military's control of its radioactive materials was also rather poor, and seemingly has not improved much if at all in the past five years. Again there were the obvious big safety problems. For example, we have had the opportunity to visit an area near Vladivostok which was contaminated from a reactor explosion on an Echo II cruise missile submarine that occurred at the end of a refuelling at the Chazhma Bay shipyard in August 1985. Waste from the accident was scooped up and dumped in a temporary burial trench in the fall-out trace. The site was not guarded and was surrounded by a decrepit barbed wire fence which locals regularly passed through while looking for mushrooms (a very popular Russian pastime). Decommissioned Russian submarines and reactor compartments are piling up at bases, shipyards and bays in the Pacific and Northern Fleet. Some are in danger of sinking at dockside, while the reactor compartments are poorly guarded and secured. In regards to health and radiation safety, workers at the shipyard complained that the portal monitoring equipment at the entrance of the plant did not work, and, in any event, workers regularly went around it entering and exiting the plant. Although, at the time, we were mainly concerned about what this meant for monitoring the health of the workers, it has obvious implications for the security of radioactive or fissile materials that would be on the premises of the facility. The lack of a functioning portal monitoring system would greatly ease the task of removing materials from the site. c. Security of military controlled non-bomb fissile materials Not very much is known about this problem, and it may mainly involve naval fuel stored at sites near Vladivostok, near Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskii, near Murmansk and at Severodvinsk. But, clearly problems do exist. It was widely reported in late 1993, that in an inside job, naval fuel rods were stolen from a building in the Rosta/Sevmorput shipyard which is located at the northern end of Murmansk. This news was not entirely a surprise to us, however. When visiting Murmansk earlier in 1993, we had an informal invitation by a local businessmen who had some friends on the base to visit the aircraft carrier Gorshkov which was tied up at Rosta. We were only stopped in our endeavor by several tough-looking elder women, who were part of the plant's militia; the very babushkas who were derided in the Russian press as being inadequate guards for the facility. To my mind, the problem was not the babushkas who looked sufficiently alert and intimidating to raise the alarm, but the gaping holes in the fencing and the dilapidated nature of the facility which made it easy for anyone to wander off the nearby road and get quite far inside. At least in the case of the stolen fuel rods, the culprit was caught after he spilled the beans over a drink, and we were told the fuel has been removed, one hopes to a more secure spot. Operation Sapphire may have not solved all the problems with unsecured or insecure naval fuel. Problems may exist at other storage, transport, or fabrication sites for fresh naval fuel for submarines. At a storage point in the Far East, we were told the fuel storage and fresh fuel containers were regularly inspected. However, it was unclear if the tagging and sealing system precluded removal of fresh fuel rods similar to what happened in Murmansk if somebody knew what they were doing. In the case of Severodvinsk, confusion over administrative control of fresh fuel in the construction facility may exist. The plant provides physical security but a recent investigation into who owned the fuel could not determine who was legally responsible for it: the plant or the Navy. This ambiguity does not bode well for keeping track of things. In this regard, however, it is good news that DOE has finally been able to move forward on working on this problem. Yet, it should be noted that the U.S. Navy -- not the Russian Navy -- has been the main obstacle to making progress in cooperating with Russia in improving the security at fresh naval fuel sites. Within the U.S. Navy, Naval Reactors has stubbornly opposed any U.S. cooperation with Russia or the Russian Navy to deal with the several serious nuclear problems the Russian Navy is facing, i.e. fresh fuel security and accountability, storage of spent nuclear fuel, decommissioning of nuclear submarines and surface ships, radiation monitoring, and storage of radioactive waste. Although some cooperation is now happening around fresh fuel security, liquid radioactive waste management, and scrapping of launch compartments from ballistic missile submarines, it seems to be happening in spite of and not because of Naval Reactors. Although some of Naval Reactor reservations with working with the Russians on their problems are understandable, they should not be roadblocks to further and even expanded cooperation around these important proliferation and environmental problems. d. The security of Minatom controlled fissile and radioactive materials It is the loose nuclear materials from Minatom institutes and research centers and not loose nuclear weapons that are the subject of the majority of nuclear smuggling press reports and this appears to be a big problem. I and other members of Greenpeace have been in or near several Minatom controlled sites, and leaving aside the question of material control and accountability what has impressed us is that some physical security tends to exist and be evident at the perimeter, but there seems to be an absence of functioning portal monitoring equipment. For example, when I visited the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering in Obninsk in 1994, the main facility was still surrounded by a relatively well-maintained double fence. Yet when we went inside one of the buildings that contained a reactor test stand, several of the visitors were struck by the lack radiation monitoring equipment. Workers assemble test fuel rods out of the disks containing fissile materials that are so easy to slip into a pocket in the test stand area. Again, like the situation at the nuclear shipyard discussed above, lack of monitoring equipment for radiation safety seems to also mean there is a lack of monitoring equipment for security purposes. Thus, all of the stories of small amounts of radioactive and fissile materials missing and being smuggled out of Minatom civil or non-bomb facilities make a lot of sense, given the lack of radiation safety and security equipment and apparent ease with which this could be done by somebody on the inside who is familiar with the procedures. e. Security of nuclear warheads In our investigations, finding out on the ground information about problems with warhead security has been the most difficult task. Press reports about stolen or sold warheads have been hard to verify and I have come to generally discount them. For example, there was a press report from Komsomolsk-na-Amure, that nuclear weapons disappeared from military storehouses in Spring 1992.[6] After discussions with the sources of this story in Khabarovsk and Komsomolsk in the Summer of 1992, it appears that some nuclear weapons may have been stored in the vicinity of Komsomolsk-na-Amure, but that they were moved to other areas using "proper procedures." A report in the Komsomolsk aviation plant's newspaper complaining about this in some fashion was picked up by the Postfactum news agency office in Khabarovsk which turned it into a story of missing warheads. This is not to say, however, that we may yet uncover safety problems that have implications for nuclear weapons security. For example, I had the opportunity to discuss the safety, security, and accounting procedures of nuclear warheads with a member of the staff of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (which has functions similar to the U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency for nuclear weapons surety and units in the U.S. services responsible for physical security of nuclear weapons assigned to U.S. military units). The conversation overall was rather helpful when it came to the question of how warheads were tracked, reporting procedures from units which have nuclear warheads, and physical security. It made me feel a bit more reassured that it was unlikely a warhead or two got lost in the shuffle as tactical nuclear weapons were brought back from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics in the 1990-1992 timeframe.[7] However, the discussion of nuclear weapons safety was less comforting. The official remarked that the Soviet Union had never had a nuclear weapons accident like that had happened with U.S. nuclear forces, particularly the B-52 crashes at Palomares, Spain, in 1966, and at Thule, Greenland, in 1968.[8] And, to avoid such accidents, nuclear weapons were never transported by air. I pointed out to him, however, the Soviet record was hardly unblemished, let alone the several submarine accidents which carried perhaps as many as 43 nuclear warheads to the ocean floor, I had recently learned that a Delta I nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine had lost a warhead off Kamchatka in 1977 when pressure built up in the missile tube.[9] Based on what we know about the general Soviet safety record, the conversation left me with the feeling there might have been a few nuclear weapons accidents with nuclear weapons where weapons were damaged or lost and unrecovered that are yet to be publicly admitted. 4. Where is the Problem: Radioactive Materials vs. Fissile Materials vs. Warheads Based on my experiences and looking into the discussion of this problem of loose nukes, I think the problem could be characterized as follows from the most serious to least worrisome. i. The poor civilian, military, and Minatom control of radioactive materials is a big problem. If anything, safety and security programs need to be expanded to cover more sites, including Radon waste disposal sites, academic institutions, and industrial enterprises. It is way too easy for a worker or military personnel who is looking to make ends meet to get hold of a highly radioactive cesium, cobalt or strontium source, thinking they have something valuable and walk out with it. Conceivably, if the person was healthy enough to deliver the material to a buyer, such materials could be used for terrorist purposes as the Chechens did in Izmailovsky Park in Moscow. Barring this, these materials are in any event very dangerous and they represent a threat to human health and safety. ii. Minatom, military, and civilian control of fissile materials (i.e. enriched uranium and plutonium), is also a big problem. As the CIA noted in its congressional testimony on this subject in January 1995, "Nuclear materials are more likely to be stolen than are warheads."[10] The major problem with safety, security, and control seems to exist at the non-weapons military and civilian facilities, institutes, and research centers of the Minatom complex. Radiation control and safety probably never have been very good here, and in this case poor radiation safety means poor nuclear security. The main danger is a knowledgeable insider taking out fissile materials or an unknowledgeable insider taking out fissile or highly-radioactive materials. I think this is something the DOE and Minatom have come to understand in the past few years. And, if you look at the DOE program over the last two years, you can see how they are making steady and even accelerating progress in including more and more Minatom weapons, non-weapons and military facilities, civilian facilities, and Navy facilities in their MPC&A program. Since the progress has been good of late, and the problem is rather large, it can only be recommended that this program of cooperation be fully supported through its planned completion date in the 2001-2002 timeframe. For those of you that have doubts about the efficacy of this whole endeavor, it is this part of the program, however, that probably faces the largest challenge. The challenge results from Minatom's zeal for continued reprocessing of spent fuel to extract plutonium for civilian purposes. So long as Minatom continues its reprocessing activities (which it is even seeking to expand), greater amounts of plutonium will accumulate. Even with improved MPC&A at Minatom civilian facilities, there will be continued opportunities for diversion in the coming years. The same can be said for uranium enrichment facilities producing fuel-rods for power plants. Although it is desirable to find a way to shut down more Russian civil-nuclear power plants, it is probably more likely in the short-term that Minatom can convinced or forced to end reprocessing; this should be a goal of U.S. government as well as Russian government policy. iii. Military or Minatom control of disarmed, disassembled, or dismantled nuclear weapons at military storage sites or Minatom weapons facilities is a lesser problem. Barring any revelations at this hearing, to date, there does not seem to be evidence that the various bits and pieces of fissile materials found outside these facilities came from them; they have come from the Minatom non-weapons or civilian facilities. On the Ministry of Defense side of things, it is my understanding that the U.S. DOD has developed a reasonable working relationship with the 12th Directorate of the MOD, and work and cooperation is proceeding more or less satisfactorily on the providing of fissile material containers and super-containers for the storage and transport of weapons or weapons material. The effort heretofore has focussed on insuring the safe and secure transport of nuclear weapons from a disarm/disassembly point to a storage or dismantlement point and back to storage if necessary. There are some general discussions of weapons protection, control, and accountability or nuclear weapons surety happening as well. It could be hoped that the program could be expanded to deal also with weapons/materials at disarm, disassembly, and dismantlement points. Again, after several years of hard work and lots of bureaucratic infighting both in Washington and Moscow, this program seems to be finally moving forward in a reasonable and useful manner. I know the Russians find this cooperation useful, and are interested in more information concerning nuclear weapons surety and the U.S. legal basis for control of nuclear weapons and fissile materials. I hope this program too will enjoy full support of the Russian and U.S. governments and the Congress and the Duma. In regards to Minatom control of weapons for disassembly\dismantlement at buildings within Minatom weapons facilities (e.g. Arzamas-16), so far neither the DOE MPC&A or DOD WPC&A effort has yet been extended to these buildings. However, as noted, fissile materials found outside the facilities seemed to have come from Minatom research institutes of civil plants and not weapons production facilities. In any event, the construction of the fissile material storage facility is supposed to deal with whatever problems may arise in safely and securely storing fissile materials removed from nuclear warheads. Progress on designing and building this facility has been slow. Fortuitously, up to now, the lack of this facility does not seem to be seriously affecting the disarmament process, nor created unreasonable security risks for the dismantled warheads. In January 1992, then CIA Director Robert Gates said there were approximately 30,000 nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Union.[11] In October 1995, Secretary of Defense Perry told Meet the Press that Russia has approximately 20,000 nuclear weapons. A discussion with DOD public affairs resulted in a modification of this statement, DOD's public estimate was 20,000 plus or minus 3,000. It seems therefore that Russia is dismantling the 1,500 warheads a year it indicated it would do back in the 1991-1992 timeframe.[12] iv. Military and civilian control of nuclear weapons: This issue was the original concern about "loose-nukes" in the aftermath of the August 1991 coup attempt. The problem was two- fold: who had command and control of Russian nuclear forces and who had physical control of Russian nuclear weapons. Except maybe for the October 1993 period when the White House was under assault, in September 1994 when electricity was cut-off to a Strategic Missile Forces command center near Moscow, and a year or so ago when the Russians mistook a scientific rocket launch from Norway for a missile attack, command and control of the nuclear forces has not been a major issue. In regards to the safety and security of nuclear weapons, the CIA concluded in their recent testimony to Congress that: Today, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) and General Staff continue to maintain what we believe to be generally effective control over the arsenal using multiple layers of physical and technical protection, and strict central authority over release of the weapons, although their standards are not equal to those of the West.[13] Earlier in 1995, the CIA noted to Congress that, "Physical security of these [nuclear weapons storage] sites is fairly sound." And, that Russia had taken steps to consolidate the number of weapon storage sites from over 600 in the former USSR in 1989 to 100 in 1995.[14] The CIA's concern therefore was directed at an inside job. Accounting procedures were so poor that "an officer with access could remove a warhead."[15] The leadership of the Russian Ministry of Defense's 12th Main Directorate has voiced similar concerns in their public statements. Although security is still sufficient at nuclear weapons storages, the facilities were built in the 1960s and are outdated. Money has been slow in coming to repair and upgrade the facilities. In addition, as result of a training exercise, they realized that people who used to work with nuclear weapons, for example a retired officers who are unsatisfied or desperate, could pose a threat. Finally, although the 12th Directorate remains sure that the theft of a warhead from a facility is impossible, they are concerned about a robbery of railway cars during the transport of nuclear weapons. In that regard, the assistance provided by the United States, France and the U.K. for helping with the secure transport of nuclear weapons -- kevlar blankets, storage containers, super-containers, and railcars -- has been much appreciated.[16] Thus, the problem with nuclear warhead security is worrisome although not as serious as the situation with radioactive materials. The U.S. and other western assistance has been very useful and appreciated and the program is showing steady progress. Again, I hope this program will enjoy continued U.S. and Russian support. 5. General Observation Relating to the Problem -"We must have the richest state in the world." -"How do you know that?" -"People have been stealing from the state for 60 years and there is still something left to steal." a. Major and petty corruption was endemic to Soviet life. It was how people got by in a situation of constant scarcity. In the Soviet days, workers would bring concrete home from the plant to build their dacha. With this historical and social background, it is small psychological step for a worker to bring bits and pieces of radioactive materials out of a plant on the supposition that is of value somewhere. b. Life in the military for the officer corps has degraded. Low pay or lack of pay is common. Even the relatively well off troops of the 12th Directorate have gone unpaid for a month or two at the time. Although I have been struck by the professionalism and commitment of the officers I have dealt with, the danger of an inside job will remain until either better times come or better physical and accounting controls are put on warheads and fissile and radioactive materials. c. Life for the workers, particularly around outlying military support facilities, is very poor and hard. These were not pampered parts of the Soviet military-industrial complex even during the heyday of the Soviet Union. Pay is intermittent, and the small towns and cities that house the workers for the submarine shipyards and bases in the North and Far East suffer from a lack of supplies, medical care, water, and electricity. There is plenty of economic motivation to take any radioactive or fissile material of any possible value to help make ends meet. d. Gulag vs. Gizmos: We want to avoid promoting a form of security that emphasizes the gulag mentality, particularly that which involves the infringement of human rights. Tightening up security to the Russian authorities unfortunately means returning to the old methods of harassing undesirables and troublemakers whether they be hoodlums, human rights activists, or environmentalists. For example, in February, the FSB arrested and charged with treason Alexander Nikitin, a retired naval officer who had assisted the Norwegian environmental group Bellona to investigate the environmental problems of the Russian Northern Fleet. The crime is punishable by death. Thus, although perimeter security can always be improved, particularly at traditionally laxly guarded institutes, a key problem seems to be forestalling an inside job and keeping honest men honest. For this we need more gizmos: this is best accomplished by increased emphasis on technical security, training, and better accounting and control measures. Also, outside oversight and control is important. In this case, it must be considered a step backwards that GAN is no longer allowed to oversee military-nuclear facilities. The Russian government should take steps to reinstate and strengthen GAN's oversight functions. e. In the public debate, problems with radioactive material control, fissile material control, and the security of nuclear weapons are all mixed-up. Control of radioactive materials and fissile materials at civil sites and non-weapons Minatom sites is very problematic. Control of weapons and dismantled weapons is more assured. The best way to assure weapons and fissile materials used in the warhead manufacturing process do not fall into the wrong hands is to continue the disarmament process, e.g. consolidate and reduce the numbers of nuclear warheads. In fact, even with the problems of ratifying START II in the Russian Duma, it is worthwhile to start proposing further reductions, i.e. --START III -- now, so further reductions and consolidation can be anticipated, planned for, and funded. The best way to insure fissile materials do not fall into the wrong hands is to continue to improve security and accounting at Minatom, military and Navy sites, and work with Minatom to stop producing ever greater quantities of fissile materials, particularly plutonium. f. Collectively the DOD, DOE, MOD and Minatom, aside from all the sundry government officials involved from the State Department, Foreign Ministry, presidential staffs, etc., have slowly been crawling up the learning curve. The pace to many has been too slow, but working in Russia and with Russians can be frustrating, exasperating, and generally difficult even if you are not dealing with highly sensitive issues like nuclear materials and warheads and millions of dollars (I am sure the Russians find Americans equally trying at times). The problems we are facing will not be worked out in six months or a year. The arsenals and nuclear complexes both sides constructed are just too large. We must be patient, stay the course, and keep our eyes on the prize: a steady and safe reduction in the nuclear threat represented by greater reductions in nuclear weapons arsenals of the United States and Russia and greater control of and transparency surrounding nuclear material stockpiles. This undertaking is truly historic, progress is being made, and we will gain nothing, and in fact lose much, if the U.S. and Russian governments stop supporting the cooperative threat reduction (CTR) program. Regardless of who comes next in Russian or U.S. politics, both countries have an interest in further reducing their nuclear arsenals and ensuring safe, secure, and transparent storage of nuclear materials. Stopping the CTR program and reducing the level of cooperation when progress is finally being made would be a grave mistake. Greenpeace is usually not so enthusiastic about U.S. and Russian government programs in the nuclear area. In fact we have been critical of various aspects of the Nunn-Lugar program. The failure to include nuclear submarine disposal; the faustian deal to provide Ukraine with nuclear fuel from dismantled warheads to keep unsafe Ukrainian nuclear plants operating; the failure to stop reprocessing in Russia; the sharing of nuclear information between governments and not with the public; the slowness of the development of the program and; bureaucratic infighting are some of the problems we have seen. But take this as a sign of the "bi-partisanship" that should exist both in Russia and the United States around this effort. The goal is worth the frustration and effort. Moreover, if the United States and Russia stop their cooperation, the problem, most assuredly, will only get worse, not better. 6. Conclusion: Greenpeace and Nuclear Disarmament In conclusion, I would like inform the committee about some our coming work on nuclear disarmament. In addition to pushing for the CTBT, we will be actively encouraging the nuclear weapons states to live up to their Article 6 commitments under to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is widely recognized the CTBT is no longer an adequate disarmament measure by itself. It will, as the President said in his 1996 State of the Union address, mainly "end the race to create new nuclear weapons" and not lead to any reductions in nuclear arsenals. Thus at least several more steps are needed beyond the CTBT to move the world along the path of nuclear disarmament and towards the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons. Some of these steps probably will be small, but important. For example, the President could really end the race to develop new nuclear weapons by turning the oft-repeated statement made by members of the Administration that the U.S. has no plans to develop and produce new design nuclear weapons into a matter of national policy. The President should say that U.S. will not develop and produce new design nuclear weapons, and he should encourage or negotiate with the other nuclear weapons states to insure this becomes a global ban on new design weapons. Larger steps, however, obviously will be needed to further reduce the nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and Russia, and to capture the nuclear arsenals of the France, China, the U.K. and the nuclear weapons programs of the undeclared nuclear weapons states such as India, Pakistan, and Israel in the nuclear disarmament process. Clearly, the U.S. and Russia need to start discussing the outlines of a START III agreement as soon as possible. Unfortunately, this Administration has taken the approach of holding START III hostage to START II ratification by the Russian Duma. But having spent the better part of 1994-1995 in Moscow repeatedly discussing this problem with flag officers in the Russian military, members of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Duma members, members of President's Yeltsin's national security staff, and specialists in research institutes who closely follow the issue, I am convinced discussing START III now -- preferably agreeing to start talking about it at the April summit -- would be one of the best ways to insure START II is ratified in the Russian Duma. As a next step towards further reductions, START III levels could be set a 1,500-2,000 range, and consideration should be given to giving up at least one leg of the strategic triad. Probably ballistic missile submarines are the best candidate for elimination in this case. Although this proposal runs counter to traditional arms control logic, it deserves serious consideration. The planned Trident force has evolved beyond the second strike, secure reserve force of the Polaris/Poseidon era. After START II, MIRVed missiles will only be based at sea. The Trident missile, particularly those armed with the some 400 available W88 warheads will be a potent nuclear-warfighting force. Since the late 1980s, moreover, the U.S. Navy has been working on and is now implementing a SLBM Retargeting System (SRS). The SRS program goal is to provide SSBNs on patrol with a near real-time targeting data so they could strike fixed and mobile targets -- that is SS-25s that would have been dispersed to their pre-surveyed launch sites -- in Russia.[17] There is some worry that improved versions of Russian SLBMs will have a greater capability as well. Interestingly, the timing for proposing the elimination of SSBNs could not be better in both Russia and the United States. Proposing elimination of SSBNs would be financially convenient for both countries, and result in large savings. In terms of procurement cycles it is an opportune time to consider eliminating SSBNs and SLBMs under START III. In the U.S., the Air Force has fully funded the upgrading and the single-warhead conversion of the Minuteman III force. The Navy, however, has not fully funded the backfit of the four older Trident submarines that will remain after START II. In Russia, the Strategic Rocket Forces seem to be ahead of the Russian Navy when it comes to production of new systems. The SS-25 Topol M version is scheduled to IOC this year, although deployment rates will undoubtedly be slow. The Russian Navy, however, is still struggling to overhaul and convert the first Typhoon submarine which entered the shipyard around 1991. Also, the Russian Navy is lacking funds to support the whole Typhoon missile system. There is a good chance that the Typhoons will all be retired even before START II levels are reached in 2003. In addition, the Russian Navy is struggling with minimal success to get the Russian government to approve the construction of a class of next generation SSBNs. In the United States, the U.S. Navy, if it plans to replace the Trident force as it begins to age around 2010, will have to begin preliminary consideration of a new SSBN design in the next three to four years. This discussion, is already happening in a fashion in the context of the design for a new attack submarine. One idea that has been discussed is having a submarine with a common fore and aft section and modular center which would be mission specific for forward ops, special ops, cruise missiles, or in this case a SLBM section. Starting talks on elimination of SSBNs now would save both countries tremendous amounts of money by obviating the need for the next generation of SSBNs. And, arms control, for once, could be ahead of the procurement cycle rather than playing catch-up trying to cut systems that have already been signed-off on and which have had billions invested in them. Finally, largest portion of warheads under START II will be at sea. If levels of less than 2,000 warheads are going to be achieved, the largest "pots" of warheads -- i.e. the 1,750 warheads allowed on SLBMs -- will have to be eliminated. Also, for financial and environmental reasons it makes sense to eliminate SLBMs ahead of bombers and ICBMs. There is not much procurement money to be saved by eliminating bombers in either the U.S. or Russia. And, as both the U.S. and Russia have discovered in the past several years, disposing of the nuclear waste from the nuclear reactors aboard submarines and the decommissioned submarines themselves is an expensive and hazardous process. In regards to tactical weapons, we feel steps need to be taken to achieve reduction and elimination of tactical nuclear weapons as soon as possible. We are particularly concerned that the eastern expansion of NATO threatens to create a new and dangerous nuclear standoff in Europe. To avoid this, we will be urging that plans be put in place to seek the elimination of the nuclear weapons that are deployed in Europe and assigned to NATO missions, and that Russia be engaged in further discussions to reduce and eliminate its own large tactical nuclear weapons arsenal. We feel eliminating these weapons would help reduce tensions between NATO and Russia and would increase international security. NATO's September 1995 "Study on NATO Enlargement," claimed NATO expansion will enhance security and stability in the Euro- Atlantic area; promote good-neighborly relations in the whole Euro-Atlantic area; reinforce the tendency towards integration and cooperation in Europe and; strengthen the Alliance's ability to contribute to European and international security. However, Russia's strong negative response to NATO expansion demonstrates NATO's enlargement plans already are having the opposite effect. Russia's reaction is predictable but it shows that NATO enlargement will create new dividing lines in Europe. Moreover, it seems nuclear weapons in Europe will become a key source of tension in NATO-Russia relations. In Russia, conservative voices, perhaps with the support of the Russian Ministry of Defense, are calling for a nuclear response to NATO expansion. Some are advocating a redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons on the Baltic Sea Fleet, on the Black Sea Fleet and to Kaliningrad, and an unilateral abrogation of the INF treaty along with the development and deployment of new short and intermediate range nuclear missiles. Extension of the nuclear umbrella to new NATO members can only add strength to the conservatives' arguments that a Russian nuclear response -- a tit for tat -- to NATO's enlargement is in order. This dynamic will be a very dangerous development and a setback to the positive steps towards denuclearizing Europe that have taken place since the signing of the INF Treaty in 1987. The discussion over NATO expansion should provide an historic opportunity to finally denuclearize NATO and Russian forces in Europe. The U.K. has announced that it will remove its tactical nuclear weapons from Europe by 1998. The remaining 480 U.S. nuclear bombs that are estimated to be in Europe should also be removed and eliminated and a proposal put to the Russians to do the same. As part of the decision, a NATO-Russia forum could be created where further steps to reduce nuclear tensions in the Europe can be discussed including further reductions in national nuclear forces. As part of this greater disarmament process, critical issues that are the subject of this series of hearings will have to be addressed. There will have to be increased bi-lateral and, we would hope, multilateral transparency about the numbers and types of nuclear weapons and amounts of fissile materials involved. Transparency and data-exchanges have been the subject of several U.S.-Russian summits and undoubtedly Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin will discuss how to implement their prior agreements on this subject at their upcoming April summit. However, for the immediate future -- i.e. under a future START III agreement and the elimination of nuclear weapons assigned to NATO -- and until much lower levels of warheads are reached (hundreds) slow progress on transparency measures should not serve as an excuse to delay further steps towards meeting our equally important and legally-binding NPT commitments to achieve nuclear disarmament. In fact progress on START III and NATO expansion issues may help break the current log-jam over implementing the transparency initiatives agreed to in principle at previous summits. There has been some frustration expressed in Washington that Russia is not moving fast enough or not at all on implementing these agreed upon transparency measures. But, from the Russian point of view, the United States is not adequately addressing a number of issues that are important to Russia, particularly NATO expansion, insuring the sanctity of the ABM Treaty, and discussing START III. So some consideration of important Russian concerns could result in quicker consideration of important U.S. concerns. ******* Joshua Handler is Greenpeace's Disarmament Campaign Coordinator. He has travelled widely in Russia, the United States, England, and France investigating the nuclear-powered fleets and nuclear weapons programs of these countries. He has authored or co- authored more than 65 articles, reports, op-eds, and conference papers on these topics, including co-authoring the Encyclopedia of the U.S. Military (Harper & Row, 1990), contributing chapters to books on U.S. military policy, the Russian military, the Law of the Sea, and environmental pollution in the countries of the former Soviet Union, and co-authoring Greenpeace's Neptune Papers, a seven-part monograph series covering aspects of the nuclear arms race at sea. His research has been covered widely in the U.S. and international press, including the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Chicago Tribune, the Wall Street Journal, the Boston Globe, the Los Angeles Times, Newsweek, the Christian Science Monitor, the Seattle-Post Intelligencer, the ABC TV Evening News, the NBC Evening News, CBS TV Evening News, and National Public Radio. Foreign press coverage has included major U.K., Scandinavian, Japanese, Russian, and Italian print and electronic media outlets. His work has also has been translated and published in Russian, Japanese, German, and Hindi. He was a member of U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment's "Advisory Panel on Russian Nuclear Contamination Project" during 1994-1995. He has an M.A. in International Relations from the University of Chicago, and a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Illinois. Notes: 1. Office of Naval Intelligence, "Nuclear Developments Around the World. I. The Orient," (secret) (declassified 10 June 1994 after a declassification request by Greenpeace), ONI Review, Vol. 15, No. 2, February 1960, p. 87. 2. Seymour Hersh, The Sampson Option, (Random House: New York, 1991), pp. 241-257. 3. For a good Russian description of this technology see: V.A.Chechurov, Candidate of Technical Sciences, "Small, Independent, Long-Lasting Power", Energiia/Energy, No. 5, 1992. 4. A. Geletiuk, "Our Little Chernobyls," Kamchatskaia Pravda (Petropavlovsk), 14 November 1990. 5. Joshua Handler, "Trip Report: Greenpeace Visit to Moscow and Russian Far East July - November 1992, Subject: Russian Navy Nuclear Submarine Safety, Construction, Defense Conversion, Decommissioning, and Nuclear Waste Disposal Problems," (Washington, D.C.: Greenpeace, 15 February 1993). 6. POSTFACTUM, "Khabarovsk Storehouses Missing Warheads," 28 May 1992 (FBIS-SOV-92-104, 29 May 1992, pp. 45-46). 7. For a general discussion of Russian nuclear warhead control and accounting see: Kirill Belyaninov, interview with Major General Vitaliy Yakovlev, deputy chief of the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, "Can the Nuclear Charge be Lost: Major General Vitaliy Yakovlev from the Ministry of Defense Categorically Asserts that it Can't," Literaturnaya Gazeta, 1 June 1994, (translated in JPRS-UMA-94-028, 29 June 1994, p. 6). Although General Yakovlev was very reassuring in this interview, in an interview a few months prior he complained about the lack of control and accounting over the nuclear warheads being kept in Ukraine; Aleksandr Zhilin, interview with Major General Vitaliy Yakovlev, deputy chief of staff of the Russian Defense Ministry's 12th Main Directorate, "Expert Appraisal: Winged Chernobyls," Moskovskiye Novosti, 5 December 1993, (translated in JPRS-TND-93-001, 6 January 1994, pp. 19-20). 8. Also see: Colonel Oleg Falichev, interview with Colonel General Ye. P. Maslin, Chief of the Defense Ministry's 12th Main Directorate, "Who Has the Keys to the Nuclear Arsenal," Krasnaya Zvezda (translated in FBIS-SOV-93-228, 30 November 1993, p. 41). 9. On 8 September 1977, the K-171, a Delta I ballistic missile submarine, accidently jettisoned a nuclear warhead somewhere near the Soviet coast off Kamchatka. The submarine was armed with 12 ballistic missiles and had left the Rybachiy submarine base for a pre-cruise training range. It was commanded by Captain 1st Rank V. Brichkov. All the equipment was working well when the submarine left, but shortly after being at sea the air pressure inside began to increase, causing a failure of a seal in the missile fuel tank and the missile compartment became filled with puffs of smoke. The situation was serious because the fuel could have interacted with an oxidizer leading to an explosion. The pressure continued to increase. To avert catastrophe the decision was made to let out the compressed air, and the lid of the missile tube was opened. But along with the outracing air a nuclear warhead also disattached itself from the missile and "after spinning high, it fell into water and sank to the bottom." This event occurred in darkness. The site where the one quarter megaton warhead disappeared was roughly established. "According to the participants of the story, the situation was rather nervous and tense." The area was surrounded by the Kamchatka flotilla's ships and vessels. The submarine was convoyed to a bay where the ammunition was under some risk offloaded. The accident and loss of the warhead were immediately reported to the Headquarters of the Pacific Fleet and from there to the Main Staff of the Navy, and personally to the Defense Minister Ustinov." It was also rumored that the members of the Politburo knew about it. Maintaining secrecy, about two dozen various ships, vessels, and submarines were drawn to the area. Air and other fleet services were involved. Nuclear scientists were hurriedly transferred by air from Moscow to Kamchatka. The warhead was found and raised. "All protection barriers against all hazards had worked. Outwardly, the warhead was intact, and all its parts had remained joint." According to the closed court documents, the accident was blamed on the chief of missile complex control group "Lieutenant M.," who while serving the missiles, displayed "lax attitude": "due to his negligence" and "carelessness", instead of the succession prescribed in the instruction he "turned on another mechanism" thus letting the high pressure air "go" out of control. "Those involved in the event tend to think that the matter here is not only in the lieutenant's laxity. They recalled 'button game' at another submarine which nearly caused a disaster." Yevgeniy Sholokh, "Here Is A Warhead Flying ...", Vladivostok (Vladivostok), 2 June 1993. 10. Dr. Gordon Oehler, Director, Non-Proliferation Center, Central Intelligence Agency, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, on "Intelligence Briefing on Smuggling of Nuclear Material and the Role of International Crime Organizations, and on the Proliferation of Cruise and Ballistic Missiles," 31 January 1995, p. 4. 11. DCI Testimony before U.S. Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearing on "Weapons Proliferation in the New World Order," 15 January 1992. 12. It is also of interest to note in late 1993, a senior officer of the 12th Directorate stated that in regards to tactical nuclear weapons, in the aftermath of the Bush-Gorbachev 1991 disarmament initiatives, the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons would proceed as follows: all land mines by 1998; all nuclear warheads for six types of nuclear artillery shells of 152mm, 203mm or 240mm calibers by the year 2000; one half of nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles by 1996; about on third of sea-based nuclear weapons by 1995; one half of tactical bombs in the inventory of the Air Force by 1996; General Vitaliy Yakovlev, "Realization of Reduction and Limitation Programs for Nuclear Weapons and the Opportunity of an Information Exchange on Amount of Produced Fissile Materials and Their Localization," Talk prepared for the U.S.-Russian Workshop on CTB, fissile material cutoff and plutonium disposal," 15-17 December 1993, Washington, DC, Natural Resources Defense Council, Federation of American Scientists, Moscow Physical-Technical Institute. It is my understanding that as of at least mid-1995, this schedule was still operative. 13. Dr. David Osias, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs, "Security of Nuclear Weapons and Weapons-Useable Material in FSU," testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 22 August 1995, p. 2. 14. Dr. Gordon Oehler, Director, Non-Proliferation Center, Central Intelligence Agency, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, on "Intelligence Briefing on Smuggling of Nuclear Material and the Role of International Crime Organizations, and on the Proliferation of Cruise and Ballistic Missiles," 31 January 1995, p. 4. 15. Dr. Gordon Oehler, Director, Non-Proliferation Center, Central Intelligence Agency, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, on "Intelligence Briefing on Smuggling of Nuclear Material and the Role of International Crime Organizations, and on the Proliferation of Cruise and Ballistic Missiles," 31 January 1995, p. 4. 16. Vladimir Orlov, "General Masilin: 'Not a Single Nuclear Warhead has been Lost or Stolen in Russia," Yaderny Kontrol (Moscow), No. 5, May 1995, pp. 2-4. 17. See: U.S. Navy, Strategic Systems Program Office, "SRS Briefing Document," n.d. (released under the Freedom of Information Act to Greenpeace). Rear Admiral John T. Mitchell, Director of the Strategic Systems Program Office, described the SRS to the Senate Armed Service Committee in 1993 saying that: We are currently implementing an SLBM retargeting System (SRS). The SRS is being implemented in three phases between fiscal year 1992 and fiscal year 1998. The objective is to provide increased SLBM retargeting capability, thus enhancing the flexibility of the Nation's sea-based deterrent. Three improvements will be made: to the fire control system to quickly, accurately, and reliably retarget missiles to targets; to the SSBN radio room to transfer targeting change information to the fire control system; and at the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division, to allow timely and reliable processing of an increased number of targets. In a world of more diffuse threats than those imagined even 5 years ago, this is both an important and timely investment; SASC, FY 1994 DOD Authorization, Part 7, p. 17.