TL: WAR, TERRORISM & NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS - Exec Summary TL: WAR, TERRORISM & NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS - Exec Summary SO: Greenpeace International, (GP) DT: March, 19, 1996 Keywords: environment nuclear power ukraine republics accidents problems chernobyl / By Gordon Thompson, Institute for Resource and Security Studies, Cambridge, MA-USA. Executive Summary of the Reportary of the report "War, Terrorism and Nuclear Power Plants". Published as Chernobyl Paper no.2 by Greenpeace International, March 1996. FOREWORD In spite of all safety barriers, nuclear power plants are very vulnerable. There are risks against which they cannot be protected. Does it still make sense to endlessly discuss the modernisation of safety systems and materials, insofar as this is even economically feasible, when forces of nature and human activity can play a role, when they can overcome all protective technical features and result in the catastrophic release of radiation? Real protection from war or terrorism is impossible - history has taught us that all things made by man can also be destroyed by man. The threat of war to nuclear facilities has long been ignored in Europe. But ever since 1 July 1991, when three Yugoslavian Air Force fighter jets flew threateningly low over Krsko, a Slovenian nuclear power plant, it has been impossible to deny the terrible danger of wartime situations. And there are many indications that the future will become even less quiet. Ethnic conflicts, a new rise of nationalism and other factors all suggest that armed conflicts and terrorist attacks will increase. "Soft" energy systems such as those using renewable sources like sun and wind are far less prone to armed attacks and natural catastrophes than the "hard" energy systems to which nuclear power plants belong. And more importantly, their damage or destruction does not lead to a widespread catastrophe for humans and the environment. Helmut Hirsch Greenpeace, March 1996 Introduction If nuclear power could have been developed earlier, and had it been in widespread use at the time of the last war, it is likely that some areas of central Europe would still be uninhabitable... (UK Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, 1976) The commercial use of nuclear energy is the result of scientific and technological developments made for military purposes. This background notwithstanding, however, hundreds of nuclear power plants are today in operation worldwide. In planning and building these, practically no account has been taken of the possible effects of war. The Second World War showed what great damage industrialised countries can inflict on each other, as it did the strategic significance of destroying energy supply systems. The history of the twentieth century is rife with examples of armed conflict and premeditated acts of terrorism. But the decades of threat from the superpowers' nuclear armaments race have possibly overshadowed all other dangers. Aims of the study We shall try to make clear why, in our view, the possible impacts of war and terrorism on nuclear power stations and fuel stores are deserving of attention. At the same time we want to supply information and analyses for public discussion. The study will examine why it has been thought fit to ignore this subject. It will look at attacks on external intermediate stores and other nuclear installations, and at the diversion or proliferation of weapons-grade material. We shall begin by taking a look at the history of war in the twentieth century and discussing the extent to which nuclear power plants could be affected by war or terrorism. We then turn to the question of what impacts different kinds of attacks could have. Finally we look at whether these threeats might be confined throug political action or measures of a technical kind and the mechanisms for achieving this confinement. We conclude by making recommendations. A LOOK BACK AT WAR AND TERRORISM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The term "war" includes both conflicts between countries and complex internal struggles such as that in what was formerly Yugoslavia. The twentieth century can be divided into three phases as regards war: from the turn of the century until the end of the Second World War; from the end of the Second World War until the end of the Cold War (for the sake of simplicity dated as 1990); and, finally, the present. During the first phase powerful industrialised countries fought each other with enormous losses of life and massive destruction. In the second phase there were numerous regional wars, but Europe remained spared. Industrialised countries did not fight each other directly, but were sometimes involved (for example in Vietnam and Afghanistan). The third phase is marked by further smaller and medium-scale conflicts, which are now also spreading to Europe. Energy supply and strategies in war The supply of energy - particularly oil - played an important strategic role in both World Wars. In the Second World War the German Reich and Japan tried, with little success, to ensure they had adequate oil reserves. From May 1944, the Allies began to bomb German power stations in which synthetic oil was being extracted from coal. They later turned to systematically destroying power plants. At the end of the war German oil and power production had almost come to a standstill; the victorious powers were better off in this regard. Balance of terror After 1945 the period commonly known as the Cold War began. While economic growth increased in the industrialised countries, and industrial plants (including nuclear power plants) and infrastructures were invested in, there was at the same time an arms race in conventional and nuclear weapons which devoured enormous sums of money. Without the high escalation in armaments civil nuclear technology might not have developed, or would have taken a different path. Between 1945 and 1990 wars and conflicts occured on the territories of countries which were not among the world's industrialised nations. Although oil refineries and electricity works were attacked, they were not generally of great strategic importance. An exception was the First Gulf War between Iran and Iraq (1980-88), in which each tried to stop the other from exporting oil. Still no peace on earth after the Cold War Since the end of the Cold War there have been armed conflicts on or near industrialised countries' territory. A report by the US Carter Center in 1993/94 alone counted 33 armed conflicts between two or more governments, or between a government and at least one organised armed group, in which over 1,000 people were killed in acts of fighting. Seven of the 27 trouble spots mentioned in the report (Azerbaijan, Georgia, Tadzhikistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Turkey and Northern Ireland) are in the industrialised world. The second Gulf War of 1991 provides spectacular examples of the destruction of energy supply systems in a war. The United States and its allies firstly of all put 90 percent of Iraqi power supplies and 80 percent of its oil refineries out of action, as well as other components of its industry and infrastructure. Iraq later sabotaged some 800 oil wells before withdrawing from Kuwait. Some of these burned and some formed huge lakes of oil in the desert. Terrorism Although terrorism occurs in times of war, in the form of partisan struggles or guerrilla warfare, here we refer only to acts of terrorism in times of peace. The composition, motive, methods and goals of the groups involved vary, and it is difficult to point to a pattern of behaviour or to trends. Organisations like the Rand Corporation in the USA have just recently begun to make records and analyse data on terrorism worldwide. Terrorist groups have demonstrated resolution and ability in making attacks on exposed targets. The attack on a US barracks in Beirut on 23 October 1983, for example, was a suicide mission - a truck sped past guards and rammed a four-storey building. A highly-developed bomb exploded, destroying the building and killing 241 soldiers. Attacks on the heart of civilisation Terrorists are also not deterred from making attacks in big cities or industrial centres. On 26 February 1993, a car bomb detonated in a multi-storey car park below the World Trade Centre in New York, as a result of which six people died and over a thousand were injured, and there was great damage to property. Attacks planned on the UN buildings, FBI offices, the Lincoln and Holland Tunnels, and the George Washington Bridge were only thwarted at the last minute. On 19 April 1995, right-wing extremists made a bomb attack on a US government building in Oklahoma, killing 169 people and injuring over 500. Bombs are not always used in attacks; sometimes other weapons are used, with equally devastating results. In March 1995 a series of attacks in the Tokyo subway with the nerve gas sarin shocked the world. Twelve people died and over 3,000 were injured. On 22 December 1995, a Chechen rebel leader exploded a container of radioactive material in Russia. A month beforehand Chechen rebels had directed a television crew to a packet containing Caesium 137 in a busy Moscow park. Terrorist attacks on energy systems are likewise not a rarity. Between September 1982 and September 1983 there were 99 incidents of activities directed against non- nuclear energy installations in 24 countries, 63 of these against facilities for generating or transmitting electricity. Most of these occured in Latin America, but Canada, Spain, France and South Africa were also affected. A troubled future Although it is, in the nature of things, difficult to make statements about the future, experts prophesy a worldwide trend towards instability and situations with warlike conflicts and terrorist attacks. The reasons cited for this are ethnic conflicts, new incitements to nationalism, cultural differences and anti-Western ideologies. The concomitant conditions creating fertile ground for these are increasing poverty; unrest in former Communist countries; a stagnating world economy; and increasing economic competition, threatening a return to self-sufficiency and mercantilism. One part of the world deserving special attention here is East and South-East Asia, where a regional arms race will go hand in hand with an anticipated increase in nuclear energy. The increase of right-wing extremist activities, often coupled with military experience, and of religious fanaticism are also regarded by experts as especially dangerous as regards possible threats to nuclear facilities. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AS TARGETS OF TERRORISM AND WAR The release of radioactive substances resulting from an attack in war or terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant can come about in three ways. Firstly, it can be deliberately sought by whoever makes the attack. Secondly, the aggressor may want to interrupt the facility's operation; the release of radioactivity is then either welcomed or a matter of indifference. Thirdly, the attack may aim to pose a threat, or put the facility out of action, in which case the release occurs unintentionally. Bombs on reactors There are a number of examples of nuclear facilities being bombed or threatened in war. On 7 June 1981, a carefully planned Israeli bombing attack destroyed a reactor under construction at the Tuwaitha nuclear research centre near Bagdad. This impeded Iraq from producing fissile material. Between 1984 and 1987, Iraq on several occasions attacked the construction site of the Iranian reactor at Bushehr, in the end destroying the control building. Eleven civilians, including one German, were killed. In the Second Gulf War the USA and its allies in turn attacked Tuwaitha in order to destroy the remaining two reactors there. On 1 July 1991 three Yugoslav warplanes flew threateningly low over the Krsko reactor in Slovenia (Slovenia having declared its independence on 27 June 1991) and the reactor was temporarily shut down because of the danger to it. Terrorist attacks on nuclear power plants While it is true that no terrorist attack has yet led to a nuclear facility being destroyed and radioactivity released, attacks by terrorist groups are not unusual. In December 1977, four Basque separatists detonated bombs on the construction site of the Lemoniz reactor in Spain. The reactor pressure vessel and a steam generator were damaged and two workers killed. In November 1979, a bomb damaged a transformer at the Goesgen reactor in Switzerland just after it had gone into operation. In December 1982, ANC guerrillas exploded four bombs in the unfinished research reactor at Koeberg, South Africa. In June 1985, in an act of sabotage against the first Philippine nuclear power plant, Communist guerilla fighters exploded 26 electricity pylons in two weeks. After the bomb attack on the World Trade Center and the forcible entry of a vehicle onto the site of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant on 7 February 1993, the highest US nuclear authority ordered stricter security measures. However, there are no special precautions against threats from "insiders" even though this threat is real. Between 1979 and 1987 there were 1,001 violations of security regulations in US nuclear power stations by members of staff, 87 of these acts being sabotage and 15 involving arson. POTENTIAL SCALE OF DESTRUCTION A modern nuclear power plant has four main components: (1) the reactor, which contains fissile material, and includes a cooling circuit which produces steam; (2) the containment; (3) instruments and control systems for the reactor's operation; and (4) turbines, generators and transformers, which transform the steam into electricity. In addition there is a storage pool for spent fuel rods, which is either inside or outside the containment. Sometimes there is also a dry store for irradiated fuel alongside it. Special studies must be conducted in order to appraise the extent of the effects of war better. There are no such studies in the literature generally available, so that only statements of a very general nature can be made here. To illustrate these we take an average 1100- megawatt pressurised water reactor as a model. What would happen if such a reactor were hit by a nuclear missile or a big conventional weapon? (1) A nuclear attack The worst case would be a nuclear attack. A one megaton blast detonating at a distance of up to 300 feet (in dry rock) or up to 540 feet (in damp soil) would vaporise or pulverise a reactor's inventory and stored fuel. Radioactive particles would be thrown high into the air. The fireball would attain its maximum expansion of approximately 7,220 feet after ten seconds, rising 260 to 330 feet per second. Depending on the nature of the ground the crater produced would be between 750 and 1,350 feet across and 165 to 260 feet deep. If the reactor were a few hundred yards from the point of impact it would break asunder. Pieces of it would be thrown hundreds or thousands of yards. Volatile radioactive substances or small particles would be spun high into the air. Even with an explosion several thousands yards away there would be severe damage to the reactor building as a result of pressure waves, the trembling in the ground below, and its being "shelled" by earth thrown out of the crater. In the previous example, the worst effect to be feared is that the reactor would be vaporised or pulverised. There would probably not be a core meltdown in the second case - that of the reactor breaking up. In the third case damage would be slighter, and the reactor would remain intact, but a core meltdown could occur on account of the cooling system being made defective. In this case the release of radioactive substances would, paradoxically, be greater than in the other two cases. (2) A conventional attack There are a great number of effective conventional weapons. For example, a 900 kilogramme bomb dropped from the air would tear out a crater 35 feet deep and 50 feet across, and would be capable of penetrating ten feet of concrete or 16 inches of steel. With today's precision methods - laser systems, for example - such bombs can be employed with unerring aim. If a reactor were directly hit by a bomb like this, it would break into pieces; the effect would be like that of the second type of nuclear attack. If a conventional weapon struck at a distance of a few dozen yards, the cooling system would be interrupted and a core meltdown would then occur. Since not all countries have precision techniques at their disposal, the latter scenario, with area bombing and strikes near the plant, would be the most probable. (3) Sabotage and more minor attacks There are many conceivable scenarios for acts of sabotage or small military operations conducted against nuclear power plants. If the attack is to pose a threat or interrupt a plant's operation, it might be directed against transformer stations or cooling towers or canals. Making the safety system inoperative could result in a "conventional" reactor accident. If the attack is aimed at releasing radioactivity, the aggressors will concentrate on interrupting the cooling circuit; and to achieve a greater effect they may also try to damage the containment. There is no doubt that specialist military commandos or terrorist groups are capable of conducting such an attack successfully. There are thousands of people in the world with the necessary knowledge for doing this. Nuclear power plant security systems are not designed to withstand resolute attacks of this kind. It is also generally underestimated how prone fuel rod storage pools are to attack. Since more fuel rods than originally planned are usually stored in pools, a loss of coolant caused by an attack means an increased danger of fire, and this would result in releases of radioactivity. It is also conceivable that damage could be caused as a result of military activities elsewhere, for example through an electromagnetic impulse from a nuclear weapon exploding at a great height. It is also possible that plant staff would not be able or willing to remain at their posts because of the threat of danger. But without its staff a nuclear power station cannot function, and the consequences could be disastrous. Radioactive releases Military or terrorist attacks on a nuclear power plant could result in two kinds of radioactive releases. The first would arise from a direct hit or near miss by a nuclear weapon. The reactor's inventory would then be flung high into the atmosphere as steam and dust, and come down to the earth with the fallout from the explosion of the nuclear bomb. The second type of release takes in the whole range between very small and larger releases such as might result from a meltdown or damage to the containment. If the attack were non- nuclear the radioactivity would spread into our part of the atmosphere. A few days afterwards, the direct effects of a nuclear attack on a nuclear power station are greater than after the isolated explosion of a nuclear bomb, but they are not dramatically different. But the delayed effects will far exceed those of an isolated nuclear explosion, because a nuclear power plant contains many more long- life radioactive substances than a nuclear warhead. A decade later, a nuclear attack against a reactor will have contaminated with radioactivity an area of ground over a thousand times as large as that contaminated by the explosion and fallout of a nuclear bomb. What happens with a release of the second type is illustrated by the disaster with the reactor at Chernobyl in 1986. Further, Chernobyl was not the worst conceivable case of releases of the second type. For one thing, there were few "early" deaths or cases of sickness because the radioactive cloud rose rapidly; secondly, only one reactor was affected; and, thirdly, no irradiated fuel store was involved. While cities and factories destroyed in war can be rebuilt afterwards and societies can become prosperous again, destroying nuclear power stations in a war would irreversibly contaminate whole stretches of land over a long period of time. Limiting damage to limited effect Technical operations for minimising the risk from attacks on nuclear power plants made in war or by terrorist attack are limited in what they can do. The following means might be employed as passive defence: walls of earth protecting a facility's buildings against attacks by missiles, bombs or artillery; camouflage; security measures guarding against sabotage from within; and fences, barricades, moats, and so forth, to help prevent forcible entry by people or vehicles. Active options include: reinforcing squads of guards; on- site ground-to-air missiles or air defence batteries; equipment for detecting airplanes in the area; and operational and maintenance procedures making acts of sabotage by insiders more difficult. These options are already employed to some extent. But they are expensive and laborious, and present the nuclear industry with problems regarding its image. New forms of defence are in addition often precursors of new forms of attack. In the 1970' there was discussion of constructing nuclear facilities underground; these would be built in such a way that they would be better equipped against attacks in war or by terrorists. But no such facilities have yet been built. It is questionable whether international laws, treaties or other institutional measures could increase the safety level of nuclear plants here. The 1949 Geneva Convention's additional protocols I and II, for example, protect nuclear power stations (although they do not other nuclear facilities); some countries, including the USA, have not signed these agreements. The USA has retained for itself the right to attack nuclear power plants if this seems to it to be militarily necessary. Recommended - pursuing the "soft" energy path The most effective protection against acts of aggression directed at nuclear power plants would be to phase out nuclear power. This apparently simple diagnosis raises a number of questions on international security policy. While it would not be appropriate to discuss these in detail here, three important questions would have to be addressed. Firstly, what are the causes of international instability, war and terrorism? Secondly, what form of society is best able to deal with these causes? And, finally, what industrial systems and systems of energy are best suited to this society? Problems including those of poverty, population growth, economic competition and environmental pollution must also be discussed here. The notion of "hard" and "soft" energy paths stems from Avory Lovins, an American scientist who developed a global energy savings scenario based on an "efficiency revolution". Nuclear power is the archetypal hard path - the construction and operation of a relatively small number of large, centralised plants requires a great concentration of capital and political power. Hard energy systems always have considerable implications of a military nature; the military apparatus required to safeguard oil wells in the Middle East is one example that comes to mind. The soft path uses renewable forms of energy, with energy being used as efficiently as possible; energy is produced in a large number of small, decentralised facilities. This path would be possible in a society in which capital and political power were widely distributed. Soft energy systems are less prone to attacks than hard systems are. If they are attacked, however, damaging or destroying them has no harmful effect on people or the environment. It is this author's conviction that soft energy systems are probably more appropriate to political, economic and social forms of organisation which are sustainable and non-violent. The accident at Chernobyl in 1986 showed how easily large amounts of radioactive substances from a nuclear power plant can enter the environment. The map of international politics has altered dramatically since then. The nuclear industry is in the position it is in today thanks to conventional technologies and institutions. Those who continue to support these have manifestly learned little new since Chernobyl.