[] TL: COUNTERBLAST UK NUKE FUELS THORP PROJECT SO: Greenpeace UK (GP) DT: 1993 Keywords: nuclear weapons plutonium reprocessing uk europe problems risks gp greenpeace / COUNTERBLAST: a response to British Nuclear Fuels briefing: THORP the FACTS Greenpeace UK In their briefing to MPs, British Nuclear Fuels pic (BNFL) have isolated certain "facts" about THORP through which they make their case. In this reply to BNFL's briefing, we comment on those facts and their truth. INDEPENDENT ANALYSTS, TOUCHE ROSS, HAVE ESTIMATED THAT THE ECONOMIC VALUE TO THE UK OF OPERATING THORP IS œ900 MILLION. The independence of the Touche Ross assessment is open to question. Touche Ross were commissioned by BNFL to produce an assessment based on figures supplied by BNFL. The assessment has never been made public. However, it is clear that to arrive at the œ900 million value to the UK, a number of accounting tricks were used: The discounting conventions used in the assessment had already been rejected by the Inspector at the Hinkley Point Inquiry. Only by using these discredited conventions could the real figure of œ900 million for decommissioning be "reduced" to just œ30 million in the assessment. Though THORP will become the biggest UK nuclear waste producer, only L10 million, is attributed to 'waste storage and disposal'. Multi-billion pound expenditures like the Nirex dump have been excluded from THORP's costs, even though it may prove possible to delay or abandon the Nirex dump if THORP does not operate. The potential revenues from offering alternative waste management schemes to THORP were excluded, even though there are good economic reasons why customers would pay for such alternatives. These revenues could easily amount to œ1.3 billion. If this sum had been included in the assessment, it would have logically lead to a recommendation to abandon THORP. BNFL's figures show that building dry stores and dealing with the contracted nuclear wastes would be œ300 million cheaper than operating THORP, even though the building of THORP has already been paid for. Notes: The Economic Case For and Against THORP. ù BNFL's economic case for THORP is as follows: Savings from abandoning THORP at this stage L1,080 million Cost of building dry stores and disposing of spent fuel L 770 million Lost revenues from switching from THORP to dry stores L1,250 million Total cost of abandoning THORP -L 950 million (These figures are quoted by BNFC in The Economic and Commercial justification of THORP. They are net present values of avoidable or variable cash flows discounted at 8%.) ù On the basis of the figures above, BNFL claims that abandoning THORP will cost the UK economy L950 million, However, a completely different view of these figures could be taken in any objective inquiry. ù The figures show that the cost of dry stores and direct disposal is some L300 million less than the costs of operating THORP from now on. Switching to dry stores is the cheaper option. ù BNFL's case rests on the unfounded assumption that no revenues can be earned by offering dry storage of spent nuclear fuel. This expected revenue loss of L1,260 billion masks the savings that would be made by switching to dry storage and swings the case in favour of THORP. ù If THORP customers were made an offer to convert their reprocessing contracts to spent fuel management contracts, they have good economic reasons to agree. This is because BNFL's customers have large sums still to pay for reprocessing. In all, THORP customers face four main future costs. 1. Remaining payments to BNFL for reprocessing 2. Costs of dealing with wastes returned by BNFL 3. Risk that BNFL will pass through future cost escalations 4. Costs of storing plutonium or possible premium prices charged for MOx fuel by BNFL ù BNFL's figures show that dry storage could be offered for less than the cost of operating THORP - even though it is already built. BNFL could charge at least as much for dry storage as the remaining charges for reprocessing (1 above) and customers would still make savings (2, 3, 4 above). BNFL would make the same money. ù A negotiated switch to dry storage could provide benefits to all parties and to the UK economy. ù In making the evaluation, BNFL has been free to make numerous assumptions. These include: inappropriate discount rates applied to decommissioning; invalid assumptions about what costs would still be paid if THORP is abandoned; inflated estimates of the costs of dry storage and disposal: implausible assessments of the revenues that can be earned by offering dry storage to BNFL's overseas customers. ù It would be a surprise if the case prepared Dy BNFL came out against THORP. As the Financial Times Power In Europe says: it would be "the equivalent of turkeys voting for Christmas." (August 1993) THORP WILL MAKE A PROFIT OF AROUND L500 MILLION IN ITS FIRST TEN YEARS OF OPERATION. THORP's profits represent a mere 2% return on capital invested. The nuclear industry has a poor record of forecasting actual costs and profits. For example, the cost of THORP itself has so far risen by three times its original estimate in real terms. According to Frans Berkhout of Princeton University, BNFL's claimed profit for THORP may disappear entirely through future cost increases of up to L1,200 million which are already identifiable. Notes: THORP Profitability ù Profit of L500 million over 10 years, just L50 million per year, represents a poor return on an investment of L2.8 billion. ù It is notable that the Government has not attempted to privatise the THORP business. Why has a Government committed to privatisation not considered the option of selling off this allegedly profitable venture? ù If THORP is so profitable; if its risks are properly covered; if the Government needs money to bridge its public sector deficit; then why not sell the THORP division of BNFL to the private sector? ù The failure to privatise nuclear power generation in 1989 exposed the flawed economics of the nuclear industry. A decision to open THORP is a decision to forget the economic lessons learned in the privatisation. The modest estimated THORP profits are at risk from numerous possible cost escalations and other problems. These risks are the overwhelmingly obvious reason why THORP cannot be privatised. These risks will instead be carried by the Government and ultimately the taxpayer. This is nothing less than a subsidy at the taxpayer's expense. ù Frans Berkhout, an energy economist at the University of Princeton, estimated that THORP's costs could increase by L710- L1,210 million pounds as a result of pollution control, delays in the Nirex dump and delays in the return of plutonium and waste to overseas customers. There are other identifiable costs to add to these. The hoped-for profit could very easily disappear. ù Any BNFL profits will be made at the expense of the UK electricity consumer. The Science Policy Research Unit of the University of Sussex estimated that the UK consumer was paying L1.7 billion (1990 money) more than necessary for THORP through electricity bills. ù Even BNFL's case for THORP, 'The Economic and Commercial Justification of THORP', shows that other UK Companies (eg Nuclear Electric) will be L860 million better off if THORP is abandoned and the spent fuel placed in dry storage. The rest of the UK economy is paying heavily for BNFL's THORP profits. THORP HAS ORDERS WORTH L9,000 MILLION, OVER HALF FROM OVERSEAS. It is not just the value of THORP's orders that matter, but how much it will cost the UK to deal with them. These costs include the decommissioning of THORP, the construction and operation (forever) of the Nirex deep dump and any further repositories required to contain THORP's nuclear wastes, over and above the operating and ancillary costs of the plant, not to speak of the disutility to the UK of having to receive and host the world s nuclear wastes. Notes: The œ9,000 million THORP order book ù The size of the order book is superficially impressive. However, there is doubt over how much it will cost to deal with these orders, and the firmness of the orders for the second ten years of THORP (roughly L3,000 million of the total). ù Numerous foreseeable cost escalations could turn hoped-for profits into large losses that would ultimately fall on the taxpayer. Some examples follow. ù Decommissioning could eventually cost more than the L900 million estimated by BNFL. A German reprocessing plant of just one twentieth of the capacity of THORP is expected to cost œ600 million to decommission. ù Decommissioning may have to be done earlier than the assumed 50 years after THORP closes for safety reasons. This could easily double the decommissioning costs. BNFL's decommissioning plans have not received approval from the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, nor were they examined in the recent National Audit Office inquiry 'The Cost of Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities' (HC-692). ù Decommissioning THORP and its support plant will account for a substantial share of UK decommissioning wastes, which includes the 19 existing nuclear stations, and numerous other facilities. Curiously, BNFL's estimated L900 million decommissioning cost for THORP is only double that of decommissioning a single Magnox nuclear power station. ù Much of THORP's nuclear waste is destined for dumping at the proposed Sellafield Nirex dump. The costs of the proposed dump may increase substantially or the project may be halted due to unsuitable geology. Civil engineering projects such as the Channel Tunnel show that very large uncertainties exist in forecasting the costs of such projects. ù THORP lags far behind the pollution standards expected in Japan and France from reprocessing operations. National or international pressure could force expensive improvements In pollution control technology. The Paris Commission recommended in June 1993 that THORP should not open without best available pollution control technology. This would include equipment tor removing radioactive Krypton gases from the THORP chimney. ù Delays in returning THORP wastes and plutonium to overseas customers may increase the costs of interim storage. Delays in the Nirex dump may necessitate the construction of further interim storage. ù THORP uses unique one-off technology. The plant has taken so long to design and build that several generations of technology are in use. THORP may not work, it may not achieve the expected throughput, there may be accidents, or it may require major mid- life maintenance. BNFL'S CUSTOMERS HAVE CONFIRMED THAT THEY WANT THEIR CONTRACTS TO BE FULFILLED. CUSTOMERS SUCH AS NUCLEAR ELECTRIC, SCOTTISH NUCLEAR, THE TEN JAPANESE UTILITIES, RWE, VEBA AND GKN OF GERMANY, AND NOK AND KKL OF SWITZERLAND HAVE ALL SUPPORTED THORP PUBLICLY. Expressions of support for THORP from its customers should be viewed sceptically. No customer of THORP will wish to get the blame for the plant's closure. Their contracts could force them to pay damages. Despite having contracts with THORP a number of European countries supported a recommendation of the Paris Commission in June 1993 that would make it very difficult for THORP to open by requiring that: ù the need for the plant to be justified ù a full environmental impact assessment to be done ù the best available pollution technology to be installed German utilities which are currently forced by law to reprocess their spent nuclear fuel are actively lobbying to have the law changed. Germany wants to dry store its nuclear wastes. The Japanese plutonium programme, based on fast breeder reactors and mixed oxide fuel (MOx), has been beset by delays and decline. As a result, its underlying demand for plutonium has shrunk to levels far below it anticipated when it signed contracts for THORP. Notes: Support From THORP's Customers ù The Financial Times (FT) wrote of THORP as a "Whitehall nightmare", noting that: "fear of incurring penalties would make it hard for the Government to raise the wider question of whether abandoning the plant, and releasing all parties from the contracts would be in the mutual interests of the UK and THORP's foreign customers." ù According to the FT, civil servants have described the THORP situation as a nuclear "prisoners' dilemma". Foreign utilities and their governments also fear penalties and view this prisoners' dilemma in the same way as the UK. All parties are worried that negotiations over the closure of THORP will leave them facing penalties. ù While THORP is delayed, BNFL can pass on certain costs to most of its customers. While no decision is made, BNFL's customers are paying for the delay. The publicly stated support for THORP by overseas customers may well be intended to limit the costs of delay passed on by BNFL. ù If THORP's customers wish to find a way out of reprocessing, their most effective tactics are to force the UK Government unilaterally to abandon THORP, while they declare their unflinching support for the plant. In that way, they may hope to avoid liability and the punitive terms of their contracts with BNFL. Both Germany and the Netherlands supported the June 1993 Paris Commission recommendation placing impossible conditions on the operation of THORP. ù Regardless of their real opinions, there are no good reasons for THORP's customers publicly to oppose the plant. It is naive in the current circumstances to believe that an expression of support is anything more than a negotiating tactic. ù There is evidence of discontent with reprocessing in Germany, the UK and Japan. These countries represent the three largest THORP customers. ù In Germany, an emerging 'Energy Consensus' between utilities, politicians and nongovernmental organisations is likely to reject reprocessing. The office of the German Auditor-General has indicated that it believes reprocessing to be twice as expensive as storage and that "reprocessing can no longer be justified on economic grounds." ù In the UK. Scottish Nuclear has opted for dry storage for 2,000 tonnes of spent AGR fuel. It hopes to halve its spent fuel management costs by adopting this route. Nuclear Electric has no plans to reprocess spent nuclear fuel from its new power station, Sizewell B. ù Japanese utilities have now produced a unified public stand in favour of THORP. However, there have previously been statements opposing reprocessing. There is great concern in Japan to avoid amassing a plutonium stockpile for security reasons. For this reason, supply of reprocessed plutonium will have to be suppressed to match demand. At present demand is failing as the Fast Breeder programme is delayed and Japanese utilities are struggling to agree to a programme for using Mixed Oxide Fuel. ù In seeking support for THORP, it is not clear what BNFL has told customers would happen if THORP is abandoned. BNFL is free to suggest that dire consequences would follow. ù until overseas customers are approached by BNFL with an alternative offer, for example, to dry store their spent nuclear fuel at a price not exceeding their committed expenditure on THORP then customers will have nothing on which to base their stated preference for THORP. THORP ALREADY HAS ORDERS TO REPROCESS MORE THAN 10,000 TONNES OF USED FUEL FROM CUSTOMERS IN NINE COUNTRIES. THESE ORDERS HAVE BEEN PLACED PROGRESSIVELY SINCE THE 1970s, DEMONSTRATING A CONTINUING DEMAND FOR THORP'S SERVICES. ABOUT HALF OF THIS FUEL IS ALREADY AT SELLAFIELD WAITING TO BE REPROCESSED. There are contracts for the first ten years of operation covering 6,700 tonnes of spent nuclear fuel. These contracts were signed in the late 1970s and early 80s when the world was a very different place from what it is today. Then the Cold War and the promise of plutonium-fuelled nuclear reactors for the future were accepted reality. Neither exist today. The contracts after this period are less certain and dominated by UK firms, whose contracts are still not signed. Nuclear Electric have openly acknowledged the influence of BNFL's monopoly power over them (relating to Magnox reprocessing) during the contract negotiations. Nuclear electric have declined to enter a new contract with BNFL to reprocess spent fuel from it new power station, Sizewell B. Scottish nuclear who are not so bound by BNFL's monopoly power, have recently decided to opt for dry storage for their Torness spent fuel. It is likely that if THORP is given the go ahead, it will have insufficient business to justify operation beyond 2003. Notes: THORP Contracts ù BNFL has contracts with eight overseas countries and the UK generators, Scottish Nuclear and Nuclear Electric. The orders, expressed in tonnes of spent fuel, are as follows: 1 st ten 2nd ten years years Overseas 4,547 1,600 UK 2,158 1,850 6,705 3,450 ù The first ten years' orders are known as the 'base load'. The justification for THORP is based on the economic value of these base load orders. The value of the orders in the second ten years is much more speculative. ù Approximately one third of the overseas contracts for the first ten years were signed before 1976. These contracts have no provision for returning any nuclear waste. ù A further one third of the first ten years orders were agreed in the 1970s. By 1980, the order book stood at 3,100 tonnes of overseas fuel. No UK orders had been agreed at that time. ù Over 4,000 tonnes (80%) of the overseas contracts for the first ten years of THORP were signed more than ten years ago. The nuclear word has changed significantly since these contracts were signed. However, BNFL has stressed that it has legal advice that these contracts remain binding. ù Nuclear Electric has indicated that monopoly pressure influenced its agreements with BNFL. Nuclear Electric and Scottish Nuclear believe they have no choice but to reprocess their spent Magnox fuel with BNFL. Any UK agreements for THORP reprocessing must be seen against the background of BNFL's monopoly in Magnox reprocessing which its UK customers believe they cannot do without. ù BNFL has indicated to the Government advisory committee RWMAC that for THORP to be cost effective in the second ten years "at least 500 tonnes per year of overseas fuel is required". BNFL has one overseas order for 1,600 tonnes in the second ten years. ù Contracts for 1,850 tonnes for the second ten years were agreed in principle with UK generators However, in late 1992, the Government refused to bear the risks of certain cost escalations. Without this subsidy, the agreement has faltered and the contracts remain unsigned. ù German utilities are the only overseas customers with contracts in the second ten years. It is possible that these contracts will have terms that allow the Germans to withdraw if the German Atomic Law is changed or reinterpreted to allow alternatives to reprocessing. At present, German law requires reprocessing. ù Japan is the largest overseas customer for THORP. However, it's programme for the use of plutonium is behind schedule, unpopular with the Japanese utilities, and consuming less plutonium than envisaged when the contracts were signed. THORP WILL SUPPORT SOME 5,450 JOBS IN TOTAL, INCLUDING WELL OVER 3,000 IN WEST CUMBRIA. IN ADDITION TO THIS, IF THORP GOES AHEAD THEN BNFL INTENDS TO CONSTRUCT A MIXED OXIDE (MOX) FUEL PLANT AT SELLAFIELD IN ORDER TO MANUFACTURE FUEL FROM THORP PLUTONIUM. THIS PLANT WOULD SUPPORT A FURTHER 6,000 FULL-TIME JOBS AND CREATE A FURTHER 3,000 JOBS DURING CONSTRUCTION. BY CONTRAST, INTERIM DRY STORES OF SUFFICIENT SIZE, WHICH WOULD MERELY DELAY A DECISION WHETHER TO REPROCESS OR DIRECTLY DISPOSE OF THE FUEL, WOULD SUPPORT IN THE ORDER OF 100 JOBS. THORP will not provide permanent jobs. Environmental resources Ltd, consulting for Cumbria County Council estimate that THORP will maintain around 1,250 long term jobs. However it is unlikely that THORP will operate beyond the ten year span of its existing contracts, if it is commissioned. Employment through THORP has fallen from 7800 in 1991 to 4350 in 1992 with a further 2580 jobs to go this year. If THORP were to close, the 1250 long term jobs would be lost. But if an alternative dry store programme were developed to replace THORP (this would still be cheaper than actually opening and running THORP even though THORP is built), thousands of short term construction and several hundred permanent operational jobs would be created. The former CEGB proposed to build a dry store at Heysham. They stated that it would take four years to build and would employ up to 1700 construction workers and 130 permanent staff. At least four such stores would be needed to cope with the spent fuel already at Sellafield. If BNFL invested the L300 million (saved by operating dry stores instead of THORP), in energy efficiency schemes it would create a further 1200 jobs over 10 years. Notes: THORP and Jobs ù Environmental Resources Limited (ERL) quantified the expected job losses for Cumbria County Council. ERL stated the "Loss of a minimum of 1,250 jobs (and associated local multiplier effects) are predicted to arise as a consequence of a decision not to commission THORP". ù Though this is a serious issue, it should be seen against a background of widespread job losses in the energy sector in 1993 For example: British Gas 20,000; National Power 10,000; Nuclear Electric 2,000, British Coal up to 30,000, BNFL 3,000 unrelated to THORP; and others. ù Most of the unemployment impacts will occur whether THORP operates or not. 2,880 contractors engaged in construction and commissioning were to be laid off in 1993 and employment on THORP had fallen from 7,800 in August 1991 to 4,380 by December 1992. West Cumbria has already had most of the employment advantages of THORP, during the 10-year construction programme. ù The figures quoted in the ERL study are only half the story. To determine the full effect on jobs, it is necessary to include the employment effect of the alternative to THORP. ERL were unable to do this because BNFL had refused to discuss alternatives to THORP. ù The figure of 1,250 (plus indirect effects) is thus a gross figure, not a net figure. A 1992 study by Media Natura, based on projections made by the CEGB for the proposed Heysham dry storage facility in 1988 suggests that the following jobs could be created: Construction 6,500 (less than 10 year duration) Managing the dry stores 520 Support jobs 500 ù THORP will not provide permanent jobs if it ever opens. It is likely to close shortly after 10 years operation due to lack of firm orders. The jobs involved in construction and operation of dry stores compare favourably with 10 year's operation of THORP. ù Savings made by dry storing nuclear fuel instead of reprocessing could be used to fund diversification into clean energy technologies, pollution control technologies and management of the serious world wide nuclear waste, plutonium and decommissioning problems. . BNFL figures show that alternatives to THORP would be at least L300 million cheaper than operating THORP. Evidence from the US suggests that an unsubsidized L300 million energy efficiency programme would create 1,200 jobs for 10 years. . In August 1993 Greenpeace launched a study into the potential for employment in West Cumbria. This initiative has been taken in the absence of any comparable action on the part of BNFL or the Government: in 1986 the Environment Select Committee recommended that: BNFL and the Department of Employment should prepare and publish a study of the alternative ways in which manpower involved in the construction of THORP could be re-employed on alternative "cleaning-up" work on the Sellafield site or on work elsewhere. (First Report, Session 1985-86) ù BNFL and the Government refused to do this study. REPROCESSING DOES NOT 'CREATE' RADIOACTIVITY. IN FACT, REPROCESSING AND THEN RECYCLING NUCLEAR FUEL ACTUALLY PRODUCES LESS TOTAL RADIOACTIVE WASTE BY VOLUME THAN THE ALTERNATIVE OF DIRECT DISPOSAL AND THE REPLACEMENT OF USED FUEL WITH FRESHLY MINED URANIUM. THORP increases the volume of nuclear waste by as much as 189 times compared with the original spent fuel. THORP does not dispose of nuclear waste. Virtually all the radioactivity ends up as waste coming out of THORP. But it is in a greatly expanded and varied form. What comes out of THORP presents far greater disposal problems than what goes into it. BNFL characterizes reprocessing as an alternative to direct disposal of nuclear waste. The characterization is misleading. The massive and hazardous wastes flowing from THORP still need disposal, as would the decommissioned plant itself. Notes: THORP and Nuclear Waste ù THORP separates uranium and plutonium from spent nuclear fuel that has been removed from reactors. It used to be assumed that these recovered products would be useful. In fact, they will probably end up as more nuclear waste. ù The recovered uranium is of inferior quality and more expensive than fresh uranium. Recovered uranium from THORP will be more contaminated than uranium from previous reprocessing plant at Sellafield and much less likely to be re-used in nuclear reactors. ù THORP is a recycling myth. Even if all uranium was recycled, the Govemment's advisers on radioactive waste (RWMAC) say that demand for natural uranium would fall by just 15%. Even this is unlikely. Technical and cost disadvantages are likely to sabotage plans to reuse uranium recovered from THORP reprocessing. ù Plutonium is 1% of the spent fuel, uranium is 96% by volume. The problem is that 99% of the radioactivity is in the other 3%. It is this 3% of the volume (but 99% of the radioactivity) that ends up as nuclear waste. ù That does not mean that THORP reduces nuclear waste to 3% of the original volume. On the contrary. Everything involved in the process becomes contaminated with radioactivity. This includes solvents, acids, containers, filters, machinery and THORP itself. ù THORP increases the volume of nuclear waste by as much as 189 times compared to the original spent fuel. The total radioactivity remains about the same but is mixed into many different chemical and physical forms making it far more difficult and expensive to deal with. ù BNFL says that there are "two ultimate management routes, namely reprocessing and direct disposal". This is completely incorrect. The massive and hazardous waste streams from THORP still require disposal and present a more serious problem than 'direct disposal'. ù Under existing arrangements, only a small proportion of the overseas waste volume can be returned. Most overseas waste will be dumped in the UK if THORP is operated. ù BNFL has 'substitution' proposals to further reduce the proportion of overseas waste that would actually be returned. Small quantities of high level waste will be returned in exchange for dumping much larger volumes of intermediate and low level waste. ù In a credible alternative to THORP, spent fuel currently at Sellafield and contracted with waste return clauses could be stored in the UK and returned after a period of storage of 50-100 years, if that was deemed the correct course of action at the time. In that way, the option is retained to return all the waste or to continue to manage it in the UK. The preferred option at present must be one that keeps future options open. ù If THORP goes ahead, the UK will deserve the title 'the world's nuclear dustbin'. THE IMPACT OF THORP DISCHARGES ON THE PEOPLE LIVING NEAR SELLAFIELD AND THEREFORE MOST EXPOSED WILL BE LESS THAN 25 MICROSIEVERTS - THE RADIOLOGICAL EQUIVALENT OF TAKING A RETURN FLIGHT TO TENERIFE ON A PASSENGER AIRCRAFT, OR ABOUT 1% OF AVERAGE NATURAL BACKGROUND RADIATION. It is facile to compare the risks from THORP with natural and avoidable risks or risks undertaken for some benefit to the exposed individual such as medical x-rays or flights. There is a huge scientific controversy over the different ways different kinds of radiation penetrate and attack the human body. There is emerging evidence that alpha emitters such as plutonium do far more harm than was previously thought. The 'smoothing' effect of average doses, even to the most vulnerable groups, sidesteps the reality of unknown and unsuspected pathways through which THORP's radiation will devastate the lives of innocent individuals. Notes: THORP's Radioactive Discharges ù Radioactive discharges from Sellafield have been cut substantially since the 1970s when Sellafield accounted for most of the deliberate radioactive discharges from the world's nuclear facilities. Even now Sellafield is one of the largest sources of radioactive emissions in the world. However, much of the radiation emitted previously from Sellafield remains in the local environment. Any new discharges should be seen as adding to an accumulated problem. ù BNFL argues that the new authorized discharge limits are lower than the old ones. This is correct, but actual future discharges will be close to the allowed limit, whereas actual current discharges are much lower than existing limits. Actual discharges will increase substantially if THORP is allowed to operate. BNFL state that "radiation doses at the new limits to members of the public from gaseous waste would be cut by 53 per cent and from liquid waste by 9 per cent" (emphasis added). This does not imply that actual doses will be reduced since current discharges are well below current authorisations. In fact doses will increase markedly. Actual doses to Europe from Sellafield will increase by over four times, from 70 man Sv to 300 man Sv for each year of discharge. ù It is facile to compare the risks from THORP with natural unavoidable risks or risks undertaken for some benefit to the exposed individual, such as medical X-rays or flights. BNFL says that the exposure received during a flight to Tenerife is greater than that received from THORP. The radiation exposure on a flight is qualitatively different to that received from Sellafield. The critical group at Sellafield is exposed to significant doses of heavy alpha particles, whereas aircraft passengers are exposed to minimal extra alpha radiation. ù In calculating the dose from different types of radiation, Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food (MAFF) has to use various weightings to account for the exposed organs and the biological damage done by different types of radiation. These calculations are controversial and subject to great uncertainty. New pathways have been discovered and certain types of radiation have been recognised as more dangerous as knowledge improves. Two examples illustrating the controversy follow: ù P J Taylor of the Political Ecology Research Group, argued in a 1988 paper that: "The naturally occurring alpha radiation regime for sensitive sites such as the bone marrow (relatively well protected from environmental alpha emitters) is in the region of 0.2 mSv. In adults the bone-marrow dose from artificial radionuclides may be fifty time the nominal alpha dose. Particular uncertainty surrounds the bone-marrow dose in the foetus and infants." "There is still controversy over the dosimetry arising from the exact distribution of plutonium in the bone and marrow forming areas. Given these uncertainties, controversy is bound to continue as to the causal link between the discharges and local cases of childhood leukaemia." (1988) ù Dr David Sumner of the University of Glasgow pointed out in 1992 that: "Recent work [...I suggests that alpha particles may produce unique effects, qualitatively different from any effect produced by gamma rays or beta particles. If confirmed this might call into question the whole concept of combining doses from alpha particles with doses from betas and gammas into a single effective dose. (original emphasis) "With the publication of ICRP60 in 1991 this already complex system has become even more arcane. The weighting factors now incorporate allowances for the morbidity of non-fatal cancers, including assessments of the quality of life and number of years lost. [...] in my view the covert incorporation of moral value judgements into scientific units is an alarming development." THE REGULATORY BODIES (HMIP AND MAFF) HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE PROPOSED AUTHORISATIONS FOR SELLAFIELD WHICH TAKE ACCOUNT OF THORP "WOULD EFFECTIVELY PROTECT HUMAN HEALTH, THE SAFETY OF THE FOOD CHAIN, AND THE ENVIRONMENT GENERALLY." For each year of discharge from Sellafield at the new limits, 60 people will die at an unknown time or place. As a result of the first ten years of operating THORP, the authorized discharges from Sellafield will kill 600 people. This calculation is based on HMIP statements of the collective dose from Sellafield (including THORP) and uses the ICRP methodology (the recognised international standard adopted by the National Radiological Protection Board) for estimating fatalities in an exposed population. The official designation of 'safety' should not be taken to mean that THORP is harmless. Because of the risks involved, all radioactive discharges require 'justification' by law. Greenpeace argues that the world has changed so much since THORP's original justification in 1977, that the Government is legally obliged to stage a new public inquiry to determine whether any justification for THORP remains today. Notes: THORP and the Regulators ù The collective radiation dose to a population is stated in man-Sieverts and is a measurement of the exposure of a group of people (or wildlife) to radiation discharges. The National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) has a guideline of one cancer death for every 20 man-Sieverts collective dose to a human population. ù HMIP gives estimates of the collective doses that would result from one year of the authorised discharges from Sellafield should THORP be allowed to operate. a. Liquid Discharges (Europe only) 270 man Sv b. Gaseous Discharges 996 man Sv ------------ 1,266 man SV ù Discharges from Sellafield at the authorised limit will spread contamination over the whole population. For each year of discharge to air and sea at the new limits, Dr. David Sumner of the University of Glasgow has estimated there will be 60 deaths, using BNFL's figures and HMIP projections. ù BNFL, has presented its case for THORP based on 10 years operation. On Dr. Sumner's figures, authorised discharges from Sellafield over this period would kill 600 unknown people at an unknown time and place. Furthermore, this radiation dose will be responsible for several thousand non-fatal cancers. ù BNFL emphasises that the risks to any particular individual are low. If 'only' 600 people die worldwide, that may represent a low risk to the average individual. The projection of 600 deaths remains. ù BNFL is required to justify the benefits to society of THORP in order to justify the discharges and resulting toll of death and sickness. The only justification that has been made so far was in 1977 at the Windscale Inquiry. Since then, the basic rationale of THORP has entirely disappeared. ù The justification for THORP can only be examined properly in a full and independent public inquiry. Greenpeace has received a Legal Opinion that the Secretary of State for the Environment is required to hold a public inquiry under the Radioactive Substances Act (1960) to re-examine the justification for THORP. ALL PLUTONIUM SEPARATED IN THORP WILL BE STORED SAFELY AND SECURELY UNDER INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS WHICH WILL ENSURE THAT ANY ATTEMPTS TO MISUSE THE MATERIAL WILL BE DETECTED. THE PLUTONIUM CAN BE REUSED IN MOX FUEL, SOME 400 TONNES OF WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN LOADED INTO REACTORS WORLDWIDE. Any mixture of plutonium can be made into a nuclear weapon. The General Accounting Office of the United States recently stated: "The major disadvantage of reprocessing is that plutonium recovered through it can be used to make nuclear weapons." Nuclear weapons have been made from plutonium recovered from reprocessed civil nuclear fuel and successfully detonated. It is not necessary for a nuclear weapon actually to be built for plutonium to create security problems. For example, North Korea seems to be responding to the accumulation of plutonium in Japan, whether or not Japan intends to build a bomb. The size of the world's civil separated plutonium stockpile is thought to be around 300 tonnes. 8 kilos is sufficient to build a simple nuclear weapon. Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) is made by adding 5% plutonium to conventional uranium oxide fuel. One third of a reactor can be loaded with MOX fuel. Plutonium is used up in the MOX fuel but is also created in the other two thirds of the reactor fuel. At these levels, the reactor is a net producer of plutonium. MOX fuel has therefore no role to play in reducing plutonium stockpiles while reprocessing continues. Notes: THORP's Production of Plutonium ù Plutonium is created in nuclear reactors and is present in spent nuclear fuel. It cannot be used while it is contained in spent nuclear fuel because it is too impure (just 1% of the spent fuel is plutonium) and because the radioactivity of spent fuel makes it impossible to handle. ù THORP will extract plutonium from the spent nuclear fuel in a form that can be used. THORP does not make plutonium, it just makes it usable. ù Any mixture of plutonium can be used to make a nuclear weapon. The General Accounting Office of the United States recently stated: "The major disadvantage of reprocessing is that plutonium recovered through it can be used to make nuclear weapons". ù It is not necessary for a nuclear weapon actually to be built for plutonium to create security problems. For example, North Korea or China may respond to an accumulation of plutonium in Japan whether or not Japan intends to build a nuclear weapon. Eight kilos is sufficient to build a crude nuclear weapon. ù Demand for plutonium is far below the levels envisaged when THORP was conceived because, for example, commercial fast breeder reactors are not available and will not be for several decades, if ever. ù Plutonium is extremely expensive to store; up to $2 million per year per tonne. THORP's first ten year's operation will produce approximately 70 tonnes of plutonium. ù The world plutonium stockpile is already so large that no new plutonium separation can be justified. ù Because the fast breeder reactors have not materialised to consume plutonium, BNFL has been promoting Mixed Oxide Fuel or MOX. ù MOX is made Dy adding around 5 per cent plutonium to conventional uranium oxide fuel. One third of a reactor can be loaded with MOX. 400 tonnes of MOX fuel have been loaded into reactors world-wide, using about 20 tonnes of plutonium. ù Plutonium is used up in the MOX fuel, but is created in the other two thirds of the reactor loaded with conventional nuclear fuel. MOX reactors are net plutonium producers. ù BNFL quotes studies showing that MOX will save L50 million over the lifetime of a reactor and that MOX will be 30% cheaper than uranium fuel. However, savings achieved by not reprocessing in the first place are ignored in these cases for MOX. ù For its two AGR reactors, Scottish Nuclear estimate the savings from not reprocessing at œ45 million per year. Not reprocessing clearly compares favourably with a lifetime saving of œ50 million from using MOX if the cost of reprocessing is ignored. It is far cheaper not to reprocess and not to need MOX to deal with otherwise unwanted plutonium. ù Nuclear Electric could use MOX in its Sizewell B PWR power station, but has no plans to do so. It has no plans to use its plutonium stockpile. Nuclear Electric has also indicated that it will store rather than reprocess spent nuclear fuel from its flagship power station, Sizewell B. In doing so, Nuclear Electric has made a clear vote of no confidence in BNFL's plutonium fuel cycle. Notes: THORP and The Dry Storage Alternative (diagrams omitted here; unscannable) 1. THORP Reprocessing Virtually all the radioactivity in the original spent fuel ends up in the numerous reprocessing waste streams and discharges arising from THORP. These waste streams require further management or disposal. In contrast, the dry storage route treats all the spent fuel as a single waste stream and avoids deliberate radioactive discharges. 2. Dry Storage Both reprocessing and dry storage are interim measures. However, reprocessing makes the problem of nuclear waste far worse and results in deliberate discharges to the environment. The products of reprocessing recovered uranium and plutonium, have dubious economic value and may become waste or, in the case of plutonium, a source of military destabilisation. Greenpeace believes that every step should be taken to isolate nuclear waste from the environment. For this reason, Greenpeace opposes disposal of both spent fuel and reprocessing wastes in geological 'dumps' such as the Nirex repository. The only way to 'solve' the problem of nuclear waste is not to produce it in the first place.