TL: THORP - SELLAFIELD'S NEW NUCLEAR DISASTER SO: Greenpeace International (GP) DT: May 17, 1993 Keywords: nuclear power reprocessing uk europe greenpeace background gp risks problems sellafield plutonium / What is Sellafield? The Sellafield reprocessing plant in the UK is owned and operated by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL), a company whose sole shareholder is the UK Government. Sellafield has been the site of plutonium separation operations - or reprocessing - for 40 years. The plant, situated in the North West of England on the coast of the Irish Sea, began reprocessing in the early 1950s to supply plutonium for the UK's nuclear weapons. Since that time, both as a result of normal operations and numerous accidents, Sellafield has continuously released radioactivity into the sea and air, causing widespread radioactive pollution. During reprocessing, nuclear waste fuel from nuclear power stations is dissolved in acid. Plutonium and uranium are then removed from the resulting nuclear waste liquid. The process results in the generation of highly radioactive nuclear waste and vast quantities of other dangerous radioactive wastes. Reprocessing increases the original volume of nuclear waste 189 times [1] and inevitably results in the discharge of radioactivity into the environment. Sellafield's current operations are dirty and dangerous; it is one of the largest sources of deliberate radioactive contamination. The plant's past radioactive discharges have made the Irish Sea the most radioactively contaminated sea in the world [2]. There is no safe dose of radiation. It can cause leukaemia and other cancers and is believed to lead to a wide range of other health effects. In children, radiation is the only known environmental cause of leukaemia. Near Sellafield, the occurrence of childhood leukaemia is up to 10 times the UK average [3]. ----------------------------------------------------------------- THORP (Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant) is an expansion of Sellafield in the UK, operated by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL). It is designed to extract plutonium from waste fuel from nuclear power stations around the world (Japan, Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, Italy, Canada, UK). It has not yet opened. If it does, Sellafield's radioactive pollution will increase by ten times. This would cause at least 60 cancer deaths world-wide every year of discharge. THORP will increase the volume of the radioactive waste it processes by 189 times. THORP will produce 59 tonnes of plutonium over its first ten years of operation - enough for over 7300 atomic warheads. This will be spread to nations around the world. THORP was due to open in October 1992. International and national concern has delayed it so far. The UK Government is due to make a decision on its future in July 1993. THORP is unnecessary, uneconomic and unacceptable. ----------------------------------------------------------------- What is THORP? Despite the environmental disaster already created by Sellafield, the UK Government is on the verge of opening a new and even more polluting reprocessing plant at Sellafield: the Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant, or THORP. THORP has been built to extract plutonium from nuclear waste fuel from the newer generation of nuclear power stations. This fuel is 10 times more radioactive than that currently reprocessed at Sellafield [4]. If THORP is allowed to open, radioactive discharges to the sea and air will increase by 900% and 1100% respectively [5]. If THORP operates, Sellafield's radioactive discharges will cause at least 60 cancer deaths and over 1,300 other serious health effects for each year of discharge - not just in the UK, but across the world [6]. THORP's Nuclear Waste Trade THORP will produce plutonium for the UK, and also for customers in Japan, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Canada. Each of these customers have sent nuclear waste fuel to Sellafield for reprocessing, thus temporarily avoiding the problems of dealing with nuclear waste in their countries, such as environmental and safety problems, public unacceptability and cost. However, these problems - magnified by THORP - will eventually have to be faced by all of the customer countries. In return for their nuclear waste fuel, it is intended that the radioactive waste and plutonium from THORP will be sent back to the customer countries. Deadly Transports The return of the products of reprocessing - plutonium and radioactive wastes - would take place by truck, train, ship and plane. The most radioactive wastes generated by THORP will be transported in flasks. Each flask will contain 8 times the amount of radioactivity found in nuclear waste fuel flasks currently in use. This would be the equivalent of 1/3 the amount of radioactivity released during the Chernobyl disaster [7]. As well as being radioactive, plutonium is also very toxic - a single particle if inhaled in to the human lung can cause fatal cancer. Besides representing an unacceptable health risk in the event of accidents, transports of plutonium are a threat to global security. Each transport could contain enough plutonium to build more than 100 nuclear bombs. The political costs of returning plutonium have been highlighted by the international outcry surrounding the plutonium shipment on board the Akatsuki Maru from France to Japan in 1992. No need for THORP When THORP was planned in the 1970s, BNFL argued that plutonium was required to fuel a future generation of nuclear power stations, known as Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR). They also claimed that the separated uranium could be used as fuel for conventional nuclear power stations and that reprocessing was sound waste management practice. These arguments no longer hold true: * after a quarter of a century and more than US$60 billion, no country has developed a commercial FBR. Country after country has abandoned the attempt and there are now no viable plans for commercial development of FBRs for decades to come - if at all; * without a FBR programme, the nuclear industry has been forced to try to find another use for the separated plutonium. The answer has been to use it in conventional nuclear power stations which have not been designed for this purpose - with serious safety implications; * the Deputy Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency stated in 1992 that plutonium "poses a major political and security problem worldwide" [8]. If THORP operates, current stockpiles of plutonium will be increased; * reprocessing generates massive volumes of additional nuclear waste. It is clear that reprocessing cannot be called sound waste management practice, especially in comparison to the cheaper and safer alternative, dry storage of nuclear waste fuel; * the economics of reprocessing make no sense at all, either for the UK or the customer countries. It is generally accepted by the nuclear industry that dry storage is cheaper. In addition, anyone involved in the reprocessing business faces massive potential cost calculations caused by decommissioning, regulatory change, and the expensive problems of trying to deal with the resulting nuclear wastes[9]. THORP must be stopped THORP poses an unacceptable threat to the environment and human health, and its production of plutonium represents a massive threat to global security. These risks are being run for a dangerous, polluting, expensive exercise that produces no benefits. However, unless the UK Government recognises the international opposition to the plant, THORP will open this summer. REFERENCES: [1] Comparison of the Radioactive Waste ArisikP.DxY5IS e5)AI=MM%91*eAMU1Q%=9 9Q=Izb]I 9 IJII%Q5R2U1M1bI 9 MM=%QM1"U5 I JJj$)Hh%jBuUMz=55=9M1Q=55%QQ~on the Environment, Radioactive Waste, 1985-86 [3] Investigation of the Possible Increased Incidence of Cancer in West Cumbria. Report of the Independent Advisory Group, 1984 [4] Hansard, ATOM Parliamentary Section, March 1976 [5] Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution, Draft Authorisations to Dispose of Liquid and Gaseous Radioactive Wastes from Sellafield,November 1992 [6] Derived from Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution, Draft Authorisations to Dispose of Liquid and Gaseous Radioactive Wastes from Sellafield, November 1992, and from the International Commission of Radiological Protection, 1990 Recommendations of the ICRP, ICRP Publications 60, Annals of the ICRP, vol 21, no1-3 Pergamon Press November 1990. [7] Large & Associates, Import/Export of Irradiated Fuel and Radioactive Waste to and from the UK, 1990 [8] William Dircks, Deputy Director IAEA, "Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing,The IAEA Perspective", 13 March 1992 [9] Fuel Reprocessing at THORP, Profitability and Public Liabilities,January 1993 ---------- ---------- Green2 17-MAY-93 17:57 1141220 To: Karen Richardson From: Karen Richardson Date: MON 17-MAY-93 17:57:29 GMT Subject: THORP Economic Briefing ---------- THORP - SELLAFIELD'S NEW NUCLEAR DISASTER THORP - A COSTLY MISTAKE Reprocessing is more expensive than storage of nuclear waste. There is no commercial use for plutonium, reprocessing's product. The costs of reprocessing will paid for by electricity consumers. REPROCESSING - A NUCLEAR WASTE OF MONEY The cost disadvantages to electricity consumers as a result of reprocessing nuclear waste fuel are well established: '...economical analyses have shown that the reprocessing technique is very costly and is not compensated by the value of the recovered materials at the present time.' H Bairiot & C Vandenberg, Belgonucleaire.[1] Reprocessing is more expensive than storing nuclear waste fuel because it is a hazardous process requiring complex technology. In addition, extra costs are incurred due to the need to manage the nuclear wastes created by reprocessing. Reprocessing increases the volume of nuclear waste by 189 times.[2] ----------------------------------------------------------------- THORP (Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant) is an expansion of Sellafield in the UK, operated by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL). It is designed to extract plutonium from waste fuel from nuclear power stations around the world (Japan, Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, Italy, Canada, UK). If it does, Sellafield's radioactive pollution will increase by ten times. This would cause at least 60 cancer deaths world-wide every year of discharge. THORP will increase the volume of the radioactive waste is processes by 189 times. THORP will produce 59 tonnes of plutonium over its first ten years of operation - enough for over 7300 atomic warheads. This will be spread to nations around the world. THORP was due to open in october 1992. International and national concern has delayed it so far. The UK Government is due to make a decision on its in July 1993. THORP is unnecessary, uneconomic and unacceptable. ---------------------------------------------------------------- Economic analyses comparing reprocessing with alternatives have clearly shown the cost disadvantages of reprocessing. A German nuclear utility study quotes an estimated saving of US$600 per kg if the waste fuel is not reprocessed.[3] This equates to a potential saving of US$1.5 billion if the German reprocessing contracts with THORP are cancelled. A Netherlands study estimates a saving of US$24 million if the Netherlands cancelled its contract with THORP.[4] Both UK nuclear power utilities have come to similar conclusions. Scottish Nuclear has stated that dry storage of waste nuclear fuel is cheaper than reprocessing.[5] Nuclear Electric has chosen not to reprocess the waste nuclear fuel from its new nuclear power station, Sizewell B, for the same reason. NO NEED FOR THORP Reprocessing began in the 1950's to separate plutonium from nuclear waste fuel for atomic weapons. Subsequently, the nuclear industry's dream was for a new generation of plutonium-fuelled reactors called Fast Breeders. After 30 years of development, Fast Breeder Reactors (FBR) have proved a technological and commercial failure. Consequently, there is no commercial use for plutonium and no need for reprocessing. FAST BREEDER FAILURE [6] US: Fermi 1 FBR was shut down in 1971 following an accident. The programme has cost over US$10 billion. France: The Superphenix FBR was shut down after a leak in 1990. It is still not operating. Germany: The Kalkar FBR was abandoned in March 1991. The programme has cost over US$7 billion. UK: Dounreay FBR will close in 1994. The UK Government has stopped funding research into FBR technology. Japan: Monju FBR start-up has been delayed because of safety problems. Its construction cost US$4.5 billion. PLUTONIUM FUEL - NO SOLUTION The costly failure of the FBR programme has forced the nuclear industry to find a use for existing plutonium. The answer has been to mix it with uranium (the usual fuel for nuclear reactors) to make a plutonium fuel for use in existing nuclear reactors. This is called MOX (Mixed Oxide). For safety reasons only a small number of MOX fuel elements can be used at one time. The rest of the fuel in a reactor is standard uranium fuel. MOX fuel is seven times more expensive than standard uranium fuel. [7] It is more dangerous to produce and handle because it emits high levels of gamma radiation and X-rays.[8] Existing reactors have not been designed for MOX: use in these reactors reduces safety by making the control mechanisms less effective.[9] Use of MOX fuel has been presented as a way of using up plutonium. However, the nuclear reaction converts the uranium in the reactor into more plutonium. So the use of MOX fuel in a reactor creates more plutonium than is used up.[10] "As we have already seen, the adverse economics of MOX fuel utilization compared to the utilization of fresh, low-enriched uranium fuel will probably persist well into the next century. Thus, there is little help to be expected here in dealing with surplus plutonium". WJ Dircks, Deputy Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency.[11] CONTRACTS UNDER THREAT As there is no commercial use for existing plutonium it is not surprising that the international nuclear industry is questioning the rationale for producing more. Reprocessing can only add to the plutonium problem. BNFL expects THORP to operate for at least 25 years. Currently it has contracts for the first ten years of operation. Only Germany has contracts for the subsequent years which the German nuclear power companies wish to cancel. It is highly unlikely that any more contracts will be signed by any country. Rather, the contracts for the first ten years are increasingly under threat. "Reprocessing is not necessary, in fact one or two of our important customers would love to cancel their contract....." A. Johnson, BNFL Executive Director, 1989.[12] The German nuclear utilities are currently engaged in negotiations with the German Government over changes to energy policy - including the immediate cancellation of their reprocessing contracts with THORP. [13] The owners of one German nuclear power station, Isar-2, have contacted BNFL's equivalent in France, COGEMA, asking for a delay in reprocessing the waste nuclear fuel from the station. A Working Party for the owners has recommended cancelling the contract.[14] The Belgian nuclear power utilities reprocess nuclear waste fuel in France. Currently the Commission d'Information et d'Enquete en Matiere de Securite Nucleaire has recommended that no new contracts are signed and that the possibility of cancelling existing contracts with COGEMA be examined.[15] Sweden has had a non-reprocessing policy in principle since 1980. Swedish utilities have managed to get out of all reprocessing contracts apart from THORP.[15] RETURN TO SENDER The advantage for THORP's customers of sending waste nuclear fuel to Sellafield is because it temporarily avoids the problems of dealing with nuclear waste in their countries: the environmental and safety problems, public unacceptability and cost. However, if THORP begins operation, these problems will be magnified and passed back to its customers. BNFL has the option to return all the solid waste including the highly radioactive waste to the customer countries. However, no country has yet developed environmentally acceptable facilities to store this waste. Any delays in its return will result in extra costs for THORP's customers.[16] It also intended to send back the plutonium from THORP. The political costs of returning plutonium have been highlighted by the international outcry surrounding the plutonium shipment on board the Akatsuki Maru from France to Japan in 1992. Besides representing an unacceptable accident risk, transports of plutonium - a weapons-usable material - are a threat to global security. As there is no commercial use for plutonium it will have to be stored at a cost of US$4 million per tonne per year.[18] The reprocessing contracts with THORP stipulate that any cost rises can be passed on to the customers by BNFL (the UK Government has refused to underwrite these future cost rises even though BNFL is a state-owned company). [19] Inevitably, it will be the electricity consumer in those countries who will have to pay through higher electricity bills. This means that the public will be forced to pay in order for nuclear power station operators to recoup their losses as a result of their reprocessing contracts. BOX Likely Cost Rises From THORP [20] Krypton removal technology installed US$150 million Construction of waste store US$105 million Waste storage US$150 million Waste disposal US$135 million Early decommissioning US$300-825 million Plutonium storage extended (5 years) US$225-450 million Total US$1065-1815 million Conclusion As far back as 1986, the UK Parliament's Environment Committee concluded that the only reason why BNFL wishes to go ahead with an expanded reprocessing programme is simply to maintain its business despite the fact that there is no need for reprocessing. [21] BNFL's reprocessing business relies on the fact that it can pass on all financial risks to its customers. In reality, THORP will be paid for by the electricity consumers in countries where nuclear power companies have contracts at Sellafield. Not only do BNFL and the UK Government expect the citizens of many countries to suffer from THORP in terms of health costs due to its radioactive pollution, they also want them to pay BNFL for a dangerous, polluting, expensive exercise that produces no benefits. However, unless the UK Government recognises the international opposition to THORP, it will open this summer. References: 1. H Bairiot & C Vandenberg (1989) 'Use of MOX fuels: The Reasons to start', in 'Nuclear Fuel Cycle in the 1990s and Beyond the Century: Some Trends and Foreseeable Problems', Technical Reports Series No.305, International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna, 1989, p. 69. 2. Large and Associates (1992) Comparison Of The Radioactive Waste Arisings Generated By Reprocessing, Encapsulation And Storage of LWR and AGR Irradiated Fuel. Greenpeace 14 December 1992. 3. H-J Dibbert (1991), Strategien des Brennstoffkreislaufs, atomwirtschaft, February 1991, pp 83-88. 4. HAJ Mulder, H Damveld, W Biesiot (1992) Reprocessing or Direct Disposal: an investigation into the economic aspects of reprocessing and direct disposal of irradiated nuclear fuel elements of the nuclear power plant Dodewaard. Interfacultaire Vakgroep Energie en Milieukunde/Greenpeace Nederland, 12 May 1992. 5. Scottish Nuclear PLC (1991) Annual Report and Accounts, 1990 - 91. 6. A Froggatt (1991) 'Fast Breeder Reactors', Greenpeace Briefing Paper (unpublished). 7. F Berkhout et al. (1992) 'Plutonium: True Separation Anxiety' in The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, vol 48, no 9, November 1992, p.32. 8. W Walker & F Berkhout (1992) Britain and Plutonium, ISIS Briefing No.31, 11/92, International Security Information Service, p.2. 9. Nuclear Energy Agency (undated) 'Plutonium Fuel: an assessment', Report by an Expert Group, Nuclear Energy Agency/Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, p.39-40. 10. Elayi AG (1990) 'Plutonium and Reactor Transmutation', Radioactive Waste Management and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, vol 14(4), p279. 11. WJ Dircks, Deputy Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency, 'Nuclear Fuel Recycling - the IAEA Perspective'. Address to Japanese Industrial Forum, 13 April 1992. 12. Inside Sellafield. Channel 4 TV, 1989 13. Draft discussion document for German Energy Consensus Negotiations. 14. Bundeshaptstadt Munchen (1992), Entsorgung von KKI-2, Beschluss des Werkausschusses vom 20.10.1992 (SB) (unpublished). 15. Commission d'Information et d'Enquete en Matiere de Securite Nucleaire, rapport final et Recommandations, 12 July 1992. 16. F Berkhout & W Walker (1990) THORP and the Economics of Reprocessing, Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, p48. 17. F Berkhout (1992) 'Fuel Reprocessing at THORP: Profitability and Public Liabilities', Centre for Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University, USA, p 16. 18. F Berkhout et al. (1992) 'Disposition of Separated Plutonium', Science and Global, 3 (3-4) 1992, p.9. 19. 'THORP's Multiplying Hurdles', Power in Europe, 137, 20 November 1992, pp.1-2. 20. See note 16. 21. House of Commons Select Committee for the Environment (1986) First Report on Radioactive Waste, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, p.xcv. ---------- Green2 17-MAY-93 18:00 1034672 To: Karen Richardson From: Karen Richardson Date: MON 17-MAY-93 18:00:03 GMT Subject: THORP Discharge Briefing ---------- THORP - SELLAFIELD'S NEW NUCLEAR DISASTER THORP: the threat to the world's health * Reprocessing at Sellafield has already made the plant one of the largest sources of deliberate radioactive pollution in the world[1] * Discharges from Sellafield into the Irish Sea have made it the most radioactively contaminated sea in the world [2]. * Sellafield's radioactive pollution has been detected in the seawater, seafood and coastlines of the North East Atlantic[3]. * The operators of Sellafield, British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL) have applied for new pollution licences for the Sellafield site which would allow radioactive pollution to increase by 900% to the sea and 1,100% to the air[4]. * The Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant (THORP) will be the main source of this unacceptable increase of radioactive pollution. * 60 cancer deaths and over 1300 victims of radiation induced illness will result world-wide from every year's discharge.[5]. ----------------------------------------------------------------- THORP (Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant) is an expansion of Sellafield in the UK, operated by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL). It is designed to extract plutonium from waste fuel from nuclear power stations around the world (Japan, Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, Italy, Canada, UK). If it does, Sellafield's radioactive pollution will increase by ten times. This would cause at least 60 cancer deaths world-wide every year of discharge. THORP will increase the volume of the radioactive waste is processes by 189 times. THORP will produce 59 tonnes of plutonium over its first ten years of operation - enough for over 7300 atomic warheads. This will be spread to nations around the world. THORP was due to open in october 1992. International and national concern has delayed it so far. The UK Government is due to make a decision on its in July 1993. THORP is unnecessary, uneconomic and unacceptable. ----------------------------------------------------------------- Sellafield - The Environmental Disaster so far. Sea pollution Every day since the early 1950s, the Sellafield reprocessing plant in the UK, operated by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL), has discharged nine million litres of low level nuclear waste into the Irish Sea down a two kilometre pipeline. As a result of these discharges, the Irish Sea is the most radioactively contaminated sea in the world. Many different radioactive substances are discharged, including plutonium, caesium and iodine. Over the past 40 years, Sellafield has discharged up to half a tonne of plutonium into the sea. The plutonium from Sellafield's discharges has not all remained in the Irish Sea[6]. It has become concentrated in the sediments of esturies and is coming back onto land to contaminate towns and farmland. Despite BNFL being forced to reduce Sellafield's discharges in the early 1980s, sea discharges from the plant remain unacceptable. The level of plutonium discharges is still one of the highest in the world[7]. Sellafield's radioactive pollution can be detected on coastlines as far away as Iceland, Greenland, Denmark and Norway[8]. Sellafield's sea discharges account for 87% of the radiation dose to the citizens of Europe[9]. Air Pollution. Sellafield's radioactive gaseous discharges are one of the world's highest. Currently radioactive gases released from Sellafield, such as Krypton, can be detected in the air all over the world by scientific monitoring stations. Sellafield also discharges radioactive substances such as plutonium and iodine into the air. Krypton gas is also believed to affect the atmosphere's electrical field, in turn affecting weather patterns, particularly rainfall - adverse effects on global climate patterns cannot be ruled out [10]. People all over the world receive a radiation dose from Sellafield's radioactive air pollution. The effects There is no safe dose of radiation. It can cause leukaemia and other cancers. It is also believed to lead to a wide range of other health effects ranging from heart disease and genetic defects to asthma and allergies [11]. Everyone who comes into contact with Sellafield's radioactive contamination faces an increased risk of health damage. Plutonium is one of the most deadly substances known - the smallest particle if inhaled can cause cancer. It remains potentially lethal for a quarter of a million years. Radiation is the only known environmental cause of childhood leukaemia. In many places around the Irish Sea cases of leukaemia and cancer have been well above the normally expected levels. Near Sellafield, the occurrence of childhood leukaemia is 10 times higher than the UK average[12]. Currently, 40 families are suing BNFL because they believe leukaemia in their children has been caused by Sellafield's radioactive pollution. A British professor reported in 1990 that workers at Sellafield who received high doses of radiation had a higher risk of having children who would develop leukaemia [13]. In response, a BNFL official suggested that workers who were worried about this possibility should not have children [14]. THORP - The New Radioactive Threat. THORP is an expansion of BNFL's reprocessing operations. Although completed, THORP's start-up has been delayed since the autumn of 1992 while awaiting Sellafield's official licence to increase pollution by 900% into the sea and 1100% into the air. If this licence is granted, radiation doses to people around Sellafield and the Irish Sea will increase substantially. Some individuals in these areas will receive doses either close to or above the UK's maximum dose constraint[6]. The effects of Sellafield's increased pollution will be felt across the world. Using the UK Government's own figures, there will be at least 60 cancer deaths and over 1,300 victims of other serious health effects (including non-fatal cancers and genetic defects) across the world for every year of Sellafield's discharge. GRAPH (From 'Sellafield The Radioactive Impact on Europe' - A Greenpeace Briefing) THORP must be stopped THORP poses an unacceptable threat to the environment and human health. These risks are being run for a dangerous, polluting, expensive exercise that produces no benefits. However, unless the UK Government recognises the international opposition to the plant, THORP will open this summer. References: [1] House of Commons Select Committee on the Environment 1st Report, RadioactiveWaste, 1985 ) 86 [2] Ibid [3] Actinide Activities in Water Entering the Northern North Sea, CN Murray, H Kaulskyet al, Nature November 1978 [4] Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution, Draft Authorisation to Dispose of Liquid and gaseous Radioactive Wastes from Sellafield, November 1992 [5] Calculations from op cit 4 and ICRP60, International Commission on Radiological Protection 1990 [6] Minutes of Oral Evidence by BNFL, House of Commons Energy Committee, 1989 [7] Op cit 4 and Radioactive Discharges and Monitoring of the Environment 1990, BNFL [8] Radiocaesium from Sellafield's Effluent in Greenland Wasters, RSIO National Laboratory, July 1983, Radiocaesium and Transuranium Elements in the Greenland and Barent Seas, November 1983 [9] European Commission Marina Project, 1989 [10] Climatic Aspects of Radioactive Trace Gases, in particular Krypton)85, Kollert and Doderer for the German Bundestag, October 1989 [11] No Immediate Danger, Rosalie Bertell, 1985 [12] Investigation of the Possible Increased Incidence of Cancer in Wet Cumbria, Report of the Independent Advisory Group, 1984 [13] Results of Case)Control Study of Leukaemia and Lymphoma among young people near Sellafield Nuclear Plant in Cumbria, Prof.M Gardner et al, British Medical Journal,February 1990 [14] Dr R Berry, BNFL Director of Health and Safety, quoted in Today, 22 February 1990 [15] Hansard, ATOM Parliamentary Secton, March 1976 [16] Radioactive Waste, the Government's Response to the Environment Committee'sReport, 1986 ---------- ---------- Green2 21-MAY-93 13:32 1426415 To: Karen Richardson From: Karen Richardson Date: FRI 21-MAY-93 13:32:36 GMT Subject: Accident History and Accident Scenario ---------- THORP - AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN. ----------------------------------------------------------------- THORP (Thermal Oxide Reprocessing Plant) is an expansion of Sellafield in the UK, operated by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL). It is designed to extract plutonium from waste fuel from nuclear power stations around the world (Japan, Germany, Switzerland, Netherlands, Sweden, Spain, Italy, Canada, UK). If it does, Sellafield's radioactive pollution will increase by ten times. This would cause at least 60 cancer deaths world-wide every year of discharge. THORP will increase the volume of the radioactive waste is processes by 189 times. THORP will produce 59 tonnes of plutonium over its first ten years of operation - enough for over 7300 atomic warheads. This will be spread to nations around the world. THORP was due to open in october 1992. International and national concern has delayed it so far. The UK Government is due to make a decision on its in July 1993. THORP is unnecessary, uneconomic and unacceptable. ----------------------------------------------------------------- THORP is an expansion of the Sellafield reprocessing plant, operated by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL), which extracts and handles plutonium from nuclear waste fuel. Producing and handling plutonium is a hazardous business. Nearly 1,000 accidents have occurred at Sellafield in its 40 year history [1] The planned expansion of Sellafield, if BNFL is allowed to operate THORP, will only increase the possibility of more nuclear accidents. Between 1976 and 1990 Sellafield accounted for 40% of all accidents in the entire British nuclear industry [2]. Accidents at Sellafield have led to BNFL being prosecuted on a number of occasions. In 1986 Sellafield was threatened with closure by the UK's nuclear safety regulator because of bad safety standards, but accidents have continued to happen. The worst accidents at Sellafield include: * 1957: a major fire in one of the plutonium producing reactors, leading to a large release of radioactivity which is estimated to have caused up to 1013 cancer deaths [3] * 1973: a radioactive gas explosion inside the THORP prototype, (B204) contaminated 35 workers. This building is still closed and contaminated. Indications are that the cause of this accident was similar to the explosion at Tomsk-7 reprocessing plant, Russia, in April 1993. The full consequences of this accident have yet to be determined; * 1979: liquid high level waste leaked from a storage silo. 100,000 curies of radioactivity leaked into the ground [4] * 1983: a radioactive leak into Irish Sea, discovered by Greenpeace and local people, resulted in the closure of 25 miles of beaches for six months. Members of the public were contaminated. BNFL was found guilty of criminal offences; * 1986: a leak of plutonium mist into the atmosphere. 11 workers were contaminated; * 1992: a major leak of 30kg of plutonium nitrate inside the reprocessing plant, goes unnoticed for 5 hours. Reprocessing operations were halted for several months; * 1993: in February, plutonium dust was released into the air following an accident during decommissioning work; * 1993: a second accident occurred at the same time as the one above. Radioactive Iodine with a half-life of 17 million years was released into the air during reprocessing operations. NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE? At Sellafield the intensely radioactive liquid high level waste left over from reprocessing operations is stored in 15 large (up to 150 cubic metres each) stainless steel silos. Each silo contains nearly twice as much radioactivity as was released from the entire Chernobyl accident in 1986. If THORP begins operating, the amount of high level waste stored at Sellafield will inevitably increase. This liquid high level waste gives off enormous amounts of heat and requires a cooling system to control the temperature at all times. If the cooling system was to fail (as happened at the French reprocessing plant, La Hague, in 1980) the temperature in the silos would rise, releasing hydrogen gas which could cause a major explosion. Such an explosion would be similar to the one that occurred in a high level waste tank at Chelyabinsk-65 reprocessing plant in Russia in 1957 - some 20 million curies of radioactivity was released contaminating up to 23,000 square kilometres and leading to the evacuation of 10,000 people. Such an accident occurring at Sellafield would release massive amounts of radioactivity into the atmosphere. Large areas of Europe would be contaminated. The diagram below shows the estimated contamination area resulting from such an accident. ACCIDENT SCENARIO DIAGRAM The projected extent of severe radiation induced health damage following a major accident at the Sellafield plant. a) significant inhalation radiation dose (up to 10 deaths per 10,000 of the population). b) radiation dose at which evacuation becomes necessary. Source - The 1979 International Gorleben Review for the Lower Saxony Government, Germany. References 1. Safety Audit of BNFL Sellafield 1988, HM Nuclear Installations Inspectorate Vol 1 Analysis of Quarterly Statements of the incidents at nuclear installations reported to the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate between 1976 and 1990. 2. Analysis of Quarterly Statements of the incidents at nuclear installations to the NII. 3. Polonium, Windscales' most lethal legacy, J.Urquhart, New Scientist 31.3.83 4. Carter, L.J. 1987. Nuclear Imperatives and public trust: dealing with radioactive waste. Resources for the future, Washington, D.C. Radiation Risks: an evaluation, Dr Sumner, Dr Wheldon, 1991, Tarragon Press. =end=