TL: BLACK ICE - The behaviour of multinational oil companies in Russia SO: Greenpeace International, (GP) DT: November 15, 1994 Keywords: environment oil energy russia republics problems spills / A REPORT BY GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL NOVEMBER 1994 Executive Summary The news of the recent oil spills from a pipeline in the Russian Arctic, (Komi region) just north of the town of Usinsk, focussed the world's attention on this area. Attention is not just on the environmental catastrophe, but also on the environmental and social costs of oil. If the figures for the size of the spill released by the US Department of Energy (DoE) are correct, this would make it the third largest spill in history, following the Gulf war and Ixtoc 1 oil rig blow-out in the Gulf of Mexico in 1979. Russian authorities report much lower figures and they seem to be trying to play down the extent of the disaster. However, although the argument about the exact amount of oil spilt into the Artic forest tundra will continue, this is largely academic. The fact remains that thousands of tonnes of crude oil are causing widespread pollution in what should be a pristine Arctic wilderness. The spills were the result of the appalling state of the oil industry infrastructure in this area and the continuing use of the system by both Russian and western oil companies. In fact, the people in the area and the environment have suffered for years from chronic oil pollution from old, corroded and poorly maintained and monitored pipelines. Blame clearly lies with the Russian authorities in allowing such lax environmental standards and with the Russian oil companies who both own and operate the pipeline. But responsibility also rests with those who use the pipeline and, since the break up of the Soviet Union, these include western multinational oil and gas companies. However, these multinational companies have carefully engineered arrangements in Russia whereby they are able to abdicate any responsibility for spills. Through tax incentives and credit systems, they are able to earn profits regardless of whether the oil reaches a refinery or is spilt into the environment. This provides little incentive to improve the pipelines. These companies know very well the appalling state of the Russian oil infrastructure and, despite statements that one of the reasons they are operating in the area is to improve the infrastructure, they are, in fact, continuing to use it as it is. Western oil companies have not engineered the comfortable arrangements on their own. Financial institutions like the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, all play their part in ensuring the highest profit for the least cost. The lending institutions, oil companies and politicians involved in the Russian oil free-for-all have completely disregarded the direct environmental and human health damage of their activities. Furthermore, the economic opportunities and the environmental need, for energy demand management, including energy conservation and renewable energy supplies, are not considered. If these criteria were made priority for investment, it would ensure long- term environmental and economic security and reduce the direct pollution by spills. Since the news of this spill broke, more information has come to light about the spills throughout the Russian oilfields. Last year, there was a 450,000 tonne spill in the north of the Tyumen region in Siberia; in 1989 there was a 500,000 tonne spill in the Southern Tyumen region. Spills under 10,000 tonnes are deemed too small to even register. The direct environmental damage caused by oil spills is already too high a price to pay for reliance on oil. But the price is being paid by the global environment as oil's contribution to the build up of CO2 adds to the threat of climate change. This report arose out of a visit to the Russian Arctic by a team from Greenpeace in response to the oil spill. It is a summary of the past two weeks' investigations into the multinationals operating in the Komi region. It is by no means an exhaustive study but raises a number of questions abut future western investment in the Russian oil and gas industry. TRANSNATIONAL OIL DEVELOPMENT IN THE TIMAN-PECHORA REGION "We always had an interest in Timan-Pechora. The fields are certainly greater than most of those you will find in North America" -- Archie Dunham, Executive Vice-President of Conoco Inc. 1. THE SOVIET OIL EMPIRE The former Soviet Union was one of the world's largest producers of oil. The USSR produced 21% of global oil production in 1990, prior to its breakup. Due to the Soviet oil industry's general inefficiency, by 1985 the oil industry was consuming around 18% of its reserves to continue extracting oil and gas. This inefficiency continued to rise thereafter. The exhaustion of traditional oil and gas fields has led to the search for new reserves in ever-more remote regions of the Arctic, Far East, and western Siberia. From 1970 to 1990, oil, coal, and gas output from these outlying regions to the European part of the country rose almost tenfold; crude oil output increased by 4,200%. With the breakup of the Soviet Union, the fossil fuel industries entered a period of rapid decline: between 1991 and 1993, total investment in Russia's oil and gas industry fell by 46% and 29% respectively, and output fell. Oil production fell by over 100 million tonnes/year, or 17%, between 1990 and 1993. Production growth has only been recorded in the European North (the Pechora region in the Komi Republic) where increased output by joint ventures usually outweighs the worst performance by state-owned companies. 2. THE MAJOR PLAYERS The monopoly structure of oil and gas production, distribution, refining, and marketing which was in operation during the Soviet period was largely dismantled between 1990 and 1993. The oil and gas industry has been opened up through privatisation, the establishment of state-owned corporations operating in the world market, and joint ventures with foreign companies. Since November 1992, when Roskomnedra (Russia's Committee for Geology and Use of the Subsoil) began granting exploration and production rights, around 1,220 oil and gas licences have been awarded. At the same time around 350 new-field development and exploration licences have been awarded through 49 tender bids - 120 have been granted to enterprises with foreign capital. By the end of 1994, Russia is expected to have launched a series of exploration and production tenders in Western Siberia, the European North, the Volga-Urals and Far East regions, including the Barents and Sakhalin shelves. The Komi Region in the Russian Arctic is a major focus of oil industry activity. The region is remote and has a history of being a semi-autonomous gulag region of Russia, largely closed to outside scrutiny. However, such regions are favoured by the oil industry around the world. The oil industry operating in Alaska (mainly BP) has a history of broken promises, neglect and pollution that break federal and state laws many times each year. In Nigeria, Shell take advantage of the Nigerian dictatorship and operate to standards which would be illegal anywhere in the west. In the Amazon (Ecuador), Texaco's exploration caused 70 percent malnutrition in children aged 6-12 in areas around oil drilling operations in the Amazon's Oriente region, and 98% malnutrition in the most contaminated areas. Residents of the region are currently suing Texaco. Amoco, before it pulled out of Burma, was directly funding its military Junta, and it enjoyed full military protection to ensure access to oil and gas. The main new Russian corporations founded in this region during this period are Archangelskgeologiya (geological exploration), Komineft (oil production), Archangelskneftegaz (oil and gas production), and TransNeft (oil and gas distribution). In order to sustain present production levels (7million barrels per day - mbbl/d) the Russian oil sector is estimated to need US$5bn in investment between now and the year 2000. The Russian concern to attract foreign capital investment while maintaining a measure of domestic control over resource industries has meant that the joint venture is the main form of enterprise for utilising western capital in oil production (see figure 1). KomiNeft and Archangelskgeologiya are partners in the main joint ventures in the region, while Transneft is attempting to establish arrangements for the construction of a major new pipeline from the Komi region to Finnish refineries. 3. VENTURES ALREADY PRODUCING OIL a) KomiArcticOil KomiArcticOil was formed in 1991 and is owned by KomiNeft (Russia, 40%), UkhtaNeftGasGeologia (Russia, 10%) Gulf Canada (25%), and British Gas PLC (UK, 25%). KomiArcticOil was formed to produce oil in the Timan-Pechora Basin (Vozey and Upper Vozey fields) and is currently producing about 17,000 bbl/day. British Gas told Reuters on October 27, 1994 that output was running at around 1.3 million barrels a year, four times the amount before the Western partners became involved. In September, 1993, KomiArcticOil received a loan of US$80 million from the European Bank for Reconstruction & Development (EBRD). This loan facility has not yet been disbursed. Major industrial developments of this kind require the Bank to produce an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). This EIA should obviously have included an assessment of the pipeline to be used for the project. According to the EBRD, an EIA was done but has been classified as the property of the private companies involved. To date the EBRD has refused Greenpeace's requests for a copy of the EIA, saying that it made the report available to the partners involved in the venture. Gulf Canada has refused to provide it. It is reported to be available in the Komi region for the people of Usinsk, but has not been forthcoming. The EBRD has a charter specifically aimed at the democratisation of the nations emerging from the breakup of the Soviet Union and collapse of the communist regimes in central and eastern Europe. b) Polar Lights: Conoco (USA, 50%) and KomiNeft (50%). Polar Lights (Polyarnoye Siyaniye) is a company formed by Conoco (USA) and KomiNeft (Russia) in 1992. The joint venture initially invested US$375 million, and pumped its first oil from the Ardalin field in late August, 1994 -- just as the first major leaks in the pipeline were showing up. The initial rate of production is 22,000 bbl/d, and is expected to peak at about 25,000 bbl/d in 1996. Polar Lights has been a major beneficiary of public lending institutions, receiving over a quarter of a billion dollars from the EBRD (US$90m), the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC, US$50m), the US Export-Import Bank (EXIM, US$60m), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC, US$60m). OPIC is an agency of the US Government, responsible for supporting private overseas investment through loans, insurance, and guarantees. c) KomiQuest: Quest Energy (UK, 50%), KomiNeft (50%) Quest Energy of Chelmsford, Essex, UK joined with KomiNeft to form the KomiQuest joint venture in 1992. Quest subsequently sold shares of its equity to Callina NL of Australia (17.8%) and Star Valley of Canada (7%). Initial financing of US$10 million to get production started was provided by the Hannai Corporation, a company owned by a Qatari family. By the end of 1993, KomiQuest expected to have exported 100,000 tonnes of oil, representing gross revenues of about US$12 million. d) AmKomi: Aminex (Ireland, 50%), KomiNeft (50%) Production at the AmKomi joint venture, which comprises several proven oil fields, has increased from 1,200 barrels of oil per day to more than 2,000 barrels per day as of October 20, 1994. Aminex, the Dublin-listed oil and gas exploration group, turned post-tax losses of Irish Pounds 124,860 in the second-half of 1993 into profits of Irish Pounds 481,778 (UK Pounds 476,159) for the half-year to June 30, 1994. This turnaround occured mainly because of the AmKomi profit. Aminex stock has risen from 5 pence/share to over 70 pence/share in the past two years on the basis of expectations about the profitability of its Russian oil venture. 4. VENTURES IN WAITING a) Pechoramorneft JV: Neste (Finland), Kvaernar Masa-Yards (Russia), state-run Soyuzmorgeo (Russia), Sevmorneftegeofizika (Russia), Nenets district administration. This joint venture is aimed at Barents Sea offshore oil development. However, the project has been hampered by the company lacking relevant offshore development licence. Neste, in conjunction with the Arkhangelskneftegaz (Arkhangelsk Oil & Gas), has also launched a joint-stock company aimed at developing two fields in the Timan-Pechora Basin. The two fields include the Yuzhno-Shapkinskoye oil and gas field and Shapkinskoye gas field. Plans call for the joint-stock company to operate on a production-sharing basis. However, activity is impeded by lack of relevant legislation. b) Nobel Oil International: Glencore International (Marc Rich & Co, Switzerland), Ukhta Oil Refinery (Russia), KomiNeft (Russia) This joint venture was formed in mid-1993 to extract heavy oil from oil stained rock near Usinsk. The partners are planning to invest an estimated US$500 million in the development of the Usinsk oil fields over the next 25 years. c) Timan-Pechora Company (TPC): Texaco, Amoco, Exxon (USA), Norsk Hydro (Norway), Archangelskgeologiya (Russia) The Timan-Pechora Company (also known as Texaco Timan-Pechora) is a recently-formed consortium which is planning to explore and drill in the region of the Usinsk spill. TPC has been set up to explore in a 2,800sq mile Arctic concession. This joint venture has received combined insurance and loan guarantees of US$400 million for exploration and drilling operations from the US OPIC. 5. OTHER VENTURES a) BHP of Australia has reportedly started feasibility work with its American subsidiary Hamilton Oil and the Russian Gazprom on seabed drilling the Pechora Bay. b) Neste of Finland and TransNeft of Russia are negotiating a deal to construct a new pipeline from the Russian north to refineries in Finland. c) Occidental Petroleum of the US began negotiations in early 1993 to form a joint venture with Ukhtaneftegazgeologiya and KomiNeft for exploitation of oil leases granted in the Komi Republic. 6. WHO SPILLED THE OIL? The local authority in Usinsk requested a halt to pumping on 24 August 1994, in a meeting with representatives of the oil companies using the pipeline. They refused. A spokesperson for British Gas told Reuters newswire on 27 October 1994 that they believed patching of the pipeline was in progress, and therefore oil was still running through the pipeline despite the spills over a month earlier. Documents shown to Greenpeace revealed that at the time of the spill in late August/September, 1994, the following companies were pumping through the damaged pipeline: KomiArcticOil: 1800 t/day (Komineft, UkhtaNeftGasGeologia, Gulf Canada, British Gas) Conoco: 1500 t/day KomiQuest: unknown (Quest Energy, Komineft) Archangelskneftegaz: 4000 t/day KomiNeft: 4000 t/day Sokol: 1000 t/day Clearly the oil now polluting the Arctic in the Komi region belongs to these companies, although they hide behind the legalities of their carefully worded contracts. Gulf Canada's spokesperson John Sparks summed up the attitude: "We don't own the pipeline, we just use it," he said to Greenpeace. 7. FINANCE Major western international lending institutions have taken a strong interest in the former Soviet Union's oil and gas sector. This is due to the widespread belief that heavy industrial infrastructure is a key component of economic development, but equally the opportunity for major revenues generated in regions with low or no environmental and labour standards has produced strong interest among private firms. It is clear that the western financing agencies are in a strong position with respect to the nations of the former Soviet Union. In the words of one official of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), "Companies now have a smorgasbord of opportunities. It is the countries [of the CIS] that have to be competitive in opening their markets." The specific function of two of the main credit agencies involved in oil production in Russia (US Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the US ExIm) is to enhance opportunities for American exporters. For example, on 27 September 1994, Exim announced the signing of nearly US$900m worth of agreements for US exports of oil and gas equipment to Russia. OPIC, in addition, is charged with providing 'political risk' insurance against expropriation, currency inconvertability, and violent upheaval. Funding from these development banks and bilateral institutions also functions to insulate western oil companies from 'normal' business risks. Gulf Canada reportedly purchased its share of KomiArcticOil for US$250m, but subsequently refused to put up any more than 10% of this amount. Gulf Canada will fund the other 90% with revenue from oil production in the Timan-Pechora region. The EBRD, on the other hand, put up US$80m. So while the EBRD expends public funds for Gulf's benefit -- thus putting Russia further into debt to the west -- Gulf itself minimises its risks by withholding its own contribution. This contributes to the unavailability of adequate funding for infrastructure upgrading. Together, the protection afforded to the oil companies from business and political risk while operating in the Arctic regions of Russia is substantial. This does not mean, however, that no one has to pay. The Russian economy goes further into debt to western banks, and the Russian people are ultimately left with whatever actual costs may be incurred, such as oil lost into the Arctic tundra. 8. INDUSTRIAL PROFILE The world oil industry has quickly exploited opportunities in the the new Russian Federation. The Russian Arctic republics of Archangelsk and Komi, along with the western Siberian region, are especially attractive. Expectations are that these regions contain more oil than all North American oil reserves combined. However, uncertainties about legal rights, infrastructure, ownership, and liability have slowed development despite the high hopes of many western corporations. Nonetheless, the Russian desire for new capital and western companies' need to find more profitable fields have been sufficient to overcome early hesitation, and today most of the oil majors and many smaller western companies are active in the Timan-Pechora Basin and elsewhere. The argument for oil investment by the western companies appears, from a narrowly financial viewpoint, to be sound. Western financial and technical capital will flow in, to be used to perform major upgrading of pipelines, refineries, and wells. In return, investors receive oil for sale on world markets with favourable profit margins to guarantee an adequate return. However, western corporations have been more successful than their Russian hosts in wringing major financial and political concessions which are to their advantage. The Russian oil industry has been compared to the 'wild west' with 'petroleum cowboys' making fortunes on the back of cheap and abundant labour, anarchic accounting and legal practices, and total disregard for the natural environment and local people. The main features include: tax exemptions and 'oil-swapping'. 8.1 Tax exemptions Mobil (USA), Exxon (USA), Shell (Netherlands), Elf (France), and Phibro Energy (USA) grouped together under the Petroleum Advisory Foundation in April, 1993, to lobby for changes in Russian oil taxation. In October 1994, just weeks after the spills of thousands of tonnes of oil into the Arctic tundra, six major joint ventures were granted 100% relief from export duties on oil exports. The Cabinet resolution, signed by Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin on October 11, was not made public until it appeared in the western trade press. The decree grants tax exemptions for three years or until the ventures have recovered their investments, whichever comes first. The companies operating in the Timan-Pechora Basin who benefit from this giveaway are: KomiArcticOil: Gulf Canada, British Gas PLC Polar Lights: Conoco (USA) AmKomi: Aminex (Ireland) KomiArcticOil's investors were given this tax break retroactively to January 1, 1994; the remaining companies received relief from September 1, 1994. The tax is about US$5 per barrel. So, for example, Conoco has been handed a windfall of US$110,000 per day until they regain their entire investment, or US$120 million if the arrangement lasts for the full three years. Whatever the merits of the view that tax concessions are needed to attract foreign capital, it is clear that the costs of the environmental disaster in the Arctic, and the ongoing damage to local people's health and livelihood, will not be paid for by the companies who are taking the oil from the ground. The Russian government will pay these costs, if at all, without the benefit of taxes accrued from oil exports by these corporations. 8.2 'Oil-swapping' The new investment flowing into Russia from the formation of the joint ventures might have been expected to provide the resources for pipeline upgrading. KomiNeft, after all, is the dominant partner in the joint ventures and also operates the local pipeline. But the question obviously arises as to why the oil companies do not step in to fix the line, given that oil is only valuable when it reaches the market, and that a sizeable portion of their oil is disappearing into the tundra? One reason is Russia's concern to maintain full ownership of the pipeline. But the joint ventures receive a credit note from Russian authorities for every barrel of oil pumped through the wellhead and into the pipeline. The companies then redeem their credits -- barrel-for-barrel -- at the refineries. In other words, it makes no financial difference to western companies whether their oil goes to the refinery or into the surrounding streams and lakes. The oil companies have no incentive to concern themselves with the pipeline; with their credit notes they get their oil at the other end. It is difficult not to make comparisons to the Stalinist ideology of 'production at all costs' -- as long as the oil passes the wellhead, 'the universe is unfolding as it should' from the point of view of Conoco, Gulf Canada, or British Gas. What is abundantly clear, though, is that the Russian economy and the northern ecosystem is absorbing the entire cost of the inefficiency which this arrangement represents. The oil companies are 'externalising' a major and crucial cost of production, ie. effective transport of their product to market, leaving this to the Russian people and the natural environment on which they depend. 9. EUROPEAN ENERGY CHARTER Much ink was spilled in the initial enthusiasm for Russian oil, about the desirability of upgrading Russia's oil pipelines. In the early 1990s, both the EBRD and the leaders of the then-European Community made strong statements that they were prepared to invest in this field. Western oil companies have argued that the inflow of their capital would benefit the oil infrastructure as well as the production wells. The newly signed Energy Charter was meant to serve this purpose, however, as Greenpeace warned when the Charter was signed by 35 countries in December 1991, this charter has simply resulted in a 'free-for-all' for the western oil interests. The Charter is an open invitation for Western oil companies to exploit Soviet oil and gas reserves, with very little in return. Greenpeace also warned that the multinationals were unlikely to spend their money upgrading the Russian infrastructure. A recent European Commission proposal [21 September 1994] to the European Council of Ministers details policies and actions which should be undertaken by energy investors in Russia. The polluter should pay for cleanup costs for pollution, including transboundary pollution. Investors should investigate energy efficiency and renewable energy sources. However, given the credit system negotiated by joint ventures, these protocols would not make any difference to the state of the Russian tundra. Komineft, the pipeline operator, has no money to clean up the spills. The main pipeline carrying oil from the Timan-Pechora Basin is severely corroded and leaking. Western investment has not flowed to the maintenance of this pipeline and as a consequence, major losses of oil into the environment have become virtually 'business-as-usual'. The local oil pipeline is owned and operated by KomiNeft, the state-owned entity created in the disaggregation of the Soviet oil monopoly. KomiNeft is also the dominant partner in the major joint ventures in the region (Polar Lights, KomiArcticOil, KomiQuest), and receives fees from the producers for oil pumped into the pipeline at the well-head. Oil executives east and west have known for years that the pipeline situation in Russia was deteriorating. By some estimates, 55 per cent of the country's 75,000 km of pipeline needs to be replaced. The EBRD made strong statements during the 1991-92 period that their priority for funding in Russia would be upgrading infrastructure, including pipelines. To date, the Bank has made no loans for this. 10. JOBS or SLAVERY? A further attractive aspect of producing oil in Russia's far north is that the KomiNeft corporation -- spun off from the Soviet-era oil monopoly -- is exclusively responsible for the workforce and does not, in fact, pay workers in standard currency (either roubles or dollars). According to Victoria Clark of The Observer newspaper, oil workers in the Timan-Pechora Basin receive payment in 'leonidovki', credit notes named for KomiNeft's general director Valentin Leonidov. These credit coupons are only exchangeable in state-owned shops. An article from the FT on 4 July of this year, concerning the debt crisis of the Russian oil industry, mentioned oil workers not receiving wages - some for up to six months. According to the article, a hunger strike had started by oil workers in Usinsk because of a backlog of wages to February this year. 11. CONCLUSION The recent oil spills from the decaying pipeline in the Komi region of the Russian Arctic serve to highlight, what can only be described as a 'cowboy' attitude similar to that experienced in the early days of oil extraction. The remoteness of the region and abundant oil and gas reserves, together with cheap labour and lax or no environmental standards have clearly made Russia attractive for investment by the western oil industry. Added to these are tax exemptions, credit system and contracts negotiated specifically to exclude responsibility for oil spills on the oil companies. It is hard not to conclude that the oil companies in the area only have regard to extracting oil as fast as possible regardless of the cost to both the environment and the people. The lending institutions, oil companies as well as the Russian authorities share the blame for this appalling state of affairs. They bear responsibility for the pollution of the Arctic tundra and the effects on the local communities living in the area. The pollution of the Arctic serves also to emphasise that oil pollutes from its extraction through to its end use. The financial institutions and oil companies, encouraged by political aggreements such as the Energy Charter, pay little, if any, regard to the local, regional and global environmental damage wrought by increasing use of oil and gas. The direct environmental damage caused by oil spills is already too high a price to pay for reliance on oil. However, the price is even higher when considering that oil, when it is used, produces 44% of the carbon dioxide (CO2) being pumped into the atmosphere from the use of fossil fuels. CO2 has been recognised both scientifically and politically as the major greenhouse gas which is causing global warming and subsequent climate change. The world's governments have recognised the threat and having signed the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) committed themselves to cutting CO2 emissions to the level which does not threaten ecosystems, food supplies or economies. It is impossible to square the circle of increased oil consumption and cutting CO2 emissions. The lending institutions, oil companies and politicians involved in the Russian oil free-for-all have completely disregarded the direct environmental and human health damage of their activities, and any economic opportunities and the environmental need for energy demand management, including energy conservation, and renewable energy supplies. If these criteria were made priority for investment it would ensure much longer term environmental and economic security. Biblography and Sources Greenpeace's sources for this report are the eyewitness accounts and interviews with local authorities and oil workers by its four-member investigative team, which spent a week in the area of Usinsk, Komi Republic from October 31, 1994. Additional material drawn from: Album of the Fuel-and-Energy Complex of CIS States, Baltic States, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, All-Russia Research Institute of Complex Fuel-and-Energy Problems (VNIKTEP) and Information and Consulting Firm INCOTEC, Moscow, 1993. World Oil, August 1994. "Amazon Crude," Judith Kimerling with Natural Resources Defence Council, October 1990 NEWSPAPERS Moscow Times June 20, 1992 Financial Times, October 20 and 31, 1994 The Times October 20 and 25, November 13, 1994 Financial Times October 20, 1994 Lloyds List September 7 and October 17, 1994 The Independent October 20, 1994 The Globe & Mail November 1, 3, 8, and 9, 1994 The Irish Times July 22, October 18 and 20, 1994 New York Times, October 24, 1994 PRAVDA, No 90 NEWSWIRE SERVICES Business Wire August 6, 1993 Extel Examiner October 19, 1994 Reuters Newswire, various BBC Summary of World Broadcasts September 30, 1994 PERIODICALS Construction News, September 15, 1994 APS Review of Oil Market Trends September 19, 1994 APS Review of Gas Market Trends September 12, 1994 International Trade Finance no. 222, October 7, 1994 International Trade Reporter Vol. 11, No. 42; October 26, 1994 BIZNES SEGODNYA, No 50 World Oil, August, 1994 East European Energy Report: Oil and Gas Ventures in the CIS, 1994 RESEARCH REPORTS US Congress Office of Technology Assessment, "Fueling Reform: Energy Technologies for the Former Eastern Bloc", OTA-ETI-599, (Washington, DC: US Gov't Printing Office, July 1994). All-Russian Research Institute of Complex Fuel-and-Energy Problems (VNIKTEP) and Information & Consulting Firm INCOTEC, "Album of the Fuel-and-Energy Complex of CIS States, Baltic States, Azerbaijan, and Georgia", (Moscow: VNIKTEP/INCOTEC, 1993). ENDS ---------- Keywords: environment oil energy russia cis republics multinationals problems spills leaks /