[] TL: TOO HOT TO HANDLE (GP) SO: Greenpeace UK DT: 1986, 1987 Keywords: nuclear power reactors insurance uk europe greenpeace groups reports gp / [part 1 of 2] An Interim Report on the Under-insurance of British Nuclear Reactors Greenpeace, 18 December 1986 Republished, December 1987 "The Chernobyl disaster has demonstrated clearly how dangerous uncontrolled nuclear energy is and to what a serious aftermath radiation contamination of even very limited scale can lead." Anatoly Mikeev Chief of the Fire Headquarters Ministry of the Interior USSR (From a speech addressed to the International Conference of Chief Police Officers, London, 16 September 1987.) INTRODUCTION AND FINDINGS This report shows how present arrangements for third-party compensation following a major nuclear accident at a British nuclear reactor are woefully inadequate. Only 20 million pounds has to be provided by the nuclear industry to meet claims arising from third party victims of a nuclear accident. A further reserve of 210 million pounds is guaranteed by the Government to bring the total cover to 230 million pounds. Any claim in excess of this amount will be met only at the discretion of Parliament. "Too Hot to Handle" shows that in the wake of Chernobyl a credible provision for compensation following a major nuclear accident in this country would be an absolute minimum of 20 billion pounds, rather than the 20 million pounds so far required of the industry. A serious accident at a British nuclear reactor has been estimated - prior to Chernobyl - to cost 15 billion pounds. This figure excludes any claims made by accident victims living abroad or foreign governments. Unlike the Ukraine, Britain is a densely populated island where the kind of mobilisation necessary to evacuate people and the massive decontamination problems witnessed at Chernobyl will be impossible to achieve here. The latest estimate for the economic cost of Chernobyl to the Soviet Union as stated by Mr A K Mikeev, Chief of the Soviet Fire Headquarters, is 200 billion pounds.1 The United States Atomic Energy Commission has estimated the cost of a serious accident at a 200 megawatt nuclear reactor sited within 50 kilo metres of a town of 1 million people to be 7 billion pounds for property damage alone.2 Contrary to the Chairman of the CEGB, Lord Marshall's assertion that an accident on the scale of Chernobyl could never happen here, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission expects there to be further major nuclear accidents occurring in Western Europe, on average once every seven years.3 The design and structure of British nuclear reactors does not prohibit the possibility of destructive power excursions, chemical explosions and graphite fires within the reactors - in other words, accidents similar in scale and consequence to Chernobyl. The present minimal insurance coverage provided by the British nuclear industry and backed by only partially specified Government funds clearly falls far short of what both history and common sense says is required. The historical reluctance of the insurance industry to have anything to do with covering the nuclear industry for possible third-party claims beyond the 20 million pounds dictated by the Nuclear Installations Act is typified by their refusal to insure personal liability or the home of anyone in this country against a nuclear accident. A nuclear accident, like an act of God or the outbreak of war, is something you cannot insure yourself against. British victims of a serious nuclear accident would quickly exhaust the industry's 20 million pounds provision for compensation and the Government's guaranteed 'top-up' of 210 million pounds. Thereafter, any claim would have to be settled by the courts. Given the potential scale of a nuclear catastrophe, it is very likely that the courts would be unable to handle the mass of litigation involved in servicing possibly millions of individual claims and Parliament would then dictate at its discretion any compensation to be paid. (In the United States, 2000 lawsuits resulting from the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979 are still unresolved. Nearly 100 more were settled out of court.)4 Nearly 18 months after Chernobyl, more than 500,000 sheep, involving more than 500 farms in Scotland, Cumbria and Wales are still bounded by restrictions due to the fallout from this accident which happened nearly 2000 miles away. The Government's generosity towards British victims of the Chernobyl accident does not set a promising precedent; Welsh sheep farmers have been so exasperated by delays and refusals to make compensation to them for their irradiated and unsellable lambs they have been reduced to 'kidnapping' Government officials in order to force a fair hearing. It is plain that the current insurance arrangements laid out by the Nuclear Installations Act are not only inadequate but also amount to an enormous hidden subsidy paid by the Government to the nuclear industry. In the United States, where freer market forces reign and public utilities are required to provide for insurance coverage on a commercially realistic basis, the premiums have proved prohibitive. It is almost entirely due to the costs of making safe and then insuring their existing nuclear reactors that many electricity utilities in the United States have turned their backs on nuclear technology. Nuclear Engineering International (based on information from the US Atomic Industry Forum) confirms that, not only have no new nuclear power stations been ordered in the US since 1978, but all those ordered in the years 1974 to 1978 have been cancelled or deferred. The question must therefore arise, would the British nuclear industry be in any way commercially viable if it were required to carry the full weight of a realistic insurance cover? To which must be added a final question: would the insurance industry in the post-Chernobyl era accept the liability? If we are to have a nuclear industry in this country it must not only be totally safe - which it can never be - it must also be accountable for the damage which it can cause - which, as things presently stand, it is not - and it must be commercially viable. The British nuclear industry is none of these and exists solely by courtesy of the protection and subsidies given to it by the current Government. STATEMENT In the light of the totally inadequate insurance coverage available in the event of a nuclear accident GREENPEACE demands the following: 1 The minimum requirement for funds available to meet Third Party claims for damages resulting from a nuclear accident must be raised from its present level of 20 million pounds to 20 billion pounds; a figure which more accurately reflects the costs of a Chernobyl-type accident taking place in the UK. 2 That this 20 billion pound third party liability be allocated to each nuclear installation and not, as at present, where the current 20 million pounds is the "floating" sum available per incident, wherever and whenever required. 3 The Government must clarify the precise commercial arrangements between the nuclear industry and the private insurance sector. 4 The Government should repeal the relevant section of the Nuclear Installations Act (1965) and enact legislation compelling the licensed operators of nuclear plant to accept full fiscal accountability in respect of damage caused by a nuclear accident. 5 The nuclear industry must accept the probability of a major nuclear accident with consequences well in excess of previous estimates; it should implement, in conjunction with the Government, comprehensive and effective emergency plans and full scale trial evacuations; and it should draw up, in this connection, comprehensive procedures for awarding prompt and adequate compensation for injury, loss of property and employment. 6 The Government should call for a complete re-evaluation of the Paris and Brussels Conventions on third-party liability in nuclear energy, thereby implementing a procedure for full financial accountability by licensed operators of nuclear plant in respect of damage caused by nuclear accidents. 7 Uniform rules on international liability in the case of nuclear accident. 8 A full report from the International Atomic Energy Agency on the current situation with regard to insurance of nuclear installations and on third-party liability in all nuclear states. 9 A full and thorough reappraisal of international law concerning long-range transboundary pollution aimed at uniform and adequate rules on satisfactory liability. UK INSURANCE LEGISLATION COVERING THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY Two years after the British Government revised and expanded the nuclear programme with the intention of providing 6 Gigawatts by 1965, the Nuclear Installations (Licensing and Insurance) Act 1959 was passed. Its purpose was to establish some minimum standards to provide protection against an accident during the transport of nuclear fuel. The 1959 Act preceded three important international conventions regulating liability for nuclear damage at installations and during transport. Britain played a major role in negotiating the three conventions which facilitated international exchanges in the peaceful use of atomic energy. These conventions are The Paris Convention on Third-Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (1960), The Brussels Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention (1963), and The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (1963). In order to establish in UK law the main principles of these conventions and to ratify their additional scope, the Nuclear Installations Act was enacted in 1965. This Act extended and amended the 1959 Nuclear Installations Act in three main respects: first, only irradiated nuclear fuel in transit was covered by the earlier Act. The 1965 Act extended absolute liability to all other aspects of the British Nuclear Fuel Cycle. Second, the occurrences covered were no longer restricted to occurrences on the licensed site and in the course of carriage between places in the UK. Third, liability is extended to foreign operators for occurrences in the UK. One thing both Acts had in common was that the nuclear industry's third-party liability was limited to 5 million pounds per incident. Anything in excess of this amount would have to be found by the government. The 1965 Act stipulates that liability ceases after a ten-year period. The Energy Act of 1983 (No. 790(C23)) increased the limit from 5 million pounds to 20 million pounds. Claims outside these limits are to be made to the appropriate minister and if not settled by agreement any question as to their establishment or the amount of compensation can be referred to the High Court. The sections relevant to this survey of the Nuclear Installations Act (1965 ) - and amended by the Energy Act of 1 983 - are quoted in Appendix 1. The two major insurance covers of importance to the nuclear industry are: 1 provision of funds to cover third-party claims against the operators of nuclear installations in the event of an accident; 2 provision of funds to cover material damage to the property of the operator in the event of an accident. The principal licensed operators of nuclear installations in the UK are: The Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) The South of Scotland Electricity Board (SSEB) British Nuclear Fuels pie (BNF) and The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) Of these, the first three are governed by the procedures of the Nuclear Installations Act (1965) as it stands. The situation with UKAEA is different and is discussed briefly later. Third-Party Claims In accordance with Section 16(1) of the Nuclear Installations Act, the operators of nuclear establishments have to ensure (or provide financial security) against claims of up to 20 million pounds in respect of any one incident. Claims in excess of 20 million pounds and up to a limit of approximately 230 million pounds (300 million Special Drawing Rights) have to be met by the Government, which may "in certain circumstances" be able to reclaim a proportion of these costs from other states party to the Brussels and Paris Conventions (approximately 96 million pounds) - Sections 18(1) and (1A). If the amounts provided for in the 1965 Act are insufficient to satisfy the relevant claims then the Act also provides that those claims shall be satisfied to such an extent and out of funds provided by such means as Parliament may determine (Section 16(3)). In other words,the totality of the Government's liabilities in respect of claims for nuclear damage will ultimately be determined by Parliament.8 Note: In 1982 the Paris and Brussels Conventions were revised and previous ceiling of 120 million pounds Special Drawing Rights was raised to the present level of 300 million Special Drawing Rights (230 million pounds). Since several countries have not yet ratified the new revisions, the Conventions (revised) have not yet come into force.9 In 1976 the CEGB and SSEB's nuclear power stations were insured against both third-party liability and against property damage to installations from fire damage and other standard perils by a group of insurance companies and Lloyds Underwriters arranged through the British Insurance (Atomic Energy) Committee. From 1st April 1983 this arrangement changed in the wake of the quadrupling of the third-party liability brought about by the 1983 Energy Act. Today, third-party insurance is provided through a commercial agreement between the Boards and the Iron Trades Employees Insurance Association Ltd. arranged through the brokers Sedgwick, Power and Nuclear Services Ltd. Material Damage to Nuclear Installations From April 1st, 1983, the nuclear installations have been 'self insured' except for a small proportion of the risk which is carried by a mutual association of European electricity utilities, European Mutual Association for Nuclear Insurance (EMANI). The contributors are the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Denmark, West Germany, Sweden with France a nominal member. These states contribute to a fund lodged in Brussels. In 1983 the total premium income was equivalent to 1.9 million pounds and total current assets are in the order of 130 million pounds. This self-insurance scheme came about because the CEGB and SSEB felt that the commercial insurance of their nuclear sites was proving too expensive. In a submission to the Commons Select Committee on Energy, the CEGB pointed out that between 1962 and 1984 they had paid out 42 million pounds in premiums while claiming only 1 million pounds in damages (by comparison premiums paid for the same 22-year period in the USA were 400 million pounds).10 The commercial insurance pool through which provision was made in this respect prior to 1st April 1983, consisted of 60 insurance companies and 250 Lloyds syndicates. They quoted the insurance value of all 13 nuclear stations at around 5,000 million pounds and that the limit of their cover per accident was in the order of 370 million pounds.10 As it stands now, the self-insured reserve amounts to a total of around 78 million pounds for all CEGB sites including non- nuclear, conventional installations. The CEGB have said that "the maximum cost damage likely to ensue from the worst conceivable nuclear incident" exceeded the 370 million pounds "by a substantial amount".11 The 78 million pounds is therefore an inadequate provision and as such the industry's arrangements are currently under review. If an accident were to happen to a CEGB station at the moment, the Government would probably have to be approached to pay the difference between the self insurance fund and the higher damage costs, even though they do not have a statutory duty to do so, as in the case of third- party liability.12 The CEGB Annual Report for 1985/1986 states that a charge of 19.2 million pounds represents a 'notional' premium for the risks envisaged. The SSEB's notional premium last year was set at 2 million pounds.13 BNF's third-party and property damage risks are currently arranged through the British Insurance (Atomic Energy) Committee. Ten years ago BNF were indemnified by UKAEA against third-party and property damage in respect of Sellafield/Windscale, Capenhurst and Drigg. Amersham International's third-party and site insurance have been carried throughout by British Insurers (Atomic Energy) Committee. Cover against all fissile risks at Rolls Royce, Derby and at Vickers, Barrow, has been provided throughout by the Ministry of Defence.14 The UKAEA also self-insures, but instead of depending on an insurance reserve (currently 103.2 million pounds) they have now switched to an insurance provision of 2.5 million pounds. The Authority's arrangements are carried through a trading fund and claims are met through "internal resources" (the provision) or by short-term borrowing. The Authority ceased to indemnify BNF from 1st March 1986. However, it will continue to pay future costs (estimated to be about 5 million pounds) arising out of cover provided in the past. In subsequent years all claims exceeding the capacity of the Authority's provision are to be reimbursed by the Government.15 In all cases, detailed information on sums assured and premiums paid is deemed commercially confidential and is therefore classified. The sums provided to meet claims in the event of a maj or nuclear accident in no way reflect the sort of predicted costs outlined later in this report. On 21st November 1984 Lord Kennet asked the Government what size was the actual, though hidden, subsidy which the taxpayer makes each year to the nuclear industry, since statutory limitations on third-party liability reduces its requirement for cover from the insurance market. In his reply the Minister of State, Scottish Office (Lord Gray of Contin), stated that "there are no hidden subsidies by the taxpayer to the energy industries".16 However, the United States experience illustrates how far from a realistic appraisal this statement is. The United States Insurance Legislation In the mid-1950s the United States atomic power programme found itself in grave difficulties when it was unable to calculate the astronomical damages that would be incurred by a major nuclear accident. In 1955 an advisory committee was set up by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to address the problem of individual insurances companies' unwillingness to indemnify the industry against such potentially colossal losses. It suggested that a mutual liability pool should be set up to cope with nuclear risks. However, it became clear that even with such a pool the industry would be unable to provide adequate public liability. The degree of opposition they faced within the insurance industry is illustrated by the statement of Hubert W. Yount, Vice-President of Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, at the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy in 1956: "The catastrophe hazard is apparently as many times as great as anything previously known in industry and therefore poses a major challenge to insurance companies ... We have heard of estimates of catastrophe potential under the worst possible circumstances running not merely into millions or tens of millions but into hundreds of millions of dollars. It is a reasonable question of public policy as to whether a hazard of this magnitude should be permitted if it actually exists. Obviously there is no principle of insurance that can be applied to a single location where the potential loss approaches such astronomical proportions. Even if insurance could be found there is a serious question whether the amount of damage to persons and property would be worth the possible benefit accruing from atomic development."17 Since the concept of unlimited liability posed a serious threat to the nuclear industry and in order effectively to avert a rebellion of private utilities, the Federal Government proposed legislation to remove this obstacle to nuclear progress. Two pro-nuclear members of the JCAE, Melvyn Price and Clinton Anderson, sponsored a bill in both houses of Congress: the Price-Anderson Act was passed in 1957. This Act, in common with the Paris and Brussels Conventions, in effect freed the nuclear industry from its responsibility for the billions of dollars worth of damages that could result from a major nuclear accident. The basic precepts of the Price-Anderson Act do not differ greatly in essence from those dictated by the Paris and Brussels Conventions. Basically it offers utilities limited third-party liability of $60 million in the event of an accident. If claims exceed this sum, raised by the nuclear industry through insurance, the Government is bound to pay the excess up to a legal limit fixed at $500 million, with a possible maximum liability of $560 million. Damages beyond that are not recoverable. Twice in 1965 and 1975 the Act was amended. The principal difference was the increase in the amount of insurance available to the industry, i.e. $160 million, and the scrapping of the Government legal limit. Instead, each utility was required to pay a $5 million 'retrospective premium', meaning that, if an accident resulted in claims in excess of $160 million, then each utility would be obliged to contribute as much as $5 million for each reactor it owned to meet the excess. With 110 reactors now operating in the United States, that limits industry liability to $710 million, still far below estimated claims for any major nuclear power plant accident. The Price-Anderson Act expired on August 1st, 1987. This will have little if any immediate impact on electric power utilities because the old act will continue to cover existing reactors. Considerable dispute has flared up in connection with what will replace it, or, should it be renewed, how the Act will be amended. After months of fierce lobbying on the part of the industry to restrict the recommends increased cap on liability to between $2.2 billion and $10 billion,19 the latest version of the P.A. Act the industry would support would keep the same $160 million insurance level, but raise the post accident contributions to $63 million per nuclear power plant. This would bring the total liability limit to $7.090 million. The house of Representatives passed such a version late in July 1987. The Senate's version of Price-Anderson is still stuck in committee, but a bill likely to be debated on the Senate floor next month calls for payments of $60 million per reactor per accident. Other differences between the House and Senate versions are the duration of the extension (10 versus 30 years) and the way claims are handled after the limits of the Price-Anderson coverage are reached. The nuclear power industry has a certain ambivalence about renewing the Price-Anderson Act. All reactors currently operating or under construction are "grandfathered" under the limits of liability from the expired Act. Pushing for a twelve- fold increase in potential payments, from $5 million to $60 million, runs against the grain. With no new orders for nuclear power plants, there is little rush to welcome the increase. But without Price-Anderson, the industry has no future, as no utility would contemplate construction of a nuclear power plant without a limit on liability.18 To put these figures into perspective, the official cost of cleaning up after the Thee Mile Island accident in March 1979 is so far put at over $1 billion.20 Unexpected problems such as recontamination of the reactor containment 21 has meant that the property insurance cover of $300 million was rapidly exhausted. Neither the US Government nor the US power utilities are prepared to forward the huge sums required. Because of further costs required to keep the undamaged reactor at Three Mile Island (TMI 1) in starting condition (between $80 and $120 million per year) the Wall Street Journal was prompted to comment that the nuclear power industry is a business that can lose $2 million in half an hour.22 The malaise in which the US nuclear power industry finds itself is perhaps best summed up by a lawyer, Robert Wise, at a conference in New York in December 1984 on the jurisprudence of nuclear power, when he stated that "bond and shareholders are in the process of replacing anti-nuclear activists as the principal threat to nuclear power".22 Small wonder that in the United States where the Government is less inclined to shoulder the financial burdens of the private sector the nuclear industry is in decline. There have been no new reactor orders since 1975 and cancellations since then have reached 110.23 Insurance Legislation in Other Countries International rules for nuclear accident liability were established by the Paris, Brussels and Vienna Conventions. However, despite these agreements there is little consistency in the international liability limits. The articles of the Paris and Vienna Conventions are given effect in each signatory state through domestic legislation; the equivalent of the Nuclear Installations Act in the UK. The Paris Convention calls for third-party liability to be set for signatory states at 120 million ECU. The current limit in the UK, pending ratification of the 1982 Revision, is 230 million pounds; in the Netherlands, 1 billion Builders (307 million pounds); in Belgium, BF9.5 billion (160 million pounds) and in France F50 million (5.3 million pounds). The political complexities which face the nuclear industry globally make it extremely difficult to determine which countries are continuing, or intend to ratify the rules established by the International Conventions. Even the Eastern Bloc, despite its ambitious five-year plan of building five new 1,000 MW reactors per year, has found that economic and technical limitations have meant in fact the construction of just one new reactor per year. The concept of compensation, as understood in the West, does not apply in the Soviet Union. However, Dr. Igor Kuzmin of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy has stated that since Chernobyl compensation has been paid to some extent by the Government, and this will be dealt with in a later section.24 Disasters like Chernobyl underline weaknesses in the Paris and Brussels Conventions. For instance, they do not make provision for an accident taking place in a Comecon country which might have serious consequences for signatory states. Their definitions are too restrictive to cover any kinds of mishap which might occur. "The application of rules governing nuclear civil responsibility for indirect damages .... is characterised by a total legal blur" according to one expert.25 In May 1986 the European Parliament undertook proceedings to claim against damages incurred by its member states as a result of Chernobyl. So far, the Soviet Union has refused to consider compensation for other countries affected by the accident.26 It is important to remember that agreements like the Paris and Brussels Conventions and legislation like the Nuclear Installations and Price-Anderson Acts arose more out of a need by the nuclear industry to avoid the burden of unlimited third- party liability than out of any responsibility towards public welfare. This, despite the fact that when these agreements were ratified a major core-melt accident was considered 'incredible' by the nuclear industry. In fact, as has already been implied in the US, it was the insurance companies, unimpressed with numerical artifacts like 1 in 10 million per year as a predicted frequency for a major nuclear accident in such a complex and expensive technology, which forced the industry to seek help through legislation. Even so, countries like Switzerland, East Germany and South Africa have passed laws providing for unlimited third-party liability. At the moment West Germany's atomic law provides for a DM1 billion (350 million pounds) ceiling on damages payable. There is at present mounting pressure to remove this ceiling and enact similar unlimited operator liability legislation. The Limitations of Transboundary Insurance Legislation Of the 140 or so nuclear reactors in Western Europe over 50 of them (35%) are within 35 miles of a national frontier. The accident at Chernobyl represents the most spectacular and well- publicised example of transboundary pollution ever witnessed. The 1979 UN Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) established international protocols attempting to govern the "exported" pollution by one country to others. However, it relates wholly to ongoing pollution, i.e. chemical pollution due to the long-range transportation of substances, mainly the oxides of sulphur and nitrogen. The accidental radioactive pollution caused by a nuclear accident is not addressed by this Convention.27 It is astounding that, despite Chernobyl, during the 4th session of CLRTAP - held in November 1986 in Geneva - the question of radioactive pollution crossing national boundaries was not even touched upon. The limited effectiveness of this Convention is shown by the fact that pollutants are only broadly defined therein and there are no specific references either including or excluding radiation pollution. Also, the footnote to Article 8(f) of CLRTAP states that this Convention does not contain a rule on State liability as to damage, although recommending that the states should exchange information on the extent of the damage. 27 Yet the responsibility of a country to provide appropriate information on pollution affecting or threatening another country, on its own initiative or at the request of the state concerned, is expressly recommended by international law (OECD C(77) 28). Indeed, international law, as pointed out by Dr. A. H. Hermann, tends to impose stricter requirements on information than those dictated by the Convention.28 The Soviet Union is a party to CLRTAP and states affected by Chernobyl have legitimate grounds for claiming against the Soviet Union for damages. However, the ineffectual nature of the Convention impedes efforts to persuade the Soviets to recognise these claims and award compensation. This is particularly irksome when it is appreciated that a properly drawn-up and efficient system of international litigation enforcing adequate compensation would not only dissuade nuclear operators from taking dangerous risks but would also benefit all countries unlucky enough to be down-wind of an accident, especially those which have chosen to do without the benefits of nuclear power.28 On 25th November 1986 a 23-nation assembly gathered under the aegis of the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD. Its aim was to examine ways of improving arrangements governing international liability in the event of a nuclear accident. The Deputy Director-General of the NEA has remarked that Chernobyl has shown that "the current international regime is absolutely not appropriate".29 To begin with, the Conventions of Vienna and Paris only cover for direct consequences. They do not provide compensation for indirect damage - the costs of emergency evacuation, long-term health care and the gross economic loss to individual nations. It is these which are certain in any case to represent all but a few percent of the total costs. Governments now realise that if an accident like Chernobyl were to happen in Western Europe indirect damages could not be met. ACCIDENTS WILL HAPPEN Barely had the fire at reactor Number 4 at the Chernobyl nuclear plant been brought to world attention than the proponents of nuclear energy, mainly industrialists from the nuclear industry and politicians, were reassuring the public that such a disaster could never strike a British nuclear power station. Even now, months later, when so much more is known about what actually happened, the management and scientific community of the nuclear industry have convinced themselves that an accident on the scale of Chernobyl is virtually impossible in Britain and are busy convincing the public. They base these convictions on the inadequacies of the Soviet RBMK reactor's safety design and unprecedented human error. Indeed, at an international conference on nuclear risks held in London in December 1986, during the course of which not a single mention was made of nuclear operator liability, it was fairly unanimously concluded that the Chernobyl disaster had nothing to teach the industry in the West. Whatever some experts may like to believe, the opinion and fear of many others is that major nuclear accidents have a very good chance of happening. Commissioner James K. Asselstine of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Committee has stated that "even with the many improvements made after the Three Mile Island accident, there is on the order of a 10% to 50% chance of a core-melt accident at one of the 104 plants now in operation in the USA over the next 20 years.30 In addition, Morris Rosen, the director of nuclear safety for the International Atomic Energy Agency, has recently stated that the existing worldwide safety record "essentially means about a 1 in 1000 chance of a severe core damage accident" (with around 400 reactors worldwide this equates to such an accident every 2.5 years).31 The nuclear industry has a long list of known 'incidents'. Many have been minor, but experience shows that minor accidents, especially several minor accidents happening at once, can lead to a major mishap. A recent US Senate report, giving the results of a global survey, listed the number of accidents severe enough to give rise to a significant release of radiation at 152 occurring in 15 countries.32 In the US alone, of 20,000 incidents at nuclear stations between 1969 and 1979 investigated by the NRC in an Accident Sequence Precursor Study, 169 were identified as possible precursors to a major accident. Fifty-two of them carried a significant risk of leading to a core meltdown.32 It has also been reported in the German press that the International Atomic Energy Agency has received more than 250 reports of accidents, some potential disasters at nuclear power plants around the world, which have been kept quiet. 33 Three Mile Island: "The Night They Nearly Lost Pennsylvania"34 The accident in the Pressurised Water Reactor at Three Mile Island in the United States started at 4 a.m. on 28th March 1979. A major loss of coolant water, due to a mechanical fault, compounded by a series of extraordinary operator errors, resulted in the 'incredible' accident that the nuclear industry said was impossible. Within five minutes of the failure of the feed-water system, the temperature in the reactor soared to over 1200øC and it began to melt down. After two hours a third of the core had been reduced to rubble. Large quantities of radioactivity were released from the burning fuel elements and escaped into the reactor housing building. Radioactivity also escaped into the atmosphere in large amounts - mostly of Xenon 133 gas, which was carried downwind over nearby towns. Thousands of gallons of irradiated water were inadvertently pumped into another adjoining building, while something like 40,000 gallons of low level waste water were pumped into the local river. Meanwhile a huge hydrogen bubble built up inside the stricken reactor, which, had it exploded, would have caused a massive fire leading to a full meltdown.34 Implications and Costs of TMI Three Mile Island, Unit 2, cost $700 million to construct (it was budgeted at $130 million). Within a 20 mile radius of the plant there are four large centres of population, including Harrisburg, the capital of Pennsylvania state, some 10 miles away. Just under 650,000 people lived in this area. When news of the accident broke the best part of 200,000 of them did not even wait for evacuation orders but took to the road in panic.34 The problems related to the TMI accident remain largely unresolved more than seven years later. E. E. Kintner, Vice- President of the General Public Utilities Corporation, who own the TMI plant, has compared the technological problems posed by the massive clean-up operation to the sort of research and development associated with the space programme!35 The immensity of these problems in technical terms, such as the defuelling and decontamination (involving the development of sophisticated robots for use inside the highly radioactive core) are matched only by the equally immense costs. In November 1979 the Presidential Commission on Three Mile Island, The Kemeny Report, estimated the clean-up cost to run to between $1 and $2 billion. It appears that the total cost, including damages payable to third-party claimants, could easily exceed the $2 billion level, not counting loss of revenue. E. E. Kintner confirmed that by the end of 1986 $700 million had already been spent on the clean-up.35 A funding programme estimated at $1 billion has been set up by the Governor of Pennsylvania and the GPU Corporation. It will be financed by a variety of sources: approx. one third from insurance ($305 million) approx. one third from GPU's customers ($328 million) approx. one sixth from US nuclear power utilities (through the Edison Electric Institute - $153 million) and one sixth between - US Department of Energy ($83 million) - Pennsylvania and New Jersey taxpayers ($41 million) - settlement from GPU suit against Babcock and Wilcox, the plant designers ($21 million). In addition the Japanese nuclear industry is supplying $18 million plus expertise.35 After the TMI 2 accident the inevitable lawsuits sprang up everywhere. $37 million was paid to GPU (in an out-of-court settlement) by Bechtel, who manufactured the equipment at TMI. The Metropolitan Edison Company, who operated the TMI reactors, were indicted by a grand jury for having "systematically destroyed, discarded and failed to maintain records". They were also found to have concealed data from the NRC relating to several earlier incidents at the plant. Metropolitan Edison were fined $45,000 plus costs and were instructed to set up a $1 million account to help formulate emergency plans for the area around the TMI site.35 On top of these are the third-party damage claims. More than 17,000 personal injury suits were filed against GPU. 2000 remain unresolved and nearly 100 were settled out of court. The utilities insurers have paid out to date $3.5 million, $1 million alone for a Downs Syndrome baby.36 At TMI approximately 2.5 million Curies of radiation were released (100 million Curies from Chernobyl) almost entirely in the form of the noble gases.37 Some of this was deliberately released later for "safety" reasons. Most of the 500,000 gallons of radioactive water left in the reactor were drained out of the containment building. These two known discharges will continue to have grave consequences on the exposed local population for many years. Already numerous cancers, unprecedented congenital abnormalities and medical conditions consistent with the effects of ionising radiation have been documented.34 The pro-nuclear lobby have denied any cause for concern and have dismissed the findings of various researchers. Dr. Ernest Sternglass, a professor of radiation physics at the University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine, claimed, prior to Chernobyl, that the fall-out will produce the highest death toll caused by an industrial accident. Furthermore he has found abnormally high levels of infant mortality due, he believes, to exposure to iodine 131, which was released in significant quantities early on in the accident sequence. Chernobyl: "The worst accident in the world"38 On April 26 1986 at 1.23 a.m. the "incredible" happened again; the world's worst nuclear accident happened at Chernobyl in the Ukraine, USSR. At the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna in August 1986 the Soviet Government produced a candid report on what had happened at the 1,000 MW RBMK nuclear reactor No. 4 at Chernobyl. Experimental safety-related tests were being carried out, taking advantage of a planned shut-down of the reactor. As the reactor was shutting down one of its two turbine generators was switched off and, fatally, the reactor's emergency core cooling system was also disengaged. Attempting to reduce the reactor power to 250 MW the operators lost control and it plummeted to about 10 MW. The reactor became "poisoned" (with neutron-absorbing material) and control became more difficult. A series of operator violations, involving the incorrect activation of water pumps and feed water valves led to an emergency order to SCRAM the reactor. However, distortion, caused by the sudden influx of coolant water, prevented the control rods from being properly inserted and shutdown was delayed. The power surged to about 540 MW. Two violent explosions followed, caused by a massive generation of steam as the overheated reactor fuel disintegrated. There then followed a hydrogen explosion which started many fires. Several tons of radioactive fuel were immediately blown out of the reactor. By the time the core had been covered and the fire extinguished an estimated 5% of the core inventory of radioactivity had been released. [] TL: TOO HOT TO HANDLE (GP) SO: Greenpeace UK DT: 1986, 1987 Keywords: nuclear power reactors insurance uk europe greenpeace groups reports gp / [part 2 of 2] Implications and costs of Chernobyl The nuclear plant explosion at the Chernobyl Unit 4 reactor in the USSR on 26 April, 1986, resulted in what almost certainly is the most expensive accident of any kind ever. Large quantities of radioactive materials were released into the atmosphere over a period of several days and subsequently carried to countries outside the Soviet Union's borders. Today, more than one year later, effects of the accident are still being felt. In this section the quantification of economic costs caused by the radioactive fallout from Chernobyl is emphasised. Although figures from as many countries as possible that were affected are included, it must be stressed that this report is still preliminary in nature due to the lack of and/or unavailability of quantifiable costs. Indeed, it may be that the true costs of this catastrophe will never be fully quantified. The cataclysm of Chernobyl has hardly begun. The most spectacular part is over but the less obvious and more sinister implications will be long and drawn-out. James Asselstine has remarked that "in the broad descriptions of the combination of human performance failures, weaknesses in safety attitudes and design vulnerabilities, the Soviet report is strikingly similar to the reports on the Three Mile Island accident prepared in the United States."37 The Soviet report confirms that total radiation releases from the accident were in the order of 100 million Curies (less than 5% of the total possible emission) - about 50% in the form of noble gases and 50% other radionuclides. This was far in excess of TMI. On the day after the accident radiation level six miles from the Chernobyl plant were 100,000 times above normal background level.37 The Chernobyl accident produced potentially health-threatening levels of radioactive materials, most notably in the form of iodine and caesium, that were carried over and deposited in various concentrations in at least twenty countries. During the first day and a half, winds blew towards the north-west, carrying the invisible radioactive cloud out of the Soviet Union and into northern Poland and across the Baltic Sea into Scandinavia. From the second through to the fourth day, the winds blew west and south-west, blanketing the Ukraine, southern Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, southern Germany, Switzerland, northern Italy and eastern France. Radiation was carried south across Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece. By the fifth day after the accident, the winds turned north-west again, taking the fallout to central Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Ireland.39 During this period, the meteorological conditions changed considerably, and as a consequence, the dispersion of radioactive material was uneven. In particular, the pattern of radionuclide deposition on the ground was heavily influenced by localized rainfall that washed radioactive particles out of the air. A person can be injured by direct exposure to radioactive materials, by inhaling radioactive gases and dust, or by ingesting contaminated food or water. Chernobyl gave rise to all three exposure routes, but the largest concern outside the immediate vicinity has been ingestion. Radioactive materials falling on soil or vegetation were consumed directly by people or by grazing animals, concentrated in their tissues, and transferred to people in meat and dairy products.39 The day of the accident, there were 176 people on duty at Chernobyl and 268 construction workers nearby. To date, 31 people have died as a result of Chernobyl with more than 200, of the 2000 initially admitted to hospitals still, receiving intensive medical care due to acute radiation sickness and burns.40 Although no-one not directly at the site at the time of the accident suffered from acute radiation sickness, Ukrainians exposed to radiation must have regular health checkups for the rest of their lives, and the Soviet Union has already planned follow-up studies for at least the next 40 years on those exposed to radiation from Chernobyl.41 Estimates of delayed deaths due to radiation exposure vary greatly, ranging from a few thousand to a few million. The Soviet Union has estimated the direct expenses on the elimination of the consequences of the accident to be about 2 billion roubles (2 billion pounds) in the Soviet Union alone and, more recently, Anatoly Mikeev, Head of the Soviet Fire Service has stated that the total cost, including estimates for long term treatment lot those with acute radiation sickness, will be 200 billion pounds. Direct expenses include sums spent on the erection of the sarcophagus to entomb the reactor, the decontamination of the surrounding territory, the construction of new housing for the evacuees, and compensation payments. The Soviet Finance Minister, Mr Boris Gostev, announced that housing for evacuees had been provided free at a cost to the state of 320 million pounds. The government also gave individuals a lump sum of 4000 pounds; a family of two, 7000 pounds plus an extra 1500 pounds for each dependent. Compensation for the loss of cars abandoned when people were evacuated, came to 100 million pounds.42 Mr Gostev claimed that that 500 million pounds had been voluntarily contributed by Soviet citizens and that 1.5 billion pounds came from abroad, of which only 100 million pounds came from the insurance organisation. "Of course, there are some indirect losses, too a 1000 megawatt unit has been ruined and will never be returned to the country's economy. One year later, another 1000 megawatt unit, the third unit, had not yet been restarted . The other two units did not generate electric power for several months. As a result, during this period, an acute shortage of electricity was felt in some regions. The normal rhythm of work of entire regions was disrupted. Many builders and technical facilities were sent to Chernobyl instead of being used at other planned projects. Some of these facilities will be used in the economy again after clean-up operations, but some have been lost for good. This incurred additional economic damage, which subsequently will be assessed."47 A total of 135,000 civilians, most of whom are unlikely ever to return to their homes, had to be evacuated from a 30 km (18 mile) zone around the reactor. Not only will this land be unfit to live in for many years, it has also been lost for agricultural purposes. As of the end of 1986, a total of 1500 km2 (580 m2) of agricultural land had not been used. Since the Ukraine, where Chernobyl is located, accounts for more than a third of the total Soviet winter wheat area, loss of the full Ukrainian crop would reduce total Soviet grain output by a maximum of 20%, that is nearly 20 million tonnes out of a total crop of 190 million tonnes. The economic forecasters, Wharton Associates of Washington DC estimated, soon after the accident, that due to the loss of crops, the Soviet Union would probably have to sell an extra 100 million tonnes of gold on world markets, drawing on reserves, to cover the cost of new grain imports. Further, the Wharton group estimated that additional losses would accrue from lost sales of oil. The oil would be needed to make up for the loss of power from nuclear sources and could have amounted to 300 million pounds for the rest of 1986.44 PlanEcon, another economic forecaster, estimated the losses in milk to be 500,000 to 1 million tons and the losses in meat to be a bit less that 200,000 tons. The reduction in oil export was predicted at 100,000 barrels per day. Their estimate of direct costs totalling between 1.95 to 3.1 billion roubles equals approximately 0.25 to 0.39% of the Soviet National Product. In sum, the high costs of the disaster have led to a dire shortage of hard currency in the Soviet Union. That subsequently has caused new shortages of consumer products because it has reduced the ability to buy-in from abroad.45 As one can see, many of these figures are only estimates. This is for two reasons: (i) much of the losses are difficult to quantify, and (ii) the Soviet Union has been very reluctant to reveal total loss figures, especially indirect expenses. Western commentators have put the costs at over 6 billion pounds.39 Furthermore, these releases of radiation from Chernobyl were substantially less than expected in a worst-case scenario for the reactor. Had 70% of the fission products been discharged the potential consequences could have included: - abandonment of at least 160,000 sq.km. of land - evacuation of women and children for 600,000 to 4 million sq.km. - ruin of agriculture for about 1 million sq km. - permanent inhabitability of 150,000 sq.km.46 The damaging effects of the Chernobyl accident have been hard felt in other countries as radioactive fallout does not honour national frontiers. "Ultimately, the accident left its radioactive visiting card in more than 20 countries, and more than 2000 km from the source."47 Before going into the damage figures of countries outside the Soviet Union, it is important to point out that the Soviet Union has refused to consider paying any compensation to foreign countries affected by the accident. Due to the absence of any suitable international protocol covering liability after a major nuclear accident, the prospects of foreign countries receiving any compensation from the Soviet Union are grim. Also, although individual states are anxious to pursue the possibility of compensation from the Soviet Union, no concentrated efforts have been put forth to accomplish this end. In particular, "the British government has now decided on a 'softly, softly' approach. Government officials are worried that if Britain is too shrill in its demands for compensation from the Soviet Union, it could be hounded by Scandinavian countries annoyed by acid rain."48 A report by the Commission of European Communities (CEC) offers that the fallout from the accident, which was spread over the whole community with particularly high concentrations in Germany, Italy, and Greece, will result in approximately 1000 extra deaths from cancer of all types in the community over the coming decades. There will also be an increase in non-fatal cancers, specifically, for example, approximately 2000 additional thyroid cancers of which about five per cent could be fatal. Putting the Chernobyl event into perspective in other European nations, a poll in West Germany found that no event in the last 25 years - neither the building of the Berlin Wall, nor the Cuban Missile Crisis, nor the oil embargo in 1973 - has worried people as much as Chernobyl radiation.49 Similarly, in the United Kingdom, rating Chernobyl on a scale of released activity, Chernobyl was about three orders of magnitude worse than the Windscale fire of 1957. The "Chernobyl cloud", financially speaking, literally wreaked havoc over the rest of Europe. The Austrian government has paid 44 million pounds in compensation to its farmers for crop losses. The Bulgarian deputy prime minister admitted that his country lost 48 million pounds in food import orders due to a ban slapped on communist countries by the European Commission for the month of May 1986. This admission makes the Polish estimate of 23 million pounds in losses seem a bit conservative. In total, it is claimed that Poland estimates to lose 135 million pounds from loss of vegetable sales. This is in addition to 3.6 million pounds lost in tourist revenues due to 40,000 visitor cancellations immediately following the accident.50 Hungary alone among East European countries has recompensed farmers, to the tune of 6.2 million pounds. The government has awarded livestock farmers 35% of the cash, while the second largest share went to the important horticultural sector. Still, this only covered roughly half of all reported financial loss caused by Chernobyl.50 Greece has tonnes of contaminated wheat to dispose of. Scientists have found that if they grind the wheat and dump it back on to the fields, the caesium is bound tightly by soil particles, and new crops do not pick it up significantly. Bad effects on food exports, however, may prohibit this use of the wheat. Overall, financial consequences of the Chernobyl accident for agriculture is estimated at 62.5 million pounds in Greece.50 The West German government has already paid out about Dm. 430 million (146 million pounds) in compensation. Agricultural losses are estimated to be of the order of Dm. 600 million (200 million pounds). West Germany received the highest doses of radiation, along with parts of Italy and Greece, and had to destroy a large amount of agricultural products.25 The States of Bavaria and Baden Wurttemburg have paid out an additional Dm.508 million for damages not included in the above criteria.51 The saga continues . . . . a five day ban on grazing cows by the government of the Netherlands cost farmers 6.6 million pounds in losses. Norway lost 20 to 30 million pounds in tourism. Overall, Norway's Eastern European neighbours felt a 30% decline in the number of Western European tourists.52 In Sweden, costs are projected at more than 88 million pounds, mainly for radiological monitoring and compensation of farmers. More importantly, a culture has been threatened. Sweden is some 1000 miles (1500 km) from Chernobyl, but the effects were strongly felt. Here, the reindeer are central to the Sami (Lapps) culture. The reindeer eat lichen, and in late June 1986, increasing activity levels were detected. The meat is no longer safe for human consumption, and although the Sami will receive compensation, it is possible that the uncertainty of a viable economic future for reindeer herding may severely damage the Sami culture and lead to further depopulation of central and northern Scandinavia.53 In the United Kingdom, readings above the 1000 becquerel/kg (combined reading of caesium 137 and 134) threshold for safety levels were experienced in parts of northern Wales, Cumbria, southwest Scotland, and the Isle of Man. It was in these areas that the heaviest depositions occurred, in particular in the areas of higher altitudes, because of the heavy rainfall when the radioactive cloud was passing above. The green vegetables in the lowlands and the cattle showed increases in radiation levels. However, sheep were severely affected. It was also at this time that young lambs were suckling and growing very fast. There was a high intake of pasture grass and mother's milk. Readings well above the safety level were recorded - some as high as 4000 bq/kg. Initially, 4.23 million sheep were restricted. The restrictions consisted of requirement of government licensing before any movement and the cessation of all sales. Today, 350,000 to 400,000 sheep are still restricted and as recently as July 10 1987, restrictions were reimposed in some areas because readings indicated the reintroduction of unsafe levels of radiation in sheep. The problem still remains critical more than one year after the accident. In the United Kingdom, no products were destroyed, but restrictions on certain items were imposed. The only compensation was paid by the government to sheep farmers. By September 1987, nearly 5000 claims by Welsh farmers had been settled, totalling 2,850,000 pounds, with 1 ,650,000 pounds reportedly paid in compensation to farmers in Cumbria, 1,200,000 pounds to farmers in south west Scotland and, for the first time since the Chernobyl disaster, restrictions on the movement and slaughter of sheep in Northern Ireland were introduced.54 It is worth noting that although the accident occurred on April 26, restrictions on movements and sales in the United Kingdom were not imposed until June 20. The reason for the delay was that monitoring facilities were "grossly inadequate". Only two machines were available at the time and they required samples of a size which required the slaughter of the sheep. Consequently, although no sheep were "officially" destroyed due to unsafe levels of radiation, some were nonetheless slaughtered for the purpose of testing. Incidentally, the majority of increased costs in the United Kingdom due to the Chernobyl accident are primarily "administrative" in nature, increased monitoring, the administering of the compensation scheme to farmers, and additional staff time spent on responding to and informing the public on the Chernobyl accident and its effects. (3771 calls about the Chernobyl accident were received between May 7 and May 21 by the Secretary of State for the Environment alone, with 991 of those received on May 8.) Finally, in the worst months of the year, shortly after Chernobyl, United States visitor numbers to Britain were down by as much as 48% compared with the corresponding month of the preceding year.55 What cost a UK accident? Estimates of the damage, the expected death toll and the costs to the British public as a result of a major nuclear accident in the UK have been evaluated in response to the prospect of a Pressurized Water Reactor at Sizewell in Suffolk. During the course of the lengthy public enquiry, considerable evidence as to the type and amount of damage that might be incurred in the event of an accident to this plant were furnished as part of the evidence. What follows is an amalgamation of some of the findings. In accepting a mortality risk associated with the use of nuclear power in society, a price is attached to the value of human life. If a major accident occurs in this country many thousands will be expected to die as a result. A report by Earth Resources Research and Friends of the Earth estimates 3,000 early cancer deaths following a major accident at the proposed Sizewell B PWR.56 The economic implications of a major accident have also been estimated. The figures will of course remain generalised just as they do even after an event like Chernobyl, and are based on a series of different though specific accident scenarios. These may result in, for example, different proportions of the fission product inventory being discharged from the reactor and are dependent on prevailing meteorological conditions. The principal costs will accrue from the following: - decommissioning the power station - providing alternative sources of electricity - the short-term emergency counter-measures - the immediate loss of crops - the loss of livestock - the loss of productive land - the laying off of agricultural workers - the loss of non-agricultural products - the relocation costs for affected communities - land and building decontamination costs - disposal costs of contaminated land,livestock and equipment - long-term emergency counter-measures, e.g. banning of foodstuffs, long-term-health care, relocation benefits, emergency administration - compensation for death, illness, property losses - loss of export revenue.57 A conservative estimate for decommissioning of the plant would be upward of 1 billion pounds. An even more conservative estimate for the capital loss of electricity and the cost of providing supplementary power would be in the order of 5 billion pounds.56 An American AEC estimate based on a major accident to a 200 MW reactor located 35 miles from a city with a population of 1 million would lead to property damage of about $7 billion (5 billion pounds) as well as causing around 3,400 early deaths and more than 40,000 injuries.2 In the event of a serious accident at the Sizewell B PWR the ERR/FoE report cited earlier suggests a representative short- term cost of 15 billion pounds. This figure, the authors maintain, is probably too low by a substantial amount, since it omits such factors as compensation for claims from other affected countries. It is important to recognise that an accident severe enough to precipitate measures listed above would not only involve the UK but neighbouring countries such as Ireland, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and beyond. In an assessment of a possible accident at Sizewell B PWR a report by the Political Ecology Research Group estimates a 20% loss of national agricultural production and a crop and livestock loss in excess of 1.5 billion pounds. The cost for Holland in this case is calculated to be four to five times these estimates. Furthermore, it is estimated that something like 10,000 sq.km. of land would be restricted and as many as 40,000 jobs lost. Again, the Dutch in particular would suffer correspondingly more.57 Since most reactors are sited on the coast large-scale nuclear accidents would also have a serious effect on Britain's local fishing industry and that of all other countries concerned. The North Sea, for example, which represents 70% of the Western Seaboard catch and 25% of the total North East Atlantic catch, if closed for one year could cost the market 2 billion pounds.57 Devastating as the effects of the accident were to the people living in the vicinity of Chernobyl, a glance at a 'nuclear' map of England, Wales and Scotland illustrating the proximity of nuclear power stations to areas of much denser population than found around Chernobyl, shows how much more serious such an accident would prove to the people of Britain. Sizewell, where there is already a Magnox station, is within 80 miles of Greater London, one of the most densely populated areas in the world. Near Torness in Scotland, where a new AGR power station is shortly due to come on line, are the cities of Edinburgh and Glasgow. Most of the population of Scotland (just over 4 million people) live in or around these cities. A major accident at this plant would almost certainly require the evacuation of them all. In terms of health impacts, in a worst-case accident scenario of the kind envisaged, the collective radiation dose would range from 4 to 11 million person-sieverts. (Note: Sievert - a unit of radiation exposure which takes into account the effects of different kinds of radiation. 1 sievert = 100 reins. A short- term exposure of 4 to 5 sieverts is considered lethal.) If foodstuffs were banned it would reduce this figure to something in the region of 100,000 to 400,000 person-sieverts. (These figures, again based on estimates for an accident at Sizewell B PWR, represent long-term exposure estimates. As such, they may prove under-estimates in view of the relatively reduced population in the immediate vicinity of Sizewell. Casualty figures in the case of an accident at Hartlepool AGR or Hinkley Point Magnox and AGR, proximal as they are to large centres of population, may be greater by an order of magnitude.)57 The specific dose to the thyroid gland is estimated at between 80 and 100 million person-sieverts without banning foodstuffs, and 100,000 to 200,000 with. The cancer incidence as a result would be approximately 10,000 per million person-sieverts, with a 5-10% mortality. This amounts to between 1,700 to 20,000 cancers even if foodstuffs were banned - allowing for risk factors and weather conditions. Without banning this could result in something like 130,000 to 155,000 cancers. Attempts to quantify the economic cost of such a health crisis have been made. The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) made recommendations that some form of social cost benefit analysis would be useful in determining the relative advantages between cost of counter-measures - like evacuation - and the cost of not implementing them. In the UK the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (MAFF) have chosen a figure of about 5,000 pounds per person-sievert and this is used as a guide in implementing measures to regulate the discharge of radioactivity from a nuclear reactor. The American figure per person-sievert is much higher - around $100,000 (70,000 pounds). Therefore, applying the MAFF figure, the health cost to the UK of a serious nuclear accident is estimated to between 500 million pounds and 2,000 million pounds with the banning of foodstuff and 20,000 million pounds and 55,000 pounds million without banning. Plainly, the explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant was an event of massive proportions that has left its mark on Europe. This report may prove preliminary in nature. Due to the vast amount of indirect effects and the difficulty of quantification, and latent long-term effects (cancer, for example) an accurate total figure may be reached. It is the authors' opinion that governments are "dragging their feet" with regards to arriving an any damage figure. There are reasons for this: First, if the governments derive any figures, including as much information as can possibly be tabulated with regard to damages, the public will recognise the existence of the damages and require to be compensated. Also, the necessary research would be very expensive in itself and quite time consuming. Second, governments with a nuclear power programme have a vested interest in letting the issue subside. By bringing out extensive damage reports, the government would be continuing to damage the already tarnished image of nuclear power. By making a large issue of the damages incurred by the Chernobyl cloud, governments would in essence be opening their own nuclear programmes up to a full scale attack. During the first oil price shock in 1973, nuclear power plants accounted for only 5% of net electricity production of the European Community. By 1986, the nuclear share will have multiplied by a factor of 7 to account for 35% of electricity, or more than 13% of total energy consumption.58 Governments are not likely to expose themselves in such a way as to open up and be forced to accept a "lesser bargaining position". POSTSCRIPT A major accident in Britain - only a matter of time? The nuclear industry asserts that a major nuclear accident on the scale of Chernobyl could never happen in Britain. In reality, the two types of civil nuclear reactor, the Magnox and Advanced Gas Cooled Reactor, are as likely to suffer an accident beyond what is called "the design base" as any other reactor type in the world and the U.K. has had its fair share of nuclear plant 'incidents'.59 (A "design base accident" implies very low releases of radiation and has limited consequences beyond the reactor site. An accident beyond the design base of a reactor implies that large releases of radioactivity caused by the failure of the reactor vessel and breaching of containment/biological shield.) Indeed, at present the Magnox reactors, of which there are 18 commercial reactors in Britain, could present an even greater risk since many of them are nearing the end of their design lives. Earlier Magnox reactors were commissioned with design omissions and serious construction faults. All Magnoxes with a steel pressure vessel have serious problems with steel corrosion which also affects components, particularly the core garter restraint system. Moreover four to six of the 10 advanced gas-cooled reactors (AGRs) have a reduced safety margin in their pressure vessels due to incorrect pre-stressing of the concrete. Both Magnox and AGRs have a potential for large radioactive releases. In a Magnox air intrusion after pressure vessel failure and subsequent graphite ignition can lead to a large release. In an AGR a steam intrusion into the reactor core due to multiple boiler tube failure followed by a failure of the pressure vessel could have a similar result.59 Philip Cade Author Edited by Colin Hines and Nicholas Gallie Greenpeace UK 30-31 Islington Green London N1 8XE December, 1986 'TOO HOT TO HANDLE' REFERENCES. 1) Anatoly Mikeev , Speech. Guardian 1719/1987 2) Stan Openshaw, 'Nuclear Power - Siting and Safety' Routledge and Kegan Paul. 3) 4) World Information Service on Energy. NC 271, 27/3/1987. 5) Guardian, 5/9/1987 6) 7) 8) Notes on Nuclear Installations (Amendment) Act 1965, Ministry of Power, 1966. 9) David Marsh, 'Assessing the Cost of a Western Chernobyl', Financial Times, 24th. Nov, 1986. 10) Anthony Bevins, The Times, 30th. Jan, 1986. 11) ibid. 12) W.I.S.E. NC 222, 15th. Feb. 1986. 13) C.E.G.B. Annual Report, 1985/86. 14) Lord's Hansard, Vol. 457, Col. 676, 21st. Nov. 1984. 15) United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority. Annual Report, 1985/86. 16) See Ref.14. 17) Richart Curtis and Elisabeth Hogan, 'Perils of the Peaceful Atom', Victor Gollancz, London, 1970. 18) Nature Vol 328, 13/8/1987. 19) Marie Louise Wagner, Nucleonics Week, Washington, 3rd. April 1986. 20) The Kemney Report. Presidential Commission on Three Mile Island. 21) 'The Lessons Learned'. A speech delivered at an International Conference on Nuclear Risks, London, 1st, Dec. 1986. By E.E. Kinter, Vice-President, General Public Utilities Corporation, USA. 22) See Ref.19. 23) See Ref.3. 24) International Conference on Nuclear Risks, London, 1st December, 1986. 25) Ann MacLachlan, Nuclear Fuel, Davos, Switzerland, 30th, June, 1986. 26) The Times, 16th. May, 1986. 27) ECO, Vol, XXXVI, No. 2, November, 1986. 28) A.H. Herman. 'Liability for Chernobyl', Financial Times, 22nd. July, 1986. 29) David Marsh, 'Assessing the Cost of a Western Chernobyl', Financial Times, 24th, November,- 1986. 30) 31) W.I.S.E. NC 278, 14/8/1987. 32) Jim Jeffrey, 'The Unique Dangers of Nuclear Power', The Ecologist, Vol. 16, No. 4/5, 1986. 33) Der Spiegel, Nov. 17th. 1987. Reported in The Guardian and The Times, 18th. 4th. 1987. 34) Judith Cook, Red Alert, New English Library, London, 1986. 35) See Ref. 21. 36) 37) 'Regulating a Multiplicity of Power Utility Companies', speech delivered at International Conference on Nuclear Risks, London, 1st, December, 1986 by James K.Asseltine, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 38) Lean, Hawkes, Pringle et al, 'The Worst Accident in the World', William Heinemman, London, 1986. 39) Christopher Flavin, 'Reassessing Nuclear Power: The Fallout From Chernobyl', Worldwatch Paper, 75, March 1987. p. 13. 40) Financial Times, August 21 st, 1986, p.2. 41) Derek Brown, 'EEC Faces Fresh Calls for Nuclear Safeguards', The Guardian, August 11th. 1986, p. 7. 42) Patrick Cockburn, 'Chernobyl Disaster, Cost 2bn.' The Financial Times, September, 20th, 1986, p. 2. 43) A Soviet Expert Discusses Chernobyl, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August, 1987, p. 32. 44) Michael Simmons, 'Soviet Union Hit by Grain Losses', The Guardian, May, 15th, 1986, p. 8. 45) Christopher Walker, 'Russians Count the Cost of Chernobyl', The Times, September 20th, 1986, p. 20. 46) R.E. Webb, 'Catastrophic Nuclear Accident Hazards- A Warning for Europe', August, 1986. 47) Roger Milne, 'Lessons for the Soviets', New Scientist, April 23rd, 1987, p. 37. 48) Brenda Howard and Francis Livens, 'May Sheep Safely Graze', New Scientist, April 23, 1987, p. 46. 49) The Guardian, May 19th, 1986, p. 19. 50) Debora MacKenzie and Misha Glenny, 'From Polish Potatoes to Turkish Tea', New Scientist, April 23rd. 1987, p. 48; P.J.Floyd, Nuclear Risks Reassessing the Principles and Practice After Chernobyl, December 1986, p. 114. 51) German Government Report, 1st. September 1987. 52) Financial Times, May 13th 1986, p. 3; The Guardian August 15th. 1986, p. 6., 53) Floyd, p.113. 54) Chernobyl Accident: Compensation Received - Payments Authorised Under the Sheep Compensation Scheme 1986; House of Commons Hansard, Written Answers, April 29th, 1987, p. 132. 55) News from the British Tourist Authority, 'Tourism - 1986 An Outstanding Year', p. 2. 56) Francois Nectoux and William Cannell, 'Accidents Will Happen - An Inquiry into the Social and Economic Consequences of a Nuclear Accident at Sizewell B', Earth Resources Research/Friends of the Earth, 1984. 57) Peter Taylor, 'The Effects of a Severe Reactor Accident at the Proposed Sizewell B Station upon Agriculture and Fisheries in the U.K. and Neighbouring Countries', Political Ecology Research Group, 1986. 58) Commission of European Communities, 'Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant Accident and its Consequences in the Framework of the European Community ', October 1986 . 59) 'International Nuclear Reactor Hazard Study ', Greenpeace/Gruppe Okologie, Hannover, September, 1986 .