TL: THE UK's INVOLVEMENT IN THE NAVAL NUCLEAR ARMS RACE SO: GREENPEACE UK (GP) DT: not dated Keywords: nuclear weapons production uk europe military arms gp navy wars / CONTENTS: 1. ROYAL NAVY OVERVIEW 2. THE NAVAL NUCLEAR ARSENAL IN THE UK 3. THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR WAR AT SEA: THE ROYAL NAVY, NATO AND THE OFFENSIVE MARITIME STRATEGY 4. NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION AT SEA: NAVAL EXERCISES IN NORTHERN WATERS IN THE 1980's 4. THE NAVAL NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE UK 5. THE ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS OF NUCLEAR NAVIES AROUND THE UK 6. NUCLEAR IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR IN THE FALKLANDS 7. THE UK, NAVAL ARMS CONTROL AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING AT SEA 8. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE THE UK's INVOLVEMENT IN THE NAVAL NUCLEAR ARMS RACE 1. ROYAL NAVY OVERVIEW The Royal Navy (RN) is the world's third largest nuclear armed and nuclear powered navy after the Soviet Union and United States. All nuclear weapons directly controlled by the UK belong to the RN, apart from Royal Air Force (RAF) free fall strike bombs, many of which are for use at sea. Of the Royal Navy's 84 major vessels, 26 are capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Over 60% of the submarines are nuclear powered and four of them carry strategic nuclear missiles [1]. This nuclear capability was initially acquired in a short period in the 1960s. The RNs first nuclear powered submarine was launched in 1962. The UK's first Polaris submarine strategic missile was test fired by HMS Resolution in February 1968 [2]. Other nuclear bombs and depth bombs were acquired in the late 1960's. This nuclear navy is now entering a new period of expansion with the Trident missile programme which could increase by four times the number of nuclear warheads on strategic missiles. The RN's nuclear role in NATO The central role for the Royal Navy has changed from one of supporting various foreign commitments, to one within NATO where it is assigned wartime tasks in the Eastern Atlantic area [3]. These are the waters closest to the Soviet Northern Fleet based on the Kola Peninsula in the northern Soviet Union, to the east of Norway. This is considered to be the major battlefield for any naval war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact [4]. The RN is the most important naval force in NATO after the US Navy. According to Admiral Sir James Eberle, RN, "The unique contribution made to NATO by the Royal Navy is in the nuclear field, in the shape of its nuclear weapons (SSBNs) and its nuclear propelled attack submarines (SSNs)" [5]. The UK also provides the "bulk of the Alliance's ready naval theatre nuclear forces" in the Eastern Atlantic. These are nuclear free fall strike and depth bombs and are the only such non-US naval weapons assigned to NATO [6]. Britain also provides bases for the US Navy which support US naval nuclear operations in the Atlantic. This primary position within NATO in relation to the US Navy is reflected in NATO command relationships. Since the creation of NATOs Atlantic Command in 1952, the Commander of the Royal Navy (CinCFleet) has been the main NATO commander of the Eastern Atlantic area, the waters closest to the Soviet Union. As Commander Eastern Atlantic (Cin-CEastLant), CinCFleet is the most important commander after NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, SACLANT. SACLANT is a position always held by the commander of the US Navy's Atlantic Command. SACLANT has overall operational control of the Royal Navy and other NATO naval forces during NATO operations, exercises, crisis or war. CinCFleet is also NATO commander of the independent, but less influential, Channel Command area [7]. Intensive naval operations The Royal Navy still maintains a residual global role. The RN participates in NATO Mediterranean exercises, and from the naval base in Gibraltar takes responsibility for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) in the straits. Outside of NATO, a ship is maintained for periods in the Caribbean as part of a commitment to Belize. Frigates and destroyers are deployed permanently in the Gulf, and until January 1987 were regularly deployed in the South Atlantic around the Falklands Islands [8]. The RN co-operates closely with the US Navy both within and outside of the NATO area. Recent deployments include 'Global-86', when an RN aircraft carrier task force visited 21 countries, and participated for the first time in the major US Navy Pacific fleet exercise 'RimPac' [9]. The RN accompanied the US Navy's battleship Iowa and its task force on their unusual visit to the Baltic in 1985 [10]. This caused much controversy because of the potentially large number of nuclear weapons the force was believed to have been carrying. The Royal Navy also participates regularly in the US Navy's western Atlantic Readiness (Read-Ex) exercises [11]. Although the size of the surface fleet is declining the Royal Navy is conducting more intensive operations [12]. In 1985 Royal Navy ships visited 83 countries, and "made a significant contribution to surveillance of Warsaw Pact shipping worldwide", and the fleet though smaller is in the words of Armed Forces Minister John Stanley, "hugely more capable" [13]. Royal Navy surface ships in 1985 spent nearly half the year at sea, as opposed to 40% of the time during WW II [14]. The proportion of the fleet that could be put to sea in 48 hours was up from 72% in 1979, to 84% by 1985 [15]. The wide scope and increasing pace of RN operations means that RN and Soviet naval forces capable of carrying nuclear weapons are in frequent close contact. This is not without incident. During surveillance of Soviet exercises far north in the Barents Sea in 1981, the destroyer HMS Glasgow collided with the nuclear weapons capable Soviet missile cruiser, the Admiral Isakov [16]. This was an operation specially authorized by the Prime Minister as it was beyond the NATO area, east of the North Cape of Norway and near to the Kola Peninsula. There were similar sensitive operations authorized in 1980 and 1983 [17]. In January 1988 HMS Liverpool observed Soviet gunnery and missile firing exercises in the Barents Sea and its helicopters closely photographed Soviet attack submarines on the surface [18]. 2. THE NAVAL NUCLEAR ARSENAL IN THE UK 1. THE NAVAL NUCLEAR ARSENAL IN THE UK The RN and RAF Naval Arsenal (Omitted .. unscannable) 2. NUCLEAR CAPABLE NAVAL AIRCRAFT (Omitted .. unscannable) The strategic naval nuclear weapons of the RN The 'strategic' force consists of 64 Polaris A3-TK submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) carried by four Resolution class nuclear powered submarines. One to two submarines are on patrol at all times in the Atlantic. Each Polaris missile has a range of 2500 miles, and is thought to carry 2 nuclear warheads with an estimated destructive power of 40 kilotons (kt) each, or approximately twice that of the Hiroshima bomb. Government statements in 1987 indicate that Polaris may carry three warheads, or may refer to the three warheads carried by Polaris when first deployed [19]. The Chevaline project modified the 'front end' of the missile, including the installation of decoy warheads and adding maneuverability to the missile front end, and reduced the number of warheads to two [20]. Although this expensive programme was authorized in 1970 it was not acknowledged by the government in Parliament until 1980 [21]. By the mid 1990s, the first of the Vanguard class submarines armed with 16 US designed and produced Trident II D5 SLBMs will become operational with the Royal Navy. The warheads are often said to be British designed, but a recent study by the UK National Audit Office contradicts what is commonly understood, stating; "Most of the expenditure on development and production [of the UK Trident warhead] is incurred in the US." [22] The RN's Trident II missiles are expected to carry 8 warheads, but they could carry the maximum of 14 for specific tasks [23]. This will increase the number of warheads on each submarine on patrol from 32 (or 48 if Polaris is deployed 3 warheads) to 128. Although the British Trident II will usually carry fewer warheads than its US counterpart they could have a higher explosive yield as much as 100kt [24]. When fully deployed the strategic arsenal of the Royal Navy could increase from 128 to 512 nuclear warheads. The cost of the Trident arsenal, excluding future running costs as of January 1987, was estimated at 9 billion and 265 million pounds at 1986-7 prices [25]. The US Navy's strategic nuclear arsenal in the UK: Holy Loch The US Navy at Holy Loch in Scotland is one of the three US Navy strategic missile bases, and the only strategic missile base held on foreign soil by any country in the world. It is a 'forward base' for 7-10 Lafayette and Benjamin Franklin submarines. These submarines are armed with 16 Poseidon missiles each of which have ten warheads. Ten submarines in the Squadron could carry 1600 warheads. Seven operational US submarines potentially carry 1120 strategic missile warheads, present or deployed around the shores of the UK by the US Navy. There are usually three submarines at anchor in Holy Loch carrying between them as many as 480 nuclear warheads [26]. Trident missiles and nuclear 'First Strike' The Trident II missile will greatly increase the size and destructive power of the UK's nuclear arsenal. Trident missiles can be targeted independently, are far more accurate and will have twice the range of the Polaris missile [27]. They could have a higher explosive yield as much as 100kt. Each Polaris submarine could destroy 16 targets. Trident submarines will be able to destroy 128 quite separate targets within a larger area in the Soviet Union. Trident provides the capability to destroy dispersed and smaller 'hardened' underground targets. This gives the UK the nuclear capability to contribute to a preemptive or 'first strike' against the Soviet Union's land based nuclear missiles (a 'counter force strike') and command centres (a 'decapitation strike'). The operational independence of the UK's 'independent deterrent', must also be in doubt, particularly during any superpower crisis. It is known that patrol areas and mock test firings of Polaris submarines, are cleared each day with the US Navy's Atlantic command representative (COMSUBLANT) at the Royal Navy's North wood HQ, Middlesex. This is to coordinate US and UK SSBN operations and patrol areas when acting in unison, and the "prevention of mutual interference" when they are acting apart [28]. For these reasons the Soviet Union may regard Trident as primarily an adjunct to US strategic forces, which could launch a 'first strike'. In a crisis this knowledge, the US Trident force and future Soviet equivalent will increase the 'hair trigger' on nuclear weapons, and encourage one side to launch first. The UK: naval nuclear arms racing The UK has constantly sought to upgrade its naval nuclear capability, with little justification. The Chevaline programme authorized in 1970, Trident I in 1980 and Trident II in 1982, were argued for primarily on the basis that they would ensure against future Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) developments around Moscow [29]. This system is designed to explode incoming missiles as far away from the city as possible. However, they are generally regarded as being highly still highly ineffective [30]. Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, former CinCFleet stated in 1985 that "I agree that (Trident II) D5 may have more capability than is required at the outset..Anybody who began with a weapon system required to extend over that period against the present generation of (Soviet) ABM..would...be unwise. I'm very happy that there is in the D5 missile what I would call stretch potential" [31]. This anticipation of a future capability is part of the dynamic that drives the arms race. An argument made for going with Trident II in May 1982 rather than Trident I, was that it would enable the UK to retain 'commonality' with the US nuclear forces in the future. According to former Navy Minister Keith Speed, "The American decision to go for Trident [II D5], meant that we really had to follow suit" [32]. In these and other ways, the UK is willingly being pulled along into perpetuating a pointless and dangerously de-stabilizing US-Soviet nuclear arms race at sea. 'Tactical' naval nuclear weapons The UK's 'tactical' naval nuclear weapons for use in ocean battles in maritime 'theatres' of war, such as the Eastern Atlantic, consist of free fall nuclear strike bombs and nuclear depth bombs. Only the US and UK possess or store such weapons in the Eastern Atlantic. The UK has a total of 271 nuclear capable RN and RAF aircraft and helicopters, with 200 usually operational, for wartime missions from land or from surface ships. Nuclear Depth Bombs Up to 140 (ASW) nuclear depth bombs for destroying submarines are carried on surface ships. These are thought to be a lower explosive yield version of the British built WE-177 nuclear strike bomb and have a 20 kiloton warhead; the power of the Hiroshima bomb. These are carried by the RN's 3 ASW carriers, the 8 Type 22 frigates, which are believed to be assigned 2-3 nuclear depth bombs in peacetime and by the 12 Type 42 destroyers in wartime. The bombs can be delivered by one, or in wartime, two Lynx Mk 2/3 on the frigates and destroyers, and 9 Sea King HAS.5 on each ASW carrier. ASW helicopters There are 70 operational Lynx Mk 2/3 helicopters in three Squadrons, (702,815,829) based at Royal Naval Air Station Portland, Dorset. There is a total of 76 including training and reserve aircraft that could deliver a nuclear depth bomb. There are 56 operational of a total of 78 Sea King HAS.5 helicopters in five squadrons. Squadrons 814, 820,824,826,819 are based at RNAS Culdrose in Cornwall and Squadron 819 at Prestwick Airport. Free Fall Strike Bombs There are 50 WE-177 nuclear free fall strike bombs assigned for maritime missions. The destructive power is believed to be variable from 5-200 kilotons. They are assigned to 25 RAF Buccaneer S.2B aircraft based on land assigned to maritime strike against surface ships. Each Buccaneer can carry one bomb. There is a total of 52 Buccaneer aircraft in Squadrons 12, 208, and 237 based at RAF Lossiemouth, Moray. In 1981 the UK Defence White Paper announced the restoration of a naval 'tactical' nuclear capability: the delivery of nuclear bombs by Sea Harrier FRS.3 aircraft bases on the 3 ASW carriers. There are currently five, and will eventually be eight, Sea Harriers FRS.3 deployed on each of the RNs two operational ASW aircraft carriers which are believed to be assigned 2-3 bombs when carried in peacetime [33]. There are 24 operational Sea Harrier aircraft of a total of 34 based at Yeovilton in Squadrons 800, 801, and 899. Nuclear capable surface ships Virtually any RN surface ship could deliver a nuclear depth bomb as ASW helicopters are widely dispersed in the fleet. However, it is thought that the three Invincible class ASW carriers and eight Type 22 frigates are the major class certified to carry nuclear weapons in peacetime for their aircraft and helicopters, with the addition of 12 Type 42 destroyers in wartime [34]. The 3 ASW carriers, Illustrious, Invincible, and Ark Royal are home based in Portsmouth. The eight Type 22 frigates are home based in Devonport, in Plymouth, Devon. Eight of the Type 42 destroyers are based in Portsmouth, and 4 in Devonport, and four at Rosyth, Fife. The nuclear capability is being enhanced with the on going Type 22 and new Type 23 frigates programmes. A new nuclear weapon capable ASW helicopter the EH 101 will also be deployed from the mid 1990's [35]. US Navy Tactical Weapons The US Navy stores 126 US B-57 nuclear depth bombs in peacetime under US control at two RAF bases, St Mawgan in Cornwall and Macrihanish in Strathclyde. These have a 'Naval Aviation Weapons Facility Detachment'. The RAFs 25 operational Nimrod MR.2 long range patrol and ASW aircraft of a total of 31 are assigned US Navy depth bombs. Numerous US Navy nuclear weapon capable ships and submarines which visit UK ports add to the US Navy's 'tactical' arsenal in transit through the UK. US nuclear weapons capable vessels spent approximately 57 ship days in Portsmouth from October 1986 to October 1987 [36]. The US Navy is developing a new nuclear ASW rocket, nuclear strike bomb and depth bomb that may be made available to UK forces in the future. Work is also in progress for a new Royal Navy depth and strike bomb warhead to replace the WE-177 warhead .An internal RN study for a long anti-submarine rocket, perhaps carrying a nuclear depth bomb warhead, has been reported [37]. A new air launched nuclear cruise missile under consideration for RAF Tornado strike aircraft, also could be assigned for Sea Harrier and Buccaneer aircraft for naval missions [38]. Nuclear war fighting at Sea The Royal Navy is described as being very sensitive about its tactical nuclear weapons acquired in the latter 1960's. Their presence was first acknowledged officially in the 1980 Defense White Paper [39]. There is little information on how they might ever be used. RAF plans to use nuclear depth bombs against Soviet SSBN's were revealed in 1976 [40]. RN nuclear depth bombs have been mentioned for use against new Soviet attack submarines with double skinned hulls which are considered difficult to destroy with non-nuclear torpedoes [41]. There is also little consideration of the implications of having them deployed on a wide variety of Royal Navy warships which would face the nuclear armed Soviet Navy in the Norwegian Sea in any naval confrontation, or of the dangers of them being used in a crisis, or during a battle which began with conventional weapons. The response of then CinCFleet Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse RN, in 1985 is typical. Asked if he thought there was a lack of thought in what is published about fighting a nuclear war at sea, and a lack of theory or study on the subject, he only replied, "You may be as a journalist. I'm not as a naval officer." He went on to describe 'tactical weapons' as a link in the 'scale of deterrence' [42]. Despite this reticence, the RN takes the prospect of a nuclear war at sea very seriously in the design of its modern surface ships. These have little known systems to allow operations in a contaminated environment, such as the design of an inner 'citadel' closed off from the outside air to prevent radioactive contamination entering the ship and water sprays which can rapidly soak the entire hull and superstructure [43]. The aircraft carrier Illustrious conducted a nuclear exercise off Scotland in November 1984. This reportedly assumed a nuclear explosion by a 100 kt nuclear weapon in northern Scotland 20 miles from the ship. The Illustrious used its capability of spraying one million gallons of sea water from 250 jets to flood the decks, and thus wash off radioactive fallout during a nuclear war [44]. It is hoped this will allow the ship to continue fighting in a radioactive environment during and after a nuclear exchange at sea, or a nuclear war on land. 3. THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR WAR AT SEA: THE ROYAL NAVY, NATO AND THE OFFENSIVE MARITIME STRATEGY Since the 1960's, NATO has planned for a protracted conventional war with the Soviet Union before there is any resort to nuclear weapons. The primary role of the navy in this plan was the defence of convoy routes, or Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), across the Atlantic for the resupply and reinforcement of Europe from the US. In the 1970's, war plans called for attacking Soviet submarines trying to reach convoys from the Kola Peninsula, in the 'choke points' of the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap. Offensive naval operations against naval forces and land targets had a secondary role [45]. US Maritime Strategy This primarily defensive strategy has changed during the Reagan administration. Since the early 1980's, the US has been pursuing 'global maritime superiority' over the Soviet Union. To this end, plans to build a '600 ship Navy' are underway and new naval nuclear weapons have been developed and deployed. There is also a new offensive US naval strategy called the Maritime Strategy [46]. The controversial Maritime Strategy calls for naval operations in a crisis that are widely believed to both threaten the outbreak of armed conflict and possibly lead to a nuclear war at sea [47]. In the Atlantic, the "offensive forward strategy" puts a new emphasis on early forward offensive movement of naval forces in a crisis [48]. US nuclear weapon capable attack submarines will move north towards the naval and air bases of the Soviet Northern Fleet on the Kola Peninsula, followed by US Navy aircraft carrier battle groups [49]. According to SACLANT Admiral Wesley MacDonald, "There's going to be an awful lot of business in the Norwegian Sea. We want to be in the Norwegian Sea before war starts." [50]. Such an early, fast movement could in itself contribute to an intensification of the confrontation between nuclear armed NATO and Soviet navies in the Eastern Atlantic. This danger is increased by planned naval operations under the Maritime Strategy, once naval forces are deployed forward near the Soviet Union. In particular, two of the objectives: to threaten and destroy Soviet SSBNs with US attack submarines; and the destruction of Soviet naval and air bases, and other land targets; threaten to precipitate nuclear war with the Soviet Union during any conflict with conventional weapons. This danger is worsened by hundreds of nuclear bombs and sea launched cruise missiles cruise missiles for land attack that the US Navy possesses [51]. NATO and the Maritime Strategy NATO allies have been integrated into US Navy forward operations, and the Maritime Strategy. At the initiative of the US Navy a parallel NATO naval strategy has been developed to coordinate with the US Maritime Strategy. It was endorsed in 1982 by NATO's three military commands and NATO's highest political authorities, The North Atlantic Council, as NATOs current "Concept of Maritime Operations" (ConMarOps) [52]. This coordinated plan addresses how NATO naval forces would be used in crisis and war [53]. The first objective of NATOs ConMarOps has been described by former US 2nd Fleet Commander, Admiral Henry C. Must in as "to contain and destroy the Soviet Northern Fleet,.." [54]. This means that NATO naval strategy now has a new emphasis on an offensive campaign in the waters north of the GIUK gap. This is referred to typically within NATO, as by Sir William Stavely, as "forward maritime defence" in the Norwegian Sea [55]. Admiral Lee Baggett (SACLANT) has described two war campaigns for NATO; the battle of the Atlantic and battle of the Norwegian Sea, both of which are inter-linked [56]. According to Admiral James Lyons, "Our ability to protect the reinforcement and resupply of the NATO alliance may be the prompt attainment of superiority in the Norwegian Sea by NATO" [57]. This is justified within NATO as the best way to defend convoys and amphibious reinforcements for Norway on the 'Northern flank', against the large Soviet submarine fleet based in the Kola Peninsula [58]. One result of following the logic of the new offensive orientation occurred in 1984, and also demonstrated the close relationship and agreement between the US Navy and Royal Navy in NATO. Then CinCFleet, Sir John Fieldhouse, and then SACLANT, Admiral Wesley MacDonald, launched an apparently bilateral initiative to change NATO's naval 'rules of engagement' [59]. These are the rules under which a NATO naval commander can fire weapons at sea. NATO's rules have been defensive, allowing only a response to fire. The initiative aimed at more 'flexibility' for naval commanders, including the ability in 'certain circumstances' to fire first in self defense [60]. Vice Admiral Lyons (USN) reportedly suggested that these proposals did not exclude the possibility of the first use of naval nuclear weapons at sea [61]. Other NATO countries, particularly Denmark, West Germany and the Netherlands, prevented any such change of the rules on the grounds that it was not consistent with the principle of NATO as a defensive alliance [62]. A new ConMarOps which is thought to develop the Maritime Strategy and also reflect European uncertainties with it, has been developed by UK, West Germany and the Netherlands and will be submitted to NATO foreign ministers in 1988 [63]. The Royal Navy's contribution to the forward offensive strategy According to SACLANT Admiral Lee Baggett "In a NATO war sixty percent of the destroyers and frigates, nearly one third of my nuclear attack submarines and maritime patrol aircraft,... and the only two ASW carriers will be provided by the allies." [64]. The Royal Navy provides the most capable of the destroyers and frigates, and Nimrod patrol and ASW aircraft, the attack submarines and the two ASW carriers referred to by Admiral Baggett [65]. The US Navy relies on the Royal Navy to supply much of the ASW capability for forward operations, for which RN ships and helicopters are specialized [66]. There are two dimensions of the Royal Navy's contribution: in the 'Striking Fleet Atlantic' and in the submarine offensive [67]. The 'Striking Fleet Atlantic' At least one of the Royal Navy's three ASW carriers with frigates and destroyer escorts would provide a specialized ASW task group to attack Soviet submarines. This was known until 1985 as Anti-Submarine Group Two (ASGRUTWO). This task group would support the 3-5 US Navy aircraft carriers with their frigate, destroyer and cruiser escorts or 'carrier battle groups' (CVBG's), in the Eastern Atlantic and Norwegian Sea [68]. Together with the powerful US amphibious force, they comprise NATO's offensive battle fleet, the 'Striking Fleet Atlantic' (STRKFLTLANT). In exercise Ocean Safari 1985 the Royal Navy's ASW task group operated up to 400 miles ahead of the US carrier America and moved deep into the northern Norwegian Sea [69]. The Royal Navy would therefore be more deeply involved than any other NATO navy in any initiation of the US Navy's offensive battle plans against Soviet land targets. If the war led to the use of nuclear weapons, Royal Navy helicopters on surface ships, and RAF Nimrod long range patrol and ASW aircraft could deliver nuclear depth bombs against Soviet submarines far north. Nuclear free fall bombs could be delivered against Soviet surface ships by Royal Navy Sea Harriers aircraft on the ASW carriers in the task group, or land based RAF Buccaneer aircraft. The latter could reach into the southern Norwegian Sea without refuelling. The Royal Navy appears to have acquired new prestige from its role in supporting the US Navy's offensive forward strategy. According to Vice Admiral Henry C. Must in, the new ConMarOps involved the restructuring of NATO and national commands necessary: "to fight a NATO war in the Norwegian Sea. This has involved...the creation of a new Striking Fleet organization, which elevates the Royal Navy Anti-submarine Warfare Commander ...to the status of a Principal Subordinate Commander in NATO,.." [70]. It was revealed during Ocean Safari 1985 that at the recommendation of Admiral Wesley Mac Donald (SACLANT), the status of the RN's ASW task force had been raised and renamed the Anti Submarine Warfare Striking Force Atlantic' [71]. The Striking Fleet Atlantic is the UK's main NATO commitment for its carriers, destroyers and frigates. In addition the combined UK-Netherlands amphibious force assigned for landings in Norway, are an additional component of 'forward maritime defence' in the Norwegian Sea. The submarine offensive The Royal Navy's nuclear powered (fleet) hunter killer submarines (SSNs) are the only non-US NATO attack submarines regularly assigned to NATO. The fleet is undergoing expansion initiated in 1982 after the Nott Defense Review, from 12 to a probable force goal of 17 in the 1990's, through a building programme for the new Trafalgar class submarine [72]. The new diesel (patrol) Upholder class submarine has also been designed for forward operations [73]. The Maritime Strategy is based on an early forward deployment of US Navy attack submarines, most nuclear weapon capable, to Soviet home waters followed by the carrier battle groups [74]. Also, according to Admiral Sir William Stavely "Our (RN) nuclear powered hunter killer submarines, and those of the United States, are the platforms best able to operate well forward and threaten the whole range of Soviet submarines and high value surface units." [74]. Other NATO naval forces are associated with 'barrier operations' against Soviet submarines in the 'choke points' of the GIUK gap, leaving US and RN nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers to operate forward. Evidence of peacetime forward submarine operations was provided in May 1987 when an incident involving the RN hunter killer submarine HMS Splendid was discovered. It was confirmed that HMS Splendid had lost its long towed sonar array in an unspecified incident in the Barents Sea, and thus while operating near Soviet naval bases. This was the first confirmation of forward operations in Soviet 'home' waters [76]. John Cartwright MP, also said in the Commons that, "It has been suggested to me that the HMS Splendid incident is not an isolated occurrence, and that there have been similar incidents involving HMS Spartan and HMS Sceptre (Swift sure class hunter killers)." [77]. A further official indication of forward submarine operations was provided in April 1987. Sir Nicholas Hunt, CinCFleet, reportedly stated that "forward defence" effectively takes RN submarines "behind enemy lines", and that this must be carried out in peacetime. [78]. The RN and escalation to nuclear war at sea: 'Strategic Anti- Submarine Warfare'. A most provocative and dangerous aspect of the RNs involvement in the maritime strategy is its apparent acceptance of the naval mission of threatening and attacking Soviet SSBNs: known as "Strategic ASW". This is part of the US Navy's Maritime Strategy that seems to have been accepted within NATO [79]. According to Admiral Trost, US Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in April 1987, "NATO's concept of maritime operations (ConMarOps) recognizes that one of the roles of NATO maritime forces is to hold at risk, to destroy the Soviet Naval threat including Soviet strategic forces at sea." [80]. Soviet SSBN's now deploy north to the Arctic and under the ice in an effort to avoid detection by US and NATO naval forces. The greater range of Soviet strategic missiles from the Delta class submarine onward, means they no longer need to transit through the GIUK gap to be within range of the US. Now, according to Admiral Trost (CNO) "US nuclear capable attack submarines are routinely deployed into Arctic waters to carry out wartime campaigns and battle plans in support of the Maritime Strategy." [81] The US Navy and some of the Royal Navy's 15 hunter killer submarines, have conducted joint exercises under the Arctic including the US Navy's SUBICE exercises between 1971-81 [82]. The RNs Trafalgar class SSN has an under ice operating capability [83]. In 1986, the Royal Navy hunter killer submarine HMS Superb and US nuclear capable attack submarines USS Sea Devil and USS Billfish surfaced simultaneously at the North Pole - only the third such western operation and the first joint US- UK surfacing [84]. Such exercises show that the Royal Navy has quietly accepted the submarine offensive far north under the Arctic ice, including the mission of hunting and destroying Soviet strategic submarines [85]. According to a reported statement of Admiral Sir Nicholas Hunt, (CinCFleet), in 1987, "..we must be able to deal with Soviet nuclear forces" [86]. The danger of Strategic Anti-Submarine Warfare The RN is thus involved in a highly provocative and de- stabilizing operation against Soviet nuclear forces. Preparing to attack Soviet SSBNs could further de-stabilize a superpower crisis. Attacks on SSBNs during a conflict with conventional weapons could precipitate the use of naval nuclear weapons and general nuclear war, since the Soviet Union might respond to such attacks by launching its strategic missiles before they were destroyed. The Soviet Union does not, as yet, have the capability to threaten RN or US strategic missile submarines in this way [87]. This naval mission is in odd contradiction to the UK government's belief in the value of nuclear 'deterrence', as the Royal Navy may become involved in destroying the Soviet naval nuclear 'deterrent' in a conventional war. There has been no extensive debate in the UK on the implications of the Royal Navy's role in support of US Navy forward operations, and the government has denied there has been any change in the basic strategy of NATO [88]. The only official indication of a policy shift is found in a change of emphasis in the annual Defence Estimates. The 1987 Estimates stated the wartime RN task of "The interception and containment of Soviet forces in the Norwegian Sea". This is listed prior to the task of defense of transAtlantic reinforcement and resupply shipping [89]. In 1984, reference to the direct defense of convoys in the Atlantic was omitted altogether [90]. Furthermore, phrases such as "forward deployment operations in the Norwegian Sea" confirm the new emphasis on more offensive operations in northern waters [91]. 3. NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION AT SEA: NAVAL EXERCISES IN NORTHERN WATERS IN THE 1980's NATO exercises test all aspects of naval war from convoy defense, to the sea borne reinforcement of Norway and forward offensive operations by the Striking Fleet Atlantic. Ever larger NATO exercises, and Soviet exercises and counter operations with routinely nuclear armed naval forces, threaten to undermine the Nordic regions historic status as an area of low military tension. The testing of the offensive strategy also threatens to cause a confrontation in a crisis, and a battle for the control of the Norwegian Sea between the nuclear armed US, Royal and the Soviet navies. Exercise 'Teamwork' 1984 was the then largest sea lane defence, Norwegian reinforcement and amphibious landing exercise ever staged. It involved 123 NATO ships including 34 from the Royal Navy. US Navy carrier battle groups operated forward to the far North of Norway and an amphibious landing of the UKUS amphibious force was conducted at Tromso close to the Soviet Union. Twelve Soviet nuclear attack submarines operated against the US carriers. In an apparent counter operation to 'Teamwork 84', the Soviet ships that had conducted surveillance of 'Teamwork 84' joined twenty other ships and practised gaining control of the Norwegian Sea, including attacks to destroy simulated US carrier battle groups [92]. 'Ocean Safari' 1985 was NATOs largest ever maritime exercise with 160 ships and 300 aircraft. The Royal Navy's ASW task force with the carrier Illustrious, operated 200 miles ahead of the offensive force of the USS America carrier battle group into the Norwegian Sea [93]. The Royal Navy contributed 33 ships including two ASW carriers [94]. 19 Soviet ships were present and there were 100 Soviet aircraft sorties in response to the NATO presence in Northern waters [95]. In July 1985 the Soviet Navy conducted an unexpected exercise 'Summerex-85'. This involved 38 surface ships, and 200 aircraft sorties from land - the largest number since the 1975 Soviet 'Okean' exercise [96]. In response, NATO mobilized about 100 ships, and flew over 100 aircraft sorties to monitor Soviet activities. This was coordinated from the Northwood HQ war operations room as a NATO exercise. NATO analysis of the exercise found that Soviet operations were further out into Atlantic than before, and rehearsing operations for a rapid naval control of the Norwegian Sea area [97]. NATO exercise 'Northern Wedding' 1986 involved 150 ships of 10 nations and 35,000 troops with a landing in northern Norway. Ark Royal conducted forward ASW far north in the Norwegian Sea for the US Navy carrier Nimitz. A large Soviet intelligence gathering presence included 3 frigates and a number of Soviet submarine 'contacts' were made. A Soviet 'Victor' class attack submarine surfaced in middle of the exercises close to the carrier Nimitz [98]. Exercise 'Ocean Safari' in Autumn 1987 involved the first major participation of Spain and France [99]. More than 150 major surface warships, 250 aircraft and helicopters from 11 countries participated: the largest number of countries in any exercise. Specific NATO objectives were announced of providing a maritime presence in Norwegian Sea, and exercising the strategy of 'forward defence' [100]. The carrier Forrestal operated in the Norwegian Sea. A large Soviet Northern Fleet exercise had finished in the area in August [101]. During the exercise a Norwegian P-3 patrol aircraft conducting surveillance activity near the Kola Peninsula in the Northern Soviet Union was involved in a collision with a Soviet fighter intercepting it [102]. 4. THE NAVAL NUCLEAR INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE UK UK naval nuclear infrastructure There is an extensive network of bases that support the UK's naval nuclear weapons, including 'C31' ( command, control communications intelligence and surveillance ), research, testing, engineering and training facilities. There are 18 locations in the UK which act as bases for nuclear weapons capable ships and aircraft or store naval nuclear weapons. There are four home bases for RN nuclear weapons capable ships. Polaris submarines of the 10th Submarine Squadron are based at Faslane in Strathclyde, in Scotland. Three aircraft carriers and eight Type 42 Destroyers are home ported at Portsmouth, Hampshire. Four other Type 42 Destroyers are based at Rosyth, and the eight Type 22 Frigates are home ported at Devonport, Devon (See Appendix 1). Nuclear capable helicopters and aircraft are based at the seven locations, in Table 2 above. Nuclear warheads for U K naval forces are stored at seven locations. Polaris missiles and warheads are stored at Royal Naval Armament Depot (RNAD) Coulport, Loch Long, Strathclyde. These are transported by regular special convoys which run about once a month, for maintenance at the Atomic Weapons Establishment, Burghfield, Berkshire. Nuclear depth bombs are probably stored underground at RNAD Dean Hill near Salisbury in Wiltshire, and RNAD Ernesettle or RNAD Bull Point in Ply-mouth, Devon. Nuclear strike bombs for Buccaneer aircraft may be stored at RAF St.Mawgan, Cornwall. Key communications centres are Criggion, Anthorn and Rugby which are Very Low Frequency (VLF) transmitters. This is the prime communications system for the Polaris, and hunter killer submarine fleet. These and other Low Frequency transmitters (LF) relay communications from the key RN command centers at Northwood in Middlesex, Pitreavie in Dunfermline, and Plymouth in Devon [103]. 'The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier': US Naval Nuclear Infrastructure in the UK. The UK is host to an extensive nuclear infrastructure of US naval nuclear weapon and C31 bases that support the global operations of US nuclear armed and powered naval forces [104]. These bases perform specific tasks for naval nuclear weapons, such as surveillance, which provides nuclear weapons targeting data; communications, for nuclear weapons launch orders; and navigational data, for the accuracy of strategic missile strikes. These are interconnected in part by the US Navy's own UK Microwave communication System (UKMS), which is an extension of the World Wide Military Command System (WWMCS) in the UK (see below) sharing British Telecom microwave relay sites used by the MoD [105]. The US Navy, with over 1700 warheads, also stores and operates twice as many nuclear warheads in the UK as the entire UK arsenal. These bases draw the UK into the wider naval nuclear arms race, and into the creation of a global nuclear battlefield at sea. Most of these bases are officially described by the government as RAF bases. In reality, they are US run and US administered, with an RAF liaison officer assigned to each base [106]. Under NATO arrangements, the US also makes use of RN command bases such as Northwood and the Pitreavie HQ. The US Navy preserves its independence in the UK. US C31 systems are generally operated and administered separately from UK facilities (ie. see Grosvenor Sq below) [107]. The US Navy avoids reliance on UK systems - thus the functions of the communication station at Crimond are duplicated by the US Navy station at Thurso. The US selectively shares its systems, such as the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), at US Navy discretion [108]. US Navy nuclear weapon stores Holy Loch, is one of four US Navy SSBN bases, and the only one maintained by a country on foreign soil in the world. It is a 'forward base' for 7-10 Atlantic fleet Lafayette and Benjamin Franklin class submarines with Poseidon missiles. It is called by the US Navy 'Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine Refit Site No.1', Submarine Squadron 14 (SubRon14). The military justification in 1962 for 'forward basing' in the UK was that shorter range Polaris missiles first deployed at Holy Loch would be able to operate in range of the Soviet Union for greater periods [109]. This justification is disappearing as the US Navy develops and deploys its new long range Trident I and II missiles. Eventually, the Poseidon force will be withdrawn, and this raises a question about the future of Holy Loch, and the justification for its continued use by US nuclear forces. However, John Stanley, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, stated on 23rd October 1986 that there was no truth in rum ours that the US intended to withdraw from Holy Loch. US Navy submarines carrying Trident I and II missiles, and nuclear land attack SLCMs, may use Holy Loch in the future [110]. The US Navy stores 126 nuclear depth bombs under US control at RAF St Mawgan in Cornwall and RAF Macrihanish, Kintyre. These are assigned to US Navy P-3 Orion ASW aircraft, and for release under NATO operations to RAF Nimrod and Dutch P-3 ASW aircraft. Italy is the only other NATO country to store US Navy tactical weapons [111]. USNAVEUR, London. 20 Grosvenor Sq, London is a separate and independent US Navy HQ for US Naval Forces Europe (USNAVEUR), and the US Navy Atlantic Fleet Eastern Atlantic Commander. It has access to the US World Wide Command and Control System (WWMCCS) for nuclear weapons. The WWMCCS links major US military commands worldwide to the US 'National Command Authority' which is empowered to authorize the use of US nuclear weapons [112]. It is also one of two US Navy Fleet Ocean Surveillance Information System (FOSIC) sites for worldwide surveillance of Warsaw Pact naval and merchant shipping. Northwood Northwood, in Middlesex is both the central RN command centre for CinCFleet and the NATO Eastern Atlantic area (EASTLANT) war operations centre. A new satellite linked worldwide command and control system (OpCon) was commissioned in 1984. Northwood has the capacity for conducting joint US-UK and NATO combined air, surface and subsurface operations in the Eastern Atlantic. Many permanent US Navy personnel include the US Navy Atlantic Fleet Submarine Forces Representative. Joint operations in peacetime include SSBN patrol coordination and the surveillance of Soviet naval activity. Brawdy Brawdy, Wales, is one of four major US Navy C31 facilities for US naval nuclear forces in the UK. It is a processing and analysis station for the US Navy's SOSUS (Sound Surveillance) System. This is a system of hydrophone listening arrays for submarine detection in the Atlantic, primarily associated with the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap. This feeds information on submarine movements through the GIUK gap to USNAVEUR, Grosvenor Sq, London, and SACLANT HQ in Norfolk, Virginia, and is shared with the RNs Northwood HQ. Its function is submarine surveillance for ASW warfare, for which many US naval nuclear weapons are designed [113]. Edzell and Scatsa Edzell in Scotland is a 'Naval Security Group Activity' part of the huge US National Security Agency (NSA) which has 2000 stations worldwide. It conducts high frequency direction finding of Warsaw Pact vessels, and Warsaw Pact signals intelligence (SIGINT). It has links to ocean surveillance satellites and is involved in gaining nuclear weapon targeting data [114]. It may operate the new US NAVSTAR system of satellites (see below) [115]. Scatsa in the Shetland Islands is a LORAN-C monitoring station, officially operated by the US Coast Guard, which provides radio navigation principally for US Navy SSBNs. This provides accuracy for US Navy strategic missiles. Thurso Forss and West Murkle, Thurso in Caithness is a US Navy base used by the Royal Navy. Its many systems include terminals for the Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS). This is for long distance command and control of US nuclear forces, including release orders for nuclear weapons via the WWMCS. In addition, it relays surveillance and early warning data to US command authorities. Thurso is also a relay for the TACAMO survivable airborne C31 aircraft designed to provide survivable communications and missile launch orders for US SSBNs during a nuclear war. Thurso duplicates many of the functions of the Crimond RN facility, presumably to maintain the operational independence of the US Navy [116]. The growing infrastructure of naval nuclear war in the UK. The Royal Navy has access to new US C31 systems which support and facilitate naval nuclear warfare, and signify the increasing integration of the Royal Navy into support of US Navy strategy and operations. The UK has purchased the US SSIX satellite communications system which will increase the 'inter-operability' of US and RN fleets [117]. The system will be accessed by most RN submarines and the ASW carriers, and be linked to unspecified sites ashore. SSIX provides a link to the US Navy Very Low Frequency (VLF) communications, which may be utilized by the RN's submarine fleet. SSIX is also a link to the US Navy's TACAMO (Take Charge and Move Out) aircraft, which are to enable communication with naval nuclear forces during and after a nuclear war, including the transmission of missile launch orders [118]. The RN Polaris submarine fleet may now be able to use TACAMO, and thus potentially be even further integrated into the wartime plans and operations of the US Navy's strategic missile submarines. The government would not comment in January 1988 on whether Trident submarines would carry the SSIX system [119]. NAVSTAR (Navigation System Time and Ranging Global Positioning System). This is a system of 18 US satellites to be operational from the early 1990s. This is expected to be used by Trident submarines. These will find, locate and allow accurate positioning of naval forces anywhere in the globe. This will replace ground based navigation systems such as VLF which are perhaps 100 times less accurate. This will facilitate nuclear targeting and enhance the military capability of the US Navy and Royal Navy submarines to conduct an accurate 'first strike' with submarine launched missiles [120]. A trial Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) transmitter was installed at Glen Garry, in Scotland in late 1987. This is for long range communications to faster moving, deeper submerged and thus more survivable submarines. If successful, it is intended to be fully operational in the mid 1990's for the Trident and Trafalgar class hunter killer submarines [121]. In 1987, it was revealed and confirmed that a joint RN and US Navy facility called the 'Joint Ocean Surveillance Information Centre' (JOSIC) exists in an unknown location in the UK for the surveillance of Soviet and Warsaw Pact vessels [122]. 5. THE ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS OF NUCLEAR NAVIES AROUND THE UK Hazards arise from the operation of naval reactors, and carriage of nuclear weapons in the ports and seas around the UK. The Royal Navy has 19 Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) in its submarine fleet. There are 6 nuclear powered hunter killer submarines based at Devonport, and 9 others at Faslane, with the four Polaris submarines. There are also 3 training and research reactors. The US Navy usually operates 7 nuclear powered and armed submarines from Holy Loch. The RN has been operating PWRs for 30 years and using them for sea operations for 25 years. RN nuclear reactor accident scenarios Outlines of two RN scenarios for nuclear reactor accidents are given in several port safety plans, and both relate to the failure of nuclear reactor cooling systems [123]. One concerns the failure of a pipe in the reactor cooling circuit, leading to the melting of the nuclear fuel cladding (a maximum design accident). The second scenario concerns the breach of the vessel that contains the nuclear reactor, perhaps caused by a severe collision (a Primary Containment Failure accident) [124]. Both would involve reactor core damage and the release of radioactive Iodine 131 and other fission products that can lead to cancer. The latter primary containment failure accident would reportedly lead to 100,000 curies of Iodine 131 and 10 million curies of other radioactive matter being released over one hour in a radioactive cloud [125]. Also, the Barry and Cardiff Special Safety Scheme states that an accident leading to the melting of nuclear fuel cladding would cause radioactive 'gamma shine', to penetrate the hull and be dangerous up to 50 metres from the vessel [126]. The Royal Navy has claimed that according to Ministry of Defence estimates, the first kind, a maximum design accident, would occur once in 10,000 years of reactor operation, and the second accident once in 1,000,000 years of reactor operation. The RN states that they have operated reactors for only about 200 combined years, thus they claim such accidents are unlikely. These kinds of statements of probability are common in the civil nuclear industry, but the full technical basis of the Navy's statements is unknown [127]. They will certainly have to be updated after the Chernobyl accident in the Soviet Union in 1986. The Director of the Division of Nuclear Safety of the IAEA is on record as saying that the actual reactor safety record, including the Chernobyl accident and the Three Mile Island accident in the US in 1979, now demonstrates a probability of severe reactor core damage nearer the order of once in every 1,000 years of reactor operation. This is much greater than the probabilities usually cited by the civil nuclear industry prior to Chernobyl. The known RN reactor incident record Despite great secrecy it is known that from the start of the RNs first sea based nuclear reactor in 1962 until 1978 there have been 700 unspecified reactor 'incidents', about 20% derived from operating error and roughly half resulting in the loss of nuclear propulsion on RN nuclear submarines. In 1979, the average was seven such 'incidents' per submarine, with about half resulting in a loss of nuclear propulsion. These incidents are believed to be defined as an event requiring operation away from the norm, and include all occasions when emergency drills have been initiated [128]. In 1980 the nuclear hunter killer submarine Dreadnought suffered serious machinery damage, and reportedly cracks in the reactor cooling system, necessitating return to Devonport and its eventual decommissioning [129]. On May 20th 1981 HMS Valiant similarly returned to Devonport after discovering a leak in the reactor cooling system after departure [130]. There was a leak in coolant in tests of the reactor of HMS Renown under refit at Rosyth naval base, leading to the clearing of some personnel in October 1987 [131]. The Royal Navy is known to be conducting the LAIRD, or Loss of Coolant Accident Investigation Rig, at Dounreay. The risks to nuclear reactors of naval operations around the UK It is not clear whether the RN statements on accident probabilities take into account the greater exposure of submarine reactors than land based reactors to collision, grounding or fire damage. The Soviet Navy's record of 200 reactor incidents includes many in the Atlantic. In October 1970, a November class Soviet attack submarine sunk in the SW Atlantic approximately 150 miles off Lands End. According to CIA documents this involved fire sweeping towards the reactor [132]. In 1983, in a reported but unconfirmed incident, an inexperienced trainee mistakenly opened an incorrect valve on the nuclear powered and armed submarine HMS Repulse, sending it into a dangerously steep dive [133]. The nuclear armed and powered US Navy SSBN Nathaniel Greene was grounded in 1986 in the Irish Sea, leading to its decommissioning [134]. In May 1985 the RN Polaris submarine Repulse even collided with a fishing vessel in the highly controlled environment of the US Eastern Missile Space Test Range off Cape Canaveral, Florida [135]. Collisions involving RN surface ships are more often reported than submarine incidents, which may reflect the fact that they are harder to conceal. In 1970, the carrier Ark Royal reportedly collided with Soviet Kotlin class destroyer causing Soviet casualties [136]. HMS Ambuscade collided with the US Navy cruiser Dale in April 1983 in the Indian Ocean [137]. In 1984 HMS Plymouth collided with the West German frigate Braunschweig during Baltic exercises [138]. There are also dangers of radioactive contamination from the incineration of a naval nuclear weapon, or reactor core damage in a ship fire. There was a fire with injuries on board the nuclear powered hunter killer submarine HMS Conqueror while in port at Devonport in August 1987 [139]. A Defence Council instruction has revealed that 312 fires had been recorded in Navy ship and shore establishments in 1986-7; including a major fire on the nuclear weapons capable ASW carrier Illustrious in the Channel [140]. According to an officer on board a sheet of flame shot up from the forward funnel [141]. There have been fires near nuclear weapons at Holy Loch on three known occasions. In 1970 the stern of the US missile submarine tender, which was storing missiles, was observed ablaze with two submarines moored alongside [142]. There are intensive submarine operations in the Irish Sea as US Navy and Royal Navy submarines travel to and from their bases in the Clyde. Soviet submarines occasionally operate in the Irish Sea, as in March 1983 when RAF Nimrods were confirmed by the government to be tracking an unidentified submarine, presumed to be Soviet, in the Clyde approaches [143]. An accident in the shallow waters of the Irish Sea involving one of these US and UK nuclear and Soviet submarines could be an environmental disaster. Port visits by nuclear vessels in the UK RN nuclear powered submarines occasionally visit Liverpool, Cardiff, Torbay and Barry apart from operating in the Clyde from Faslane. There are numerous port visits by US ships potentially armed with nuclear weapons, which multiply the risks of weapon or reactor accidents. No full records are kept by UK authorities of US port visits, but government figures for US Navy visits from the 1st July 1986 to June 30th 1987, revealed at least 16 visits by nuclear weapon capable ships in Portsmouth, Plymouth, Portland and Rosyth. No duration was given, but it could mean between 32-48 ship days. This included 12 nuclear powered ships and submarines in five different ports, each for perhaps one to three days [144]. This is in addition to the average presence of usually 3-4 nuclear submarines with 16 Poseidon missiles at Holy Loch near Glasgow. Emergency plans for naval reactor accidents Information available on emergency plans in the event of a reactor accident shows they are totally inadequate. At Plymouth, a city of 250,000 and home port for nine of the RNs nuclear powered hunter killer submarines, the recently published Devonport Public safety scheme complacently asserts that if radioactive material was released into the atmosphere after a maximum design accident "it is unlikely a health hazard will exist beyond 550 metres from the vessel...subsequent monitoring after a radioactive cloud has passed may indicate that the evacuation of the general public from certain areas out to one or two kilometers is advisable...". [145] The basis for this zone is unknown. The document does also not speculate on how far a radioactive cloud would travel, but the accident at Chernobyl demonstrated that an evacuation zone of at least 30 km might be required for a major reactor accident. Royal Navy safety regulations were revised in 1984 and in the Clyde area in 1986 [146]. A RN spokesman in 1984 could provide no information on why or how they were revised, reportedly saying that it was 'not usual to have public questioning of these safety measures' [147]. The RN has also provided a disturbing pre-worded statement for authorities at Faslane in the event of an accident which in advance stresses a minor radiation hazard [148]. In 1985, the combined Barry and Cardiff Special Safety Scheme was released. This states that in liaison with the media, "The main aim must be the continual reassurance of the General Public and the allaying of fears and emotions that could be aggravated by sensationalist pronouncements by the media" [149]. The pre- written press release cites "some release of radioactivity in the vicinity", and for an accident involving a radiation hazard external to the reactor, the press release states in advance that "it is emphasized that there is no danger to the public" [150]. Existing liaison bodies between the US and Royal Navy and the public authorities have been accused of being 'rubber stamps' for naval nuclear activities. The Clyde Local Liaison Committee, which is responsible for emergency plans in the event of accident, meets once a year. No details of radiation levels in the Clyde waters are provided in these meetings, other than that they remain within prescribed limits [151]. The risks of naval nuclear bases Day to day operations of the nuclear navy present hazards to those working at or living nearby naval nuclear establishments. At Rosyth, in Fife, where nuclear submarines are refitted every 5-7 years, and nuclear waste and highly radioactive uranium fuel rods removed, secret radiation records of many workers made public showed that some workers received up to seven times the maximum permitted dose of radiation. A Medical Research Council study of Rosyth workers found a direct correlation between levels of radiation exposure and the damage done to chromosomes in the blood which can lead to cancer. In the vicinity of Rosyth eight cases of Leukaemia amongst the under 15 years were found; a rate nearly three times greater than the Scottish average. Six cases of lymphatic cancer in the 15-25 age group were also identified where one would be expected [152]. The Royal Navy has also admitted that four babies born between 1972 and 1975 to families of submariners on the nuclear powered and armed submarine HMS Resolution had hair lips and cleft palates. To have occurred at an average rate, each of the 300 crew would have had to have fathered 13 to 14 children over three years [153]. Additional hazards arise from the handling and storage of nuclear weapons and waste materials from submarines in the UK, and the routine elimination of propulsion by-products. On 2nd November 1981, a Poseidon missile was dropped 17 feet before being arrested by a safety device at Holy Loch, possibly striking the submarine tender. This risked the detonation of an unstable conventional explosive LX09, which has subsequently been replaced in US missiles. Its detonation could have caused the dispersal of the plutonium cores of the nuclear warheads as dust particles in a radioactive plume possibly 28 miles long and 2 and a half miles wide [154]. At Holy Loch, abnormal levels of radioactivity have been confirmed in the mud flats linked to reactor coolant waste discharges in 1962 and 1978. These introduced significant levels of radioactive isotopes Caesium 134 and Cobalt 60. Barges of waste at Holy Loch and Gareloch near Falsane may contain low level radioactive waste. There is some evidence that the Holy Loch barges have dumped there contents at sea, beyond the 12 mile limit [155]. In 1984, the US SSBN James Madison was observed to undergo intensive decontamination at Holy Loch, including the apparent stripping of paint from the hull. This may have been caused by the discharging of radioactive propulsion components at sea, such as resin filters, which washed back and contaminated the hull [156]. Naval Reactor Disposal The latest radiation problem is the disposal of decommissioned submarine reactors. HMS Dreadnought has been in storage at Rosyth awaiting disposal plans. Fears that further nuclear submarines would be similarly dumped at Rosyth prompted 1500 electricians and shipwrights to black work on the Dreadnought in 1983. This is the first of at least five Valiant and four Resolution class submarines scheduled to be decommissioned through the 1990s. Of the options so far considered, Ministers have recommended the sealing of the hull and its sinking in the mid Atlantic as "by far the safest and least disruptive means of long term disposal" [157]. 6. THE UK's ROLE IN THE NAVAL NUCLEAR ARMS RACE: THE WAR IN THE FALKLANDS Nuclear Weapons in the Falklands war It has been reported that tactical naval nuclear weapons were deployed on surface ships going south towards the Falkland Islands with task force 317 during Operation Corporate in 1982 [158]. Type 22 Frigates and ASW carriers are believed routinely to carry weapons in North Atlantic in peacetime. In addition, many of the RN nuclear capable ships in the task force had been taking part in annual RN fleet weapons training exercise 'Spring Train', which reportedly had no time to offload nuclear weapons. Former Admiralty Under Secretary Keith Speed stated that he "would have been astonished if those ships, from exercise Spring Train had not been carrying nuclear weapons" [159]. It has also been reported that the UK war cabinet was surprised to find that a large proportion of the RN's tactical weapons were going south with the task force, and a Royal Fleet Auxiliary vessel was sent to retrieve them in mid Atlantic [160]. According to the letters of a Falklands war witness, Lieutenant David Tinker, practice rounds of nuclear bombs were present. These were eventually taken back to the UK by Fleet Auxiliary vessel Fort Austin, which was diverted south on March 29th, 1983 from Gibraltar. This raises the question of whether real nuclear bombs and depth bombs were present [161]. Many press reports claimed that ships were carrying nuclear depth bombs [162]. It was reported that the HMS Sheffield and the HMS Coventry may have been carrying nuclear depth bombs when lost [163]. Two ships were chartered for use by divers to recover what was officially described as 'documents and strategic material' from HMS Coventry and this was thought to mean nuclear weapons. However it has since been interpreted as secret cryptographic equipment and code books and not nuclear depth bombs [164]. It was also claimed that Whitehall sources had confirmed that a Polaris submarine had been deployed to the South Atlantic [165]. The Latin American Nuclear Free Zone and the proliferation of nuclear technology Commitments to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 1968, (also known as the Treaty of Tlateloco) were also not taken into account in the initial deployment of the task force if nuclear weapons were present. This Treaty establishes a nuclear weapons free zone in a large area in Latin America. The UK is a signatory of the protocols designed for nuclear powers. Protocol 1 of the Treaty excludes deployment of weapons to the UK's territories inside the zone, including the Falklands, and Protocol 2 suggests a prohibition on the much wider geographical zone of the Treaty, including the seas of Latin America. The sinking of the General Belgrano by the hunter killer submarine HMS Conqueror was the first use of a nuclear powered submarine in combat. Five hunter killer submarines were thought to have been in the South Atlantic area, and there was a danger that one could have been lost in combat [166]. The use and military success of nuclear propulsion on hunter killer submarines in the Falklands has served to encourage the development of nuclear technology by Argentina [167]. Worse, Argentina is a state capable of producing a nuclear weapon and has not yet ratified the Tlateloco Treaty. Research on a naval propulsion reactor has been confirmed by Argentine officials to have been underway for several years [168]. Ironically, the UK is also the main competitor to sell Canada 10-12 Trafalgar class submarines. This is against the spirit, if not the letter of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which tries to prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons between states. The sale has been described by Defence Minister George Younger as "transportation technology" and thus outside the letter of the NPT [169]. RN nuclear weapon capable ships have continued to deploy to the South Atlantic, and tension remains. RN ships have on two occasions shadowed West German built submarines in transit for service in the Argentinean Navy, to gain propeller signatures for ASW identification [170]. The South Atlantic may become an new area for naval nuclear powered, and perhaps even nuclear armed, confrontation involving the Royal Navy in the future. 7. THE UK, NAVAL ARMS CONTROL and CONFIDENCE BUILDING AT SEA. The UK and strategic nuclear weapons arms reduction British policy is not to include its sea based strategic weapons in US-Soviet arms control negotiations until significant cuts in the US and Superpower arsenals are achieved. This has been a major stumbling block in Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT 1) in the early 1970's. The position of the government is that "if the US and Soviet arsenals were very substantially reduced...Britain would review its position and consider how best to contribute to arms control.." [171]. The UK government reportedly is anxious for a long pause in strategic arms control after any significant reduction in the Soviet and US strategic forces achieved through the current START negotiations at Geneva [172]. It fears that in the next round Trident would inevitably come under discussion. Reducing the risks of nuclear war - The lack of Confidence Building Measures applied to the seas. Britain is only country apart from the US to have concluded an agreement with the Soviet Union on the prevention of dangerous incidents at sea. This was concluded on July 15th 1986, 14 years after the US-Soviet agreement in 1972. The agreement's prohibitions include limits on maneuvering to block aircraft landing, blinding ships bridges with searchlights, or simulated naval attacks. It is likely that the RN would not have asked for such an agreement unless it had become necessary, and this is a disturbing indication of the increasing naval tension in the Atlantic and Norwegian Sea in the 1980's [173]. In September 1987 two RN Lynx nuclear weapon capable ASW helicopters were reportedly aggressively overflown in the Barents Sea by two Soviet SU-27 'Flanker' aircraft, to within 10 ft of the helicopters rotors and threatening their safety. The UK Ministry of Defence reportedly protested to the Commander in Chief of the Soviet Airforce [174]. There is a danger that the UK-Soviet agreement may serve to legitimise provocative naval activity outside of its few limitations, unless it is extended. The UK shares the US and NATO position opposing naval arms control or confidence building initiatives. In 1983, the UK and US voted against the initiation of a United Nations Study on the naval arms race and did not participate in it. This was the first such initiative for 50 years. The US voted against it on the grounds that a naval arms race 'did not and does not exist' [175]. The only international forum in which naval issues have been raised is the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE). This is part of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The CDE has a mandate to discuss 'first stage' confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) prior to nuclear disarmament. The discussion of basic naval confidence building measures, such as the advance notification of large naval exercises, was finally postponed in May 1986 after NATO states refused to consider anything except amphibious exercises. An agreement for notifying and observing land, amphibious and airborne exercises involving troops, was achieved in October 1986 [176]. 'Neither Confirm Nor Deny' and Nuclear Free Policies The Royal Navy 'neither confirms nor denies' the carriage of nuclear weapons on its ships or aircraft. This has led to conflicts with countries with nuclear weapon free policies and aspirations. The 'neither confirm nor deny' policy caused a controversy during the deployment of the Invincible task force to the Pacific in December 1983. The Invincible required repairs in dry dock but was denied a berth in Japan and compelled to leave Sydney in December 1983 after both governments enforced their policy banning nuclear weapons on their territory. This was because of the suspected presence of nuclear bombs and depth bombs on the Invincible and the refusal of the RN to confirm or deny their presence. Visits to Hong Kong, China and Tonga were also cancelled because of controversy over the suspected carriage of nuclear weapons in the task force [177]. The nuclear capable destroyer HMS Brazen visited Gothenburg, Sweden on December 18th, 1985. Sweden is a non-nuclear weapon country which does not enforce its restrictions on nuclear weapon capable ships. The resulting demonstrations led to the cancellation of a visit scheduled for March 1987. This has been credited with putting the issue of such visits on the agenda in Sweden [178]. The Rarotonga Treaty (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty) creates a nuclear free zone in a large area of the Pacific, but does not limit the transit of nuclear weapons on ships. In July 1986, the Royal Navy participated in the US Navy's Pacific fleet exercise 'RIMPAC' during 'Global-86'. The French Navy also participated. The Royal Navy was regarded as replacing the New Zealand Navy in the RIMPAC exercise. The New Zealand Navy was not participating because of a dispute with the US over its nuclear free policy - which would have required the US Navy to confirm that it was not carrying of nuclear weapons before entering New Zealand ports. A visit to New Zealand by the Royal Navy was not requested in 1986. Four RN surface ships of the 'Global-86' task force pointedly visited 9 Australian ports. Unlike dry docking, this was not a technical violation of Australia's nuclear free policy as the policy is not applied to its territorial waters. RN frigates and destroyers also visited several Pacific islands, which allowed nuclear weapon capable ship visits, within the then prospective area of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone [179]. In March 1987, the UK joined the US in its decision not to sign the SPNFZ Treaty. As expected, France also declined to sign. Australia and New Zealand, however, did become Parties [180]. In 1986, the destroyer HMS Manchester and frigate HMS Amazon visited Shanghai, China. This was only the second such port call by the RN, and it paved way for the first port call by US Navy since 1949. This visit had been delayed by a dispute between the US and China for over a year because the ships the US Navy proposed sending were nuclear weapon capable [181]. This neither confirm nor deny policy has harmed relations with allied countries. British actions in the Pacific seem to have been in direct support of US opposition to all such nuclear free zones, to providing information on its naval nuclear force and to any potential limits on naval nuclear operations. The UK, US Navy nuclear cruise missiles and the INF agreement The US Navy is deploying nuclear sea launched land attack cruise missiles (SLCM's) on its ships and submarines to a planned level of 758. Roughly half will be in the US Navy's Atlantic Command, and a majority of those will threaten the Soviet Union's most important naval and air bases on the Kola Peninsula. These weapons are virtually identical to the GLCM's removed under the INF agreement and can strike wide areas in the Soviet Union. "Compensatory adjustments" to NATO nuclear forces after the INF agreement were discussed at Nuclear Planning Group meetings in May.and October 1987. Assigning some of these nuclear land attack cruise missiles to NATO operational control was discussed [182]. NATO's High Level Group reportedly favoured two options after the INF agreement, new US Air Launched Cruise Missiles and SLCMs [183]. The steady deployment of over 300 US nuclear cruise missiles in the Atlantic Fleet, whether assigned to NATO or not, and deployment of the Soviet equivalents from 1988, will steadily undermine the value of the INF agreement. British Defense Secretary George Younger reportedly stated in May 1987 at the Stavangar Nuclear Planning Group Meeting, that Britain might accept some new nuclear weapons. He reportedly said that the possibility of the UK acting as a base for US submarines with cruise missiles was "on anybody's list of possible measures" for after the INF agreement [184]. The US Navy has occasionally used Holy Loch for its attack submarines for several years [185]. Defense Secretary George Younger reportedly confirmed that some of these had carried cruise missiles, but did not say if they were the nuclear variant [186]. Four US SLCM capable submarines have reportedly been identified at Holy Loch in the first six months of 1987 [187]. The US Navy has reportedly approached the UK government concerning the continued use of Holy Loch into the future [188]. 8. WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE The RN and Tension in the North Atlantic Naval experts in the UK have worries over the implications of an offensive forward strategy with nuclear armed US and RN naval forces, and doubts about its effectiveness in comparison to more defensive protection of trans-Atlantic convoys [189]. According to Admiral Sir James Eberle, RN, former CinC Home Command, "The pursuit of a qualitative advantage by exploiting our lead in high technology can never bring more than temporary respite. This is not defeatism. It is realism. The objective of sea control [such as in the Norwegian Sea] requires the pursuit of maritime superiority. If this is pursued in peace, it can only lead to an upward spiralling arms race; and in war, it is a concept that the advent of nuclear weapons no longer permits. We need to adjust our maritime strategy accordingly." [190]. There is a need to establish confidence building measures to reduce the risks of accidental war starting at sea, and the danger of escalation to nuclear war. There should also be agreements to progressively withdraw and eliminate all naval nuclear weapons. Confidence Building Measures for the Atlantic The UK government has recognized that the September 1986 agreement for Confidence and Security Building Measures focused on land would "...reduce tension, mistrust and the risk of military confrontation through accident or misunderstanding." [191]. This benefit would also apply to the growing naval nuclear confrontation in the Atlantic. Several exercises involving the RN have already been applicable under the terms of the 1986 agreement. The amphibious exercises 'Bold Guard' in November 1986 in Denmark and 'Cold Winter' in March 1987 in Norway involved RN forces and were observable under the agreement. The UK exercise 'Purple Warrior' in September 1987, which involved 39 vessels and amphibious landing of the 3rd Commando Brigade, was the first observable exercise inside the UK [192]. It is clearly possible to extend even greater CSBM's to the sea and NATO and Warsaw Pact naval exercises. The neither confirm nor deny policy undermines efforts to create confidence building, such as nuclear free zones, as well as the non-nuclear policies of many states. Naval disarmament agreements The Soviet Union has dropped its requirement to include British and French strategic forces into the START negotiations for the time being. The increase in the UK naval arsenal to perhaps 512 warheads, and growing 'first strike' fears because of the US and UK's Trident missiles, and the French and Soviet equivalents, means that Polaris and Trident must be taken into account and subject to limits in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) talks, or subsequent strategic arms control negotiations. Royal Navy 'tactical' nuclear weapons should be eliminated as well as plans for new nuclear bombs, depth bombs or rockets. Their presence in forward deployed naval forces in the Eastern Atlantic and Norwegian Sea threatens to bring them rapidly into use in any conventional war at sea. Their suspected presence in peacetime on RN ships clashes with the genuine nuclear free aspirations of countries worldwide. The most dangerous and de-stabilizing sea based nuclear weapons are the nuclear land attack SLCM's - the US Tomahawk now being deployed and the Soviet SS-NX-21 and 24, which are expected to be deployed starting in 1988-9. These long range highly accurate missiles are designed to use the seas as a new way to wage nuclear war on land. These cruise missiles should not be allowed to reduce the value of the INF agreement. The UK should not provide facilities for ships carrying SLCM's in Holy Loch and other UK ports. They should be withdrawn and eliminated, using the principle of on- site intrusive inspection established under the INF agreement to verify their withdrawal from ships and submarines of both the US and Soviet Union. Environmental risks of nuclear navies Nuclear navies operating around Britain present a greater combined risk to the environment than is realized. The London Dumping Convention, which regulates the disposal of non-military materials at sea, has declared a moratorium on the ocean dumping of all radioactive waste. However, there is no regulation or scrutiny of naval reactors, even though they are a constant source of radioactive pollution and risk to the ocean environment. The Royal Navy should reveal the basis of its calculations of safety and review its port safety plans. Appendix 1. ROYAL NAVY NUCLEAR WEAPON CAPABLE SHIPS CURRENT VESSELS 1. 'Resolution' class Polaris submarines Name: Pennant No. Base Port HMS Resolution S22 Faslane HMS Repulse S23 (not " HMS Renown S26 carried) " HMS Revenge S27 " Each submarine on patrol is armed with 16 Polaris A3TK missiles with two, or perhaps three nuclear warheads, for 32 or 64 warheads per submarine on patrol. 2. 'Invincible' class aircraft carriers HMS Invincible R 05 Portsmouth HMS Illustrious R 06 " HMS Ark Royal R 07 " These carry 9 nuclear weapon capable Sea King ASW aircraft and presently 5, in the future 8, Sea Harrier aircraft. Sources inside the Navy indicate that each vessel carries 3-5 nuclear depth bomb when deployed in peacetime, and thus presumably a similar number of strike bombs in peacetime. 3. 'Broadsword' class Type 22 Frigates HMS Broadsword F 88 HMS Battleaxe F 89 HMS Brilliant F 90 HMS Brazen F 91 HMS Boxer F 92 HMS Beaver F 93 HMS Brave F 94 HMS London F 95 HMS Cornwall F 99 HMS Sheffield F 96 Due 1988 HMS Coventry F 98 Due 1988 HMS Cumberland F 85 Due 1989 HMS Cambletown F 87 Due 1989 HMS Chatham F 87 Due 1989 Home ported in Portsmouth. Believed to be allocated 2-3 nuclear depth bombs in peacetime and wartime. They carry nuclear weapon capable Lynx ASW aircraft, and can carry two in wartime. Those after HMS Brave can carry two nuclear weapon capable Lynx ASW aircraft in wartime, or a nuclear weapon capable Sea King helicopter. Type 22's will be capable of carrying the new EH 101 ASW helicopter in the early 1990's, which will probably be nuclear capable. 3. Type 42 destroyers HMS Birmingham D 86 P HMS Newcastle D 87 P HMS Nottingham D 91 P HMS Liverpool D 92 R HMS Glasgow D 88 R HMS Cardiff D 108 P HMS Exeter D 89 P HMS Southampton D 90 P HMS Manchester D 95 P HMS Gloucester D 96 P HMS Edinburgh D 97 R HMS York D 98 R Home ports, P = Portsmouth R = Rosyth. Certified for carriage of nuclear depth bombs in wartime but probably not in peacetime. They carry nuclear weapon capable Lynx ASW helicopters. From HMS Manchester on they can carry two Lynx, but usually one in peacetime. 4. Support vessels - Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFS) vessels RFA Fort Grange A 385 RFA Fort Austin A 386 RFA Resource A 480 RFA Regent A 486 Used for at sea replenishment and given authorization to carry weapons as required. RFAs load and unload warships at Portsmouth, which reportedly cannot handle nuclear weapons ashore. Two replacement vessels, one named RFA Fort Victoria and due in 1990, will replace Resource and Regent, and are likely to be nuclear weapon capable. FUTURE VESSELS 1. Type 23 Duke class Frigates HMS Norfolk F 230 HMS Marlborough F 231 HMS Argyll F 232 Due 1990 HMS Lancaster F 233 Due 1991 The first four were ordered in 1988 for commissioning 1992-3, eight more are expected. Each will carry one EH-101 or two Lynx nuclear weapon capable ASW helicopters. 2. Vanguard class SSBN - Trident submarines HMS Vanguard Due 1991 HMS Victorious Due 1993 HMS Vengeance Due 1992 HMS Venerable Due 1994 Each submarine to be armed with 16 Trident II D5 missiles with probably eight independently targetable nuclear warheads. SOURCE: Malcolm Spaven, 'Royal Navy Nuclear Weapon Capable ships' ADIU, 1987, unpublished. NOTES 1. William Arkin and Joshua Handler, 'Nuclear Warships and Naval Nuclear Weapons: A Complete Inventory of the worlds Naval Nuclear Weapons', Neptune Paper No.2, IPS/Greenpeace, Washington DC, March 1988. (Hence Nuclear Warships an naval nuclear weapons) 2. Eric J. Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy since World War II, U.S. Naval Institute, London 1987, pg 243. (Hence Vanguard to Trident). 3. Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident, ibid, Ch 9. 4 Eric J. Grove Vanguard to Trident ibid. 5. Admiral Sir James Eberle former C in C Home Command, 'Towards a European Navy', Naval Forces, Vol 6 No 3, 1985. 6. John Nott, 'Decision to modernize UKs contribution to NATO strengthen deterrence', NATO Review, vol 29 no.2, April 1981. 7. See, The Military Balance 1987-88, IISS, London 1987, map insert. In addition the Royal Navy's submarine fleet commander (Foam) is also NATO commander of submarines in the Eastern Atlantic command area (ComSubEastLant). 8. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1987, vol 1, Cm 101 -I, HMSO, London,1987, pgs 20 9. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1987, vol 1, ibid pg 36. 10. 'US Naval Operations in 1985', US Naval Institute Proceedings, May Review Issue, May 1986, Annapolis, Maryland,1986. (Hence USNI Proceedings). 11. 'U.S Naval Operations in 1985', U.S Navy Institute Proceedings ibid. 12. 'In Parliament', Armament and Disarmament Information Unit Report, vol 9 no 2, March April 1987, Sussex University, pg 12. (Hence ADIU Report). In March 1987 there were 47 RN operational surface ships, or those preparing for service, trials and training. 13. 'In Parliament', ADIU Report, vol 8 no 2, March-April 1986. 14. 'Navy Ships at sea more than war years', The Telegraph, 1st. February 1986. 15. 'In Parliament', ADIU Report, vol 8, no 2, ibid. 16. 'UK, Soviet Union agree on exercise safety', Janes Defense Weekly, 2nd August 1986, vol 6 no 4, pg 149. 17. 'Britain's dilemma: a naval strategy but too few ships', The Telegraph, 20th January 1984. 18. 'Gruelling Test for Warrior', Navy News, January 1988 pg 9. 19. Joshua Handler and William M. Ark in, Nuclear Warships and Naval Nuclear Weapons, ibid. pg 99. Third Report from the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, Session 84-5,37-11, HMSO, pg 280, (House of Commons hence, HC) The government position: "we would have no more warheads on D5, than on the C4 which in fact limits us to no more than eight warheads". ADIU Reports vol 9 no 1, January-February 1987, pgs 15-16. Statements of Secretary of State for defence George Younger that increase in warhead numbers of Trident over Polaris would "at must be two and a half times," not the eight to fourteen that had been suggested. Minister of Defence Procurement, Lord Trefgarne repeated "the true ratio is two and a half to one, not 8:1.". 20. Paul Rogers, Guide to Nuclear Weapons, University of Bradford School of Peace Studies, May 1984, pg 70. 21. Malcolm Chalmers, Trident: Britain's Independent Arms Race, CND Publications, London 1984, pgs 10- 11. 22. Control and Management of the Trident Program. U.K. National Audit Office, Ministry of Defence and Property Service Agency, HMSO, London, 14th July 1987, pg 18. 24. Strategic nuclear weapons policy, First Special Report of the Defence Committee, HC 266 (1981-2) p2. and William Arkin, 'Sleight of hand with Trident II', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 1984, pg 5. 25. The Progress of the Trident Programme, HC 356, HMSO, 3rd June 1987. 26. William M. Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields, pg 270-1. 27. Thomas B. Cochrane, William M. Arkin, Milton M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume 1. U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities, Natural Resources Defense Council, Ballinger, New York 1984, pg 144. 28. USINCLANT/CINCLANTFLT/CINCWESTLANT/COMOCEANLANT Staff Organization and Regulations. Staff Instruction 5200. IQ 8th February 1985 p.2-6-18. Obtained under the US Freedom of Information Act. 29. Memorandum by Malcolm Chalmers, Third Report from the House of Commons Select Committed on Defence, Session 1984-5, HC 37-11 HMSO, 1985, pg 337. 30. Memorandum by Malcolm Chalmers, Third Report from the House of Commons Select Committed on Defence, Session 1984-5, HC 37-11 HMSO, 1985, pg 337. 31. 'An interview with the First Sea Lord', Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, Naval Forces. Vol VII, no 2, July 1985, pgs 15-16. 32. Keith Speed, Sea change, Harpers and Row, London 1983, pg 165. 33. Eric J. Grove, Vanguard to Trident, ibid, pg 384. 34. Malcolm Spaven, Royal Navy nuclear capable ships, ADIU, 1987, unpublished. 35. Joshua Handler and William M. Arkin, ibid, pgs 100-7. 36. Figures provided by Portsmouth CND from observation at Portsmouth, in Jim Skinner, 'Nuclear Weapon Capable Ship Visits to Portsmouth, October 1987, Portsmouth CND. 37. The Telegraph, 27th October 1987. 38. UK Includes Missile Talks with France', The Independent, 21st April 1987. 'Warheads Shortage threatens Trident', The Independent, 26th January 1987. Internal MoD sources cited indicate started on a new tactical warhead. 39. Eric J. Grove, Vanguard to Trident, ibid pg 384 40. Duncan Campbell, The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier, Paladin, London, 1986, pg 207, citing The Times, 2nd May 1986. 41. Eric J. Grove, 'Nuclear Weapons on Surface Navies - More trouble than they are worth?', Council of Arms Control Bulletin No.24, January 1986. 42. 'An interview with the First Sea Lord', Naval Forces ibid, pg 14-25. 43. Dr P.A. Gates, Surface Warship Design, Brasseys Defence Publishers, London 1987, Chapter 10. 44. 'North venue for naval test', Press Journal 17th November 1984, pg 13. 45. William M. Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields, ibid, chapter 6. 46. John F. Lehman Jr, former Secretary of the US Navy, 'The 600 ship Navy', USNI Proceedings, January 1986. Admiral J.D. Watkins, USN, former US Chief of Naval Operations. 'The Maritime Strategy'. USNI Proceedings, January 1986, Special Supplement, pg 11. 47. For analysis of the escalatory aspects of the Maritime Strategy see Barry Posen, 'Escalation on NATO's Northern Flank', International Security, vol 7 no 2, Fall 1982, pg 28. 48. Vice Admiral Henry C. Must in, USN, 'Maritime Strategy from the deck plates', USNI Proceedings, September 1986 pg 33. 49. Admiral J.D, Watkins, 'The Maritime Strategy', ibid. 50. 'New Strategy to hem in the Russians: NATO fleets go on to the offensive', The Times, August 30th 1985. 51. William M. Arkin, 'The Nuclear Arms Race at Sea', Neptune Papers No.1, October 1987,1 PS/ Greenpeace, Washington DC. Barry R. Posen 'US Maritime Strategy: A dangerous game.' Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1987, pp 24-28. 52. US HAC, FY pop, Part 4, p 432. This followed a joint Maritime Force Requirement conducted by the three NATO Commands, SACLANT (Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic) SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe), and CinCHAN, (Commander in Chief Channel). The former held by US officers, the latter by C in C of the Royal Navy, CinC Fleet. 53. 'NATO: Its naval posture', Navy International, vol 89 no 3, 1986. Described by former SACLANT, Admiral Wesley MacDonald as the which ".which outlines NATO's basic strategy for maritime campaigns.". 54. Transcript of talk by Admiral Henry C. Must in, Commander 2nd Fleet, US Naval Institute, "The Maritime Strategy", 29th May 1986 pp 20-21. 55. Admiral Sir William Stavely, Transcript of 'Overview of British Defence Policy and the Relevance of the Northern Flank' at the Conference on Britain and the Security of NATOs Northern Flank, 7-8th May 1986. Also 'Briefing for Commander in Chief for the press on exercise Ocean Safari', 27th August 1987, Northwood HQ, pg 1. One objective cited, 'Forward Defence in the Norwegian Sea'. 56. Statement of Admiral Lee Baggett Jr, USN on Status of Atlantic Command, to Senate Armed Services Committee of pop Authorization for Appropriations for FY 1987, March 11,12, 1986. 57. Statement of Vice Admiral James A. Lyons., Jr Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations before the Seapower and Force Projection Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, on the US Navy's Global Commitments, 28th February 1985, pg 9., HAC FY 1986, pop, Part 2 p 931. 58. Vice Admiral Sir Peter Stanford, 'The current position of the Royal Navy', US Naval Institute Proceeding, March 1984. and. 'NATO naval posture now offensive', Janes Defence Weekly, Vol 10 no 4, September 7th 1985. ' NATO outnumbered navies move over to the offensive', The Telegraph, 30th August 1985. 59. Dossier, Naval Forces, Vol 5, No.3 1984, pg 103. and International Herald Tribune, 4th April 1984. 60. 'NATO navies allowed nuclear first strike', The Telegraph, 23 March, 1984. 61. The Telegraph, March 23rd, 1984, Reportedly the proposal include greater discretion for naval commanders since according to then Secretary of the US Navy John Lehman Jr. "the delicate period between conflict and no conflict is inadequately handled by large peacetime bureaucracies - and NATO is a large peacetime bureaucracy.". 62. The New York Times, April 2nd, 1984. 63. Jan Breemer, 'Royal Netherlands Navy: Status Report', Navy International, October 1987, Vol 92 No.10. 64. Statement of Admiral Lee Baggett Jr. USN, C in C US Atlantic Command, before House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defence on Military Strategy in the Atlantic, April 16th, 1987, pg 4. 65. 'The Way Forward', Cmnd 8288, HMSO, paragraph 22. John Notts Defence White paper emphasized the utility of submarines and ASW aircraft operating forward. 66. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1987, ibid, pg 25, "Because of the increasing size and capability of the Soviet submarine fleet we place particular emphasis on our Anti- Submarine Warfare (ASW) capability". 67. Eric J. Grove, Vanguard to Trident, ibid. Statement on the Defence Estimates, Vol 1, 1981 para332. 68. Arkin and Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields, ibid, pg 115. 69. Eric J. Grove, 'After the Falklands', USNI Proceedings, March 1986, pg 126. 70. Vice Admiral Henry C. Must in, USN, 'Maritime Strategy from the deck plates', USNI Proceedings, September 1986 pg 33. 71. 'NATO pays tribute to the Royal Navy', The Times, 31 st of August 1985. 72. The Way Forward, Cmnd 8288, HMSO,ibid. The 1982 Defence White Paper announced an increase of 12-17 attack submarines. The Telegraph, 11 th September 1985, The UK Government ordered three Trafalgar class SSNs in 1985. 73. Admiral Sir William Stavely, 'Power factor: Sub-Ops in NATO, NATOs Sixteen Nations, April 1986. 74. Admiral J.D Watkins, USN, The Maritime Strategy, ibid. 75. Admiral Sir William Stavely, RN, Transcript of 'Overview of British Defence Policy and the Relevance of the Northern Flank', ibid. 76. The Times, February 3rd 1987. 77. HC Official Report, (Hansard), vol 109 no 43, 2nd February 1987, pg 732. 78. 'New Navy Plan to attack Soviet subs near bases', The Independent, 14th April, 1987. 79. Admiral James D. Watkins, 'The Maritime Strategy', ibid, pg 11. 80. 'An exclusive AFJ interview with Admiral Carlisle A.H.Trost Chief of Naval Operations', Armed Forces Journal International April 1987, Pg 9. 81. Report to Congress by Admiral Carlisle Trost, USN, Chief of US Naval Operations, US Navy on Posture and Fiscal Year Statement 1988-9, Budget of United States Navy, pg 40. 82. HC Written Answers, 3 June 1986, pg 9678, Lord Trefgarne, Minister of State for Defence Procurement. 83. Admiral Sir William Stavely, 'Power factor: Sub-Ops in NATO', NATOs Sixteen Nations, ibid. 84. The Times, 3rd July 1987. 85. Captain T.E. Le Marchand, 'Under Ice Operations', Naval War College Review, Vol.38 No. 3, May-June 1985, pp 19-27. 86. 'New Navy Plan to attack Soviet subs near bases', The Independent, 14th April 1987. 87. Statement of Jonathon Alford and Dr Desmond Ball of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, before the Defence Select Committee of the British House of Commons, 9th July 1980. 88. 'In Parliament', ADIU Report vol 8 no 2, March-April 1986, and Vol 9, no 2, March-April 1987. 89. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1987, ibid, pgs 15 and 25. 90. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1984, vol 1, Cmnd 92227-1, London, HMSO 1984, paragraph 430. 91. Eric J. Grove, 'The Royal Navy sails into tomorrow', Defense and Foreign Affairs, September 1987. 92. USNI Proceedings, May Review Issue, May 1985. and 'An interview with Admiral Wesley MacDonald' Armed Forces Journal International, April 1985. also US HAC, FY 1986, pop Part 2, p 648, and 'A Test for NATO at Sea', Newsweek, 16th April 1984, p. 93. Atlantic News No.1748, 20th September 1985. 'Ocean Safari 1985', Armed Forces Journal International, Vol.5 No.1. January 1986. 94. 'US Navy Operations in 1985', USNI Proceedings, May Review issue, May 1986. and The Telegraph, 'Landings watched by Russian Spy ship', 25 September 1985. 95. John F Lehman, 'The 600 ship Navy', USNI Proceedings, January 1986 (Special Supplement) p.36. 96. HAC FY 1987 pop part 1. pg 293. and Statement of Vice Admiral James A. Lyons Jr, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval operations for Plans, Policy and Operations before the Seapower and Force Projection Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on The US Navy's Global Commitments, 28th February 1985, pg 18. 97. 'Exercise Ocean Safari', Naval Forces, VII 11, 1985. pg 43. 98. Major 3 week NATO exercise begins today . Janes Defence Weekly, 20 September 1986. Also, The Scotsman 29 th August 1986 99. 'Ocean Safari exercises NATO mine warfare role', Janes Defence Weekly, 17th November 1987. 100. 'Surface and Submarine activity 27th August 1987 'Ocean Safari Press Brief', Northwood, UK. 101. The Arms Control Reporter, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, Washington DC 1987, Section 402.B.156. (Hence, ACR). The Cork Examiner, October 17th 1987. 102. 'Su-27 collides with Norwegian P-3', Janes Defence Weekly,19th September 1987, vol 8 no 11. 103. William M. Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields. ibid. pgs 2346. 104. William M. Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields. pg 67. 105. Malcolm Spaven, Fortress Scotland, ibid. pg 74. 106. HC Official Report, HC written Answer to Mr Norman Lamont, vol 87 no.17,27th November 1985, pg 577-8. 107. Duncan Campbell, The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: American Military Power in Britain, Paladin, London, 1986 pgs 178, 184. 108. Malcolm Spaven, Fortress Scotland, ibid, pg 73. 109. Duncan Campbell, The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier, ibid, pg 206-9. 110. ADIU Report vol 9 no 1, January-February 1987. 111. William M. Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields, pg 223, 234. 112. Duncan Campbell, The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier, ibid pg 178-9. 113. Nuclear Battlefields, ibid, pgs 69-73. 114. Malcolm Spaven, Fortress Scotland, pg 105. 115. William M. Arkin and Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields ,ibid: pg 10. 116. Malcolm Spaven, Fortress Scotland, ibid, pg 59, 71-3. 117. HC Written Answers, 7th December 1987, 11 January 1988. from T. Sainsbury. 118. Desmond Ball, 'Can Nuclear War be controlled?', Adelphi Paper No.1 London, International Institute of Strategic studies, 1981, p 22. 119. HC Written Answer,18th January, vol 125 no 74, from T. Sainsbury. 120. William M. Arkin and Richard Fieldhouse, Nuclear Battlefields, pg 22-3. 121. Malcolm Spaven, ELF Communications, ibid. 122. 'Pentagon discloses overseas arms sales', Janes Defense Weekly, vol 7 no 2 17 January 1987. HC Written Answer, 21 January 1988, T. Sainsbury. 123. The Clyde Area Public Safety Scheme (CLYDEPUBSAFE), Revised 1983. pg 1-2. 124. CLYDESPUBSAFE, ibid, pg 1-3. 125. 'Navy Revises Nuclear Sub Disaster Plan', The Telegraph, 8th March 1984. 126. Combined Barry and Cardiff Special Safety Scheme for the visit of nuclear powered warships, Chief Executive South Glamorgan County council, Newport Rd, Cardiff, and Flag Officer Plymouth, June 1985 pg 2-9, par a 27. 127. Clydespubsafe, ibid 1 -2. 128. World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1986, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1986.pg 61. 129. Eric J. Grove, Vanguard to Trident, ibid, pg 353. 130. 'Chronology of events 1981', USNI Proceedings, May 1982 Review Issue. 131. The Sunday Mail 4th October 1987. 132. 'Radiation risk off Scilly', The Guardian,8th October 1986. HC Written Answers, Vol 108 no.34 pg 156 15 January 1987, Mr Stanley. 'Soviet Submarine accidents - new details', Janes Defence Weekly,19 January 1985, pg 85. 133. Shaun Gregory, Nuclear Weapons Accidents Involving Britain, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Technical report No. 6, September 1987, and Atlantic News, No.1683,9th January 1985. 134. 'US Navy operations in 1986', USNI Proceedings, May Review issue, May 1987. 135. 'Sub, fishing boat collide', Aviation Week and Space Technology,17th June 1985, pg 27 and Washington Post, June 11th 1985. 136. Janes Defense Weekly, 2nd August 1986, ibid. 137. A Chronology of events 1983', USNI Proceedings, May 1984 Review Issue. 138. The Guardian, 12th April, 1984. 139. The Guardian, 8th August, 1987. 140. Janes Defence Weekly, 17th October 1987, pg 861. 141. 'Royal Navy Fires', News in Brief, Janes Defense Weekly 17 October,1987, pg 861. Jan S. Breemer, 'Soviet Submarines Accidents Background and Chronology', Navy International, May 1986 91 (5) pg 312. 142. Duncan Campbell, The Unsinkable aircraft carrier, ibid, pg 219. 143. RUSI Yearbook, 1983, Russey and Brasseys Defence Publishing, 1984, pg 245, 'A Chronology of events'. 144. Official Report, HC Written Answer Vol 120 163. Tam Dalyall, 'Secrets of Davy Jones No.25, Thursday 23rd July 1987, pg 226 from I. Stewart. 145. The Guardian, 16th July, 1987. 146. HC Written Answer, 27th January 1988, I. Stewart, to Mr B. Wilson. 147. The Telegraph, 15th November 1987. 148. Duncan Campbell, The Unsinkable Aircraft carrier, ibid, pg 215-6. 149. Combined Barry and Cardiff Special Safety Scheme for visits of nuclear powered warships, ibid, June 1985. pg 1-3. 150. Combined Cardiff and Barry Special Safety Scheme, ibid, Annex 2A, Part II. 151. Duncan Campbell, The Unsinkable Aircraft carrier, ibid, pg 215-7. 152. James Cutler and Rob Edwards, Britain's Nuclear Nightmare, Sphere books, London, April 1988. 153. 'MP calls for sub atom leak inquiry', Daily Mail, 10th March 1986. 154. Duncan Campbell, The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier, ibid, pg 219-221,. 155. Campbell, ibid, 217. 156. SCRAM Journal, vol 3, no 2 1985. 157. 'MoD seeks resting place for old reactors', The Guardian 3rd October 1987. 158. See Ken Coates 'Nuclear Weapons in the Falklands', END Papers Sixteen, Swords and Ploughshares, Spokesman 54 Summer 1987 pg 58. for much of subsequent account. 159. Tam Dalyall, 'Secrets of Davy Jones's 176. Arms Control Reporter, 402.B.108, 1986. Locker', New Scientist, 24th March 1983, pg 834. 160. Eric J. Grove, Vanguard to Trident, pg 384, and Tam Dalyall MP, Thatcher's Torpedo. Cecil Woolf, 1983, p. 208. 161. David Tinker, "A Message From The Falklands", Penguin, 1982 pg 20. 162. 'Frigates had nuclear weapons', The Times, 3rd November 1988. 163. Tam Dalyall, 'secrets of Davy Jones Locker', New Scientist, 24th March 1983, pg. 834. 164. Duncan Campbell, 'Too few bombs to go Round', New Statesman, 29th November 1985. 165. Duncan Campbell and John Rentout, 'The Falklands: All out war', New Statesman, 24th August 1984, pg 9. 166. 'Dalyall claim on the Falkland Force', The Times 22nd April 1985. 167. George H. Quester, 'Nuclear Implications of the South Atlantic war,' University of Maryland, unpublished, June 1985. 168. The Arms Control Reporter, 452.B.42, 7th August 1984, pg 477. 169. 'UK Says Arctic subs avoid Canadian Waters', Toronto Star, 16th September 1987. 170. 'Western Navies in 1986', USNI Proceedings, April 1987, Review issue. 171. Statement on the Defence Estimates 1987, ibid. pg 9. 172. 'Carlucci gets British INF support', The Guardian, 3rd December 1987. 173. 'Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom and USSR concerning the Prevention of Incidents at sea beyond the Territorial Sea', London, 15 July 1986, Treaty Series No. 5 1987, Cm 57, HMSO. 174. 'Soviet fighters try to blast British helicopters', Daily Mail, 28th October 1987, pg 15. 175. William M. Arkin, The nuclear arms race at sea, ibid, Pg 1 October 1987. 176. Arms Control Reporter,402.B.108, 1986. 177. 'Japans Rebuff for Invincible', The Guardian. pg 30 1985. 'Far East Visit beset by problems', The Times, 7th January 1984:. 178. Port Watch Newsletter. international nuclear free harbour network information no. 3, March-June 1987, pg 6. 179. Australian Foreign Affairs Record, April 1987, in Ports Watch Newsletter, no.9 July September 1987 pg 17. 180. Malcolm Macintosh, 'A Nuclear Free Pacific ?', ADIU Report vol 9, no 2, March-April 1987. 181. 'No Nagging on Nukes as China hails the Navy', Telegraph, 12th July 1986. 182. International Herald Tribune, 13th May 1987. 183. ADIU Report vol 9 no 3, May-June,1987 pg 8. 184. The Financial Times, May 16th, 1987. 185. HC Written Answer,4th November 1986 in ADIU Report, vol 9 no 1 Jan-Feb 1987, pg 16. 186. 'Younger says Cruise has visited the Clyde', The Scotsman, 24th September 1987. 187. Source, Faslane Peace Camp, and Vivian Kendon, Scottish CND. 188. 'US Wants to extend N-base at Holy Loch' The Guardian. October 24th 1986. 189. Eric Grove, 'The Convoy Debate', Naval Forces, Vol Vl, No 3, 1985. 190. Admiral Sir James Eberle, Naval Forces, Maritime Strategy, Vol VII, No 11, 1987, pg 37. 191. Statement on the Defense Estimates,1987 Part 1. ibid, pg 12. 192. ADIU Report, vol 9 no 1, August 1987. pg 20.