TL: FMC/WATH RECYCLING - WASTE TRADE SCANDALS GREENPEACE CASE STUDY NO. 2 SO: Greenpeace International (GP) DT: 1992 Keywords: fertilizers production toxics greenpeace reports gp hazardous waste trade us europe uk sludge chemicals legal enforcement failures workers safety risks / Inside cover = contents Page 1 = title page: FMC/WATH RECYCLING WASTE TRADE SCANDALS GREENPEACE CASE STUDY NO. 2 SERIES: RECYCLING The Greenpeace waste trade scandal series has been created in an effort to provide legislators, journalists and public officials, with behind-the-headlines case studies as to what actually happens in today's flourishing hazardous waste trade "business". It is our sincere hope that given good information, good decisions will be made to prevent the transboundary movement of hazardous waste. Page 2 = press clipping THE SCANDAL DATE: June 1989 THE DEAL: The US brokers, Amlon Metals Inc. purchased 403 tonnes of what they thought was copper hydroxide sludge from the USA multi-national chemical company known as FMC Corporation which they then sent to a UK metal reclamation plant, Wath Recycling. Wath Recycling were contracted to combine and dry the waste ready for recycling. Upon arrival however, a horribly powerful smell was noticed coming from the barrels. It was soon discovered that the supposed non-ferrous metal waste was contaminated with dangerous organic solvents and compounds associated with herbicide manufacture. Wath and Amlon Metals have complained informally and formally about the misrepresentation of the waste but to this day FMC refuses to take the wastes back. The case is to be tried in a federal court in the USA. THE WASTE: 400 tonnes of copper hydroxide sludge contaminated with 4.5% organic material. Contaminants of main concern include xylene, 2,3-Dihydro-2,2-dimethyl benzofuran, chlorinated phenolic compounds. THE HAZARD: Toxic, carcinogenic, flammable, explosive, irritant. ORIGIN: FMC Corporation, Baltimore, USA., fertiliser and pesticide plant. PERPETRATOR: FMC Corporation MIDDLEMEN: Amlon Metals Inc., Amlon Metals Ltd (Euromet), possibly Disposal Reclamation Environmental Corporation. LESS THAN INNOCENT VICTIM: Wath Recycling ULTIMATE FATE: As yet unknown. Currently stored in South Yorkshire, UK, pending legal case. LEGAL LOOPHOLES EXPLOITED: EC Directive Transfrontier Shipment of Hazardous Waste Regulations, (non-ferrous metals loophole-- Article 17). LESSONS LEARNED The FMC/Wath scandal exposes the following flaws in existing and proposed EC legislation on the transboundary movement of waste: 1 It's easy to misrepresent wastes. Waste traders can take advantage of the fact that governments have little ability to monitor and thus catch illegal shipments or shipments which are misrepresented on the required Uniform Document. 2 If a waste trade deal cannot be performed according to the contract or is illegal, there is no authority granted to the holding state or business to demand its re-export. 3 There is considerably less scrutiny and legal controls for recyclable waste. 4 The producer of the waste is currently not ultimately responsible for its disposal costs and the environmental damage that may occur. 5 Nobody is required to test for a full range of problematic chemicals such as organic contaminants in metals waste. THE DISCOVERY SOMETIME ON OR AROUND 13 JUNE 1989, WORKERS AT WATH RECYCLING, A SMALL REPROCESSING FIRM IN SOUTH YORKSHIRE, WERE STRUCK BY A PUNGENT ODOUR COMING FROM A DELIVERY OF NEW MATERIAL DESTINED FOR RECOVERY. This was waste from a North American fertiliser company, FMC Corporation of Baltimore, and was supposed to consist of copper hydroxide sludge which Wath would dry prior to reclamation of the copper. A New York metal broker, Amlon Metals Inc. had agreed to take the waste from FMC and sell it to Wath Recycling on condition that it did not contain more than trace amounts of organic contaminants and was otherwise free of harmful impurities.1 HEAVILY CONTAMINED SLUDGE FMC sent a sample of the waste and an analysis to Amlon Inc. followed by a three-tonne initial batch. Amlon Inc. then sent it on to Wath Recycling. Wath successfully reprocessed the sample and agreed to take the rest of the consignment. The waste was sent under Article 17, using a special document procedure (Annex iii) of the EC Directive on the Transfrontier Shipment of Waste (84/631/EEC). It is used for non-ferrous metals going to a recycling facility. In May 1989, a further 400 tonnes of the waste in 20 freight containers were shipped from the Dundalk Marine Terminal, USA to Tilbury Docks in Essex, UK and then sent on by train to Rotherham, Yorkshire, arriving on 13 June.2 After thirteen of these stinking containers arrived at Wath Recycling, Wath claimed that the delivery contained a different material from that for which they had contracted to receive. At that point, Wath refused to take any more deliveries. The 13 bulk containers they had received amounted to about 250-260 tonnes. This left 7 containers of the waste stranded at a British Rail depot near Leeds.3 The waste which had arrived in ordinary lorries with simple tarpaulin covers was placed in plastic barrels by experts wearing special breathing apparatus and "moon-suits" working for no more than 15 minutes at a time. Eight of the barrels sitting at Wath now contain just the equipment used to repackage the waste.4 Although the waste did indeed contain copper hydroxide sludge, an analysis, done on behalf of Wath, showed that it was also heavily contaminated with toxic organic chemicals associated with the manufacture of herbicides. The most dangerous of these contaminants were xylene, dimethyl benzofuran and chlorinated phenolic compounds. Wath Recycling was not licensed either to store or to process such chemicals. Wath informed the relevant authorities: the Department of the Environment's Inspectorate of Pollution in the UK and the US Environmental Protection Agency. On 19 June, Wath also informed the South Yorkshire Hazardous Waste Unit (SYHWU). The British Authorities (SYHWU and the Director of Environmental Health) visited the site on the morning of 20 June and confirmed that the independent analysis Wath had commissioned on the material was correct. Though an ignition test carried out by the Environmental Health laboratories found the material not to be a fire hazard, the consensus was that the waste was misrepresented and hazardous and should be returned to the United States.5 CONTAMINANTS IN THE AIR Dust and vegetation sampling in the area around the plant led the SYHWU to believe that there was no cause for concern for damage to the immediate environment.6 However, air monitoring carried out by an independent consultant during the plant's normal operation indicated an increased level of contaminants. These higher levels dropped after the drumming operations were slowed.7 Throughout this time the director of Wath, Michael Harris, and his wife continued to live in a caravan on the site, only a few metres from the operational area. The SYHWU concluded that there was no danger to the communities off-site. However, two public notices were distributed to all residents in the neighbouring areas, warning them not to approach the site.8 CONCERN AT LACK OF ACTION In June and July, technical and engineering staff from FMC's Baltimore plant arrived in the UK to, as they put it, "assist in providing and obtaining information regarding the shipment." The full extent of their assistance however seemed to amount to little more than an offer to look for another UK disposal or reclamation option. The only likely candidate was the incineration company, Rechem, but they were already fully booked with orders. The Health and Safety Executive seemed reluctant to get involved so on 26 July, the director of Environmental Health rang them to express his department's continued concern at the lack of action. An inspector from HSE arrived at Wath's site on 28 July to gather information, and then sought advice from The Health and Safety Executive's Technology Division. These specialists looked at the results of the analysis carried out for Wath and visited the site themselves. They took samples from the waste and also from the ground and the air, both in the factory yard and around the perimeter.9 On this basis, the HSE did not consider the emissions dangerous enough to justify moving Mr Harris and his wife away from the site. On 10 August the HSE placed two Prohibition Notices on the company. The first was an order prohibiting anyone coming into contact with the sludge without wearing adequate protective equipment. The other was a deferred Prohibition Notice which prohibited storage in a loose bulk form after 23 August.10 This date was later put back to 10 October 1989 because the specialist firm hired by Wath Recycling needed time to carry out their assessment, prepare a safe method of repackaging and then implement it.11 On 11 August the local press got hold of the story and aroused public concern. A local action group was formed which consulted with health authorities, the companies involved, the local press, and the general public. A public meeting was held, attended by more than 800 people. DISAGREEMENT OVER CONTENT Over a period of five weeks, beginning in September 1989, the waste was transferred to 2,733 steel drums by a team of specialists from the company Waste Management Ltd, wearing protective clothing. The building in which the waste had been stored was decontaminated with a high pressure, low volume jet and the contaminated water stored in eight other drums.12 No reprocessing was done on any of this 20 container consignment. FMC proclaimed that the waste was not hazardous and refused to take it back. Paul Clements, FMC's lawyer in London, said he could not agree that Wath had been deliberately misled about the contents of the consignment it had agreed to handle. They said it was the same as the original sample.13 At this point, the UK Secretary of State for the Environment intervened personally, promising that the waste would be returned to the US. But the next day, the Department of the Environment had to admit that the Government had no powers to return it under current regulations. Wath and Amlon Metals now threatened to sue FMC unless they took back the waste. Still FMC refused. On 13 September 1990, more than a year after the waste was discovered to be contaminated, the US Environment Protection Agency arrived at Wath and took samples for their own analysis. While Wath's lawyers were trying to get the case heard in an English court, FMC made a successful application to have it heard in the USA: which meant that, pending the hearing, neither Wath nor Amlon Metals, the local people, the health authorities nor even the British Government could do anything to get the waste out of the UK -- Where it still sits as of the date of this publication. THE LESS THAN INNOCENT VICTIM--WATH RECYCLING The following are excerpts from an eye-witness account of events at Wath by Dr. Plews, Chairman of the local protest group, The Wath Environmental Abuse Lobby: "A group of approximately nine of us went to the (Wath) factory site. It is only 700 metres from the town centre. "I was horrified at what I saw. There were piles of rusting drums, drums that appeared to be leaking. Drums that appeared to have leaked in the past. Drums marked hazardous waste. Drums with labels on showing previous or present contents, amongst them being nickel, copper, zinc and molybdendum compounds. "Downwind of the plant there was a disgusting sickly smell. On the south side of the perimeter fence the ground was stained with a blue/green substance over a large area. No excess radiation was detected. "I began watching the factory. I cannot remember exact dates but on a number of occasions I saw smoke coming from the factory chimney. I informed HMIP (Her Majesty' Inspectorate of Pollution) in Sheffield, a Mr White. He assured me that there were a few teething problems as the chimney had been recently installed, but everything would be alright. "On 11 August, the Rotherham Advertiser announces that there are 500 tonnes of toxic waste at Wath Recycling." PHOTO 1/2 Page - of local protest group standing outside the Wath Recycling site. WHAT THE WASTE REALLY WAS A DANGEROUS CONSIGNMENT "This is really an outrage, what they have done...This is really vile material," said Bob Koppel, President of Amlon Metals Inc.14 The 400-tonne consignment sold to Amlon and subsequently shipped to Wath Recycling, was generated, according to FMC, through routine operations between April 1988 and January 1989.15 The contract between Amlon Metals Inc. and FMC specifies the material as copper residue - typically 33% copper, 54% water with a maximum 0.5% each of chlorine, nickel, arsenic, antimony and lead and no other harmful impurities.16 FMC provided Amlon Metals Inc. with a sample, a chemical analysis and, after June 1988, a three tonne initial consignment. Amlon Inc. confirmed, after negotiations, that it wished to acquire the material for recycling.17 FMC claimed later to have been "distressed" that the company selected by Amlon to handle the waste (Wath Recycling) was not equipped to do so.18 At Wath, the material was mixed with material from two other contracts. The resulting mixture was copper hydroxide sludge, but it contained up to 4.5 per cent organic chemicals.19 One of these chemicals was xylene, which is among the most widely used solvents in the chemical industry. It is harmful if it is inhaled or comes into contact with the skin. The waste also contained furans which are even more toxic than xylene. They are the undesirable byproducts of some of the processes in the manufacture of pesticides and herbicides. Trace amounts of furans may cause cancer if ingested. On a Material Safety Sheet, dated 16 August 1989, (after the material had arrived at Wath) FMC Corporation gave the following composition. Water (40.50%) Copper Oxides/Hydroxides (20.30%) 7-Hydroxy Tar (2.8%) 2,3-Dihydro-2,2-dimethyl benzofuran (7-hydrogen) (1.6%) Sodium Sulfate (<10%) Ferrous Hydroxide (1%) Xylene (0.1%) Other process impurities were supposedly present at concentrations of less than 0.1% QUESTIONS ASKED In a letter to FMC, dated 16 June 1989, Amlon's investment recovery officer posed the following questions: "1. Does the xylene content at these levels pose problems for the drying, smelting or refining of material? 2. What health data can you provide regarding this material containing xylene contents of 500-1400 ppm? (In fact the waste was found to have much higher levels of xylene.) 3. We understand the xylene loose in a sealed container can be explosive. Can we have your confirmation of this and how this can be neutralised?" To these three questions, FMC replied: "1. FMC will provide the recovery plant with the technical assistance, if required please call Eugene Reynolds 301-355-6400 ext 5751. 2. Since this material is non-hazardous a MSDS (Material Safety Data Sheet) sheet was not developed. However, it is my understanding that you have MSDS information on the known materials in the sludge. The plant will develop a MSDS for your use. 3. Xylene is a flammable material and if there is a source of ignition and a spark present there could be a condition where a small explosion could result, ie. blow the tarpaulin off. This condition is highly unlikely because of the high moisture content of the material (sludge) and a large amount of the xylene has already evaporated from the container."20 AMERICAN RULING Meanwhile the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) ruled that although part of the waste was volatile, the cargo was not hazardous under Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulations and had therefore not contravened US export regulations21 (see Annex). THE DEAL (MAP) THE GENERATOR FMC CORPORATION Agricultural Chemical Group, 1701 E. Patapsco Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland 21226, USA. Plant manager - Frank Solecki According to FMC themselves, the FMC Baltimore plant has had no commercial or structured relationship with Amlon or Wath Recycling other than the arrangement currently discussed.22 It is worth noting that FMC has a policy to assess and pursue reclamation and "recycling" alternatives to disposal in preference to landfill which was used in the past.23 On 3 January 1990, the Yorkshire Post reported that FMC was negotiating a lucrative defence contract with the British Government. The paper claimed that the Ministry of Defence was in discussion with FMC regarding the provision of equipment for the army's new multi-million pound rocket system - the Multi Launch Rocket System (MLRS). This was later confirmed by Secretary of State for Defence, Tom King.24 On 15 November 1984, a toxic cloud of methyl isocyanate was released into the air from FMC's agricultural chemicals plant, in Middleport, near Buffalo, New York. This was the same chemical that devastated Bhopal in India two weeks later. Nearby schoolgrounds were contaminated.25 IMPORTERS EUROMET 5th floor, Victoria House, Vernon Place, London WC1B 4DH Waste Metal brokers. Incorporation - 22 November 1977. Number of employees : 11 - 20. Registered Company number - 01340153. Chief Executive - Israel Weinstock In 1987 Euromet of London imported hazardous wastes from the following US firms: Atlantic Steel Co. of Atlanta, Georgia; Duracell, Lexington, North Carolina; International Metals Reclamation, of Ellwood City, Pennsylvania.26 Euromet was also involved in sending dangerous waste (shipped as "zinc oxide residues"), including high levels of cadmium and lead to Brazil in the summer of 1989. Greenpeace, working in cooperation with Brazilian officials and environmentalists, succeeded in having the waste returned to Rotterdam. (See Waste Trade Scandals, Case Study 4.) Euromet was one among several companies exporting toxic mercury waste to the Spanish company Minas de Almaden y Arrayanes S.A. (See "The Great Cover-Up: The Transport and Dumping of Foreign Hazardous Wastes in Almaden, Spain". Greenpeace, 27 March 1991.) Euromet was also involved in selling dioxin contaminated wastes to the ASER zinc and lead recycling plant in Bilbao, Spain (See "Dumping By another Name", Greenpeace report, 26 June 1991). Euromet is the trading name for Amlon Metals Ltd. According to the President of Amlon Metals Inc in the United States, Euromet had nothing to do with this particular deal. However, a report in the Yorkshire Post alleges that Euromet disputes this claim, saying they were engaged in a joint venture with Amlon Metals Inc.27 According to the South Yorkshire Hazardous Waste Unit, Euromet was the legal holder of the waste. When the waste arrived in England, the documents carried the name of Euromet and not of Amlon Metals Inc.28 AMLON Amlon Metals Inc., 40 Rector Street, NY NY 10006 1705, USA Amlon Metals Ltd., 23 Barham Avenue, Elstree, Herts WD6 3PW, UK. Amlon Metals Inc is an agent for Wath Recycling. Amlon Metals Inc. is beneficially owned by Amlon Metals AG.29 In 1980, Amlon Metals Inc. was incorporated under its President, Robert Koppel. Its market is non-ferrous metals. A Dutch company called Metaalhandel J.A. Magnus has a 49% shareholding in Amlon Metals Ltd. Leon Magnus is also a director of Euromet and like Euromet was involved in the transport of contaminated wastes to Brazil in 1989 (See Waste Trade Scandal: Case Study 4). Amlon Metals Ltd (incorporated 11 May 1972) owned Amlon Metals Inc. until 1985 and has loaned monies to Wath Recycling.30 "RECYCLER" WATH RECYCLING Moor Road, Wath-on-Dearne, Rotherham, South Yorkshire Tel.: 0709 878907 Registered office: 16 Harcourt House, 19 Cavendish Square, London W1 Managing director - Michael Harris Directors: Michael Harris - metal trader, British Roy Bowmer - Plant technical executive - British Israel Weinstock - metal trader/director - Dutch (Mr Weinstock's other directorships are Amlon Metals Ltd, Amlon Freight, Chartering Services Ltd, Disposal Reclamation Environmental Corporation Ltd (D.R.E.C.) David Bensosan - waste metal dealer - British (other directorships - D.R.E.C. Ltd) Wath is a small metals reclamation firm with about 14 employees. It is not a metal refiner; it prepares material through a process of calcination and drying, and then sends the residue on to be refined. Its contract called for it to combine and dry the waste before it was recycled. Wath Recycling was formerly known as Rapid 1706 Limited (date of incorporation : 4 August 1986). Less than a month after its initial incorporation, it changed its name on 2 September 1986 to Wath Aluminium. On 25 May 1988 it changed its name again; this time to Wath Recycling.31 In 1987 Wath Recycling had a net worth, according to their accounts submitted 30 September, of 859 pounds sterling. By the same time the following year, 1988, the company was worth 26,024 pounds sterling (company accounts 1988). By September 1989, Wath Recycling had a net worth of 63,110 pounds sterling. Israel Weinstock has a material interest in Amlon Metals Ltd and Disposal Reclamation Environmental Corporation (D.R.E.C.). Before the FMC/Wath scandal, Wath, under different ownership, was not popular with the local community. Wath Aluminium used to be engaged in melting down aluminium car engines. There were a lot of complaints because of the black smoke that was emitted from the plant. There were complaints of headaches and stomach upsets. In 1987 Wath imported waste from Harshaw/Filtrol Partnership of Louisville, Kentucky, USA and Federated Metals, Newark, New Jersey, USA. Also in 1987, Wath imported 18.8 tonnes of metal electroplating sludge from Digital Equipment Corp. of San German, Puerto Rico.32 In May 1990, Rotherham Council granted planning permission for excavation and landfill works on Wath's site, despite local protests. There is a fear, amongst some local residents, that Wath wishes to expand its operations. At present, it uses only a small part of the land it owns. On 29 April 1991, there was a serious fire at the Wath plant. Although the drums of waste from FMC were not affected, it was not the first fire to have occurred there and local residents remain worried that one day a fire will spread to the drums. Amlon Metals Inc. serves as their sole agent and it is likely that a large proportion of their business comes from abroad. DISPOSAL RECLAMATION ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION (D.R.E.C.) (formerly Haleton Ltd) According to the company records, Israel Weinstock and David Bensusan (both directors of Wath Recycling Limited and Mr Weinstock a director of Amlon Metals Ltd) are directors of D.R.E.C. A Yorkshire Post article claims that D.R.E.C. was named on the Transfrontier Shipment documentation that accompanied the waste. Unfortunately, it has not been possible to ascertain whether D.R.E.C. had any actual monetary or legal dealing in this particular contract. AUTHORITIES INVOLVED - Health and Safety Executive (HSE) Duty to ensure on and off-site safety in working activities. It is responsible for enforcing those parts of the Health and Safety at Work (HSW) Act of 1974 which are concerned with the health, safety and welfare of employees and the health and safety of other persons who may also be affected, such as visitors and members of the public. - Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution (HMIP) Formerly Alkali Inspectorate Duty to ensure that emissions from scheduled processes do not affect the health of the public. - Environmental Health Department Rotherham Environmental Health Department enforces legislation for general public protection from environmental pollutants. In this case, monitoring of the environment following alleged health effects from pollution in the area adjacent to the work. It is also responsible for the waste regulatory function. This is carried out through the South Yorkshire Hazardous Waste Unit. - South Yorkshire Hazardous Waste Unit (SYHWU) To advise Waste Regulatory Authorities on all waste disposal functions. In this case, advice is given to Rotherham Environmental Health Department. Monitoring of site licence and special waste regulations as well as regulations dealing with imported waste. The Wath Recycling site is licensed for storage and disposal under the Control of Pollution Act by the SYHWU who act on behalf of Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council Environmental Health Department. - The US Environmental Protection Agency The US federal agency charged with overseeing protection of the environment. It has enforcement powers over US exports of hazardous waste. THE MONEY In a letter to FMC, dated 16 August 1988, Amlon Metals Inc. confirmed purchase of approximately 200 tons (sic) in bulk of ___ copper residue. In the same letter, Amlon confirmed terms as follows: Copper Content (Dry basis) 40 per cent and above - Amlon Inc. to pay FMC $25 per short ton of material 30 per cent and below - FMC to pay Amlon Inc. $25 per short ton of material Fractions pro rata. There was also an escalator clause: for each percentage point under 30, treatment charge to FMC would be increased by $10 per short ton, fractions pro rata. For example, if the copper content was 25%, the treatment charge would be increased $50 per short ton and the total treatment charge would be $75 per short ton material. According to FMC, the samples provided to Amlon Inc. in 1988 were not sold but offered to them so that Amlon Inc. had the opportunity to assess whether their facilities could handle the main consignment.33 According to Israel Weinstock, who is knowledgeable about importing and exporting hazardous wastes, FMC saved themselves around $700-800 per tonne by sending the waste to Wath rather than landfilling it in the US.34 If he is correct, then FMC saved themselves around $280,000 - $320,000 on the 400 tonnes. ULTIMATE FATE The FMC waste is currently stored in 2,733 metal drums in Wath upon Dearne, a small town near Rotherham in South Yorkshire. It is stored within a few hundred meters of busy streets on a site not licensed to deal with such wastes. It has been there since July 1989 and may be there for a decade longer as the parties involved await the outcome of the court case that has since been moved to the United States.35 RISK TO PEOPLE AND THE ENVIRONMENT The Health and Safety Executive made the following judgement based both on their own analysis and on the analysis done on behalf of Wath: "The waste contains three substances of particular concern, the properties of which are: One: Xylene - present in quantities up to 11,000 parts per million. Occupational exposure limit is 100 ppm for an 8 hour Time Weighted Average. Not carcinogenic. Flammable. May cause loss of consciousness to humans when the concentrations are sufficiently high. Is also an irritant to skin and eyes. Possible liver effect (enlargement) recoverable. Two: 2,3-Dihydro-2,2-dimethyl benzofuran - present in quantities up to 60,000 ppm. No documented toxicological data is available for this substance. The substance is closely related to benzofuran and to the insecticide carbofuran. Benzofuran carcinogenicity has been studied by the US - National Toxicology Programme; the report is in preparation. We understand the substance is carcinogenic to animals and we must therefore presume it to be carcinogenic to humans. Carbofuran is acutely toxic to many species and must be presumed so also for man. Three: Chlorinated phenolic compounds - several varieties are found in the mixture. No dioxins have been detected, the detection limit is 2ppb. The compounds present are toxic and are possibly carcinogenic to humans. For this reason, exposure to those substances should be kept to a minimum. The health risk will depend on the concentration and the duration of exposure to harmful substances present in the waste. Short single, low level exposures are unlikely to constitute a significant risk."36 On 16 June, 1989 Amlon Metals Inc. faxed the following letter to FMC: "Re Contract 1368: Copper residue To reconfirm your telecon with Mr. J. Lassner the above material is now causing serious problems due to the xylene content. The dangerous and extremely strong odour has caused a dock worker to collapse and others to complain of sickness and nausea. Although you had originally thought the xylene content to be only 50-100 ppm, today you are advised some samples ran 500-1400 ppm. This is no longer trace amounts but high concentrations which is not as per contract and poses various problems, i.e. sickness due to strong odour, contamination of your Cu (Copper) material, hinderance to the refining process and contamination of our other materials which your residues were blended with... We must state quite emphatically, any and all costs incurred because of this problem will be for FMC's account. Firstly, we put at your disposal and for your ownership the seven containers which have just arrived. They are sitting at Leeds Dock in the UK. Contact should be made with Middlegate Shipping & Forwarding Co. Ltd, Knowsley Industrial Park (south), Liverpool L34 9EU, England. Attn: Mark Stark. Tel: 011-44-51-549-1111. Furthermore, this also includes any costs incurred at our (sic) plant for handling and additional processing (neutralising) of your material and costs related to the contamination of our other materials. Let me also point out the material which is at our plant may have to be packaged into drums in order to control the strong odor. Point blank, we may be talking about a great deal of money. In addition we are quite disturbed and alarmed by FMC's lackadaisical attitude on their environmental responsibilities. We were never informed of the strong smell upon loading and an attempt should have been made prior to shipment to determine an actual xylene content..." On 19 June, FMC sent the following faxed letter: "...please be advised of the following: The seven (7) containers at Middlegate meet the same specifications as the original container shipped as a sample and accepted by Amlon. The increased odour level of the trace organic is undoubtedly due to the hot weather experienced during travel time. The sample container was shipped during cooler weather. The copper sludge in the containers is non-hazardous. FMC fails to understand the action of Amlon in refusing to move your seven (7) containers from the dock because of some highly subjective complaints. FMC will provide the services and cooperation required to move the seven (7) containers to the designated recovery plant." WORST POSSIBLE PLACE A regional officer for the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) said the 7 containers were in the worst possible place, near a passenger line and an electricity sub-station. The railway workers there, refusing to handle it, went on strike. Union representatives said that several workers had suffered respiratory problems and eye irritation after working near the containers. Workers agreed to resume work after talks with British Rail, the NUR and the Health and Safety Executive. Men in protective clothing and breathing apparatus then sealed the containers. The seven containers of the waste refused by Wath remain stranded at a rail depot near Leeds. The rest remain at Wath Recycling. THE LAW POWERLESS TO ACT In a letter to Peter Hardy MP, whose constituency covers Wath-on- Dearne, the South Yorkshire Hazardous Waste Unit concluded: "Our view is that the whole incident has highlighted the problem with British Waste Management legislation in general and Transfrontier Shipment of Waste Regulations in particular."37 It was discovered that there is no legal means for a country to rid itself of waste which may have been illegally exported to it. On 16 August 1989, Chris Patten, Secretary of State for the Environment said: "If there are any problems then the waste will have to be taken away from where it is and sent back to the US." The day after this promise was made, it had to be repudiated. The Department of the Environment admitted: "The Secretary of State has no power to order this or any other imported waste out of Britain."38 Chris Patten sought to avoid a repetition of this embarrassment by introducing a new clause into the Environmental Protection Act, giving the Secretary of State for the Environment new powers to reject imported waste. But the new Act still does not give the Secretary of State the power to return wastes once they have arrived. Once waste has been imported, even if it is found on arrival not to conform with the description in the consignment note, there is nothing in the EC Directive that empowers anyone to return it. The UK Department of the Environment has advised in a circular that when a contract is drawn up, provision should be made for sending back any consignments rejected by the consignee. But this is merely a recommendation. Furthermore, although the South Yorkshire Hazardous Waste Unit came under pressure from the Department of the Environment to prosecute FMC, FMC is a US company without a registered office in the UK, and the SYHWU could not, in fact, take proceedings.39 WHO IS LIABLE? All of these issues points to the question of who is liable and unfortunately the law is unclear in this matter. In this case, the waste came via intermediaries (Amlon Metals Inc. and Euromet) and both English and EC law allows middlemen to be the legal holders of the waste. A Government circular (16/89 DOE) says the holder may be the producer of the waste, "or may be another person who takes control of the consignment before the start of the transfrontier shipment". Here, the waste passed from the producer, FMC Corporation in Baltimore, into the possession of Amlon Metals Inc. of New York, before embarking on its journey to Britain via France. In fact, neither of these companies appeared on the documents accompanying the shipment to South Yorkshire, which mentioned only Euromet, the UK partners in the brokerage. In the letter to Peter hardy MP, (16 October 1989) from Neil Morton, Director of Environmental Health, SYHWU said: "Unless the Government makes the producer of waste totally and absolutely responsible for proper and ultimate disposal/reclamation of waste, we will continue to have problems of this nature. "If the wrong materials are imported into this country then the Government of the exporting country should be made responsible for the proper disposal of the waste either by re-importation or any other means, and pay for all expenses connected with any incident. "It is for the appropriate Government to then claim compensation from the producer of the waste or whoever was responsible for the incident." RECYCLING LOOPHOLES Quadeer Khan, Chief Scientific Officer with South Yorkshire's hazardous waste unit, said the incident confirmed that there were "glaring loopholes" in the legislation governing the shipment of waste for recycling. His authority has been calling for over eight years for a system under which exporters of waste must notify authorities in the receiving country of the full chemical composition of the consignment.40 According to the present directive, because of a special loophole for non-ferrous metal wastes intended for recycling (Article 17), it is up to the holder of the waste to notify the authorities only of its commercial content (ie. that part which is intended for recycling or reclamation). Even under the newly proposed EC waste trade regulation, the consignment note would only be required to include "the source and composition of the waste". It is not specified what type of analysis is required and it is doubtful that trace or unexpected contaminants will be reported. In the FMC/Wath case, it was only due to the fact that the contaminants smelled bad that they were detected at all. There is increasing pressure on industrialists to rid themselves of wastes that are expensive to dispose of due to their high degree of hazard or lack of "treatment" capacity. The incentive exists to combine recyclable materials with these problematic compounds and export them, thereby avoiding the high costs of disposal. The UK Institute of Wastes Management agrees that this practice is on the increase: "...with those consignments of material there seems to be an increasing proportion of material that is not suitable for recycling and it is effectively coming in simply for waste disposal purposes...Recycled solvent recovery material is not going to be caught by the special wastes regulations at the moment."41 DOUBLE STANDARDS Unfortunately, bowing to strong lobbying from industrial "recyclers", the European commission has seen to it that the proposed regulation will include new more encompassing recycling loopholes. Under the proposed regulation, double standards are introduced whereby waste for recycling or "further use" is treated differently from wastes bound for "disposal". This dangerous distinction not only derogates from the Basel Convention,42 but from past EC legislation as well. In the past directive, certain wastes such as chlorinated solvents were excluded from the directive and others such as non- ferrous metals were given loopholes allowing less strict control. Now, the Commission is proposing one overall encompassing loophole whereby wastes bound for so called "further use" can avoid the principles of waste management self-sufficiency and disposal proximity and avoid the notification procedure known as "prior informed consent". On the face of it, this "double dealing" may seem a prudent measure to facilitate recycling. But as we have seen, these loopholes are easily exploited by waste traders using the pretext of "further use" to justify their transboundary waste dumping schemes. The real reason for most waste export is the high costs of disposal in parts of Western Europe. Even in legitimate recycling projects, unless there are provisions for repatriation of the resulting residues, all "further use" schemes will involve waste dumping for final disposal. This is due to the fact that nothing can ever be recycled 100% and thus the residual material, often the bulk of the dangerous wastes, will be dumped on the receiving territory. In addition, the transport of such waste remains highly risky and thus there can be no justification for assuming less strict environmental criteria. For these reasons, Greenpeace feels it is indefensible to retain a dual definition. According to Greenpeace's European Waste Trade Project Director, Jim Puckett, "Hazardous waste recycling can be a very dirty business, but too often, as soon as the word "recycling" is used, people tend to look the other way." In the FMC/Wath case, the parties involved utilised the non- ferrous metals loophole of the existing directive (Article 17, 84/631/EEC) which allows a streamlined procedure. Not only is it not necessary to claim what exactly is in the waste, but it is not necessary to get the consent of the competent authority in the receiving country for the waste shipment. This shipment would have been allowed to come from the farthest corner of the globe with no governmental scrutiny whatsoever. The proposed regulation is not much better. The proposed EC legislation now under consideration will create the following loopholes for wastes traded within the EC: Loophole: In Article 5 of the directive to amend 75/442/EEC, the landmark principles of "self-sufficiency" and "proximity" are applied only to wastes bound for disposal. Thus a loophole is created for wastes bound for recycling facilities. In cases such as FMC/Wath, principles which prohibit the waste from travelling great distances when disposal can be found nearby or in the country of origin (the United States, in this case), would not be invoked, since these would not effect wastes bound for "further use". Loophole: Article 15 of the proposed regulation to amend 84/631/EEC allows an exemption for requiring the deposit of a surety for wastes bound for "further use" (a surety is a bond guaranteeing performance of contractual obligations). This exemption makes no sense: wastes bound for recycling are no less a hazard than those bound for final disposal. As applied to the FMC/Wath case, the requirement of a surety bond (if the loophole did not exist) would have accounted for the costs incurred by the government for problems en-route. These costs would have been paid by the legal holder of the waste in advance. For a shipment entering the Community from outside as in the FMC/Wath case, Wath would have had to pay the surety at the Customs Office of entry into the UK. This obligation would have created an incentive for Wath to be very sure of the contents of the waste before becoming the legal holders. Loophole: The proposed regulation will actually expand the non- ferrous loophole of the existing directive and make similarly weak provisions applicable to all wastes bound for "further use". In Article 7, the obligation of "prior informed consent" required in Articles 3, 4, and 6, (waste trade within the community) and in the Basel Convention, is ignored as the competent authority of the state of dispatch is not required to be involved and "only in the absence of reasoned objections" Article 7.1 (c) can the shipment take place. The "absence of reasoned objections" is hardly consent! In the case of FMC/Wath, nobody in the receiving country would be required to consent to the shipment. If a bureaucrat is very busy and gets behind in paperwork, the shipment will proceed with the "absence of reasoned objections" on the part of the competent authority in the importing country. Loophole: More frightening still, "further use" is also given as one of the justifications by which waste will be allowed to be exported to non-EC countries such as Third World destinations. In the case of FMC/Wath, if FMC decides that exporting such problematic waste streams to the UK is too much trouble, they may turn around and ship the material to a recycler in Taiwan who is not so fussy. ENFORCEMENT FARCE Another weakness of the UK national and EC waste transport legislation is that there is no provision for monitoring at the port of entry or exit. Very hazardous components can travel unnoticed with recyclable wastes. In the Environment Committee Second Report on Toxic Waste, the Chairman, Sir Hugh Rossi, stated that: "....it is possible for special waste to come in with ordinary waste but not designated as such and then possibly to find its way to a cheap landfill site and possibly create hazards. Yet there is nobody, but nobody, at the port of entry who is in a position to say, `Wait a minute! That's special waste and separately treated."43 There is no provision in the existing or proposed Transfrontier Shipment Regulations to ensure that the Waste Disposal Authorities (WDAs) at the port of entry sample and verify the waste that arrives there. Although the Circular accompanying the Regulations says that the competent authority should consult with the WDA at the port of entry before acknowledging the documents, the WDA at the port of entry has no powers to reject a shipment of waste as long as the consignment note has been filled in. There was no way the WDA could have verified the constituents of the consignment. Local authorities simply do not have the time or the resources to inspect and monitor shipments and indeed there are some authorities in the UK which do not employ so much as a single member of staff to monitor waste coming into their area. Local Authorities cannot really be blamed for this as the costs of monitoring on a regular basis are prohibitive. A full analysis costs up to 3000 pounds sterling per sample and the results from a professional analysis can take from 10 days to 6 weeks to come through. In the words of Mr. Butlin, an environmental consultant for Wath Recycling, "It is easy for material to come from foreign countries with the wrong notification and it is very difficult to catch it."44 The WDAs at the port of entry are not authorised to check loads unless this is specified under the licence for a particular transfer station at the dockside and neither are customs unless they can show good reason to be suspicious. Even at the disposal site there is no guarantee that the waste will be checked against the description in the consignment note. Even if the authorities did spot the contaminants, it is likely that the shipment would still be legal as there is no requirement to list each and every constituent of the waste. With so little risk of detection, the financial incentive to misrepresent the waste is enormous. Certain wastes are much cheaper to dispose of than others, and a waste shipment that can exploit the recycling loopholes is cheaper to administer. It is relatively simple for a company to misrepresent waste as recycled waste, get it through the port of entry and to a recycler without any inspection whatsoever having taken place. Moreover, the authorities at the port of entry are not informed of the exact date of arrival but are given a time-span, usually a month, within which the shipment will arrive. It is only after the waste has passed through the port of entry that the WDA for the area learns of the exact date of its arrival. The proposed EC regulation now under consideration in Brussels fails to address this fundamental problem of monitoring and enforcement. This problem will be especially acute after the removal of border controls by 1993. Thus, the question of what will prevent a consignment of waste from being transported across national frontiers without any notification and documentation if there are no border police, remains unanswered. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS The following is a listing of the legal problems revealed by this scandal and the existing and proposed waste trade legislation which has been drafted to resolve them. "No" indicates the issue remains unresolved. PROPOSED LEGAL PROBLEM 84/6311 REGULATION2 BASEL3 1. If a waste trade deal is illegal or cannot be performed according to the contract, there is no authority granted to the victim state or business to demand its re-export. 2. There is considerably less scrutiny for recyclable waste. No full analytical description is required of the producer. 3. Article 17 of 84/631/EEC (Non-ferrous loophole) does not require pre-notification and consent of the country of destination before the waste can be sent. 4. The producer of the waste is not ultimately responsible for its disposal costs and the environmental damage that they will incur. 5. There is little ability to monitor and thus catch illegal shipments or shipments which are misrepresented on the required Uniform Document. NO PARTIAL4 PARTIAL5 NO6 ____________________ FOTENOTES: 1 Council Directive of 6 December 1984 on the Supervision and Control Within the European Community of the Transfrontier Shipment of Hazardous Waste, (84/631/EEC). Current law implemented in most member states. 2 "Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Supervision and Control of Shipments of Waste Within, Into, and out of the European Community", COM(90) 415 final - SYN 305. Still being debated in the European Council. 3 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, United Nations Environment Programme, 22 march 1989. UNEP' global attempt to deal with the problem. Considered by many a minimalist convention that runs the real risk of legitimising waste trade while doing little to prevent it. Not yet in force. 4 Article 13, Proposed EC Regulation, is copied from the Basel Convention Article 8. The loophole allowed is that re- export can be avoided if alternative arrangements can be made within 90 days. 5 Ibid 6 Annex I and III of 84/631 EEC which spell out the informational requirements of the notification forms do not specifically state how extensive the analysis should be. In practice many states do not specify the concentrations, testing procedures or, detection limits. Other states, such as NO7 IN THEORY ONLY8 NO NO9 YES NO10 NO11 UNKNOWN12 NO NO NO PROCEEDINGS LAWYERS LOCK HORNS Lawyers for both companies met in Rotherham on 15 August 1989. The meeting was also attended by representatives of the Health and Safety Executive, the Pollution Inspectorate and local environmental officials. However, the meeting failed to resolve what would be done with the waste. On 15 November 1989, Wath Recycling went to the High Court to force FMC to take back the waste. The writ described the waste as "toxic, carcinogenic and flammable"; it claimed damages of more than 500,000, and requested an injunction ordering FMC to remove the waste within 21 days of any order.45 ____________________ Holland for instance, do have limits but they are amazingly high (eg. dioxin limitation at 50 ppm). 7 The proposed EC regulation is similar in approach to the Basel Convention, and although both of these include Annexes on hazardous substances and characteristics, they do not define the point at which they become hazardous. It is unknown how the reporting requirements will be implemented. 8 Ibid 9 Article 7 (c), of the proposed EC regulation, states that the shipment may be carried out "in the absence of reasoned objections". This is not the consent required by the Basel Convention. In addition, Article 7 dealing with waste bound "for further use" defines a regime where no competent authority of the state of dispatch needs to be involved, thus implying an honour system. This is also in derogation of the Basel Convention. 10 There is very little in the directive 84/631/EEC concerning liability. A separate liability directive is in progress. This applies to the proposed regulation as well. 11 Ibid 12 SHIFTING THE BLAME FMC, for their part, denied having misrepresented the waste. They say the composition of the waste was accurately described to Amlon Inc. before shipment. They blame the problem, at least in part, on the fact, accepted by both sides, that some of the shipment was mixed with other material after it arrived at Wath. But Mr Koppel, President of Amlon Metals Inc., pointed out that the part of the shipment that was held at the British Rail depot near Leeds was similarly contaminated.46 HIGH COURT HEARING In May 1990, the High Court heard FMC's application for the case to be fought in the US rather than in the UK. Mr Justice Potter granted FMC's application. Hilary Stone, representing the plaintiff (that is, the three companies Euromet of London, Amlon Metals Inc. of New York and Wath Recycling) said they would appeal against this decision.47 If the appeal is not upheld, it may mean another two years before the case comes to court in the USA. "The basis of the argument is that when the 20 loads arrived the quality of the material was entirely different from what was contracted for, said Neil Morton, the director of environmental health for the metropolitan borough council of Rotherham. What is being contended now is who will pay the high cost of incineration which will cost about 1,000 pounds per tonne.48 On 6 March 1991, Mr Peter Hardy MP asked the Secretary of State for the Environment when he expected the toxic waste held at Wath to be removed. The reply came that there was "no immediate prospect of the waste being removed by agreement."49 Mr. Peter Hardy has made more than 40 seperate attempts, through parliamentary speeches and questions to force action, all to no avail.50 "On 31 August last year, the Department of Environment did a Pontius Pilate on us and said they could take it no further, said Morton." Ever since the waste has remained at the Wath Recycling site in South Yorkshire and at the British Rail depot near Leeds. "It is my prediction that this waste will be here for five to 10 years," said Morton.51 LESSONS LEARNED In a letter to Peter Hardy MP, Mr David Trippier, Minister for the Environment, concluded: "Whatever the solution in this case, I agree that it will be pertinent to the review of the operation of the EC Directives which the Commission have undertaken to carry out."52 However now that we have seen what the European Commission has drafted after their "review of the operation of the EC Directive", there is no cause for hope that the problems highlighted in the FMC/Wath scandal will be avoided in future. CLOSE THE RECYCLING LOOPHOLES Greenpeace's ongoing inventory, tracking every known waste trade scheme, has shown that today, a full 60% of all proposals to move wastes across boundaries cite some pretext of recycling or "further use". Waste traders exploit the "green" connotations of the word "recycling", using it, or similar words like "treatment" and "processing" wherever possible, especially in their corporate name. They have found that the authorities tend to look the other way when these magic words are used. Businesses involved in these unscrupulous transactions have also been helped by those legislators who have, with the intention or providing incentives for recycling, made loopholes or exemptions in the law for various types of recyclable wastes. These loopholes are readily exploited by illegal traffickers as they call for to less scrutiny and control. In the FMC/Wath case, the waste was tainted with highly hazardous compounds. It arrived in the UK designated as non-ferrous metals waste. As such the full disclosure of its contents was not required. Further, the competent authority in the dispatch company (U.S.A.) did not have to be notified, nor was the consent of the competent authority in the UK required. Clearly, Governments should not assist mistaken or unscrupulous waste traders by creating special provisions and definitions for hazardous wastes bound for recycling. Such allowances leave an open door through which a variety of deadly wastes can pass, putting foreign communities at great risk. Even hazardous waste trade intended for a "legitimate" recycling process must be recognised as a form of waste dumping, since most of these supposedly "green" processes involve dangerous processes with more hazardous residue wastes which gets dumped on the receiving territory. STOPPING ILLEGAL TRADE In spite of all the legislation aimed at controlling the transboundary movement of hazardous waste, the fact that hazardous wastes can be transported so easily as "goods" or "recyclables" indicates a terrible lack of enforcement. The problem of enforcement will become especially acute after 1992 with the absence of border controls. The proposed EC regulation says nothing about enforcement requirements or interstate cooperation in this matter, putting the onus entirely on the member states. But can we hope that individual states will take the responsibility or even have the power to track illegal transboundary movements of hazardous wastes when they have not proved able to in the past? It is unlikely that they will in future without some legislated initiative on an international basis. There is also a clear need for a co-ordinating body or network between state enforcement agencies, to facilitate the communication necessary to monitor and apprehend illegal trade. Intergovernmental bodies such as the European Community must recognise the need for a police agency or network with respect to hazardous waste and possibly other illegal traffic. In lieu of border patrols, such an organisation would have the power to carry out spot-checks and maintain a police data-base on illegal trade. This issue is too critical to be left till a later date. The enforcement gap must be filled within the text of any proposed waste trade regulation. THE PRODUCER IS RESPONSIBLE We can no longer afford an institutionalisation of the "throw away" mentality. There is no "away" and there is no safe place to "throw" hazardous waste. Producers of waste must be made accountable for their waste products. By doing this we will ensure that a clear economic incentive exists for industry to reduce the volume of waste. There must be strict generator liability especially where waste shipments and disposal are concerned. Every waste shipment that leaves a factory site represents avoidance of corporate responsibility. Certainly, if anything goes wrong with such transport and disposal, the producer that brought the waste onto the planet in the first place must be ultimately liable. WASTE IS NO "GOOD" It is vital that hazardous waste trade regulations aim toward preventing the trade rather than legitimising it. Hazardous waste is no "good". It is a social liability and should be prohibited from transboundary movement just as dangerous drugs, pornography or weapons are prohibited. For these things we do not insist on a "free market" and we do not consider these prohibitions "non-tariff trade barriers". Hazardous waste trade particularly must be eliminated as it exploits economic inequalities, victimising poorer, less protected areas of the globe. No Time to Waste -- Ban Hazardous Waste Trade It is a time of waste crisis and there is no time to waste. Most governments now cite waste minimisation as the priority to their waste management strategy. The Basel Convention states that all transboundary movements of hazardous waste be reduced to a minimum: Indeed the latter aim is a key to achieving the former. For as long as corporations and nations are allowed to dump their poisonous effluent in hiding places around the world, no incentive can draw them down a responsible path - the path toward no waste, the path of clean production. Until the path of least resistance leads no further than the production site itself we will continue to discover such criminal scenes as Koko, Nigeria, and Love Canal, and further dangerous scandals like the FMC/Wath case. -------------- FOOTNOTES 1. Purchase contract no. 1368 drawn up between Amlon Metals Inc. and FMC Corporation, 16 August 1988. 2. The Baltimore Sun, 18 August 1989. 3. The Independent, Containers of Hazardous US Waste stranded in Leeds, 16 August 1989. 4. "Welcome to the Wasteland", The Independent, 23 March 1991. _______________ 5. Quadeer Khan, South Yorkshire Hazardous Waste Unit, pers. com. 1 February 1991. 6. Letter from Neil Morton, South Yorkshire Hazardous Waste Unit, to Mr Peter Hardy MP. 16 October 1989. This letter was released by Peter Hardy. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Letter from Mr E.J. Cullen of the Health and Safety Commission to Mr Peter Hardy MP. 12 September 1989. Letter released by Mr Hardy. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Letter from Mr Neil Morton, South Yorkshire Hazardous Waste Unit, to Mr Peter Hardy MP. 16 October 1989. Letter released by Mr Hardy. 13. Peter Davenport, Legal Threat over Hazardous Waste, The Times, 16 August 1989. 14. Brian Kay, "Regulations over recycling a cowboy's charter," says expert, The Yorkshire Post, 27 September 1989. 15. Letter from Mr J.Jacoby, FMC Corporation to Mr Jim Bedford, Wath Environmental Abuse Lobby. 28 September 1989. 16. Purchase contract no. 1368 drawn up between Amlon Metals Inc. and FMC Corporation. 16 August 1988. 17. Letter from Schindler & Co., solicitors to Euromet and Amlon Metals Inc., to Greenpeace International, 1 February 1991. 18. Peter Davenport, US Shipper denies firm's charge over toxic waste, The Times, 17 August 1989. 19. Letter from Mr E.J.Cullen, Health & Safety Commision, to Mr Peter Hardy MP, 12 September 1989. Letter released by Mr Hardy. 20. Letter from Mr Merle Rodley, FMC Corporation, to Mr L.Lasher, Amlon Metals Inc. 19 June 1989. 21. US Environmental Protection Agency, Summary of 40 CFR Part 261: Identification of Wastes Regulated as RCRA Hazardous Wastes. (undated) 22. Letter from Mr J.Jacoby, FMC Corporation to Mr Jim Bedford, Wath Environmental Abuse Lobby, 28 September 1989. 23. Ibid. 24. Mike Woodcock, Waste Row Firm in Defence-Deal Bid, The Yorkshire Post, 3 January, 1990. 25. Paul MacClennan, State Rejects FMC Plans for Cleanup, The Buffalo News, 27 January, 1989. Associated Press, Parents Demand Toxic Tests Schoolyard Contaminated, The Times - Union (Albanu, New York), 8 April, 1987. 26. Greenpeace International, "The International Trade in Wastes", fifth edition 1990. 27. Robert Schofield, Stephen Walsh, Brian Kay, Yorkshire Post, 27 September 1989. 28. Letter from Quadeer Khan, South Yorkshire Hazardous Waste Unit, to Greenpeace International, 17 December 1990. 29. Letter from Shindler & Co., solicitors to Euromet, Wath Recycling and Amlon Metals Inc., to Greenpeace International, 18 February 1991. 30. Amlon Metals, Company Records. 31. Wath Recycling, Company Records. 32. Greenpeace International, "The International Trade in Toxic Wastes", fifth edition 1990. 33. Letter from Mr J.Jacoby, FMC Corporation to Mr Jim Bedford, Wath Environmental Abuse Lobby, 28 September 1989. 34. Conversation between Israel Weinstock, Director of Wath Recycling and Greenpeace UK, 18 February 1991. 35. "Welcome to the Wasteland", The Independent, 23 March 1991. 36. Health & Safety Executive: "Wath Recycling Ltd., Wath on Dearne - toxicological assessment of copper hydroxide waste and proposed strategy for reducing exposure to persons who may be affected." (undated) 37. 16 October 1989. Letter released by Mr Hardy. 38. Department of the Environment, Press Release, 18 August 1989. 39. Letter from Neil Morton, South Yorkshire Hazardous Waste Unit, to Mr Peter Hardy MP, 16 October 1989. Letter released by Mr Hardy. 40. Brian Kay, Regulations over recycling a cowboy's charter, says expert, The Yorkshire Post, 27 September 1989. 41. House of Commons Environment Committee, "Toxic Waste," Second Report, February 1989 (Q.183), HMSO. 42. "Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal," United Nations Environment Programme, 22 March 1989. 43. House of Commons Environment Committee, "Toxic Waste," Second Report, Minutes of Evidence (Q.180), February 1989, HMSO. 44. "Firm May Sue over Toxic Cargo", Guardian, 16 August 1989. 45. James Erlichman, Court battle over US waste, The Guardian, 16 November 1989. 46. Liz Bowie and Gilbert Lewthwaite, British recyclers reject toxic waste from Baltimore, The Baltimore Sun, 18 August 1989. 47. Nicholas Schoon, Judge's ruling means toxic waste must stay in storage, The Independent, 19 May 1990. 48. "Welcome to the Wasteland", The Independent, 23 March 1991. 49. Hansard, Parliamentary Answers, 192, 6 March 1991. 50. "Welcome to the Wasteland", The Independent, 23 March 1991. 51. Ibid. _____ 52. September 1989. =end=