[] TL: AN ABSTRACT OF WASTE MANAGEMENT INC.: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES AND OTHER MISDEEDS (GP) SO: Charlie Cray, Greenpeace International DT: January 1991 Keywords: toxics wmi hazardous waste business us abstracts profiles greenpeace gp / [part 1 of 3] Charlie Cray, "An Abstract of: Waste Management Inc.: An Encyclopedia of Environemntal Crimes and Other Misdeeds," Second Edition, Greenpeace USA, Chicago, Illinois, January 1990. Via US Toxics, Cray. SECOND EDITION - JANUARY 1991 GREENPEACE USA - CHICAGO, ILLINOIS ------------------- INTRODUCTION Waste Management Inc.'s (WMI) name suggests wastes can be con- trolled after they are generated. But once produced, toxic gar- bage and industrial waste cannot be safely controlled. Incinera- tors, landfills and other methods of waste disposal don't protect future generations and the environment from the toxic leftovers of a society addicted to disposability, poisonous materials and unclean technologies. Promoted as an enterprise which "profits by protecting the environment," WMI has become a primary actor in and accessory to global contamination. WMI's corporate history is marked by violations of environmental and anti-trust law, a pattern of excessive and misused political influence, and a disrespect for the communities in which it does business. This Greenpeace report details WMI's track record, and focuses primarily on its operations in the United States, where the company has built an unrivaled waste disposal empire. WMI often blames its problems on past activities and claims that it has now cleaned up its act. "What we may have considered a compliance mentality 10 years ago would pale by today's compari- son," WMI senior vice president Harold Gershowitz claimed in 1990. "Now we think we have a work force that has an acute sensitivity to environmental issues...These are people who have a strong environmental ethic." (82) Of course, nobody knows exactly what the company is up to at the present moment. But, whenever we examine the company's most recent past, we find its methods and crimes are virtually identical to those in its distant past, despite the good intentions of many of its employees. We are likely to see WMI's pattern of financial and environmental abuse repeated around the planet, as the company aggressively carves out new markets in Eastern and Western Europe, Asia and South America. This report is intended to help citizens understand the problems involved in waste disposal as it is practiced by an industry leader. The story of WMI is only part of the picture. To cast WMI as the premier environmental villain of our time risks distraction from the larger problems at the root of the toxics crisis. It is the waste disposal industry as a whole which has promoted the myth of safe disposal, a myth which has hindered policy-makers and society from examining the source of the waste crisis in terms of materials and technologies employed in production. The lessons learned from this company have more to do with the inherent nature of the waste disposal industry --both inappropriate use and promotion of dangerous technologies and the abuse of economic and political power -- than with the specific character flaws of any particular WMI officials. We hope this report will help people protect their community not just from bad actors, but from bad ideas, such as increased disposal of waste streams of all kinds. POWER, CORRUPTION AND LIES Waste Management Inc. is the world's largest waste disposal company. Its annual revenue grew from 76 million dollars in 1971 to four and a half billion dollars in 1989. It ranks 19th in the Fortune 500 list of the largest diversified service companies in the U.S. It hauls garbage from almost eight million households in the U.S., in over 1350 communities. It operates over 128 landfills in at least 36 states. (1) WMI's subsidiary, Chemical Waste Management (CWM), is the largest hazardous waste disposal company in the U.S. CWM controls at least 20% of the American commercial hazardous waste disposal industry. CWM's revenues doubled in the late 1980s, and the company will likely earn over one billion dollars in revenue in 1990. (1) WMI also controls the largest nuclear waste disposal firm in the U.S. (Chem-Nuclear), owns 49% of the U.S.' largest asbestos removal company (Brand Industries), and owns 55% of the U.S.' largest garbage incineration firm (Wheelabrator Technologies). Fate and providence have not guided the transformation of a once obscure regional garbage hauling company into a powerful global waste disposal conglomerate. To create an empire, the company has mixed business acumen and foresight with strong doses of deception, corruption and monopolism. Waste Management's growth is the result of devouring its competitors -- smaller waste haulers, and disposal firms -- from the streets of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to Venezuela. In many instances the tactics used -- bid-rigging, predatory pricing, price-fixing and even alleged physical threats -- have resulted in criminal and civil suits. The corporation's growth has paid WMI's executives handsomely. WMI's president, Philip Rooney, was the fourth highest paid U.S. corporate executive in 1987 (earning $14,276,000). Donald Flynn, a WMI senior vice-president, was the sixth highest paid executive in the U.S. in 1987, and Dean Buntrock, the Chief Executive Officer of WMI, was the highest paid CEO in Illinois in 1988. (2) ECONOMIC MALPRACTICE FOR PROFIT WMI was formed in 1968 when Dean Buntrock's midwestern U.S.- based waste hauling firms, Ace Scavenger and Atlas Refuse Disposal, merged with Florida-based Southern Sanitation, owned by H. Wayne Huizenga. Ace and Atlas had been accused of belonging to associations of waste hauling companies which allegedly used strong-arm tactics against their competitors. In 1962, the State of Wisconsin filed a suit in the Milwaukee Circuit Court against 11 hauling companies and their owners for illegally restraining competition. Dean Buntrock and his Ace Scavenger Co. were sued for allegedly engaging in a "conspiracy to restrain trade, to willingly injure the business of others, to hinder others from performing lawful acts, and an attempt to monopolize the rubbish collection, waste removal or disposal business in and around Milwaukee County." Buntrock and the owners of the other ten waste haulers were jointly accused of having "threatened physical harm to the owners of competing [firms]...and their families and destruction or damage to their property and equipment, or threatened to haul all their accounts for nothing" if they competed against the accused firms. (3) The Milwaukee Circuit Court prescribed a temporary injunction against the firms, which stood for eight years. The charges were finally dismissed in 1970, after Ace and many of the other ac- cused garbage firms became subsidiaries of the newly-formed Waste Management Inc. Buntrock faced similar legal problems in Chicago, where a local trade association, Chicago Refuse Corp., was sued in 1971 for price fixing and harassing competitors since 1965. Ace Scavenger, the WMI subsidiary, was a member of the association. Chicago Refuse paid $50,000 to settle the suit in a consent decree which neither admits nor denies guilt. (4) Since the beginning of WMI, its lawyers have beaten a steady path to courtrooms and backrooms, settling suits in and out of court, paying a token price for going beyond the legal boundaries of competition in the waste disposal industry. The company, its subsidiaries and its employees have faced anti- trust lawsuits or government investigations in at least 17 states. Since 1980, WMI, its subsidiaries and its employees have paid over $8.5 million in fines and other settlements for price- fixing, bid-rigging, and other allegedly illegal means of dis- couraging competition. (This figure includes out-of-court settlements in which WMI neither admits or denies guilt.) Here are some examples: * In 1983, WMI's wholly-owned subsidiary, Georgia Waste Systems, was convicted of conspiring to fix prices, and fined $350,000. The company's former general manager was also found guilty and sentenced to a one-year jail term, with all but 45 days suspended. WMI refused to fire the official, proclaiming his innocence. Although acording to a 1981 FBI memo, illegal activities at Georgia Waste Systems "were probably directed by corporate officials from the [WMI] company headquarters," the parent company and senior executives were never charged with anti-trust violations. (5) * In April 1986, David Hoopengardner, the manager of WMI's Florida subsidiary, United Sanitation Services, was sentenced to two years probation and fined $10,500 for price-fixing and customer allocation (that is, illegally dividing market territory with other haulers). WMI then transferred him to a Caracas, Venezuela, subsidiary, where he could avoid having to report to probation officials. (6) * In January 1988, a subsidiary of Waste Management Inc. of Florida was fined $1,000,000 after pleading "no contest" to charges of involvement in a conspiracy to keep prices fixed at artificially-high and non-competitive levels and for other anti-trust activities. (8) * In October 1987, subsidiaries of WMI were fined $1,000,000 by the U.S. Justice Department for conspiring with Browning Ferris Industries to fix prices and divide markets in the Toledo, Ohio, area. The companies involved, including Waste Management of North America, also split a $700,000 fine paid to the state of Ohio. (7) * In October 1988, the supervisor of garbage disposal for the city of New Orleans alleged that officials of WMI's New Orleans subsidiary warned him and a colleague that they would wear "cement boots" and "meet their maker" if they persisted in investigating garbage disposal overcharges. After investi-gating the allegations, the U.S. Attorney failed to file charges. (9) * In March 1989, WMI of California was fined $1,000,000 for conspiring against trade. Los Angeles' district attorney described this as the biggest criminal anti-trust case in California's history. WMI of California conspired with other haulers to eliminate competition, to not touch each others' business and to use below-cost "blitzes" to lure customers from businesses that did not go along with the trade conspirators. (10) The victims of these criminal activities are the people who pay WMI to take their trash away. Ira Reiner, the district attorney for Los Angeles, has said, "the crime here amounts to a theft from the public... who are paying artificially high fees to have their trash hauled away. The high prices are ultimately passed along to the public." (11) Court records in a 1988 anti-trust case that led to a one million dollar fine for WMI revealed that the company and other haulers in southern Florida "carted off more than 2.5 million dollars in the past ten years through overcharges and other suspect billings." In Toledo, Ohio, where WMI was convicted of an anti-trust conspiracy and fined one million dollars in 1987 for price-fixing and other anti-trust violations, customers included dozens of schools and even a convent. (12) Because of these convictions and settlements, WMI and its subsidiaries face potential bans from eligibility in bidding on new contracts in several U.S. cities and states. Many federal, state and local laws prohibit governments from hiring or contracting with convicted criminals. The laws allow companies to be barred from government contracts when the company has a record of repeated violations of laws and regulations. However, these laws are rarely mandatory and rarely enforced. So, WMI's empire grows, unimpeded by its history of "contract crime." CORRUPTION OF THE ENEMY WMI complements its business dealings with a massive effort to be blessed by the public, environmentalists, politicians and regulatory officials. It has successfully used the power of money to capture the favor of potential enemies. WMI purchases goodwill through glitzy TV and newspaper public relations blitzes and through cash gifts -- to Congress, where it lobbies for legislation favorable to the company, to federal agencies where it seeks to manipulate the drafting and implementation of disposal rules, and even to local chapters of organizations like the League of Women Voters and the Boy Scouts, in communities where the company wants to haul or dump wastes. POLITICIANS The company and its officials have been willing to pay almost any price for assistance from politicians. WMI and its employees have paid politicians hundreds of thousands of dollars annually through speaking fees, campaign contributions, "Christmas gifts" and, on occasion, bribes. WMI began using the power of cash to influence politicians early in its history. In 1972 to 1974, according to a federal Securi- ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) investigation, WMI operated a secret slush fund for unlawful political contributions in Flori- da, and estimated that WMI had given about $36,000 in "dubious outlays" from unrecorded cash received in the course of doing business. (13) WMI has become of one of the main corporate financiers of U.S. congressional campaigns in the United States. The WMI Employees "Better Government Fund" was the seventh largest corporate political action committee (PAC) during the 1988 U.S. elections, giving over $430,000 to candidates for U.S. Congress from 1987 to 1988. (14) Untold amounts also came from WMI subsidiary PACs, and directly from WMI stockholders, employees and their relatives. In addition, WMI paid U.S. congressmembers $57,500 for speeches and appearances in 1985, ranking tenth among corporations giving such "honoraria." They once paid U.S. Representative Walter Jones of North Carolina $2,000 for a speech to WMI officials in which he announced that he would personally oppose legislation that would delay WMI's plans to burn toxic wastes on an incinerator ship in the Atlantic Ocean. (15) Money equals power on Capitol Hill, and Waste Management has purchased substantial influence on waste policy legislation in Congress. The company's generosity to politicians is often even more obvious in city halls and state legislatures. WMI has learned that a few thousand dollars can secure and protect dis- posal arrangements worth hundreds of thousands. A former Margate City, Florida, Commissioner testified in court that he sold his vote on a 1979 city garbage contract to WMI for $3,000. (16) In 1988, in Alabama, where CWM operates the largest toxic waste dump in North America, the company gave $2,500 to members of a state House committee that killed toxic waste measures that would have discouraged waste shipments to the landfill. In 1985, CWM sent $500 checks as "Christmas presents" to numerous other Alabama legislators. (17) The Chicago area, the hub of WMI's empire, has been criss- crossed by WMI officials offering government officials gifts in exchange for favorable political decisions. Among the bribes and other "gifts" given to Chicago area politicians: * Between 1972 and 1975, WMI gave $55,885 to Chicago-area politician Patrick O'Block to "neutralize any adverse community or political reaction" to a landfill. (18) * In 1981-82, WMI gave Chicago mayor Jane Byrne $13,000 in campaign contributions while she extended certain WMI waste hauling contracts. (19) * For Christmas in 1985, WMI gave Cook County, Illinois, State Attorney Richard Daley (who is now the mayor of Chicago) six pounds of meat in a package labeled "Happy Holidays." (20) * In 1986, WMI lobbyist Raymond Akers, was found guilty of mail fraud and of charges that he paid $6,500 in bribes to Chicago City Alderman Clifford Kelley. Akers stated that the bribes had the approval of top WMI executives, including James DeBoer, a WMI Vice President. (21) * Also in 1986, John Horak, the general manager of a WMI subsidiary, was jailed for six months for giving $12,000 in bribes to a Fox Lake, Illinois, mayor and a Village Board member. Horak stated that the bribes were approved by DeBoer. (22) * In 1988, Philip Elfstrom, the president of the Kane County, Illinois, Forest Commission accepted donations from WMI to help his bid for a National Forest Association office. Elfstrom had previously claimed under oath that he never accepted donations from WMI. Elfstrom helps supervise a county-owned landfill operated by WMI. (23) * Also in 1988, former Chicago City Alderman Edward Vrdolyak admitted that he used WMI-owned airplanes for free flights from Chicago to his house in Florida. While Vrdolyak was in office, he helped ensure the siting and expansion of WMI toxic waste dumps and a hazardous waste incinerator in his political district. Vrdolyak is no longer in office in 1990, but WMI continues to contribute thousands of dollars to political funds controlled by him. (24) REGULATORS WMI has also established a friendly rapport with regulatory agencies. A main incentive for this friendship is the potential of lucrative employment for regulators, when they choose to leave the government. It is no coincidence that Waste Management's growth skyrocketed while the U.S. government implemented sweeping waste disposal regulations over the last two decades. Many Waste Management Inc. employees helped author these regulations before turning to the company for employment. While the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's official policy is that the only way to prevent pollution is to stop the genera- tion of hazardous wastes, regulatory policies focus solely on "controlling pollution" from wastes already created. Hazardous waste disposal laws in the United States have created a bull market for the waste disposal industry. The EPA commonly circum- vents public accountability and scientific evidence in favor of industry in waste disposal siting battles throughout the country. Waste disposal regulations and a cozy relationship with the disposal industry have transformed the EPA from an agency that protects the environment into an advocate agency for the waste disposal industry. Seven former top EPA officials are now employed by WMI and CWM. For example, Walt Barber, a CWM vice president, once was the acting administrator of EPA; Gary Dietrich, a WMI consultant, once helped write solid waste disposal regulations for the EPA's Office of Solid Waste; Jeffrey Miller, a WMI attorney, once directed EPA's enforcement division; and Joan Bernstein, a CWM vice president, once was EPA's General Counsel. The public policy impact of this "revolving door" between EPA and WMI was clear in the early 1980s, when well-placed CWM employees helped write EPA's ocean incineration and liquid waste disposal permits. In October 1981, the EPA issued a permit for a series of "research" burns of millions of gallons of PCB wastes aboard CWM's incinerator ship, Vulcanus I. It was later learned that CWM lobbyist Scott Clarkson helped write the research permit. One EPA official alleged, "CWM wrote the permit. There was no research protocol." (25) At the same time, an attorney for CWM, James Sanderson, was in a perfect position to influence EPA agency decisions. He worked as Special Assistant to EPA Administrator, Anne Gorsuch, from March to July 1981 and from October 1981 to June 1982. Before, between and after his employments at EPA, Sanderson was a an attorney for CWM in Colorado. Sanderson quit in June 1982 after senior White House officials reportedly urged Gorsuch to fire Sanderson for unethical conduct and potentially criminal conflict-of-interest violations. In February 1982, after Gorsuch lifted a ban on dumping liquid wastes in hazardous waste dumps across the country, CWM dumped 2,491 barrels of liquid hazardous wastes in its Colorado toxic waste landfill. CWM had "stored" the barrels in disposal pits at Lowry in anticipation of Gorsuch's ruling. (26) ENVIRONMENTALISTS The "revolving door" to WMI's corporate riches is open even to environmental groups in the U.S. As with regulatory agencies and politicians, many "environmentalists" have established close relationships with WMI in exchange for cash. WMI's corporate "grants" to environmental and conservation groups totaled more than $892,000 between 1987 and 1989. (27) In turn, WMI's association with a variety of large environmental groups serves to improve the company's public profile and to disarm its potential opposition. The company has thus given the following environmental groups over $50,000 in grants since 1987: National Audubon Society ($110,000) National Wildlife Federation ($102,500) The Nature Conservancy ($70,000) International Union for the Conservation of Nature ($51,000) World Wildlife Fund/Conservation Foundation ($50,000) Some groups even have WMI executives on their board of directors. In 1987, the National Wildlife Federation (NWF) elected WMI's chief executive officer, Dean Buntrock, to its Board of Directors. Alexander Trowbridge, a director of WMI, serves on the U.S. national council of the World Wildlife Fund. The value of such ties to environmental groups became clear last year, when NWF's president, Jay Hair, brokered a discussion between WMI and EPA Administrator William Reilly that helped convince Reilly to prevent individual U.S. states from enacting environmental regulations that are more stringent than federal rules, an effort later overruled by a judge as violating basic legal principles. In March 1989, Hair arranged a breakfast meeting between Buntrock and Reilly with the stated purpose of discussing the national implications of a recent decision by North Carolina's state government to restrict waste dumping into rivers and streams. Hair's invitation to Reilly read: "Bill -- if at all possible I would like to arrange a breakfast meeting with you, Dean Buntrock and myself to discuss [the] national implication of" the North Carolina situation. WMI prepared a briefing paper for Reilly, which asked him to "emphatically restate [EPA] opposition to these states actions" by threatening to withdraw North Carolina's authority to legislate hazardous waste policy. One month after the March 16, 1989 breakfast meeting, Reilly announced that EPA would open hearings on whether to withdraw North Carolina's hazardous waste disposal authorization. NWF's Hair has frequently denied any role in the decision, and publicly opposed it. However, EPA's Reilly expressed surprise that Hair opposed the North Carolina hearings, because "Jay Hair hosted the [March meeting with Buntrock] at which I was lobbied to do the very thing that we are doing." An investigation con- ducted by the EPA inspector general, John C. Martin was itself called into question by J. Richard Wagner, an official in the inspector general's office. The Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee opened an investigation into the matter which was never completed. (28) Fortunately, not all environmental groups have allowed their politics to be bought by WMI. For the past few years, WMI has been trying to gain acceptance as the first for-profit member of the Environmental Grantmakers Association, a three-year-old association of about 90 foundations that help support many envi- ronmental activist groups in the U.S. When WMI's Environmental Affairs Director, William Y. Brown was invited to EGA's 1988 meeting, several grantmakers refused to participate. Finally, in 1989, the EGA voted to disqualify WMI from membership, citing corporate practices "contrary to the Association's fundamental goals and aspirations.... It is readily apparent that WMI has engaged in a pattern of abusive corporate conduct involving repeated violations of both criminal and civil laws, with the effect of endangering and degrading the environment." (29) Similar rejections came from a church and a citizens group in Chicago's economically-poor southeast side. In the spring of 1987, St. Kevins Church and the United Neighborhood Organization rejected WMI's offers to donate food for the hungry, because the offer was perceived as an effort to buy out community opposition to the company's waste disposal operations. St. Kevins Church is located near a pollution-plagued hazardous waste dump and incin- erator operated by WMI. (30) The purpose of WMI's "generosity" is perhaps best described by WMI executive Joseph Jack. Ater WMI distributed over $25,000 to 115 southern Florida high school students, Jack explained "when they grow up, they can't say anything nasty about Waste Manage- ment because maybe we made it possible for them to go to college." (31) In the language of Waste Mangement Inc.'s public relations cam- paigns, "the environment" is often represented as a faceless, abstract concept. But the environment is real places, tangible and diverse ecosystems, and real people's lives and neighborhoods -- places where WMI has shown little concern for the community and the environment. WMI is one of the world's biggest polluters. The technologies that WMI employs to dispose of industrial and household wastes - - including landfilling, incineration, and deep well injection -- all fail to protect the public from contamination. Worse, the existence, growth, and influence of WMI works against effective solutions to toxic pollution, such as pollution prevention plans which would motivate individuals, regulators and industry to reduce waste and convert to clean technologies and safe materi- als. The myth of "safe disposal" is the grand illusion that has al- lowed Waste Management to build its empire. Wordsmiths have concocted comforting phrases, such as "integrated waste manage- ment," "state-of-the-art" and "best available technology" to obscure the inevitable damage that disposal facilities create. Behind the label "state-of-the-art" lurk incinerators and land- fills that damage human health and ecosystems. [CONTINUED] [Entered Toxbase February 14, 1991] =============================================================== [] TL: AN ABSTRACT OF WASTE MANAGEMENT INC.: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES AND OTHER MISDEEDS (GP) SO: Charlie Cray, Greenpeace International DT: January 1991 Keywords: toxics wmi hazardous waste business us abstracts profiles greenpeace gp / [part 2 of 3] Charlie Cray, "An Abstract of: Waste Management Inc.: An Encyclopedia of Environemntal Crimes and Other Misdeeds," Second Edition, Greenpeace USA, Chicago, Illinois, January 1990. Via US Toxics, Cray. SECOND EDITION - JANUARY 1991 GREENPEACE USA - CHICAGO, ILLINOIS ------------------- [CONTINUED] The label creates a positive mystique about waste disposal, a mystique which begs the public to trust "the experts." Of course, the "experts" you must trust are those whose sole interest is in seeing a disposal site built. The "experts" at a typical disposal site hearing are company officials, consultants hired by the company to make "independent" analyses of dumping plans, and regulatory officials who feel they are required to grant any permit if it meets written standards, no matter how inadequate those standards may be. (*) In the last decade, generation of hazardous waste by U.S. indus- tries increased by about 7.5 percent each year. U.S. industry's yearly waste generation now totals about one trillion pounds of toxic waste -- about one and a half tons for every U.S. citizen - - and 15 trillion pounds of other potentially toxic wastes which are not officially classified as "hazardous." (32) -------------------- * - For example, the state of Georgia appointed P.E. LaMoreaux, an official from the University of Alabama's Environmental Institute for Waste Management Studies, as a consultant to review the safety of a proposed WMI toxic waste incinerator site. LaMoreaux's institute, through 1989, received the majority of its funding from Waste Management Inc.: over $1,500,000. Such are the "experts" to whom government officials entrust environmental safety. (33) -------------------- The promulgation of lengthy regulations to "control" pollution from wastes have failed to prevent pollution, because these laws were crafted to suit the interests of industry, not the environ- ment. Cheap waste disposal is vital to corporate profits and government budgets. In today's chemically-dependent economy, toxic waste disposal costs do not reflect the real costs of destroying our planet; if they did, industry could not produce cheap chemicals and products. Under the rules of government-sponsored initiatives to burn and dump, a free market in waste disposal is more important than the health of the planet and our descendants. Industry will neglect waste reduction as long as the government ensures the easy availability of dumpsites and incinerators. Toxic waste disposal is a deadly industry, utterly dependent upon industry's production of poisons. When industry's poisons stop flowing, so will WMI's profits. Until wastes are no longer made, WMI is certain to be the king of a waste heap, distributing poisons for thousands of years. While WMI is integral to the U.S. government's strategy of ensuring plentiful waste disposal capacity, public concern over pollution has forced regulators to appear to be penalizing the polluters. Government agencies have fined WMI repeatedly for violations of environmental regulations. These fines do not reflect the true cost of damage done to the environment by the company's disposal operations, nor do they reflect the profits made from such violations. However, the frequency of these penalties show that, even under a permissive regulatory climate, WMI's crimes are so obvious that government officials can not avoid penalizing their friends. WMI has thus set the U.S. record for environmentally-related penalties and settlements in the 1980's. Greenpeace estimates that WMI has paid over $43,000,000 since 1980 in fines, penalties and out of court settlements for admitted and alleged violations of environmental laws at its dumpsites. At least 45 WMI waste sites have been found out of compliance with federal or state environmental regulations. At least five WMI sites have been ordered by regulatory agencies to close. By the end of 1989, WMI was listed as a Potentially Responsible Party at 96 sites on the U.S. Superfund National Priority List, while its subsidiary Chemical Waste Management was listed for 25.At least ten WMI dumpsites have contaminated groundwater. While WMI claims that these are problems of the past, there are no signs that pollution violations are slowing at WMI dumpsites. WMI was issued at least 547 citations and orders for pollution violations between 1980 and 1983. Between 1984 and 1987, this number increased to 632. Statistics such as these drive insurers away from WMI. Because of the company's potentially-disastrous operational deficiencies, WMI has operated without meaningful outside liability insurance for its hazardous waste sites for years. This could impact the company's long-term viability. In a 1990 report to WMI stockholders, WMI admitted that if "the Company continues to be unsuccessful in obtaining risk-transfer Environmental Impairment Liability insurance coverage, the Company's net income could be adversely affected." (34) The potential cost of "cleaning up" WMI's contamination has been estimated at over 2.4 billion dollars. (35) Investors, too, fear the long-term financial threats inherent in the contaminants released by WMI's landfills and incinerator stacks. In 1985, a federal court approved an $11.4 million set- tlement of a suit filed by WMI shareholders. The shareholders charged that WMI failed to disclose potential liability arising from "investigations, complaints, enforcement actions, and other suits" relating to the firm's toxic waste handling operations. In 1990, an investment analysis firm quoted in Fortune magazine gave WMI its worst environmental rating. (36) Waste Management's illusionary promises of "safe management of wastes" have already been disproven by the escape of pollution from its disposal facilities. WMI's disposal methods range from shooting poisons into the sky (incineration), heaping wastes together in a pile (landfilling) and pumping them into the earth (deepwell injection). Each of these disposal methods have one thing in common: they will contaminate the earth's life support systems -- air, water and soil. "BURN AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE" Hazardous Waste CWM often points to its hazardous waste incinerator in Chicago as the United States' "state-of-the-art" incinerator. The Chicago incinerator is one of the largest commercial hazardous waste incinerators in the U.S., burning an estimated 32,000 tons of toxic waste annually. (37) In 1988, the Illinois state Environmental Protection Agency called for a temporary closure of the incinerator because operators frequently and deliberately disconnected pollution detectors in the incinerator stack. (38) In 1989, CWM was levied a proposed fine of $4,475,000 -- one of the highest EPA fines ever in the U.S. -- for numerous violations at the Chicago incinerator. Among the crimes that EPA found: failing to monitor emissions and failing to halt PCB waste incineration when scrubbers and stack monitors were not operating. There may have been many violations that EPA missed; one former worker at the incinerator said that "breaking regulations was more the routine than the exception." The operations manager of the incinerator's favorite phrase allegedly was "Burn as much as possible." (39) Pollution problems are not confined to the incinerator stack. In May 1990, the Chicago Metropolitan Water Reclamation District revealed that CWM repeatedly violates its water discharge permit, exceeding discharge limits for mercury, lead, copper and zinc. In 1988, CWM was fined $18,240 for groundwater contamination and groundwater monitoring problems at the Chicago incinerator. Spills of toxic waste are common on plant property, and toxics are leaking into the city's sewer system. (40) CWM's other major toxic waste incinerator is located in Sauget, Illinois. Dirty operations there, too, have forced the state of Illinois to fine CWM for environmental violations. In February 1990, Illinois fined CWM $250,000 for operating the incinerator for four days without a stack gas hydrocarbon monitor, and other violations, such as burning waste faster than permitted. (41) Operations began at CWM's newest incinerator, in Port Arthur, Texas, this year. CWM plans to eventually burn three times more wastes at this facility than any other CWM incinerator complex. CWM is trying to build or purchase hazardous waste incinerators throughout the U.S. -- in Alabama, California, Georgia, Kentucky, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, and Tennessee. (42) WMI's rush to burn toxic wastes in incinerators across the coun- try follows its failed, hard fought attempt to burn toxic wastes at sea in a flotilla of incinerator ships. WMI would have pref- ered to avoid localized community battles, and burn industry's wastes at sea, out of public view. The company's limited and now-extinct ocean incineration program in the U.S., and its nearly extinct incineration of wastes in the North Sea, prove that even in the middle of the ocean, WMI can not hide the severe environmental impacts caused by their disposal operations. Strong evidence of pollution from incinerator ships led the world's governments, under the London Dumping Convention, to collectively ban ocean incineration by 1994. Household and Hospital Wastes WMI is also constructing a national network of incinerators to burn garbage and medical wastes. WMI recently bought control of the largest garbage incinerator firms in the U.S. (Wheelabrator Technologies), and hopes to burn garbage in 80 incinerators on land adjecent to its garbage landfills. At least 10 garbage incinerators in the U.S. are currently operated by WMI and Whee- labrator. (43) WMI refers to its first garbage incinerator, built in 1986 in Tampa, Florida, in the same manner as its hazardous waste incin- erator in Chicago: "state-of-the-art." Sadly, the state of the art is not good. The Tampa incinerator has been plagued by air emissions, toxic run-off from incinerator ash, and financial disappointment for the city of Tampa. The Florida Department of Environmental Regulations has ordered WMI to prevent toxic ash runoff from flowing into a ditch that runs into the Gulf of Mexico. As in Chicago, operators of the Tampa incinerator were reluctant to turn on pollution control equipment. For 17 months, WMI re- fused to operate air pollution control equipment when turning on the furnace. (44) Medical waste incinerators, like garbage burners, routinely discharge extremely toxic dioxins, furans, lead and mercury into the atmosphere. They also emit small amounts of radioactive waste. Incineration precludes the more environmentally benign medical waste disposal option of steam sterilization, and dis- courages the implementation of programs to separate infectious wastes from harmless, recyclable hospital wastes streams. (Infectious waste generally represents just 15% of the waste that is burned in medical waste incinerators). (45) WMI operates at least seven medical waste incinerators, and plans to own a total of 18 in the U.S. (46) Operations here, too, have been troubled. In March 1989, state of Ohio inspectors uncovered three environ- mental violations at WMI's medical waste incinerator in Jackson Township, Ohio. Potentially-toxic runoff was draining off the storage area, incinerator dust was blowing out of containment boxes, and the incinerator was operating without a valid solid waste disposal license. (47) Shortly after WMI signed a 10-year lease from the city of Ter- rell, Texas, for an old, idle incinerator, it ran into numerous legal problems. In October 1988, the Texas Department of Health opposed WMI's attempt to burn infectious waste in an incinerator that had not previously incinerated such waste. WMI began burning medical waste, without an air permit, on October 12, 1989 -- four years after the incinerator had been abandoned by the city. By December 1989, the Texas Air Control Board ruled that WMI could not operate the facility on a full time basis. (48) "SAVING A HELL OF A LOT OF MONEY" Deep Well Injection Loopholes in U.S. hazardous waste regulations have made deep well injection the cheapest and most poorly monitored waste disposal method. Despite little understanding of the long-term fate and effect of chemicals in geological formations, waste disposal companies drill a deep hole in the earth and inject huge quantities of pressurized waste into underground layers of permeable rock. Injection wells are known to have caused groundwater contamina- tion, well blow-outs, and even sizeable earthquakes. Leakage and geologic events will become more likely as time passes and wastes migrate further from injection wells. Despite these environmental hazards, legal loopholes in U.S. waste disposal laws have allowed CWM to inject millions of gal- lons of extremely hazardous wastes into the earth, particularly in Ohio and Texas. Since 1982, CWM's Corpus Christi, Texas, toxic waste injection well has been found to be in violation of environmental laws in 10 of 18 inspections by the state of Texas (49). In 1989, the Texas environmental group, Coalition Advocating a Safe Envir- onment, charged that another CWM injection well, in Port Arthur, Texas, poses a potential threat to local drinking water (50). Near the coast of Lake Erie, in Vickery, Ohio, CWM operates an infamous toxic waste storage, disposal and deepwell injection facility (*). In 1983, an estimated 40 million gallons of indus- trial wastes leaked from the well shaft, above the injection wells, at depths prohibited by law. (51) In 1986, an Ohio University professor predicted that continued deep well injection at Vickery "will to a reasonable degree of professional certainty cause an earthquake within the area of the Vickery site." (52) -------------------- * - Deep well injection is not the dirtiest disposal method employed by CWM in Vickery, Ohio. Between 1980 and 1983, CWM illegally dumped PCBs and dioxin-contaminated wastes in open lagoons. Worse, the company mixed PCB wastes with waste oil at Vickery, and then sold over six million gallons of the toxic concoction as "heating oil" to unsuspecting Midwestern oil customers. (54) The U.S. EPA eventually penalized CWM $2.5 million for these violations, but it is estimated that WMI saved over $20 million by selling the PCBs rather than disposing them. William Sanjour of the U.S. EPA's Office of Solid Waste says that the agency "never really made a strong effort to find out where [the toxic oil] went. By doing so, they saved Waste Management a hell of a lot of money. All of those buyers could have sued." (55) -------------------- In 1990, a class-action lawsuit by local residents against the Vickery injection well was partially settled. In what is de- scribed by attorneys as the largest settlement ever awarded in the U.S. related to a hazardous waste disposal site, WMI agreed to pay $15,000,000 to property owners and their attorneys. However, under terms of the settlement, local property owners are forbidden from "objecting to migration [of toxics from the deep well] in any forum," and even their heirs are not allowed to make any legal claims regarding damage from such migration. CWM could not buy every Vickery citizen's silence, however: William Warner, one of the original plaintiffs, rejected the agreement, stating that he refuses to sell his human rights to the company. (53) LANDFILLS The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency recently reported that "there is good theoretical and empirical evidence that the haz- ardous constituents that are placed in land disposal facilities very likely will migrate from the facility into the broader environment. This may occur several years, even many decades, after placement of the waste in the facility, but...it will occur eventually." (56) WMI's toxic waste and garbage landfills have provided EPA with much of this empirical evidence. "A TALE OF TWO BOOKS" Hazardous Waste Landfills Over the past century, dumping hazardous wastes in landfills has become an industrial tradition. Now, hazardous wastes are being exhumed from hundreds of leaking landfills across the U.S., and shipped to newer landfills across the U.S., under the Superfund program. WMI is responsible for many of these sites, both those that are being un-buried, and those that are receiving Superfund wastes. Most of CWM's dumps receiving Superfund and other haz- ardous wastes have begun to show signs of leakage. Others are already closed, such as CWM's toxic waste dump in Lowry, Colorado. The Lowry landfill has been closed since 1982, when CWM employees tried to hide a major toxic waste leak. According to two employees, Lowry's general manager instructed them to keep two sets of books: one of them a black-colored logbook to be shown to inspectors that did not reveal the leak, the other a yellow-colored log that did record the leak and was concealed. (57) CWM currently operates seven hazardous waste landfills in the U.S., including an Alabama toxic waste dump which is one of the world's largest. Since 1978, CWM has dumped over five million tons of toxic wastes on what was once lush farmland, in remote Emelle, Alabama. Last year alone, Emelle received 790,000 tons of wastes from 42 U.S. states and U.S. military bases abroad. (58) CWM's Emelle dump has experienced on-site fires, off-site water contamination, and over two million dollars in penalties for environmental violations. PCBs were also found in wetlands near the dump. (59) In 1989, mounting evidence that the Emelle landfill will soon contaminate a major aquifer inspired the state of Alabama government to ban waste imports from states that do not have their own hazardous waste disposal facilities. (Less than 25% of the wastes dumped in Emelle are generated in Alabama.) In 1990, Alabama's Governor Guy Hunt proposed raising the state tax on out-of-state waste imports to $116, to end Alabama's status as "the waste dumping ground of the nation." (60) It is not a coincidence that the Emelle dumpsite is located in a remote community, many of whose residents -- primarily African Americans -- live in poverty. Toxic waste is generally dumped on those with the least economic and political power. According to a local official, when the dump's original develop- ers first announced that they were opening a facility in Emelle in 1978, residents were told that "they had found a new use for the Selma chalk...and we thought it was going to be some kind of liming operation. And lo and behold, the use they found for the Selma chalk was the holding of chemicals." (61) And "lo and behold," the rate of unemployment in surrounding Sumter County rose from 5.6% in 1978 to 21% in 1986 as clean industry left and plants shut down. (62) It is also no coincidence that WMI's second largest toxic waste dump (and the fifth largest in the U.S.) is located in Kettleman Hills, California, a small, remote community of primarily Span- ish-speaking farm workers. (*) One EPA official has called WMI's handling of the Kettleman Hills landfill "a situation of gross non-compliance with the federally mandated requirements for a hazardous waste disposal facility." Numerous pollution detectors have revealed the migration of toxic contaminants into surrounding groundwater. Still, the dump legally receives over 250,000 tons of toxic waste annually. (63) -------------------- * - Another alleged form of racial exploitation at a WMI-owned toxic waste disposal site: last year, four CWM employees and one former employee at the Carlyss, Louisiana, toxic waste dump sued CWM for racial discrimination in hiring and promotion practices. One worker claims he was harassed by CWM officials, another says that his firing was racially-motivated, and that co- workers verbally abused him with racial slurs. (64) -------------------- In 1988, the Kettleman Hills dump suffered a toxic landslide. As CWM wrote, "We encountered an unfortunate incident in one section of our...Kettleman Hills facility. For an as yet unknown reason, part of the landfill's liner system pulled away from its anchor on March 19." According to CWM, the accident caused "extensive damage" to the landfill's top liner and its leachate collection system. (65) In 1989, the state of California fined CWM $82,500 for eleven violations of environmental regulations, including failure to report a fire and discrepencies on written records for weight and volumes of wastes received. That brought the total amount of fines and penalties paid by CWM for Kettleman Hills' operations to over $4,300,000. (66) Similar histories of fines and evidence of groundwater contamination are evident at other WMI/CWM toxic waste dumps in Port Arthur, Texas; Carlyss, Louisiana; Arlington, Oregon; Joliet and Calumet City, Illinois; and Furley, Kansas. "WE ARE A HICK TOWN IN THE MIDDLE OF NOWHERE" Radioactive Waste Landfills WMI is also capitalizing on the growing and lucrative "low- level" radioactive waste disposal market in the U.S. This type of waste includes highly toxic waste generated by commercial nuclear power reactors, industry, and research and medical institutions. Wastes dumped in "low-level" radioactive waste dumps range from irradiated animal carcasses and contaminated clothes to radioactive hardware and pipes, resins and sludges from nuclear reactors, and decommissioned nuclear reactor vessels. CWM's subsidiary, Chem-Nuclear Systems, operates one of three licensed commercial "low-level" radioactive waste dumps in the U.S., in Barnwell, South Carolina. Like most of WMI's network of hazardous waste landfills, the Barnwell dump is leaking. In 1982, a U.S. Geological Survey report found that radioactive tritium is migrating "downward, outward and upward from the buried waste." The survey reports contamination of water beneath the buried waste, including tritium levels 100 times higher than background levels. (67) The Barnwell dump is expected to close before the end of 1992. By then, Chem Nuclear hopes to open at least three new radioactive waste dumps (in Illinois, North Carolina and Pennsylvania) under the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, which encourages the construction of regional radioactive waste dumps across the country. Chem Nuclear also operates a nuclear waste compacting station in Channahon, Illinois. The station began operation in January 1987, without WMI informing local residents, including the mayor. "The whole thing that is upsetting to us here is that we are a hick town in the middle of nowhere, and they think they can dump on us," said the town's mayor. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission agreed that the company may not have adequately informed the Channahon police and fire departments about the presence of low-level radioactive waste. (68) In 1990, an Illinois Senate Executive subcommittee accused WMI and state officials of secretly agreeing to relocate Chem Nucle- ar's supercompactor to Martinsville, Illinois. The "confidential side agreement" also allows Chem Nuclear to expand planned operations at a proposed regional nuclear dump in Martinsville. CNSI denied the agreement existed before the state acknowledged its existence. The director of the Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety was recently fired over the incident. (69) GARBAGE DUMPING & WMI's SHAM RECYCLING EFFORTS At the beginning of 1990, WMI operated 127 landfills for house- hold garbage in North America. The U.S. EPA has warned that household waste landfills "have degraded and continue to degrade the environment." (70) Contamination at almost 200 garbage dumps has been so severe that they have been declared Superfund sites. WMI is a partially responsible party for the Superfund "cleanup" of at least 15 garbage landfills. Often, the company's strategy has been to create a subsidiary which buys an old landfill in an attempt to reopen it. The land- fill is usually inexpensive, because it is leaking or otherwise troubled. The subsidiary then tells environmental officials that it will clean up the mess if it gets authority to reopen it or keep it open. The officials have little choice. If they refuse, the subsidiary goes bankrupt and the responsibility of cleanup falls to the public. "It's a real slick strategy," Peter Montague, the editor of "Rachel's Hazardous Waste News," explains. WMI's landfill acqui- sition strategy "essentially blackmails local and state officials into allowing them to expand." (71) WMI plans to open 60 new garbage dumps and 80 new garbage incin- erators. These new landfills and incinerators will not just contaminate our drinking water and air, their availability will discourage real solutions to the garbage crisis: the reduction in the toxicity of garbage, and the implementation of waste recycling, composting, reduction and reuse programs. U.S. television networks often air advertisements that portray WMI as the country's leading recycler. Yet very little waste handled by WMI is ever recycled. In 1989, WMI hauled away recy- clables for recycling from just 16% of their household customers. The purpose of WMI's small but highly-visible recycling efforts, as a recent Business Week article explained, is that "even though recycling has yet to turn a profit, it's working...to pull in business for WMI's landfill operations, which boast a pretax profit margin of 20%." (72) WMI has not invested more heavily in recycling because waste prevention is a direct threat to the company's revenue, which is generated almost entirely from waste disposal. Currently, the U.S. recycles about 13% of its solid waste. The EPA has set a national goal of 25% reduction in the waste stream through recycling. Studies by institutions such as the Center for Biology of Natural Systems in New York have shown that between 70 and 90 percent of the household waste stream can be eliminated through an aggressive recycling, composting and waste reduction program. WMI officers, such as William Hulligan, president of WM of North America, claim that only 10 to 20 percent of household waste can be reduced through recycling. (73) Even where Recycle America and Recycle First (WMI and Wheelabra- tor's recycling divisions) operate extensive recycling programs, the company has not eliminated the use of landfills and incinerators. For example, in San Jose, California, where it runs a showcase recycling program, WMI continues to dump garbage in a leaking dump in a canyon occupied by an endangered type of butterfly. (74) Aware of WMI's motivations and history of operations, communities like Oak Park, Illinois, have chosen alternative contractors over WMI for city recycling contracts. The city of Tamarac, Florida, turned down WMI's offer to handle residential recycling "because of uncertainty of the fairness of the proposed pact." WMI's subsidiary, Recycle America, was also blocked in its attempt to take over a Montevallo, Alabama church-based recycling program. (75) Waste Management's new image as a recycler should not, therefore, be confused with a sincere desire to prevent household waste. Nor should anyone be fooled by CWM's Waste Reduction Consulting Services division, which does next to nothing to prevent the production of waste by industry. True toxics reduction does not mean shifting toxic exposures between workers, consumers and various segments of the environ- ment. True toxics reduction means changing production processes to avoid the use and production of toxics. CWM's Waste Reduction division focuses entirely on the reduction of hazardous waste after it has been produced by an industrial plant. For example, it advises companies to divert deionizer regenerates (wastes from a deionizing wastewater treatment proc- ess) directly to the sewer, instead of a wastewater treatment plant. (76) CWM also recommends, and engages in, shipping toxic solvent wastes to cement kilns where they are burned as fuel. Federal regulations allow waste generators to reclassify solvent wastes as "recycled" when delivered for blending for use as a supplemental fuel in cement kilns. This sham "recycling" loophole has transformed the cement manufacturing industry into a major disposal point for toxic wastes, burning three billion pounds annually. (77) [CONTINUED] [Entered Toxbase February 14, 1991] =============================================================== [] TL: AN ABSTRACT OF WASTE MANAGEMENT INC.: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES AND OTHER MISDEEDS (GP) SO: Charlie Cray, Greenpeace International DT: January 1991 Keywords: toxics wmi hazardous waste business us abstracts profiles greenpeace gp / [part 3 of 3] Charlie Cray, "An Abstract of: Waste Management Inc.: An Encyclopedia of Environemntal Crimes and Other Misdeeds," Second Edition, Greenpeace USA, Chicago, Illinois, January 1990. Via US Toxics, Cray. SECOND EDITION - JANUARY 1991 GREENPEACE USA - CHICAGO, ILLINOIS ------------------- [CONTINUED] Since 1988, CWM has become a supplier of solvent waste fuel for many cement kilns in the U.S. and for a WMI-owned incinerator in Mexico. The company's West Carrollton, Ohio, solvent fuel blend- ing plant received over 108 million pounds of chlorinated solvent wastes from 26 states in 1989. CWM currently operates fuel blending facilities in Newark, New Jersey; Azusa, California; Henderson, Colorado; and Tijuana, Mexico. CWM's hazardous waste landfills in Alabama and Chicago also ship solvents to cement kilns. (78) THE EMPIRE EXPANDS WMI is diversifying rapidly into operations such as asbestos removal (Brand Companies) and Superfund site remediation (ENRAC division), whose profitability takes advantage of the historical failure of industry to reduce waste and convert to the use of safe materials and clean technologies. WMI is also going into such industries as the lawn pesticide business, a business whose entire existence is sustained through the unnecessary and harmful dispersion of chemicals. WMI is also quickly expanding from North America to the rest of the world. Waste Management's International division now accounts for 10% of the company's total revenue. Earlier this year, Thomas Smith, WMI's manager of Far East business development, predicted that Asia will replace North America as the biggest WMI customer within 20 years. WMI has entered into a partnership with a ministerial-level investment wing of the government of China in a bid for a chemical waste plant on Hong Kong. (79) This is not the first time WMI's search for profits across the globe have taken precedence over concerns for human rights. In 1979, during the height of Argentine government-sponsored "disappearances" of thousands of political dissidents, Waste Management took advantage of the country's move to privatize services by entering into a ten-year municipal contract to haul garbage in Buenos Aires. Dean Buntrock, WMI's chief executive officer, commented at the time that the contract with the city "reflects the pro-business policies of the federal government which have created an attractive atmosphere in Argentina." (80) WMI's biggest current expansion is in Europe. An investment firm recently reported that WMI "has grown its European business from $35 million to $500 million annually over the past two years." WMI expects that its 1990 European revenues will exceed $700 million. By May 1990, WMI held contracts in more than 325 Euro- pean communities. (81) The company is establishing major operations in Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, France, Germany and Italy. WMI operates a hazardous waste incinerator in Moerdijk, Netherlands. It is trying to gain control over the French waste management firm, PEC, whose subsidiary, Tredi, operates five incinerators in France. WMI is also believed to be trying to take over Italy's largest waste hauling company, SASPI, which would give WMI 55% of the Italian garbage hauling market. (82) FIGHT THE POWER THAT POLLUTES Greenpeace and other environmentalists and community groups around the world are fighting WMI with ever-increasing success as the company's dismal track record is revealed. It is our hope that this report will help generate even more success in blocking WMI and other companies' attempts to site new disposal facilities. Here are just a few of the places where, since 1988, a combina- tion of knowledge of WMI's troubled history, combined with community pressure, forced WMI to cancel plans to burn, bury or store hazardous wastes and garbage: Douglas County, Colorado Dallas County, Missouri Nobel County, Indiana Rapid City, South Dakota Anchorage, Alaska East Liverpool, Ohio Stickney, Illinois New York City Pike County, Mississippi Palmer, Massachusetts New Orleans East, Louisiana Calumet City, Illinois Blairsville, Pennsylvania A well-informed, firmly entrenched group can keep WMI's unsafe operations out of a community. These groups have proven that WMI is vulnerable. Grassroots groups across the continent have publicized WMI's sorry history, used civil disobedience, and forced authorities to enact local ordinances to prevent this company from entering their community. Greenpeace, the Citizens' Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes, and many well-organized grassroots groups can help you learn how to organize such a group. We hope this report will aid community groups, enforcement offi- cials, and public employees across the world in their decisions about dealing with WMI. THE END? This abstract is incomplete and has no ending -- because there is no apparent ending to the company's corruption of the public mind and the global environment. At the same time, there is a growing movement for environmental justice around the world, and a growing sense that things can and must change before it's too late. Please send us your information about the company and your suc- cess in stopping their efforts to expand, so we can help complete the story. Send information, with complete references (unless the sources are confidential), to the address listed below. The full report, "Waste Management Inc.: An Encyclopedia of Environmental Crimes and other Misdeeds," is voluminous and will provide activists with hundreds of pages of facts, figures and stories about the world's largest waste hauler. To receive written notice when the Waste Management Encyclopedia is published, please send a self-addressed envelope to: Waste Management Inc. Encyclopedia Project Greenpeace USA 1017 W. Jackson Boulevard Chicago, Illinois 60607 USA OTHER REFERENCES Other excellent sources of information about Waste Management Inc. include: "Waste Management Inc.: A Corporate Profile," published by the Citizens' Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes in 1988. This is a manual designed to arm citizens with information needed to fight WMI in every community. The report is available from CCHW, P.O. Box 926, Arlington, Virginia 22216, telephone: (703) 276-7070. See also, "There Ought Be a Law," by Brian Lipsett and Will Collette, an article about enacting contract crimes ordinances in your community, in the June issue of "Everyone's Backyard." Each issue of "Everyone's Backyard" covers the latest in WMI follies. The newsletter, "Rachel's Hazardous Waste News," published by Peter Montague. Available from: Environment Research Founda-tion, P.O. Box 73700, Washington, DC 20056-3700. Subcription rate: $40 per year for individuals and citizens groups, $15 for students and seniors. A series of articles about WMI and Browning-Ferris Industries by reporters from the Fort Lauderdale News/Sun-Sentinel. A news-magazine edition of the series, titled "The Titans of Trash," was published by the newspaper in December 1988. See also, Harold Crooks' book, "Dirty Business: The Inside Story of the New Garbage Agglomerates," published by James Lorimer & Co., Toronto, 1983. Contact the Canadian Union of Public Employees, John Calvert, Research Department, 21 Florence St., Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K2P OW6. For more information about WMI's garbage incineration subsidiary, Wheelabrator Technologies, see: "Waste Not," a publication of Work on Waste USA, Inc., 82 Judson, Canton, N.Y. 13617, telephone: (315) 379-9200, and Robert Collins, "Bad Deals and Broken Promises: A Survey of Wheelabrator's Performance," Clean Water Fund, September 1989. Copies are available from Clean Water Fund, 1320 18th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Telephone: (202) 546-6614. FOOTNOTES 1. "Investment Opportunities in Pollution Control," Merrill Lynch, 1989. Waste Management Inc. company fact sheet, 1990. "Waste Services Industry Review," Kidder Peabody Equity Research, June 27, 1990. 2. Akron Beach-Journal, May 2, 1988, p. B3. 3. State of Wisconsin Circuit Court, Milwaukee County, State of Wisconsin vs. Acme Disposal, et al., complaint filed in 1962. 4. Brian Bremner, "Waste Management: A Rogue, or a Star?," Crain's Chicago Business, October 12, 1987. Harold Crooks, Dirty Business: The Inside Story of the New Garbage Agglomerates, James Lorimer & Co., Toronto, 1983. Fred Schulte, "Laws Provide Little Deterrent to Price Fixing," (in 'the Titans of Trash' series), Fort Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel," December 7, 1987. 5. Culp, Guterson, et al., "Report on Charges and Claims of Corrupt Practices, Price Fixing, Violations of Environmental Standards at Landfills, etc.," presented to Seattle City Council, November 16, 1989. H. Draeger and B. Ingersoll, "Oak Brook waste company mired in EPA 'Sewergate,'" Chicago Sun Times, March 6, 1983. North Carolina Department of Justice, "Compliance History Report," Select Committee on Low Level Radioactive Waste, July 21, 1989. Schulte, "Laws Provide Little Deterrent." 6. Schulte, "Laws Provide Little Deterrent." Draeger and Ingersoll. 7. Culp, Peterson, et al. United Press International, October 29, 1987. 8. Associated Press, "Garbage hauler collects fine in price fixing case," Pensacola News-Journal, January 17, 1988. Associated Press, "Fort Lauderdale Firm Accused of Conspiring," September 25, 1987. L. Stuart Ditzen and Mark Jaffe, "Price-fixing accusations follow Waste Management and BFI, Philadelphia Inquirer, May 9, 1988, p. 4. North Carolina Department of Justice. Rick Pierce, "Hauler Fined $1 million, Waste Management Inc. Pleads No Contest in U.S. Suit," Ft. Lauderdale Sun- Sentinel, January 13, 1988. Schulte and Robert McClure, "The Trashing of America," (in 'The Titans of Trash' series,) Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, December 6, 1987. Schulte and McClure, "Inflated Prices Help Profits Pile Up," (in 'The Titans of Trash' series,) Ft. Lauderdale Sun- Sentinel, December 7, 1987. 9. Culp, Guterson, et al. Frank Donze, "Officials say garbage collector threatened lives," New Orleans Times-Picayune, October 7, 1988, p. B1. Jim Sibbison, "Revolving Door at the EPA," the Nation, November 6, 1989. 10. Bill Richards, "Waste Management Faces More Inquiries," Wall Street Journal, September 28, 1987. 11. "Reiner Sees Pervasive Cartel Conspiracy by Trash Hauling Firms," Los Angeles Times, June 10, 1987, p. 6. 12. Associated Press, "Top Garbage Hauler Fined $1 million," Columbus Dispatch, January 17, 1988. Ditzen and Jaffe. Schulte and McClure, "The Trashing of America." United Press International, October 29, 1987. 13. R. Blumenthal, "Waste Hauler's Business Acts Faulted," New York Times, March 24, 1983. McClure and Schulte, "Bribery Investigations Dog Waste Hauler," Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, December 8, 1987. 14. U.S. Federal Electoral Committee, as reported in the Universal Almanac, 1990. 15. B. Jackson, "Interest Groups Pay Millions in Appearance Fees to Get Legislators to Listen as Well as to Speak," Wall St. Journal, June 4, 1985 Common Cause, press release, June 25, 1986. 16. M. Burke, "Waste corporation tries selling self to commissioners," Pensacola Journal, November 14, 1984, p. 1. McClure and Schulte, "Bribery Investigations." 17. Associated Press, "Business, Lobby Give Money to Alabama Legislators," Atlanta Constitution, September 14, 1988. Brightman Brock, "To keep or not to keep is question," Mobile Register, December 19, 1985. 18. Pierce and Schulte, "Haulers Curry Favor in Community," Ft. Lauderdale Sun-Sentinel, December 8, 1987. 19. W. Gaines and D. Baquet, "City can't dispose of waste firm," Chicago Tribune, June 29, 1986. 20. B. Brock, "To keep or not to keep." 21. M. Possley, "Guilty please by bribery case figure," Chicago Tribune, May 19, 1988. M. Possley and R. Davis, "Ex.-Ald. Kelley to plead guilty," Chicago Tribune, April 24, 1987. 22. W. Crawford, Jr., "Waste company oficial jailed for bribery," Chicago Tribune, March 14, 1986. 23. K. Seigenthaler, "Kane County Official Linked to '81 Donation," Chicago Tribune, August 25, 1988. 24. S. Neal, "Toxic Eddie flied free on Waste Management jets," Chicago Sun Times, October 19, 1988 A. Webb, "Waste Management Cleans Up," Chicago Magazine, June 1990. 25. C. Peterson and H. Kurtz, "EPA Speeds Friend's Permit," Washington Post, February 19, 1983. K. Schneider, "The Leper Ships: Incinerators Sent to Sea," Oceans Magazine, May 1984. 26. "The Filthiness Issue," The New Republic, March 14, 1983. J. Evans (district attorney of Montgomery County, Alabama), "Brief of the District Attorney in support of petition to compel witness to comply with subpeona," June 1985. G. Gordon, "Firm Represented by Gorsuch Crony Gets Quick Action," United Press International, February 18, 1986. A. Taylor, "the Cleanup Men Get Spattered," Time, April 4, 1983. Lash, A Season of Spoils 27. List of WMI environmental grants recipients provided by WMI, 1990. 28. J. McNeill, "Protective Instincts at the EPA, Part II: Keeping Reilly Covered," In These Times, November 22, 1989. Waste Management Inc., "State Initiatives to Inhibit Development of Hazardous Waste Disposal Capacity and to Restrict Interstate Shipment of Hazardous Waste," 1989. T. Martin and J. Healy, "Ecologists Outraged Over Attack on Program," Winston-Salem Journal, April 21, 1989. J. Hair, president of the National Wildlife Federation, letter to Elizabeth Spence, executive director of South Carolina Wildlife Federation, December 21, 1989. A. Gold, "House Panel Opens Inquiry Into EPA Office," New York Times, December 10, 1989. 29. "Federation Hires Chief, Plans Campaign; New International Law Effort," The Chronicle of Philanthropy, July 25, 1989; Peter Montague, "EGA Gives WMI the Boot," Hazardous Waste News, May 16, 1990. 30. M. Nolan, "Church refuses donation from Waste Management," The Times (Chicago), December 28, 1986. 31. Pierce and Schulte, "Haulers Curry Favor in Community." 32. D. Hanson, "Hazardous Waste Management: Planning to Avoid Future Problems," Chemical and Engineering News, July 31, 1989. J. Warren, "Status of Hazardous Waste Management in the U.S.: Focus on Incineration," presented at: "Incineration of Industrial Wastes: fourth annual national symposium," Houston, Texas, February 28 to March 2, 1990. 33. Atlanta Constitution, December 4, 1989, page 10. Site Study Selection Committee of the North Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Authority report to N.C. Governor Joe Frank Harris, January 9, 1990. 34. CWM and WMI 10K's, filed with the Securities Exchange Commission, 1989. 35. H. Kaufman, memo to John Martin, EPA Inspector General, October 17, 1989. 36. "WMI plan to settle suit gets preliminary approval," Wall Street Journal," May 29, 1985. 37. R. Bareton, "Waste Disposal," El Dorado News-Times (Arkansas), September 14, 1986. California Department of Health Services, Toxic Substances Control Division, "Community Relations Plan, CWM, Kettleman Hills Facility, Kings County, California," 1987. 38. C. Bukro, "Illinois EPA wants to shut Southeast Side incinerator," Chicago Tribune, April 22, 1988. 39. D. Nelson, "Foes step up attack on incinerator," Chicago Sun Times, October 2, 1989. 40. R. Bergsvik, "Incinerator to stay open," Daily Calumet (Illinois), June 16, 1989. "Charge 219 companies polluted local streams," The News (Chicago), April 26, 1990. Chicago Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, Summary of FOIA Report, May 24, 1990. D. Nelson, October 2, 1989. 41. A. Smith and J. Aubuchon, "Waste company will pay penalty," Belleville (Ill.) News-Democrat, February 17, 1990. 42. P. Kemezis, "Chemical Waste Outlines Ambitious Expansion Plans," Environment Week, February 22, 1990. 43. J. Hutson, "How Clean are the Titans of Trash?," New Hampshire Broadcaster, July 5, 1989. M. O'Conner, "Waste firm conquers new worlds," Chicago Tribune, February 7, 1988. B. Richards and F. Rose, "Henley and Waste Management to merge trash to energy lines into a new firm," Wall Street Journal, April 22, 1988. 44. R. Pierce, "City Gets Burned," Ft. Lauderdale Sun Sentinel, December 10, 1987. 45. "Draft Technical Support Document to Proposed Dioxins and Cadmium Control Measure for Medical Waste Incinerators," prepared by the California Air Resources Board, 1990, as reported in "Hazardous Waste News #179," May 2, 1990. 46. "The WMI Report" (WMI Newsletter), October 1989. 47. D. Budd, Ohio EPA Division of Solid and Hazardous Waste, letter to Multi Tech Industries Inc., April 3, 1989. 48. Written correspondence between the Terrel, Texas, city government, the Texas Department of Heath, the U.S. EPA, the Texas Air Control Board and Waste Management Inc., October 20, 1988 to December 22, 1989. 49 and 50. H. Scarlett, "Environmental group gives notice about suit," Houston Post, March 2, 1989. 51. Peter Montague, The Chicken Guarding the Foxes," Testimony before the U.S. EPA public hearing on ocean incineation, April 18, 1985. Wall Street Journal, November 13, 1984. M. Wanetick, "The Superfund Stench," The Progressive, November 1985. 52. Affadavit of Professor Moid U. Ahmad, in support of motion for preliminary injunction, William Warner, et al., v. Waste Management Inc., Sandusky County Court of Appeals, October 1986. 53. Release, acknowledgement and agreement, in the case of William I. Warner, et al., v. Waste Management Inc., et al., Case No. 83-CV-781. J. Immel, "Chem Waste settlement OK'd," Fremont News- Messenger (Ohio), January 27, 1990. 54. J. Cook, "Waste Management Cleans Up," Forbes, November 18, 1985. A. Pasztor, "WMI is cited by EPA over PCBs, contaminated heating oil," Wall Street Journal, January 1985. B. Richards and A. Pasztor, "WMI Sold Tainted Oil that was Put on Roads, Agencies Say," Wall Street Journal, January 1985. U.S. EPA Region V, Complaint and notice of opportunity for hearing regarding Chemical Waste Management Inc., January 24, 1985. 55. "Fires hit waste plant; 2 injured," Chicago Sun Times, August 17, 1989. 56. U.S. EPA, "Report to Congress: Solid Waste Disposal in the U.S.," Volume I, EPA 530-SW-88-011, October 1988 57. Montague. U.S. EPA, RCRA Inspection Report, September 16 and 17, 1982. 58. J. Horan and D. Suchetka, "Company to oversee waste site plagued by fines, lawsuits," Charlotte (N.C.) Observer, March 25, 1990. Kemezis. 59. Associated Press, "Radioactive metal dust buried at area landfill," Tuscaloosa (Alabama) News, October 20, 1987. J. Boren, "State-of-the-art Schmoozing," Fresno Bee, July 10, 1988. D. Loverude, "Lawmaker wants radioactive waste removed from state," and "Credibility Problem," Montgomery Advertiser, October 22, 1987. 60. Kemezis. 61. B. Brock, "Dioxin find to instigate Emelle probes," Mobile Register, December 15, 1984. 62. J. Greene, "The Poisoning (of Emelle, Alabama)," Southern Magazine, February 1988. 63. R. Clemings,"New contamination discovered: tests at Kettleman Hills site unearth cyanide in ground water," Fresno Bee, March 27, 1986. A.M. Gurevich, CWM, letter and attachments to chief, Waste Programs Branch, U.S. EPA, and Section Chief, Northern California Sections, Toxics Substances Control Division, Department of Health Services, April 10, 1986. D. Solov, "Fake Numbers Charged at Delaware Waste Station," Business First-Columbus, March 16, 1987. Solov, "Waste Firm Accused of Market Fixing," Business First-Columbus, April 14, 1986. 64. "Southwest Daily News," February 12, 1989. 65. Letter from Steven Drew, CWM Regional Community Relations Manager, to "Environmental and Public Interest Group Leaders," April 5, 1988 R. Clemings, "Kettleman landfill unit shut down," Fresno Bee, March 24, 1988. 66. R. Nielsen, "ChemWaste Deluged with Questions," Hanford Sentinel, June 30, 1988. 67. J. Cahill, "Movement of Radionuclides in Unconsolidated Coastal Sediments at the Low-Level Radwaste Burial Site near Barnwell, South Carolina," U.S. Geological Survey, 1981. 68. C. Bukro, "A nuclear foot in door draws fire," Chicago Tribune, January 26, 1987. Bukro, "Nuclear safety unit hit on compactor," Chicago Tribune, January 29, 1987. "Nuclear News," April 1987. 69. C. Nicodemus, "Secret nuke plan bared," Chicago Sun-Times, March 18, 1990 70. U.S. EPA, "Solid Waste Report to Congress," October 1988. 71. G. Pawling and J. Donahue, "Firm's Record Questioned in Offshore Burn," The Press (N.J.), January 27, 1986. 72. B. Bremner, "Recycling: the newest wrinkle in Waste Management's bag," Business Week, March 5, 1990. 73. B. Commoner, Making Peace With the Planet, 1990. Hans Mueller, serveillance and enforcement branch, TDH division of Solid Waste Management, letter to Kevin Yard, WMNA Inc., December 22, 1989. 74. D. Rodebaugh, "Landfill leak expected by opponents," San Jose Mercury News, March 10, 1989. Rodebaugh, "Landfill toxics ooze toward water," San Jose Mercury News, March 9, 1989. B. Witt, "Little competition foreseen in trash service," San Jose Mercury News, January 6, 1988. 75. T. Jensen, "Tamarac Recycling Program Talks Stalled," Fort Lauderdale Sun Sentinel, February 15, 1989. 76. Chemical Waste Management, "Waste Reduction Services," (pamphlet) 1989. 77. For more information on the use of hazardous waste in cement and aggregate kilns, see "Sham Recyclers, Part I: Hazardous Wastes Incineration in Cement and Aggregate Kilns," by Pat Costner and Joe Thornton, available from Greenpeace U.S.A. 78. Cerrell Associates, "Political Difficulties Facing Waste-to- Energy Conversion Plant Siting," presented to the California Waste Management Board, 1988. Compliance History - Module 10, filed by CWM with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources, January 18, 1988. "Waste Managment Inc." company fact sheet, attachment to letter from Bill Brown, WMI Director of Environmental Affairs, to Peter Bahouth, Greenpeace USA Executive Director, March 16, 1990. 79. G. Aderman, "U.S. Waste Specialist Opens Asian Office," Journal of Commerce, February 7, 1990. Alex. Brown and Sons, "Waste Management Inc.-- Company Report," April 1, 1990. Waste Management Inc., "WMI Report" Newsletter, June 1990. 80. H. Crooks, "Dirty Business: the Inside Story of the New Garbage Agglomerates," James Lorimer & Co., Toronto, 1983. 81. Investext, May 14, 1990. "U.S. waste major targets European acquisition," European Chemical News, vol. 52, February 13, 1989. 82. M. Hamilton, "Turning Trash Into Cash," The Washington Post, July 8, 1990, p. H4. [Entered Toxbase February 14, 1991] ================================================================