TL: GREENPEACE ANALYSIS: UN FISH TREATY SO: Matthew Gianni, Greenpeace International (GP) DT: October 20, 1995 Keywords: environment greenpeace fisheries oceans agreements / igc:mgianni en.dolphinnet 5:01 PM Oct 20, 1995 The following memo contains a summary analysis of the UN Fisheries Treaty, including a discussion of the potential relevance and utility of provisions of the treaty for NGOs active on fisheries issues. For further information, please feel free to contact Matthew Gianni at Greenpeace, 568 Howard St., San Francisco CA, USA 94105 tel: (1) 415 512 9025/ fax: (1) 415 512 8699 email: mgianni@igc.apc.org or the Greenpeace office nearest you. Greenpeace Analysis of the United Nations Treaty for te Conservation of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks September 1995 To: NGOs and others interested in fisheries and related issues Fr: Greenpeace International Fisheries Campaign I. INTRODUCTION 1. On 4 August 1995, the UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks concluded with the adoption, by consensus, of a new global treaty. Over 100 countries participated in the traty negotiations, which began in 1993. A special session of the Conference will be held on 4 December, 1995 at the United Nations in New York City for the purpose of signing the treaty and formally opening it for ratification. In addition, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is expected to adopt two resolutions in December which, among other things, will call on nations to provisionally abide by the treaty, pending its entry into force, and establish a biennial UNGA review of the implementation of the treaty, beginning in 1996. This memo analyzes key treaty provisions, including implications for future fisheries work. It is our hope that you will find the analysis helpful in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of this new regime. 2. At the close of the UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Greenpeace criticized the treaty as being inadequate in many important respects (ee Greenpeace's Closing Statement, 4 August 1995). The treaty does not, for example, address the problem of government subsidies which promote unsustainable fishing, the migration of distant water fishing fleets from northern to southern waters, or the negative impacts of international trade in fisheries products on global food security. Other issues, such as excess fishing capacity, marine biodiversity, and the rights and interests of fishing communities traditionally and culturally dependent on fish for food and livelihood, though somewhat addressed by the treaty, were not given the attention they deserved. The intent of Greenpeace's closing statement was to send a clear signal to governments that the treaty will not "solve" the world's fisheries problems. Though it does represent a significant step forward, substantial further reforms are needed. 3. In contrast with the above criticisms, Greenpeace's closing statement also made it clear that several provisions of the treaty represent significant advances in international fisheries law. NGOs may find a number of these provisions quite useful in pressuring for fisheries reforms at local, national and regional levels. Amongst these are provisions related to the precautionary approach (Article 6, Annex 2); the application of key provisions throughout the range of the affected stocks (consistent with the need for "biological unity") - both inside EEZs and on the high seas (Article 7); the collection, analysis and sharing of data (article 14, Annex I); several important conservation measures established as "General Principles" for fisheries conservation (Article 5); the interests of subsistence and artisanal fishworkers (Article 5,24); and detailed provisions for enforcement in high seas fisheries (Articles 18-22), strengthening regional fisheries management organizations (Articles 8-16), and establishing dispute settlement procedures to enhance the compliance of States with the provisions of the treaty (Articles 27-32). 4. Greenpeace believes that the treaty, if effectively implemented, can serve to improve the conservation and management of fisheries on straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. Equally important, the treaty sets new precedents and global standards for fisheries conservation in Articles 5 and 6, amongst others and, in Greenpeace's view, these standards should be considered applicable to all fisheries. If all countries involved in the negotiations agreed to these standards for fisheries on straddling and highly migratory fish stocks both inside and outside of EEZs, then why not apply the same standards to other fisheries as well? 5. It is important to recognize that it will be 1-2 years, and possibly longer, before the treaty has the force of international law. Thirty countries must ratify the treaty before it enters into force; thereafter the treaty will only be legally binding on those countries which have ratified; and the central thrust of the treaty's provisions apply only with regards fisheries on straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. Moreover, ratification and entry into force do not necessarily guarantee that a country will implement the treaty's provisions. 6. Nonetheless, the treaty's numerous positive features and concepts serve as important steps in the right direction. As such, the treaty provides a political and practical base for fisheries reform work by environmental, fishworker and other NGOs at regional and national levels. To help firm up that base or foundation, countries should be urged to ratify the treaty. 7. It also is worth stating the obvious, i.e., that the final agreement has taken the form of a legally binding treaty, something that was far from certain or even likely when the negotiations began in earnest in 1993. At that earlier time, distant water fishing nations, in particular, contended that the 1982 Law of the Sea (LOS) treaty was sufficient, did not need to be supplemented, and that the negotiations should focus on developing voluntary guidelines. But the treaty clearly shows that, while the Law of the Sea treaty serves as the foundation, further legally binding reforms were needed. In this regard, the treaty serves as a door opener, or precedent, for governments to agree to further, more stringent, legally binding conservation reforms at regional and national levels that likewise are compatible with the effective execution of the LOS treaty, as well as this new global fisheries treaty, where the scope or coverage of both treaties overlaps. 8. With this introductory overview, the remainder of this memo focuses in summary form on the contents of the treaty, including key treaty provisions that were highlighted in the NGO Declaration of July 1995 as points of emphasis or concern. II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR FISHERIES CONSERVATION AND THE PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH 9. The treaty establishes important obligations for fisheries conservation. Article 5 contains "General Principles" for fisheries conservation and management, including provisions related to excess fishing capacity, the precautionary approach, bycatch and marine biodiversity. Article 6 and Annex 2 contain more detailed provisions for the application of the precautionary approach to the conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, the conservation of other species impacted by fishing, and the protection of the marine environment. For NGOs concerned primarily with fisheries in national waters, these two articles should prove quite useful. 10. The provisions of these articles apply to fisheries for straddling and highly migratory stocks inside EEZs as well as on the high seas, and they establish significant and important advances in international fisheries law which can and should serve as precedents for the management of fisheries on other types of stocks, including those found wholly within EEZs. Though general in nature, these provisions establish a legally binding framework for the more detailed elaboration and application of conservation measures at the regional and national levels. Provided that they are effectively implemented, they will assist in efforts to halt unsustainable fishing practices. 11. The provisions of Articles 5 and 6 are a package of inter- related conservation measures, and should be read carefully. Among other obligations, States are required to set conservation and management measures (e.g. quotas, access limitation, gear restrictions, allocation of catch) that are "precautionary" in nature [Art. 5(c), Article 6]. States are under the obligation to collect and share complete and accurate fisheries data [Art. 5(j)], assess the impact of fishing on the marine environment [Art. 5(d) and 6.3(d)] and establish management measures that must ensure the protection of marine biodiversity [Art. 5(g)]. 12. States are further obliated to take into account the interests of subsistence and artisanal fishers [Art. 5(i)]; minimize waste, bycatch and discards [Art. 5(f)]; prevent or eliminate over-fishing and excess fishing capacity [Art. 5(h)]; take into account the uncerainties inherent in fisheries data and science [Art. 6.3(c)]; ensure the conservation of other (non- target) species [Art. 6.3(d)]; and protect habitats of special concern [Art. 6.3(d)]. For new fisheries, the precautionary approach provisions mandate that States must first assess the long term sustainability of the stocks and then may only allow the gradual development (consistent with the provisions of Articles 5, 6 and others) of the fishery [Art. 6.6]. Precautionary Approach 13. The precautionary approach provisions, while not nearly as strong as Greenpeace and a number of other NGOs would have liked, nonetheless offer the potential of being used to reverse the laissez faire approach prevalent in the management of so many of the world's fisheries. Rather than allowing fisheries or other human activities to go un-monitored and unregulated until there is absolute proof of over-fishing or harm to the marine environment, the treaty mandates that the absence of scientific information cannot be used as an excuse for failing to establish measures for the conservation of fished stocks and non-target species, and the preservation of the marine environment, in particular, the protection of habitats of special concern [Articles 6.1-6.3]. 14. In addition, States are required [Art. 6.3(b)] to set precautionary "reference points" or management measures according to the guidelines established in Annex II. These guidelines, in essence, detail the treaty's requirements with respect to the obligation to "prevent...over-fishing" contained in Article 5(h). Precautionary reference points are target levels of fishing effortdesigned to ensure that the biomass (or abundance) of fish stocks is maintained or restored to some level above that which can produce Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY), taking ito account the resilience and rprui pi osse smar sources of uncertainty related to the knowledge of the stocks and the fisheries exploiting them. In the event that the reference points are exceeded, that is, thebiomass of a stock falls below a "precautionary" level, States are required to implement ("trigger") measures that they have agreed to in advance, to rectify the situation [Annex II.4]. At the same time, hwever, if stocks are over-fished, Annex II.7 allows States to continue to use MSY, rather than requiring a more conservative level, as the target for "rebuilding" the stocks. 15. Fishing at MSY has been roundly criticized for years by many fisheries scientists and others as almost inevitably leading to the depletion of fish stocks and ignoring the impact of fishing on other species of marine life. Yet MSY is the approach favored by many sectors of the fishing industry, particularly in fisheries where there is a concentration of large-scale and corporate fleets interested in maximizing catches so as to maximize short-term profits and, in the process, pushing fish stocks to the brink of sustainability and beyond, and disrupting the balance of biodiversity in the marine environment. The strength of the Annex II provisions lies in the fact that they establish a legal basis for limiting fishing effort to more conservative levels than MSY. The major weakness of the Annex II provisions, however, derives from the fact that: a) many of the provisions only require that States "should" as opposed to "shall" meet various conservation requirements and, b) the 'bottom line' is that if stocks are over-fished, States are essentially allowed to continue to manage fisheries for MSY. 16. As with the other provisions, precautionary "reference points" or levels of fishing effort must be consistent with the package of provisions contained in Articles 5 and 6 as a whole. Among other requirements, precautionary management measures must maintain levels of stock abundance that are sufficiently high to ensure that the impact on associated and dependant species is minimized [Art. (f)], that the conservation of these species is ensured [Art. 6.3(d)], and that marine biodiversity is protected. The way in which precautionary levels of fishing effort are determined for specific fisheries at regional and national levels for the implementation of these provisions will depend, to a large extent, on the efforts of fishworkers, NGOs, fisheries biologists, and others concerned with the health and abundance of fish stocks and the protection of marine biodiversity from excessive levels of fishing. 17. The provisions of Article 5, 6 (and those related to fishworkers elsewhere in the treaty) should prove useful to fishworker, environmental and other NGOs in a number of other ways. For example, on the question of allocation and fishing gear selectivity, Article 5(f) requires States to minimize waste, bycatch and discards through the use, "to the extent practicable" of selective fishing gears and techniques, amongst other measures. It could be argued that Article 5(f) would require States to grant a priority to more selective fishing practices, e.g. hand-line or set net fishing as opposed to bottom-trawling, in fisheries where these practices are in use, when setting catch quotas, allocation and other conservation and management measures. Assigning a priority to selective methods of fishing already in use, through measures such as preferential allocation, should satisfy the criteria in Article 5(f) that the use of selective fishing gears and techniques be employed "to the extent practicable". 18. Article 5(f) could also be used to pressure for seasonal and area restrictions in mixed species fisheries. For example, given that temporal and spatial co-occurrence of species is often well known and predictable, Article 5(f) could be construed to require that regulations be established to minimize bycatch, waste and discards of juveniles and other species by mandating that individual stocks be exploited only in specific areas, and during periods, of maximum spatial separation of stocks. 19. Article 6.6 addresses new or exploratory offshore fisheries. It requires States to adopt "cautious" measures pending an assessment of the long-term sustainability of the stocks before allowing the commercial development of such fisheries, whether inside or outside of national waters, for migratory or straddling stocks. Only then may the fishery be allowed to gradually develop, "if appropriate" based on the criteria established in Articles 5 and 6 including consideration of the interests of subsistence and artisanal fishers, the conservation of non-target species, the use of selective fishing gears, comprehensive programs for data collection, and the adequacy of steps taken to ensure the prevention of excess fishing capacity. These provisions should be useful to fishworker and NGOs concerned with the unregulated development of offshore fisheries. 20. With respect to the protection of marine habitats, Article 6.3(d) requires States to adopt plans to protect habitats of special concern. This obligation should apply to areas such as coral reefs and coastal mangrove forests which serve as spawning or nursery grounds for straddling or highly igratory species of fish, associated or dependent species, or species belonging to the same ecosystem. More generally, this should apply to any area of the marine or coastal environment critical to the protection of marine biodiversity [Art. 5 (g)]. The treaty's requirements in this respect could prove useful for NGO efforts to protect coastal mangrove areas and other critical coastal and marine habitats from the degradation of intensive aquaculture, land-based sources of marine pollution and other activities. 21. Articles 5 and 6 need to be read closely, since the various provisions and subsections lay down a number of important and inter-related obligations and markers for fisheries reforms. NGOs can play a critical role in defining, advancing, and building upon these obligations and pressuring for their implementation. However, the "proof will be in the pudding": in follow-up review and modification of regional agreements and national laws and practices. Unless and until that occurs, unsustainable fishing practices will only increase. III. SMALL-SCALE AND ARTISANAL FISHERIES 22. In addition to the requirement in Article 5 to take into account the interests of subsistence and artisanal fishers [Art. 5(i)], States are under the obligation to "take into account" the needs of coastal fishing communities which are dependant mainly on fishing [Art.11 (d)], and the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure access to fisheries by, subsistence, small-scale and artisanal fishers and women fishworkers as well as indigenous people in developing States [Art. 24.2(b)]. Countries are also under the obligation to "take into account" the vulnerability of developing States which are dependant on the exploitation of living marine resources, including for meeting the nutritional requirements of their populations or parts thereof [Art. 24.2(a)]. 23. The provisions of the treaty related to subsistence and artisanal fishers are new in international fisheries law. While a number of NGOs had called for much stronger language in the treaty text - i.e. "respect for the rights" as opposed to "tak[ing] into account the interests" of artisanal fishworkers - these provisions should help advance the legal recognition of the interests of small-scale, artisanal, women and indigenous fishers at national and international levels. But substantial further reform is needed in this area, with the treaty provisions resembling a "foot in the door" that needs to be opened a lot wider. As with discussions about other treaty provisions, further advances at regional and national levels need to occur, and when they do, they need to be shared with NGOs as "models" for use elsewhere. IV. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE MANAGEMENT OF STRADDLING FISH STOCKS AND HIGHLY MIGRATORY FISH STOCKS Data Collection 24. A critical problem in fisheries worldwide is the general lack of basic information and data on catches, bycatches and discards of both target and non-target species. The treaty establishes, for the first time, a requirement for standardized scientific and systematic collection, analysis, verification and sharing of data relaed to catch, bycatch, discards, fishing effort, area and time of operation in fishing operations, both inside EEZs and on the high seas, in fisheries for straddling and highly migratory fish stocks [Article 14 and Annex I]. 25. Many countries, both northern and southern, may argue that the comprehensive collection of data is cost prohibitive. However, the treaty clearly establishes that "the timely collection, compilation and analysis of data are fundamental to effective conservation and management" [Annex I, Art 1.1]. The treaty contains provisions for assistance to developing States directed specifically towards, among other things, assistance in the collection, reporting, verification, exchange and analysis of fisheries data, stock assessments and capacity building for observer programs [Art. 25.2, 25.3, Annex I, Art 1.2]. These various treaty requirements are important tools for NGOs, fishworkers, scientists and others. As a resut, those groups should demand the use of satellite surveillance systems, observer programs, and other measures to ensure the comprehensive collection of data from offshore and high seas fishing fleets. Enforcement 26. The enforcement provisions of the treaty require States whose vessels fish on the high seas to ensure that their fishing vessels observe conservation and management measures adopted by regional fisheries management organizations, consistent with the treaty's provisions [Articles 18 and 19]. The treaty allows States that are parties to a regional fisheries management organization to board and inspect vessels fishing on the high seas flying the flag of another State in areas covered by the regional organization [Articles 21 and 22]. If a vessel is found to be in violation of measures agreed by the regional organization, a coastal State may, in some cases, detain the vessel in the event that the flag State is unable or unwilling to do so. 27. These provisions of the treaty have been hailed by many governments as the centerpiece of the agreement. The general lack of flag state enforcement has been a major factor in excess fising on the high seas. Indeed, all too often, distant water fishing nations and, in particular, flag of convenience countries, have allowed their flagged vessels to fish in high seas areas with few or no constraints. By granting enforcement authority to coastal States and other States that are members of a regional organization, the treaty goes a long way toward 'solving' the problem of compliance and enforcement on the high seas. 28. At the same time, tough enforcement measures on the high seas risk being like "one hand clapping" absent coastal states being far tougher on enforcement within their zones. Though the treaty establishes extensive procedures for enforcement on the high seas, the need for stronger enforcement measures applies equally to regional and national fisheries laws and management regimes for fisheries inside the 200 mile limits. In addition, the effective enforcement of fisheries regulations will not prevent the decline of fish stocks if the regulations themselves are not sufficiently stringent to ensure conservation. Compatibility of Measures between EEZs and High Seas 29. The treaty requires States to ensure that conservation and management measures established within EEZs and on the high seas for fisheries on straddling and highly migratory stocks be "compatible" - that is, consistently applied to the fisheries throughout the range of the stocks [Article 7]. In ffect, coastal States and high seas fishing States are under an equal obligation to apply conservation and management measures adopted by regional organizations, consistent with the treaty's provisions (including Articles 5 and 6), to fisheries on straddling and highly migratory stocks inside and outside EEZs. These are important provisions which are further strengthened by the dispute settlement provisions described below. Dispute Settlement 30. Any country which is a member of a regional organization may initiate a legally binding dispute settlement process where there are disagreements amongst States regarding their respective implementation of the provisions of the treaty [Articles 27-32]. Where States have initiated a dispute settlement procedure, provisional conservation and management measures can be established by the court or tribunal chosen to resolve the dispute pending the final outcome of the dispute settlement process [Art. 31.2]. 31. These provisions provide potentially powerful mechanisms to ensure a State's compliance with the data collection requirements, the conservation nd management provisions, and other obligations in the treaty, both inside a oseE. T etyle special emphasis regarding disputes arising over the compatibility of conservation and management measures [Art. 7.4, 7.5, 16.2, 31.2]. Th compatibility provisions coupled with dispute settlement are a legal means States have to keep each other "honest". If a high seas fishing State does not abide by measures agreed at the regional level, another State which is a member of the reional fishery management organization in the area can initiate legal action. Similarly, if a coastal State does not apply regionally agreed measures to the fishery for a straddling or highly migratory stock inside its zone, another astal State or high seas fishing State can, in turn, take legal action. Transparency 32. The issue of transparency and NGO participation in the work of regional organizations was hotly debated during the treaty negotiations. Some regional organizations such as the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas charge excessive observer fees (US$ 2000 per NGO) that are prohibitive for NGOs while others, such as the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization have established rules allowing one or several countries, in private, off-record sessions, to deny NGO requests for observer status. 33. Greenpeace and many other NGOs argued for the inclusion of strongly worded provisions establishing public participation and public accountability as fundamental principles related to fisheries decision-making at national, regional and global levels, in addition to provisions specific to the rules of procedure for regional organizations. Unfortunately, the treaty's provisions related to transparency only apply to the functioning of regional organizations. Nevertheless, it does contain provisions to assist in NGO participation at meetings of such organizations [Art. 12.2]. These require that regional organizations be transparent and that their procedures related to the participation of NGOs as observers or in other capacities "not be unduly restrictive". Regional Organizations 34. Regional fisheries management organizations provide the mechanism or means for the implementation of the provisions of the treaty. Detailed provisions regarding the structure and functions of regional organizations are contained in Articles 8-16. Where regional organizations do not exist for EEZ and high seas fisheries on straddling and highly migratory stocks, States are essentially required to establish such organizations [Art. 8.5]. Whether existing or newly forming, States are required to structure or strengthen regional organizations in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. 35. In general, regional fisheries management organizations have been ineffective in preventing the over-fishing of straddling and highly migratory stocks for a variety of reasons. These include the failure of distant water and coastal States to ensure that their vessels comply with measures adopted by regional organizations, the refusal of distant water and/or coastal States to form or join regional organizations, and the fact that the decision making procedures established by regional organizations often serve to preclude effective agreement; for example, decision making on the basis of consensus (which allows a single State to effectively veto any measures) or procedures which allow participating States to "opt out" of (legally ignore) agreed measures. 36. The treaty requires all States fishing in a region to either join or at least abide by the measures adopted by the relevant regional organization(s) [Art. 8]. Only those States which comply with this requirement shall have access to the fisheries covered by a regional agreement [Art. 8.4]. States which do not comply are obliged to prevent their vessels from fishing in the region [Art. 17], and other States which are members of the regional agreement are permitted to take action "consistent with...international law" to deter fishing by vessels from a non- participating State. These provisions, coupled with the high seas enforcement provisions, will go a long way toward ensuring that vessels fishing on the high seas comply with agreed measures. 37. However, the treaty leaves several important issues unresolved. For example, the treaty requires that States agree on regional decision making procedures that will facilitate the timely and effective adoption of conservation measures [Art. 10(j)] but, if States fail to do so, the treaty dose not establish explicit mechanisms to correct the problem. Similarly, States are required to agree on allocation of catches (assuming that they have agreed on overall levels of fishing effort or quotas) [Art. 10(b)], but if they cannot agree on how to divide up or allocate the quota amongst themselves, what implications does this have for the conservation of stocks and which State or States are to blame? The treaty does offer some very general guidelines related to the question of allocation or "participatory rights" but does not establish specific procedures to resolve this issue. 38. These are potentially serious problems given that the implementation of the provisions of the treaty related to high seas enforcement, compatibility, and other measures depends, to a large extent, on States being able to agree to and adopt conservation and management measures at the regional level. How these issues are resolved will depend to a large extent on the political will of nations to collectively establish effective decision-making procedures at the regional level and/or the extent to which dispute settlement procedures, if invoked, will be effective in dealing with these issues. 39. In spite of these concerns with respect to the regional implementation of the provisions of the treaty, it is likely that in many regions of the world where there are substantial high seas fisheries on straddling and highly migratory stocks, coastal States in those regions will move relatively quickly to implement the provisions of the treaty related to high seas enforcement. Aside from conservation concerns, there are obvious and powerful economic incentives for coastal States to do so. 40. It is worth noting, though, that greater restrictions on high seas fishing effort very likely means more fish available to be caught inside EEZs, particularly through joint-venture arrangements and licensing agreements between coastal States and distant water fleets and other nations facing fewer opportunities to fish in international waters. Given the overwhelming importance that coastal states attached to the negotiation of the high seas enforcement provisions, it is critical that the implementation of these provisions does not transfer excessive fishing capacity, over-fishing, non-selective and destructive fishing practices and other such problems from the high seas into EEZ fisheries. The treaty's compatibility and dispute settlement provisions provide both the obligation and an important "hammer" to help ensure that coastal states abide by and implement the treaty's conservation provisions inside EEZs. 41. Even here, however, the "real world" politics of fisheries may intervene. A hypothetical example may serve to illustrate the point: A high seas fishing State threatens to initiate a dispute settlement procedure against a coastal State for failure to implement regionally agreed measures inside the EEZ. The coastal State offers to grant the high seas State a quota of several thousand tons of tuna, cod or some other species inside the coastal State's zone. The high ses State withdraws the threat of legal action. End result - the stocks are, or continue to be, over-fished. 42. As highlighted by the issues addressed in paragraphs 32 - 39, the real battle for ecologically sound and socially equitable fisheries practices, insofar as straddling and highly migratory stocks are concerned, now shifts to the regional level. Despite its limitations, the treaty does contain important provisions that will serve to advance efforts for fisheries conservation. The challenge to NGOs and others interested in fisheries conservation will be to ensure effective national and regional implementation of the treaty's conservation measures inside EEZs, as well as on the high seas. Pursuant to provisions regarding "Application" [Article 3] and "International Cooperation" [Articles 8-16], regional organizations and arrangements are required, once the treaty is in force, to incorporate essentially all of its important reforms. As part of efforts to advance those reforms, NGOs need to monitor and press for effective adoption, implementation and further strengthening of the global treaty's measures at national and regional levels. V. CONCLUSION 43. As discussed in the introductory section of this memo, a number of issues such as inappropriate subsidies and fleet migration highlighted in the NGO Declaration of July 1995 received almost no attention during the 2-year negotiation of the treaty. Though the treaty does contain strongly worded requirements to eliminate excess fishing capacity and protect marine biodiversity, these provisions lack specificity. 44. The issues of subsidies and excess capacity require concrete and urgent action, but thus far governments, the FAO and others have done little to identify constructive, effective ways forward. It is possible that this issue could receive special attention at the 1996 meeting of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development, given the oceans focus included in that session. Similarly, the Convention on Biological Diversity provides a means for elaborating concrete measures for the protection of marine biodiversity from excess fishing pressure, pursuant to Article 5(g), as well as to further define and strengthen the interests of artisanal fishers. For either to happen, though, NGOs concerned with conservation and sustainable fishing need to develop ideas and proposals for governments to consider, and pressure for political action. In addition to these and other related forums, the biennial review of the treaty by the UN General Assembly (mentioned in paragraph 1) may provide an opportunity to further address NGO concerns related to the interpretation and implementation of the treaty. 45. The UN Fisheries Conference treaty, though lacking in many respects, does establish new and important obligations, principles, standards and precedents for fisheries conservation in international law. The provisions of the treaty can, provided that the treaty is ratified and implemented, serve to improve the management of fisheries for straddling and highly migratory stock fisheries, the conservation of associated and dependent species, the protection of habitats of concern, and the involvement of artisanal fishworkers. In addition, NGOs can use those kinds of measures as precedents, or building blocks, for more comprehensive measures at local, national and regional levels - broadening the application of the treaty's provisions, for example, with respect to waters under national jurisdiction, and for species other than those covered by the treaty. END