TL: THE WWER - 440: EASTERN EUROPE'S MOST IMPORTANT REACTOR (GP)
SO: Greenpeace Germany
DT: April, 1987
Keywords: nuclear power problems greenpeace groups reports gp east
reactors germany europe pr /

Dangers/Confidential  Malfunction  Reports/Catastrophe Scenario
A Black Book: A Report by the Ecology Group, Hannover on behalf
of GREENPEACE, April 1987 


- Summary of the report done by I.Albrecht/ U.Fink/
K.Hinrichsen/ H.Hirsch Ecology Group, Hannover

- The road to nuclear free future done by GREENPEACE

26th April 1987

GREENPEACE launches nuclear hazards study in Eastern Europe

To mark the first anniversary of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor
accident , the international environmental organisation
GREENPEACE will, at press conferences in Vienna today release a
scientific report on the hazards of nuclear power in Eastern
Europe.

The report, commissioned from Dr Helmut Hirsch, an independent
Austrian nuclear expert is based in part on information obtained
from some confidential International Atomic Energy Agency
documents. It makes available for the first time detailed
information on the safety problems of the Soviet designed
+VVER-440+ nuclear reactor which is located at ten sites in
seven countries throughout Eastern Europe and Finland.

Summaries of this report have been translated and are available
in Russian, Polish, German, Czech and Hungarian. One thousand
copies in each of these languages have been distributed in the
appropriate Eastern European countries.

The design of the VVER-440 reactor is fundamentally different
from that of the reactor that exploded at Chernobyl. Whilst the
Chernobyl reactor is no more dangerous than other types of
nuclear reactors throughout the world, the VVER-440 has been
identified by the Greenpeace report as suffering from
exceptional safety hazards.

The particular problems concerned include inadequate containment
structures, rudimentary emergency coolant systems, fault-prone
pressure reduction systems, leakage of primary coolant and signs
of wear in valves and in the electrical system. The report makes
public for the first time information that, in February 1983,
the VVER-440 at Kozloduy in Bulgaria experienced a series of
malfunctions that could have developed into a very serious
accident.

The probability of a serious accident occurring before the end
of the century at the Czechoslovak VVER-440 nuclear reactor
plant at Dukovany is assessed to be between one in five and one
in one hundred and seventy. In the event of a major, but not
worst case, accident occurring at Dukovany, prevailing winds
would carry fallout to Vienna in six hours. This could result in
at least 100,000 extra cases of thyroid cancer and 5,000 cases
of bone cancer in Austria alone.

Greenpeace is also releasing studies commissioned from
independent scientists in Spain and the United Kingdom. In
Madrid, a technical report will be launched that shows in detail
how Spain could phase out nuclear power in five years.

In London, a report revealing previously unpublicised safety
defects in British gas cooled nuclear reactors will be made
public. Demonstrations and other undisclosed Greenpeace
activities will accompany the release of all these studies.

For more in formations please contact:

GREENPEACE
Osterreich
Marjahilfer Wien/Austria
Tel. (0222)597 30 46-0*


SUMMARY :

1. The WWER-440 is world-wide one of the most numerous types of
reactor. Almost one in ten of all power reactors operating or
under construction is of this design. It is at present the only
type of reactor providing electricity in Bulgaria, the German
Democratic Republic, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Hungary
(apart from one WWER-70), and is the only Russian-designed
reactor to have been exported to non-COMECON countries (two
blocks have been exported to Finland). They are often situated
near borders, and also in the proximity of large cities (e.g.,
Berlin, Brno, Vienna, Copenhagen).

2. An international committee of experts commissioned by
GREENPEACE in 1986 to investigate the potential dangers of all
commercially operating power reactors in the world at present
came to the conclusion that all modern types of reactors, both
in the East and West, are approximately equally (un)safe. Major
accidents with catastrophic consequences - as in Tschernobyl,
and worse are possible in all reactors. The committee of experts
was not able to identify any one type of reactor which could be
rated as considerably safer than the average. It was however
able to point out a number of different types of reactors which
were clearly worse than the average: among these was the
WWER-440.

3. The WWER-440 was developed in the Soviet Union: the first
forerunner prototype, the WWER-210 (pressurized water reactor
with 210 MW electrical output) was put into operation in 1964 in
Noho-Woronesh. Two further prototypes led to the first
standardized Soviet type of reactor, the WWER-440 (first block:
Nowo-Woronesh 3, put into operation in 1971) Almost all plants
up to the present have been constructed by the Soviet atomic
industry. One exception to this are the Czech power reactors
from Bohunice-3 onwards, which were built under licence by the
CSSR firm of Skoda. Developments have led to the larger type,
the WWER-1000.

4. The WWER-440 is a pressurized water reactor (light water
cooled and moderated, with two coolant circulations). Its
reactor core contains approx. 40 t reactor fuel, comparable to
the pressurized water reactors in the West (slightly enriched
uranium), and similar to these this is contained in one single
reactor vessel. It is equipped with two turbo-generators with
220 MW electrical output each. Two reactors are always
constructed within one building (double-block plant). It is
planned to incorporate power reactors equipped with WWER-440
reactors in the long-distance heating system; this is encouraged
by the fact that they are often situated in the proximity of
conurbations.

5. As in all pressurized water reactors - those in the West as
well - the integrity of the reactor vessel is of prime
importance: its breakdown (rupture) cannot be controlled and
leads to a catastrophic accident. The weld seams of a number of
WWER-440 reactor vessels are in particular danger of brittle
fracturing as a result of impurities. In addition to this, 10
older plants have no protection against corrosion inside the
reactor vessel. A further weak point for 17 plants are the main
coolant pumps.

6. All WWER-440's have a particularly inadequate safety
containment. Their compression resistance is very slight. The
danger of a premature malfunction through a building up of
excess pressure in the reactor building following a break in one
of the coolant pipelines and the escape of steam from the
primary coolant circulation system is particularly high. The
earlier the safety containment fails, then the greater the
release of radiation and thus there is less time for the
disaster control services to take the necessary measures.

7. In nearly half of all WWER-440's (the first generation) only
the most rudimentary emergency coolant systems and systems to
reduce pressure within the safety containment are present. It is
thus possible for catastrophic accidents to develop from
relatively small leaks and other such faults.

8. The second generation of WWER-440's also exhibits an
increased risk of core meltdown accidents with early containment
malfunction. Emergency coolant and pressure reducing systems
have been further developed and are a great deal more complex
than those of first generation reactors. The pressure reducing
system is however prone to faults (vibrations in the
condensation chamber). The large degree of interconnection
between the emergency coolant and pressure reducing systems
remains a disadvantage in respect of safety technology. A
rupture in one or the main coolant pipelines ("2F-Break") should
be able to be controlled by the second generation safety
systems. On the basis of the interaction between different
systems, which are to some extent dependent on one another to
function, a small fault can here lead to the situation getting
out of control.

9. Both WWER-440's in Loviisa (Finland) have been subsequently
fitted with western (US) safety technology. They have been
equipped with an ice-condenser-containment system, which of all
the American pressurized water reactor containment systems
exhibits the least compression resistance and is also otherwise
to be rated as very negative.

10. Almost nothing has been reported in publications concerning
actual faults in the WWER-440. Confidential malfunction reports
from the Incident Reporting System of the IAEA however record
numerous safety problems which have occurred in practice: leaks
in the primary coolant circulation system and steam generators,
faults and signs of wear in valves and gaskets, problems in the
electrical system.

11. The most dangerous of all the malfunctions which are
published here for the first time took place on February 21, 
1983 in Kozloduy in Bulgaria: following an electrical defect,
two valves of the pressure maintainer in the primary coolant
circulation system were opened. The pressure in the primary
circulation system dropped rapidly, the reactor was switched
off. The valves could not be closed. After more coolant had been
lost the emergency coolant system was activated. A third valve
could be closed; the situation was under control again. Since
cold emergency cooling water was fed into the reactor vessel,
this meant an acute danger of brittle fracturing of one of the
weld seams - the block in question in Kozloduy is most probably
one of the plants whose weld seams are in particular danger.

12. The probability of a serious accident in a WWER-440 (or any
other type of reactor) cannot be calculated with any degree of
reliability. The uncertainties and gaps in our knowledge are too
great. We can however guess at a range for our rough
orientation, within which the probability lies. For example, the
probability of a serious accident in the CSSR plant at Dukovany
for the period 1987 to 2000 lies somewhere between 0.6% and 20%.
It is thus clear that this is in no way a negligible "residual
risk".

13. An accident (one of many) could start as in Kozloduy in 1983
with a vessel valve opening and remaining open. The input of
cold high-pressure emergency coolant leads to a great stress on
the materials ("thermoshock") and to the rupture of a main
coolant pipeline. The slightest carelessness during an
inspection of the safety system (e.g. the water level in one of
the tanks for the pressure reducing sprinkler system being too
low) and this could lead to the breakdown of the pressure
reducing system, and later the emergency coolant circulation
system. (The accident scenario here is for one of the second
generation plants.)

14. In this case the safety containment system fails within the
first minute. It already shows an extensive leak, as during the
next hour the core melts. During core meltdown radioactive
materials are released into the atmosphere in large quantities.
A further release of radioactivity occurs when the molten mass
breaks through the reactor vessel and begins to react with the
concrete of the building itself. The release of radioactive
materials would be comparable to that experienced in the
Tschernobyl accident, in the case of certain radionuclides (e.g.
iodine-131) the amounts would be even higher, although the
WWER-440 is a great deal smaller than the RBMK-1000.

15. In spite of the large amount of radioactivity released the
case in question is by far not the worst. The amplifying effect
of an explosion during the accident has not been taken into
account; furthermore we have assumed that the other blocks in
the same location are not affected by the accident, and that no
radioactivity is released from the storage reservoirs for spent
reactor fuel which are situated within the reactor building.

16. The radiological consequences of this sort of accident were
calculated as an example for the location Dukovany (CSSR). In
accordance with actual atmospheric conditions which have been
registered œor the area, it was assumed that the radioactive
cloud would move towards Vienna. The weather conditions chosen
were not particularly unfavourable (e.g.: no rain which would
greatly increase the radiation exposure over Vienna and lower
Austria). Other atmospheric conditions are possible whereby the
consequences would be a great deal worse. With a calculated wind
speed of 14 km/h, the radioactive cloud would reach Vienna in
approx. 6 hours.

The radioactive materials in the cloud would be inhaled by
people in the areas affected. This type of radiation exposure is
important above all for iodine-131, which collects in the
thyroid gland. In the accident scenario presented here nearly
12,000 people in Vienna would contract cancer of the thyroid
from radiation exposure by inhalation alone. A super-
proportional number of children would be affected because of
their particular sensitivity. An infant's thyroid would be
exposed to anything up to 1,9 Sv (190 rem).

18. Radioactive materials from the cloud also settle on the
ground. Humans would then be exposed to radiation for a number
of years, whereby caesium-134 and -137 play an important role
here. The radiation level is significantly higher than the
natural radiation exposure. In the years following the accident
this ground radiation would lead to 4,500 deaths by cancer in
Austria.

19. Finally, radioactive materials would also contaminate
vegetable products, and would thus enter the food cycle. This
would be predominantly through the ground and the roots, at the
beginning through the leaves as well. Radiation exposure via the
consumption of food can be considerably reduced by setting
limitations and withdrawing highly radioactive products from the
market. If all radioactive foods were consumed (either because
no limitations were set, or because the radioactive food which
was above the limit was mixed with food below the limit and then
eaten) we could expect more than 100,000 cases of thyroid cancer
in the whole of Austria (with nearly 3% of these fatal), more
than 5,000 cases of bone cancer (approx. 50% fatal) as well as
other types of cancer. The number of fatal cases of cancer would
be around 12,000. If the limits of the FAO (Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations) are adhered to and no
radioactive foods are "diluted", the total number of fatal cases
of cancer could be reduced to 1,400. A further 100 cases of
thyroid cancer and more than 1,400 cases of bone cancer would be
registered. At the same time, a large amount of food must be
thrown away (kept in ultimate waste disposal areas) in the first
three years following the accident: in the first year all
foodstuffs produced in 1/10 of the area of Austria (i.e. approx.
180,000 t milk, 60,000 t meat and large amounts of vegetable
products); and even in the third year approx. 6,000 t meat.

20. Obviously, not only Austria is affected by the accident. The
radioactive cloud would take a course over agricultural and
urban areas in the whole of Europe. The final consequences of
the accident would amount to at least ten times those in
Austria; with unfavourable atmospheric conditions (widespread
rain) even more. The cloud would eventually reach other
continents in a largely diluted form.

21. In addition to the cases of cancer, the radiation would also
bring about genetic changes. Our knowledge in this area is so
scanty that a numerical guess at the number of cases would
appear impossible. But we can safely say that the genetic risk
is approx. as great as the risk of cancer. Furthermore, we can
expect damages to the fetus in the womb - e.g. a reduction of
the intellectual abilities - as well as an increase in a number
of other illnesses as a result of the general weakening of
immunity by radiation.

22. The extremely short early warning period makes
countermeasures such as evacuation impossible. Even if the
Austrian authorities were informed immediately and effectively,
the only advantage would be that measurements could be taken and
measures to reduce radiation by consumption of contaminated
foods could be planned and put into operation earlier. In spite
of the agreement concerning immediate notification in the event
of a nuclear accident, which was ratified in a special meeting
of the IAEA in September 1986 in Vienna, and which came into
force on October 27, 1986, we should not assume that this will
lead to a rapid and efficient exchange of information.

23. It is uncertain whether, for example, the CSSR authorities
know which authorities to inform in Austria: whether
arrangements have been made to immediately transfer all
important data; and whether it can be guaranteed that no
language problems will arise during the exchange of information.
Furthermore, there are no international guidelines as to what
constitutes an "accident" and what can be regarded as a
permissable "fault". The permissible fault limit for a whole-
body dose is e.g. in Czechoslovakia 0.25 Sv (25 rem) per fault.
The Austrian legislation in respect of radiation protection on
the other hand makes no provisions for any special fault limits
for the population, in all cases the maximum value of 0.0017 Sv
(170 mrem) per year is applicable. Thus, what is seen in one
country as a medium sized accident, is seen in another as an
acceptable fault, and as such no notification of this is
necessary.

24. The reactor type WWER-440 has up to the present not been
subjected to a critical analysis. This report hopes to make a
start in filling this gap, which, in view of the lack of safety
measures in the WWER-440, must be seen as particularly serious.
But this does not mean that it is only this type of reactor
which causes concern. This is not the case. Only someone who can
convince another person that he or she takes the dangers of
atomic reactors in his or her own country seriously, can
credibly point out the dangers of atomic reactors in other
countries.

Hannover, April 1987


THE ROAD TO A NUCLEAR FREE FUTURE

GREENPEACE, April 1987

The Problems of Nuclear Power

As the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station one year
ago so tragically showed, nuclear power is a problem for all
those of us who live within its reach.

Scientific studies conducted in many countries now conclude that
anything up to five hundred thousand people may die in Europe
over the next seventy years as a result of the radioactive
pollution from the Chernobyl disaster. The cost of the accident
to the Soviet Union alone has been officially assessed to be
2.800 million dollars. This money has been needed to pay for the
attempts to decontaminate miles of countryside, for the
evacuation of towns, for the construction of twelve thousand new
homes to house the refugees, for the loss of agricultural
produce. It is widely regarded that this figure represents a low
estimate of the total cost. It does not include the ongoing
health care of the victims. The total cost to all the countries
of Europe who were effected will be far higher.

After Chernobyl, and the accident at Three Mile Island in the
United States, it is clear that a future with nuclear power can
only promise further disasters of this kind. With over one
hundred and seventy nuclear power reactors spread throughout
Europe, it has been calculated, using scientific risk assessment
models, that major nuclear accidents be expected to occur in
Europe once every seven years.

No technology can ever be one hundred per cent reliable. People
will always make mistakes. However, it is not only because of
the risks of regular nuclear catastrophes that Greenpeace is
opposed to nuclear power. There are many other reasons to
demand, as we do, a "Nuclear Free Future" for all countries,
East and West.

* Cost

When all the costs are considered, from the mining and
processing of uranium, through the expenses of constructing and
operating nuclear reactors, to the costs of the unsolved
problems of the disposal of nuclear wastes and the
decommissioning of nuclear plant, it is clear that nuclear power
is more expensive than other methods presently used for the
generation of electricity.

The only country in the world where nuclear power is expected to
be competitive with other ways for generating electricity
without Government subsidy is the United States. In the US,
because of the excessive costs of nuclear power, no new nuclear
power reactor has been ordered since 1978, and over 100 orders
for new stations have been cancelled.

* Health 

It is not only by occasional, but nevertheless regular, nuclear
accidents that nuclear power threatens the health of the general
public. Even the routine operation of nuclear power plants
results in the release of small but measurable amounts of
radioactivity into the environment. In those countries where
detailed scientific studies have been carried out, it is now
becoming clear that the incidence of radiation-induced illness
amongst people living in the vicinity of nuclear plants is
measurably higher than in other areas.

* Reliability

Nuclear power reactors are unreliable technology. Quite apart
from major accidents, less severe unforeseen technical problems
and relatively minor accidents are constantly arising. These
often mean that reactors have to be shut down for investigation
or repair. Most nuclear power stations are "off line" for a
higher proportion of their working lives than was anticipated in
their design expectations.

*Transport

The operation of nuclear power stations requires the constant
transport of radioactive materials by sea, road, rail, and even
by air. Chernobyl has clearly shown that even the relatively
elaborate containment structure of a nuclear power reactor is
not entirely secure. The movement of these hazardous materials
spreads the net of nuclear risk even more extensively across
Europe.

* Society

In all those countries where nuclear power is presently employed
it has led to an increased need for security, to a growth in
official secrecy, and to a failure to consult with ordinary
people who will have to live with the technology. And, of
course, without the nuclear reactors to produce the plutonium,
nuclear weapons would not now be threatening the future of all
societies, whether nuclear or not.

* Shutting Down Old Reactors

No large power reactor has yet been successfully decommissioned.
As the experience with the decontamination of Three Mile Island
in the US has shown, many of the technical difficulties of
decommissioning are as yet unforeseen.

Once a nuclear reactor has ended its active life, after about
thirty years if it is lucky, it will require large amounts of
energy and a long period of time before it can be dismantled. In
the first few years after the last fuel has been removed, the
reactor is still so radioactive that it has to be cooled,
initially using a significant proportion of the energy that it
produced whilst it was in operation. Even after it has cooled
down, the reactor itself will be so radioactive that it will not
be practical to begin taking it apart for up to one hundred
years . Throughout this whole period, the building must be
protected and maintained at great expense. In the end, the most
radioactive parts of the reactor become nuclear waste, with a
whole new set of problems of its own.

The problems of disposal of nuclear wastes, (including spent
nuclear fuels and certain components of old reactors) are not
only unsolved, they are fundamentally insoluble. The most
dangerous of the radioactive pollutants in nuclear waste will
remain hazardous to life for a period up to, and in some cases
exceeding, a quarter of a million years. No building or other
work of man can hope to last this far into the future undamaged.
No matter how deep or how strong the nuclear dumps are, it is
inevitable that radiation from nuclear waste will come back into
contact with life. The only way of preventing this is to stop
producing nuclear waste.

The moral question of expecting future generations to cope with
the thousands of tonnes of highly radioactive wastes produced by
our wasteful civilisation thousands of years after we are dead,
is something that no society has ever had to consider in the
past.


Nuclear power is simply a very expensive, dirty, dangerous and
old fashioned way of boiling water.

A nuclear power reactor does exactly the same job as a coal
boiler or a gas burner; it boils water to make steam, to drive
turbines, to generate electricity. It was thirty years ago that
the first nuclear reactors were used to produce electricity.
Since then, no fundamental developments upon the original basic
design principles have taken place. It is time that the nuclear
nations looked beyond the 1950's technology of nuclear power.

As the world approaches the twenty first century, many other
cheaper, cleaner, safer and more modern alternatives are now
available. It is with these that our plans for a "Nuclear Free
Future" should lie. 

The Place for Fossil Fuels

Most of the electricity that is generated, even in the
industrialised world, is produced by burning fossil fuels such
as coal, oil or gas. Fossil fuels are limited in supply, and,
burnt in the present manner, they can cause very serious
pollution such as acid rain. However, these fuels do not present
us with the problems with the same kind of problems with which
we are faced from nuclear power.

The technology now exists by which the acid emissions from the
combustion of coal and oil can be reduced to almost zero. Flue
gas desulphurisation systems can be fitted to existing power
stations to reduce the acid emissions, and new power stations
can be designed to use fluidised bed combustion technology,
which permits the more efficient clean and economical combustion
of coal.

Using these fuels, conservation measures and, in some cases,
hydroelectric power as short term alternatives, detailed
programmes have been put forward in many European countries, for
the complete phasing out of nuclear power. Sweden has
already embarked upon a programme for the phase out of her
forty per cent nuclear capacity by, at the latest, the year
2010. In Britain, with 19 per cent of electricity nuclear
generated, plans for a phase-out range from four years to
fifteen years. Similar proposals have been advanced at a
high political level in West Germany (31% nuclear), Italy
(4% nuclear) and Spain (24% nuclear). Austria has already
decided to scrap its only nuclear power station even before it
begins operation. Denmark and Ireland have decided not to pursue
nuclear technology.

If countries with nuclear power contributing up to forty per
cent of their electricity can consider phasing it out completely
then this strategy is even more feasible for an eastern block
country. A]l of whom have nuclear proportion of total
electricity below 32%.

However, no amount of treatment can avoid. the simple fact that
burning fossil fuels produces carbon dioxide gas. Whilst not
poisonous, the production of carbon dioxide is gradually but
inexorably leading to a global "Greenhouse Effect" which, if we
continue to burn these fuels at the present rate, will cause
radical worldwide climatic change beginning as early as the next
century. For this reason, and because these materials are
valuable resources with which we can do better things than
simply burning them, we should be seriously planning to minimise
our dependence on fossil fuels.

The transition away from nuclear power does not mean that we
need to burn more coal or oil. In fact, as is explained below,
alternative technologies are available that can eventually
replace both nuclear power and fossil fuels.

Energy Saving and Efficiency

Electricity is responsible for under thirty per cent of the
world's energy use (only four per cent of the world's energy is
nuclear). One reason for this is that conversion into
electricity is a very inefficient way to make use of the limited
energy available to us. For this reason, the most immediately
promising alternative to nuclear power is not another rival
fuel, but more rational methods for using those fuels we have.

At a power station, whether it be coal, oil, gas or nuclear,
only about one third of the energy contained in the fuel is
converted into electricity. The remaining two thirds is usually
disposed of as waste heat into the atmosphere or through water
pipes into a river or the sea. Then, in transmitting the
electricity to the place of use, whether that be factories or
homes, a further 10% can be lost in the cables. With
electricity, only one about 27% of the energy extracted from the
fuel is actually delivered to the user.

Of course, electricity will always be required for certain
purposes. However, in countries that have embarked upon nuclear
power programmes, the investment is so great that it compels
them to neglect other alternatives and concentrate too much on
electricity. The most efficient way to utilise our available
resources is the direct use of fuels as near as possible to the
place of consumption. Nuclear power stations are so huge in
their output, that they demand a very centralised electricity
supply system. This is the least efficient way of using the
energy extracted from the fuel

Investment in energy conservation measures such as thermal
insulation or timing devices is more cost effective in terms of
the amounts of energy made available for use than is
investment in nuclear power (or any electrical power). The
potential for energy saving technologies is only now being
realised in certain countries. It has been estimated that the
energy demand of a northern European country could be
reduced by up to fifty per cent, simply by investing in a
programme for the conservation of energy. This is equivalent to
the output of several nuclear power stations.

Further measures such as using the waste heat from electricity
power stations to heat houses and factories are also promising
and under-utilised in Europe as a whole. Nuclear power stations
are inappropriate for this purpose since they are so large and
so sparsely distributed, and because the safety hazards require
that they be situated as far from houses or industry as
possible.

Renewable Energy Sources

The energy technology of the future lies with what is now known
as "alternative technology". By harnessing the power available
in the natural forces at work around us, we are guaranteed a
truly inexhaustible and non-polluting source of energy. The fuel
is free. In many countries, these technologies are already
becoming available.

Despite the huge amounts of resources poured into research