1¾«óaÅ An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding David Hume 1748 Copyright: 1995, James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu). See end note for details on copyright and editing conventions. This is a working draft; please report errors.[1] Editor's Note: At the age of 27, Hume published his philosophical masterpiece, the seven-hundred page (1739-40). In spite of the 's importance in the history of philosophy, it did poorly when it first came out, selling only a few dozen copies. In Hume's own words, the "fell dead born from the press." Stricken by this failure, about a decade later Hume wrote the (1748) and the (1751) as an attempt to produce a shorter and more popular account of his views. Both met with success and soon established Hume's reputation as a world class philosopher and skeptic. Hume eventually came to reject the as an immature work, and wished to have his philosophical views represented by his later writings. The first appeared under the title . Although the name was changed 10 years later, the original title indicates its place within the 18th century genre of essay writing insofar as it is a collection of twelve loosely related philosophical essays. The underlying theme which ties the essays together is the primacy of experience and causal inference in establishing our ideas -- specifically philosophically potent ideas such as necessary connection, free will, and God. The text here is based on a public domain text file of the generously provided by Thomas Dell . Dell scanned the text from the 1910 Harvard Classics edition and electronically compared it to commercial editions of the . I have read Dell's file against the 1777 edition of the and adapted it for spelling, punctuation, italicization and small capitalization. The latter half of Section 3 along with several footnotes removed by Hume in later editions of the were reintroduced as appears in Green and Grose's 1874 of Hume. CONTENTS Section 1: Of the Different Species of Philosophy Section 2: Of the Origin of Ideas Section 3: Of the Association of Ideas Section 4: Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding Section 5: Sceptical Solution of these Doubts Section 6: Of Probability Section 7: Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion Section 8: Of Liberty and Necessity Section 9: Of the Reason of Animals Section 10: Of Miracles Section 11: Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State Section 12: Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy Notes * * * * SECTION I. Of The Different Species Of Philosophy. M/ORAL\ philosophy, or the science of human nature, may be treated after two different manners; each of which has its peculiar merit, and may contribute to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of mankind. The one considers man chiefly as born for action; and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment; pursuing one object, and avoiding another, according to the value which these objects seem to possess, and according to the light in which they present themselves. As virtue, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable, this species of philosophers paint her in the most amiable colours; borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their subject in an easy and obvious manner, and such as is best fitted to please the imagination, and engage the affections. They select the most striking observations and instances from common life; place opposite characters in a proper contrast; and alluring us into the paths of virtue by the views of glory and happiness, direct our steps in these paths by the soundest precepts and most illustrious examples. They make us the difference between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our sentiments; and so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honour, they think, that they have fully attained the end of all their labours. The other species of philosophers consider man in the light of a reasonable rather than an active being, and endeavour to form his understanding more than cultivate his manners. They regard human nature as a subject of speculation; and with a narrow scrutiny examine it, in order to find those principles, which regulate our understanding, excite our sentiments, and make us approve or blame any particular object, action, or behaviour. They think it a reproach to all literature, that philosophy should not yet have fixed, beyond controversy, the foundation of morals, reasoning, and criticism; and should for ever talk of truth and falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity, without being able to determine the source of these distinctions. While they attempt this arduous task, they are deterred by no difficulties; but proceeding from particular instances to general principles, they still push on their enquiries to principles more general, and rest not satisfied till they arrive at those original principles, by which, in every science, all human curiosity must be bounded. Though their speculations seem abstract, and even unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the approbation of the learned and the wise; and think themselves sufficiently compensated for the labour of their whole lives, if they can discover some hidden truths, which may contribute to the instruction of posterity. It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will always, with the generality of mankind, have the preference above the accurate and abstruse; and by many will be recommended, not only as more agreeable, but more useful than the other. It enters more into common life; moulds the heart and affections; and, by touching those principles which actuate men, reforms their conduct, and brings them nearer to that model of perfection which it describes. On the contrary, the abstruse philosophy, being founded on a turn of mind, which cannot enter into business and action, vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade, and comes into open day; nor can its principles easily retain any influence over our conduct and behaviour. The feelings of our heart, the agitation of our passions, the vehemence of our affections, dissipate all its conclusions, and reduce the profound philosopher to a mere plebeian. This also must be confessed, that the most durable, as well as justest fame, has been acquired by the easy philosophy, and that abstract reasoners seem hitherto to have enjoyed only a momentary reputation, from the caprice or ignorance of their own age, but have not been able to support their renown with more equitable posterity. It is easy for a profound philosopher to commit a mistake in his subtile reasonings; and one mistake is the necessary parent of another, while he pushes on his consequences, and is not deterred from embracing any conclusion, by its unusual appearance, or its contradiction to popular opinion. But a philosopher, who purposes only to represent the common sense of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colours, if by accident he falls into error, goes no farther; but renewing his appeal to common sense, and the natural sentiments of the mind, returns into the right path, and secures himself from any dangerous illusions. The fame of C/ICERO\ flourishes at present; but that of A/RISTOTLE\ is utterly decayed. L/A\ B/RUYERE\ passes the seas, and still maintains his reputation: But the glory of M/ALEBRANCHE\ is confined to his own nation, and to his own age. And A/DDISON\, perhaps, will be read with pleasure, when L/OCKE\ shall be entirely forgotten.[2] The mere philosopher is a character, which is commonly but little acceptable in the world, as being supposed to contribute nothing either to the advantage or pleasure of society; while he lives remote from communication with mankind, and is wrapped up in principles and notions equally remote from their comprehension. On the other hand, the mere ignorant is still more despised; nor is any thing deemed a surer sign of an illiberal genius in an age and nation where the sciences flourish, than to be entirely destitute of all relish for those noble entertainments. The most perfect character is supposed to lie between those extremes; retaining an equal ability and taste for books, company, and business; preserving in conversation that discernment and delicacy which arise from polite letters; and in business, that probity and accuracy which are the natural result of a just philosophy. In order to diffuse and cultivate so accomplished a character, nothing can be more useful than compositions of the easy style and manner, which not too much from life, require no deep application or retreat to be comprehended, and send back the student among mankind full of noble sentiments and wise precepts, applicable to every exigence of human life. By means of such compositions, virtue becomes amiable, science agreeable, company instructive, and retirement entertaining. Man is a reasonable being; and as such, receives from science his proper food and nourishment: But so narrow are the bounds of human understanding, that little satisfaction can be hoped for in this particular, either from the extent of security or his acquisitions. Man is a sociable, no less than a reasonable being: But neither can he always enjoy company agreeable and amusing, or preserve the proper relish for them. Man