EARLY COMMENTARIES ON HUME'S WRITINGS by Thomas Hayter 1780 5/1/95 Copyright 1995, James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu). See end note for details on copyright and editing conventions. This is a working draft; please report errors.[1] Editor's Note: Published in 1780, Thomas Hayter's is the first sustained discussion to appear of Hume's . Hayter's comments are confined to the discussion of the problem of evil in parts 10-12 of the . The complete review in the is as follows: These remarks are such as must naturally and obviously occur to those readers who are conversant with moral and theological subjects, and acquainted with Mr. Hume's writings. They chiefly relate to the moral attributes of the Deity, and the influence of religious principles upon human conduct. The Author writes in a lively and animated manner; and his style, after a little more practice and attention to the rules of composition, will, we doubt not, become more chaste, correct, and uniformly elegant. (1781, Vol. 64, p. 159). The concludes its brief review noting that Hayter uses an "which the advocates of Mr. Hume cannot possibly evade" (1780, Vol. 49, pp. 315-316). The notes that Hayter counters Hume's objections to the moral attributes of the deity "with considerable success." They continue, though, listing Hayter's stylistic errors, although one error is corrected in Hayter's errata (1780, Vol. 11, p. 282-283). * * * * REMARKS ON M/R\. HUME'S DIALOGUES, CONCERNING NATURAL RELIGION. By, T.[homas] HAYTER, A.M. F/ELLOW\ /OF\ K/ING'S\ C/OLLEGE\, C/AMBRIDGE\; /AND ONE OF THE PREACHERS AT HIS\ M/AJESTY'S\ C/HAPEL IN\ W/HITEHALL\. ---- CAMBRIDGE, Printed by J. A/RCHDEACON\, Printer to the UNIVERSITY; For T. C/ADEL\, in the Strand, London. M.DCC.LXXX. REMARKS ON MR. HUME'S DIALOGUES. {1} REMARKS ON M/R\. H/UME'S\ DIALOGUES M/R\. H/UME\, in the introduction to his Dialogues (p. 10.) exhibits the following sketch of the personages between whom the Dialogues are supposed to be maintained. "The remarkable {2} contrast in their characters still farther raised your expectation; which you opposed the accurate philosophical turn of C/LEANTHES\ to the careless scepticism of P/HILO\, or compared either of their dispositions with the rigid inflexible orthodoxy of D/EMEA\." From this representation one might at first be led to look for Mr. H/UME\ himself under the mask of C/LEANTHES\, and to expect from the mouth of C/LEANTHES\ the celebrated Metaphysician's own sentiments. Let us consider however that Mr. H/UME\, after the great nominal superiority attributed to C/LEANTHES\, could not possibly, without appearance of vanity, have appointed C/LEANTHES\ his representative. The fact indeed indisputably is, that P/HILO\, not C/LEANTHES\, personates Mr. H/UME\. C/LEANTHES\ assumes times (p. 242 and 244) the tone of D/EMEA\: while P/HILO\ possesses in general the sole exclusive priviledge {3} of retailing the purport of Mr. H/UME'S\ former Philosophical productions. -- Every remarkable trait and feature of those productions may be traced in the parts of the Dialogue assigned to P/HILO\. {4, 5} PART I. T/HE\ first part of Mr. H/UME'S\ Dialogues is employed in proposing and canvassing different systems of cosmogony -- The system of C/LEANTHES\ deducing (p. 47) the universe from an intelligent cause (after being confronted by various intermediate theorys) is allowed (at p. 196) to prevail over its rivals, and to convert their advocate, P/HILO\ -- Neither the system of C/LEANTHES\, in its original state, nor any of its rivals are proposed {6} as the objects of the present disquisition. The sole aim of these remarks is to contravert P/HILO'S\ own additions to the system of C/LEANTHES\, viz. P/HILO'S\ disavowal of God's moral attributes, and his proscription of popular religion. P/HILO'S\ objection to the existence of benevolence in the divine nature is grounded principally on the circumstance of human misery. Of this melancholy object he[2] exhibits (from p. 173 to p. 192.) a most uncomfortable, forlorn, and, I trust, overcharged description -- Some of the darkest shades in the frightful picture are borrowed {7} from the Pencils of writers in general, particularly of Poets. Their testimony P/HILO\ appeals to (p. 173 and 174) as decisive, "The Poets (p. 173.) who speak from sentiment, without a system, and whose testimony has therefore more authority, abound in images of this nature." Again, (p. 174.) "Look round the library of C/LEANTHES\. I shall venture to affirm that, except authors of particular sciences such as chemistry and botany, who have no occasion to treat human life, there is scarce one of those innumerable writers, from whom the sense of human misery has not in some passage or other, extorted a complaint and confession of it." Let us here, by P/HILO'S\ leave, recall to recollection an old remark "Omnes ingeniosos esse melancholicos." Suppose now any individual of the pensive tribe to labour under a real misfortune or under the spleen, and to have, at that critical {8} moment, a pen in his hand: He instantly, in all human probability upon the slightest provocation in his subject, gives a dash at the condition of mortal affairs: vents his particular emotions in general terms: expands a partial posture of private concerns into an universal representation: and etches a copy of human life from the present complexion of his own situation -- With respect to Poets, we need not conceive them in any actual distress in order to justify a suspicion of some misrepresentation in the affair of human calamity. What pathetic incident ever passed through the hands of a genuine bard without receiving many touches of amplification? And is the interesting argument of mortal misery likely to be dismissed naked, and unadorned, totally destitute of its poetical finishing? Without calling in the supposition of absolute fiction, how greatly does the warm animated language alone of {9} poetry vary the aspect, without altering the circumstances, of a fact; and magnify, without seeming to depart from truth? In what doth oratory consists? not professedly, nor yet visibly in falsification. Yet, hear the same identical narrative at one time form an eloquent, at another time from a plain man; you will perceive the one to have heated, you know not why, your passions and imagination, while the other best satisfies your judgment. In a word, the testimony of authors, especially of "the inspired train", as P/HILO\ calls the poets, does not seem worthy of the great stress laid upon it by P/HILO\. R/ENOUNCING\ then the illusions of fancy, let us listen to P/HILO'S\ own representation of the horrid scene. "You ascribe (p. 186) C/LEANTHES\, (and, I believe, justly) a purpose and intention to nature. But what, I beseech you, {10} is the object of that curious artifice and machinery, which she has displayed in all animals? the preservation alone of individuals and propagation of the species. It seems enough for her purpose, if such a rank be barely upheld in the universe, without any care or concern for the happiness of the members that compose it. No resource for this purpose: no machinery in order merely to give pleasure or ease: no fund of pure joy and contentment: no indulgence, without some want or necessity accompanying it. At least the phenomena of this nature are overbalance by opposite phenomena of still greater importance. Our sense of music harmony and indeed beauty of all kinds gives satisfaction, without being absolutely necessary to the preservation and propagation of the species. But what racking pains, on the other hand, arise from gouts, gravels, {11} megrims, tooth-achs, rheumatisms; where the injury to the animal-machinery is either small or incurable? Mirth, laughter, play, frolic seem gratuitous satisfactions, which have no farther tendency: Spleen, melancholy, discontent, superstition are pains of the same nature". Again, (at p. 191) "You must at the same time allow, that if pain be less frequent (which is extremely doubtful) than pleasure, it is infinitely more violent and durable. One hour of it is often able to out-weigh a day, a week, a month of our common insipid enjoyments; And how many days, weeks, and months are passed by many in the most acute torments? Pleasure scarcely in one instance is ever able to reach ecstasy and rapture: And in no one instance can it continue for any time at its highest pitch and altitude, The spirits evaporate; the nerves relax; the fabric is disordered; {12} and the enjoyment quickly degenerates into fatigue and uneasiness; But pain, often, good God, how often! rises to torture and agony; and the longer it continues, it becomes still more genuine agony and torture. Patience is exhausted; courage languishes; melancholy seizes us; and nothing terminates our misery but the removal of its cause, or another event, which is the sole cure of all evil, but which, from our natural folly, we regard with still greater horror and consternation". It positively asserts, at setting out "that the sole object (pray mark the expression "sole") of nature's curious machinery is the preservation of individuals and the propagation of the species". At the distance of a few sentences, however, the tale enumerates several sources of delight "not absolutely necessary to the preservation and propagation of the species". Is this {13} reasoning, P/HILO\, or prating? would not a single instance (you recite several) of "gratuitous satisfaction" completely exclude the supposition of a total insensibility and unfeelingness, if we may so speak, in the determinations of nature? She does not, you say, grant as much as I could reasonable with -- But, if she had been perfectly and entirely inattentive to your accommodation, would She have granted any thing at all? "The phenomena of her graciousness, you reply, are overbalanced by opposite phenomena of still greater importance". How does this subterfuge demonstrate your first doctrine of a total uniform obduracy? If nature had been so unequivocally void of goodness as you pretend, She would have exposed you to the evils you describe without any, the slightest mixture of alleviation: she would never have imparted any solace, that could possibly have been dispensed with: and {14} you would have drunk from her cup nothing but dregs. You must surely retract your first accusation. D/ISLODGED\ form this post you next retreat to the position, that evil does, upon the whole, predominate in the canvass of nature: the picture is cast in shades. Before we adopt your representation, let us survey the facts on which it is grounded. Your own catalogue of evils is nearly equal in point of number, with your list of blessings. Thus far your argument looks almost equally both ways: it will quickly, I hope, set its face against you. If, for instance, your evils, though rather more numerous than your blessings, be found to center in a comparatively small number of individuals, while your blessings are pretty generally diffused through the human race, there will evidently result, in regard to the whole creation, a far greater measure {15} of happiness, than of misery. This conclusion cannot be denied, if the two first branches of the sentence are established. To establish them is my task -- In regard to the first branch, namely, the comparatively narrow operation of P/HILO'S\ evils; are most of those evils, let us ask, any thing else than various species of ill health? And is health or sickness, let us next ask, the most usual visitant to the sons of men? A great proportion of mankind in every civilized country live in a state of idleness: if a great part of the remainder was sick, how could the business of the world go on? Let every one, in a word, form his own experience strike an estimate of the actual balance between sickness and health, and then answer my question. P/HILO\ has, it must be confessed, two evils, discontent and superstition, not strictly reducible to the head of sickness. Are not both these evils, however, of a {16} very precarious, fluctuating nature? Chearful company, a fine day, the slightest amusement, the most trivial employment suspend, sometimes cure, their influence. May they not therefore fairly be considered as a sort of neutral powers; hanging at equal distances between the attractions of pleasure and pain, and not decisively gravitating towards either? P/HILO'S\ evils, upon the whole, appear evidently to have a much more contracted range in human life than P/HILO\ was willing to ascribe to them -- Let us next see, if P/HILO'S\ blessing (which is the second branch of the sentence I am to demonstrate) do not move in a pretty large circle? Is any man so unfortunate, as not frequently to have tasted some of these blessings? Is any man so forlorn, as to despair of all future access to the rich feast? -- The reader does, I flatter myself, by this time think me entitled to the conclusion, which I drew from {17} the two branches of my sentence now discussed, viz. That good, not evil, is the leading feature in the state of mortal affairs. B/UT\ though P/HILO\ should allow pleasure to have the ascendancy, in point of frequency, over pain; P/HILO\ still laments (p. 191 and 192) that the former sensation is inferior to the latter both in duration and degree. "Pleasure, he cryes, scarcely in any instance is ever able to reach ecstasy and rapture". What a complaint from a Philosopher! who tells us (at p. 259) of these very dialogues "That there is no state of mind so happy as the calm and equable." Without however pressing the Philosopher either with his character or declarations, let us look abroad into the world, and see whether the wand of "ecstasy and rapture" be very generally and seriously deplored. That part of mankind, {18} which is engaged in constant employment, and which possesses at the same time either a competence or at worst a bare sufficiency of necessarys, comprehends probably near two thirds, at all events half of the human race. Now amongst this very large body it is much to be doubted if the scarcity of "ecstasy and rapture" has, ever since the creation, been the transient occasion of a single sigh. These contented mortals dream not of raptures, bu enjoy satisfaction: they have not the word ecstasy in their mouths, but solid tranquility in their hearts: they wish not to be angels, and are happy men: they have not yet schooled themselves into discontent: nor learnt the sublime science of becoming metaphysically miserable -- P/HILO'S\ estimate of pain now claims our attention. "Pain, often, good God, how often! rises to torture and agony". That pain is sometimes excessive, it is more {19} our business to lament, than to deny. Let us remark however, foe the consolation of mankind, that this melancholy grievance appears often of greater magnitude and in far larger dimensions to the spectator, than to the sufferer. Persons, condemned by sickness to lasting confinement and quick returns of pain, wear, not uncommonly very strong marks of serenity and acquiescence. The goodness of God's providence infuses, no doubt, some drops of comfort into the bitter draught of agony, to attemper its malignity and restrain its excessive operation. -- At the worst, an event, not far distant from any of us, is, according even to P/HILO'S\ account (p. 192), "A cure of all evil." P/HILO\ indeed adds, "But which, from our natural folly, we regard with horror and consternation." But pray, if death be really a cure of all evil, are we not, when it comes, cured by it, whether {20} we wished to be so, or not? does death, when it actually takes place, loses its efficacy, as a remedy, through our previous misconceptions of its nature? -- Let us here remark, that when men of sense shudder at death, their emotion, it is to be feared, arises more from depravity, than folly. The profligate and irreligious may naturally recoil from the approach of that futurity whose reality they have questioned; and may justly dread the frowns of that being whose authority they have defied. But thousands of virtuous men in all ages have received, and will doubtless, to the end of time continue to receive the final summons of their Creator with calm undisturbed composure. P/HILO\ from (p. 199 to p. 102) repeatedly echoes to us, that the whole sublunary scene (human life of course included) wears no stamp or signature {21} of a benevolent author. This idea (at p. 201) sprouts up into the following allusion. "Did I show you a house or palace, where there was not one apartment convenient or agreeable; where the windows, doors, fires, passages, stairs and the whole oeconomy of the building were the source of noise, confusion, fatigue, darkness and the extremes of heat and cold, you would certainly blame the contrivance without any farther examination." Instead of examining his imaginary building, let us ask P/HILO\ a simple question, namely, whether he has already entirely forgot "the sense of music harmony and beauty?" of p. 187. "The mirth, laughter, play, frolic" of p. 188? Has, in a word, the whole fair train of "gratuitous satisfactions," enumerated by himself, totally escaped from his recollection? If a single trace of them had survived in his memory, he would surely not have {22} represented his miserable allegorical lodging so shockingly ill-furnished, so completely deficient in every, the smallest, article of accommodation. F/ROM\ p. 205 to p. 217 P/HILO\ employs himself in displaying four circumstances on which, to use his own words p. 203, "All or the greatest part of the ills that molest sensible creatures depend" and by the removal of which the creation would, in his conception (p. 217.) be prodigiously improved. -- Notwithstanding however P/HILO'S\ present apparent acquiescence in his new mundane arrangements, we find him, no farther off than p. 218, staggering into the following reflexion, "Shall we say that these circumstances are not necessary, and that they might easily have been altered in the contrivance of the universe? This decision seems too presumptuous for creatures so blind {23} and ignorant." What a pity, P/HILO\, is it, that this very natural obvious sentiment did not occur to you, a few pages back, at your first entrance into the intricacys of cosmogonic criticism! How endless is it to object to what we do not understand! How idle is the proposal of altering what we do not know if we can improve! To erect card-constructed houses indeed with the infant, to weave straw-crowns with the maniac seem far more rational employments of time and intellect than for blind mortals to revise creation, and ignorant theorists to new-model the universe. D/ESCENDING\ then from these illusive, air-built speculations, let us hasten to the final result of all the foregoing theories, namely, to P/HILO'S\ representation, inferred from the said theories, of the divine attributes.{24} P/HILO'S\ first position on this head (p. 221.) runs thus, "There may four hypotheses be framed concerning the first causes of the universe: that they are endowed with perfect goodness: that they have perfect malice: that they are opposite and have both goodness and malice: that they have neither goodness nor malice: mixt phenomena can never prove the two former principles: and the uniformity and steadiness of general laws seems to oppose the third; the fourth therefore, seems by far the most probable." In opposition however to the fourth supposal, let it be asked, whether one single solitary instance (P/HILO\ has recounted several) of "gratuitous satisfaction," would not forbid us to consider the Deity as absolutely regardless of our welfare? Let it next be remarked, that to those, who adopt my estimate of human happiness and misery, the belief of God's benevolence {25} acquires instant confirmation, and stands erected upon a fair ample, immoveable foundation. P/HILO'S\ next feature in the divine nature is thus sketched (p. 222.) "What I have said concerning natural evil will apply to moral, with little or no variation; we have no more reason to infer, that the rectitude of the supreme being resembles human rectitude than that his benevolence resembles the human." In subversion of this doctrine I will beg leave to cite a passage from "Mr. H/UME'S\ 11th essay on the practical consequences of natural religion," where E/PICURUS\, in a speech ascribed to him (p. 217.) thus expresses himself, "I acknowledge that in the present order of things virtue is attended with much more peace of ind than vice, and meets with more favourable reception in the world. I am sensible, that according to the past experience {26} of mankind, friendship is the chief joy of human life, moderation the only source of tranquility and happiness. I never balance between the virtuous and vicious course of life; but am sensible, that to a well disposed mind every advantage is on the side of the former." The supreme being then, has (by the confession of a person not to be suspected of bigotry) interwoven in the very frame and constitution of things, a testimony to the superiority of virtue above vice: in other words, the Almighty hath provided, that the presence due to the former quality beyond the latter, should be suggested to us, at every step of our existence, by the striking evidence of familiar facts. With this glaring document of the deity's love for moral uprightness in us, let us couple P/HILO'S\ assertion, (p. 236.) that the nature of the supreme being does, in point of intelligence, "bear a considerable resemblance to ours." And {27} will this nature, in the direction of its intelligence, totally renounce the rules recommended by itself for the government of our analogous intelligence? shall the declared lover of righteousness not do right? shall the determined patron of justice be himself unjust? {28, 29} PART II. P/HILO\ opens his charge (p. 243.) against religion with the following invective. "How happens it then, if vulgar superstition[3] be so salutary to {30} society, that all history abounds so much with accounts of its pernicious consequences on public affairs? factions, civil wars, persecutions, subversions of government, oppression, slavery; these are the dismal consequences which always attend its prevalency over the minds of men. If the religious spirit be ever mentioned in any historical narration, we are sure to meet afterwards with a detail of the miseries which attend it." We shall be extremely mistaken, if we consider all the mischiefs {31} in which the word religion has been held out, or in which religionists had concern, as the genuine fruit of mere religious influence. The name of religion has often hung upon the tongue, where no particle of her holy energy reached the heart. P/HILO\ himself will inform us (p. 244) that "religion is (only) a cover to faction and ambition," which are the real prompters of those turbulent scenes where religion alone appears upon the stage. Now ambition and faction are durable permanent principles; and, if religion had never existed, would undoubtedly, on some pretence or other, have found vent. Passions, in a word, that use religion simply as a veil, will, though striped [sic] of the veil, present an undaunted front: though detected, they will not be dismayed. Ambition and faction are no bigots. Divested of their religious disguise, they instantly assume some other; immediately {32} new-dress their indefatigable characters, nor remain a single moment absent from the stage. They substitute perhaps popularity for prayers; Agrarian laws for alms; and largesses to the mob instead of donations to saints. -- they have, it is true, often borrowed the vizor of religion; must religion therefore be made their voucher? must that chaste and holy principle be loaded with the infamy of actions, which she had not the smallest concern in giving birth to? must she be rendered responsible for measures, which she was not allowed to direct; and be represented as their adviser of those, by whom she was never consulted? -- What? -- Some men have basely prostituted the name of religion, all men therefore ought to renounce her precepts! some persons, not really under her guidance, have acted wrong, she must therefore no longer teach us to act right! We must strip ourselves of the substance, because {33} others have put on the semblance. Religion, in fine, having been accommodated to bad ends, must on that account, not be permitted to promote good ones[4]. By this mode of reasoning the worthy man, whose signature is counterfeited for the purpose of forgery, ought to suffer capital punishment: and honesty, because personated now and then by hypocrisy, should be proscribed as a species of villany. P/HILO\ (p. 243.) declares positively that "no periods of time can be happier or more prosperous than those in which it (religion) is never heard of nor regarded." Before we assent to this proposition, let us recollect, that at no period probably of time whatever was religion so little heard of or regarded, as in the aera immediately preceding the dissolution of the Roman republick.{34} -- In this immaculate aera (let us briefly trace its happiness and prosperity) one man concerted and had nearly executed a general massacre of the supreme magistrates, with a total subversion of a free government. -- Governors of extensive provinces constantly ravaged the unhappy objects of their jurisdiction, with merciless, and more than hostile licentiousness. -- Fortunes of an almost imperial amplitude, vanished daily at the touch of dissipation: while, to repair the mighty ruins, crimes of every complexion and enormity were, without fear or compunction, had recourse to -- one general alone, in pursuit of wealth and power, desolated Gaul, threw his own country into convulsions, nor finished his career till near two millions of his fellow creatures had fallen victims to his ambition. -- Can one meditate without horror on almost any of the principal transactions in P/HILO'S\ golden age! {35} religion had indubitably no concern in those dreadful scenes: and may securely exclaim in the language of our Poet; "Thou canst not say, I did it" -- Let us now suppose for a moment, that religion had actually happened to have interested, in P/HILO'S\ favorite age, the passions of mankind. What would have been the consequence? she would, in all human probability, have been appointed the nominal president, the ostensible high-priestess at the dreadful rites. C/AESAR\ would have been a C/ROMWELL\: would have waved a dagger in one hand, his manual in the other; would have pretended, which he sought only his own aggrandisement, "to seek the Lord[5]. If this imaginary state of things indeed had really taken place; religion, we may be assured, would have been marked by P/HILO\, as principal instigatress of {36} C/AESAR'S\ worst actions, as the sole mover of his way-ward ambition! P/HILO\ proceeds (p. 244.) to depreciate the efficacy of future rewards and punishments. "The inference is not just, because finite rewards and punishments have so great influence, that therefore such as are infinite and eternal must have so much greater. Consider, I beseech you, the attachment we have to present things, and the little concern we discover for objects so remote and uncertain. When divines are declaiming against the common behaviour and practice of the world, they always represent this principle as the strongest imaginable (which indeed it is) and describe almost all human kind as lying under the influence of it, and sunk into the deepest lethargy and unconcern about their religious interests. Yet these same divines, {37} when they refute their speculative antagonists, suppose the motives of religion to be so powerful, that, without them, it were impossible for civil society to subsist; nor are they ashamed of so palpable a contradiction." They need not P/HILO\, be ashamed of it, for it is not, (if my conjectures are right) a contradiction. The meaning of the divines (if I could be referred to their works) would prove, I really believe, consistent. It probably runs thus, sensible objects, take strong and lasting hold of the human mind; and powerfully detach it from the doctrines of eternity: the doctrines of eternity however, by means of exhortation and meditation, do in many instances find entrance into the heart, once admitted they operate potently; mightily convert the inclinations; and prevent numberless enormities. Without their salutary influence, society would be deluged with insufferable profligacy; {38} and be rendered incapable of substituting. -- In opposition to these very rational suggestions of the divines, P/HILO\ remarks (p. 245.) "It is certain from experience, that the smallest grain of natural honesty and benevolence, has more effect on men's conduct, than the most pompous views suggested by theological theories and systems." Supposing, though not admitting, the truth of this position, how P/HILO\ does it answer your present purpose? in what shape does it constitute a plea for the entire renunciation of religion? in recommending the exterminating system, 'tis your business to prove - - not, that religion has little influence: but, that she has none at all. This latter position however, you will scarce venture absolutely to maintain, after having declared (p. 246) that religion "operates by stars and bounds," that is, that religion has some influence: -- calculate P/HILO\, the amount of this influence {39} at your discretion: does it direct one half, one third, or one fourth of human agency? deliver your estimate. Morality will accept it at your hands; and rejoice in the friendly tender. S/AUL\ slew his thousands, D/AVID\ his ten thousands; yet, both surely merited the applause of their countrymen. Is the general, who wins five battles, to be disgraced, because another general wins ten? no judicious person, in a word, will, in the great task of curbing human wickedness, reject any, the very slightest, co-operation. -- Aware perhaps of some reasoning of thPKW`3�� SCI125.TXT�V�o�6��cX:�V��a�|�u#v� �h�l��H�G��nZ7��9��ɻ��4�j[ ��B�P��^+C��tQA�Tx=Ǹ�u��gܲ��5 ך�&��K�XBpᥦ�x��I�0�J�y-9�\w�fʖ0�8�t�M�̔]��K��]�h��,��p)M��'�tY �.T^#e��a��}�»�(��Q�4y�"��TS��sR�w��\*è��ł�� 2V��\��I�3��E �U�/O��I�~��~$٥w5X�P�-�D�יŰC�x�mW1Vj��?�X|��(��joN��f�1�i��Y�i 1��e��;8<��c�]�PΎ�̣�KV8��-�&��C��g�gs�)SE֮�ō�A[��p�o�d��ar�ݵ�:�p�:; �4�A"��<��O߾>��g�[K;��DhK�9��:�x��ڷ64� ��v9��9<�&w~��SI��`��ҡ�>�},i.��([�ɹ �ì�>n-b[��u~�*?>��Y��E��H��X�ir�9]�<[F�z�c럪�o�|�^/� ��!lܠC�Δ0Uu�|%i�s�� {&�e�1N�3Ǐ�;r;g��~��-��c��t9U�p�44�(�&hŁ��Ҧd�0,B&�N{(U�x�� >ö2�r�4�/5�Z,D�}a�F�V��j!�Z��"�b��B�&�c>c�7�"%R��F`��b&��38�ۢ�TK6��"u�4�hc �+�zW�1�8/�(t��O�/��ǅ�0ݙ�ԸR�l�=�U�6V䎀��I��jT�F �J��l�` zrV��vBWJda��N��kg�X��1*� śGv*��;��N��F_�,�P�X��B��]�C��$3� ��1� J��Y��b��`�!U��q��{e�Sź�Imt,"��J�Ul��d��Ѵs�i�� +&�G��&7��9��_z�X)�e''z��jΥ��x�F�*<]��1�&��r��p6�^�r7�/��ތ��忆�b��|�Bg^]�>��5-}Q�V޵_�i��d;�k�*�_/n8�`��ε�,��5J�D�PKW`3�� SCI125.TXTPK8�\��I�3��E �U�/O��I�~��~$٥w5X�P�-�D�יŰC�x�mW1Vj��?�X|��(��joN��f�1�i��Y�i 1��e��;8<��c�]�PΎ�̣�KV8��-�&��C��g�gs�)SE֮�ō�A[��p�o�d��ar�ݵ�:�p�:; �4�A"�� w�^��$��,�d4,�d4,�d4( �C�M�.��5�d4�M�.CX.EXE, PDl*s-�%T"�4l*s-DDAEMON.EXE, dD.�i/@)5�d4.�i/DOSVIPX.SYS, zDz�.i5�d4z�.DRIVERS.OS2, }D��.��d4��.INSTALL.EXE( "��/4("�4��/IPX.SYS, 8�J,�W"�4�J,IPXCALLS.DLL, 8��+p�5�d4��+ LANSUP.SYS( i8�r�.�:�4�r�. LOGIN.EXE( e9�.�R"�4�.LSL.SYS( �9,r�.�(;�4,r�.MAP.EXE( &:\�.1"5�d4\�.MINI.IFS, 9:�:�,�5�d4�:�,NBDAEMON.EXE, @:�(�*E5�d4�(�* NETAPI.DLL, D:��O.b_5�d4��O.NETBIOS.EXE, u:��-$N5�d4��-NETBIOS.SYS, �:�(�*E5�d4�(�* NETSUB.DLL( �:�d/�L��4�d/NETX.EXE( J;�W�.`�<�d4�W�. NLIST.EXE$��I�d4I�d4I�d4NLSIP, J<}|-�\(�4}|- NMPIPE.SYS, z<�R�,FW"�4�R�,NPCALLS.DLL �<X�.�I<�d4X�.�PDAEMON.EXE, �<�Ɓ.�<�d4�Ɓ.NPRINTER.EXE, =�-p<�d4�-NPSERVER.SYS, :=��.j<�d4��.NTR2000.SYS, q=�T /�<�d4�T / NVFLDR.ICO( z='�(�<�d4'�( NWAFP.DLL, �=4\�.�<�d44\�.NWCALLS.DLL, ]>.<�d4.NWCONFIG.DLL, f>-[/��<�d4-[/NWDAEMON.EXE( �>�,[/�<�d4�,[/ NWIFS.IFS, ?��~.@�<�d4��~.NWLOCALE.DLL( 4��.pD�d4��. NWNET.DLL, 9��W-xD�d4��W-NWOS2DOC.ICO, k��.�!D�d4��. NWPSRV.DLL( ��[/�|D�d4�[/ NWREQ.SYS, ދ�n�.# D�d4�n�.NWSTART.EXE, ��*�.�D�d4�*�.NWTOOLS.EXE, E�f�}-�L�d4f�}-NWWORKER.DLL, '�F�+ IL�d4F�+ODINSUP.SYS( M�� B/��L�d4� B/ ROUTE.SYS, �� -�L�d4� -SPDAEMON.EXE( ��R�I/4=L�d4R�I/SPX.SYS, ؎�� -� L�d4�� -SPXCALLS.DLL, ߎS_.\L�d4S_. TCCTOK.SYS �� wX��$��,�d4,�d4,�d4 ��