EARLY COMMENTARIES ON HUME'S WRITINGS "An Examination of Hume's Essay on Justice" from 1793 5/1/95 Copyright 1995, James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu). See end note for details on copyright and editing conventions. This is a working draft; please report errors.[1] Editor's note: This anonymously written essay attacks Hume's claim that justice is an artificially instilled virtue. The author begins distinguishing between optional vi`rtues, such as charity, and obligatory ones, especially justice which is necessary for the existence of society. For Hume, justice is artificial, deriving not from "the constitution of human nature" but "from the association of mankind together." Contrary to Hume, the author argues that justice is natural. Justice lies between favor and injury. "A favour naturally produces gratitude. An injury, if done to ourselves, produces resentment...." Justice involves the idea of things which are due or not due, and such ideas are no less natural than gratitude. Gratitude and resentment, which correspond to favor and injury, "are acknowledged by Mr. H/UME\ himself to be natural...," hence justice too must be natural. * * * * "An Examination of Hume's Essay on Justice" 1793, Vol. 24, pp. 422-424 {422} THE general distinction between Virtue and Vice is sufficiently known to all men. There are certain actions which are universally the objects of approbation, which we call good, virtuous, or praise- worthy. There are other actions which are universally the objects of disapprobation, which we call bad or vicious; and which seem in many cases to deserve punishment. The consideration of Virtue and vice, and the questions relating to them, make up what is called the science of Ethics or Morals. When we consider the general distinction between virtue and Vice; when we consider certain virtues on the one hand, and certain vices on the other, they evidently appear to admit of a subdivision. There are many virtues which are altogether left to our own choice - - where we are at liberty to practise them or not as we please. A man is apprehended to act improperly when he is a miser; on the contrary, he is approved of when he acts generously: but it is never apprehended that we can with propriety force him to act in the one way or in the other. We do not think that we can force a miser to be generous. {434} On the other hand, there are certain virtues which are the proper objects of compulsion; or certain vices which may with propriety be restrained. It is a virtuous action for men to pay their just debts; but if they refuse to pay them, force may be used in order to extort the observance of this virtue, or to avoid the contrary vice, which is precisely the same thing in another point of view. Here then are two different classes of virtues, where the agent is at liberty to practise them or not; and where, in other cases, he may be compelled to observe them. This makes the distinction between Justice and the other Virtues. These rules of conduct, which a person may be forced to observe, belong, properly speaking, to Justice, and make the object of Law. Those rules of action where no force is used, make properly the subject of Ethics. Hence it is evident that Justice is a species of Virtue. Virtue in general comprehends Justice as well as many other particular virtues; but all the other virtues are in a different situation from justice in this respect -- that we may practise them or not as we please. Justice implies that we invade no man's property, nor violate his rights; that we do not injure him in his person, in his family, or in his good name: that we pay our just debts; that we make reparation to the best of our power for any damage we have done, or offence we may have given to others; that we fulfil our contracts, and be faithful to our promises; that we use no fraudulent dealings, nor take advantage of the weakness, ignorance, or necessity of those with whom we deal; and, in a word, that we be fair, honest, and without guile in our speech and behaviour. These, and matters of a like nature, constitute what we call fair-dealing, honesty, integrity. Justice is opposed both to violence and to deceit. So necessary is Justice to the very being of human society, that without it there could be no society at all. And it has been very justly observed, even by the most ancient authors, that those gangs of thieves and robbers who pay no regard to the rights of other men, must observe the rules of Justice towards one another, otherwise they could not possibly keep together. It would be more safe, as well as more comfortable, for a man to renounce all human society, and to live as an hermit in the wilderness, or to dwell with the beasts of the field, than with men who paid no regard to justice. It is chiefly with a view to defend themselves from injury, that men associate together and form human societies. The first end of all Governments, and the chief object of all human Laws, is to secure men from unjust violations of their rights by violence or fraud, and to deter men by punishments from all such violations of the rights of others. Having said these things, I shall take notice of an opinion which H/UME\ has advanced, and endeavoured with all his eloquence and reasoning to support, that Justice is not a natural but an artificial virtue. It is not a virtue which the constitution of human nature points out to us of itself, but which, from the association of mankind together, appears to be necessary for human society, and is regulated entirely by its use. Nothing therefore, according to him, is just or unjust by nature; but what is for the benefit of society is on this account called just, and what has the contrary tendency is called unjust. In order to throw some light on this subject, it may be proper first to explain, as distinctly as possible, the notion we annex to this word J/USTICE\, and then consider Mr. Hume's reasoning to shew that it is not a natural virtue. As men, we are endowed by nature with powers, in the exercise of which we may do good or evil to our fellow men. When we employ our powers to promote the good and happiness of others, this is beneficence or favour. When we exert our powers to hurt them, this is injury. Justice lies in the middle between these two. It is such a conduct as does no hurt to others, though at the same time it does them no favour. Now the idea of a favour on the one hand, and of an injury on the other, are so universal, that it may justly be doubted, whether ever there was a man come to years of understanding who never had in his mind the notion of a favour and of an injury -- of a good office and of a bad one. These notions discover themselves in all men, not by language only, but by certain affections of mind of which they are the natural objects. A favour naturally produces gratitude. An injury, if done to ourselves, produces resentment; and when done to others excites indignation. Now it is acknowledged by all, and I apprehend by Mr. H/UME\ himself, that gratitude and resentment are natural ingredients {424} the human mind, no less than the appetites of hunger and thirst; and these passions are as naturally excited by their proper objects as these appetites. This indeed is so evident in itself, that it would be impertinent to offer an argument for it, as no philosopher, as far as I know, ever denied it. It is evident that the proper object of gratitude is one who has done us a favour, and the proper object of resentment is a person who has done us an injury. Every sentiment of gratitude implies in its nature a conception and belief of a favour done by the person who is the object of our gratitude; and every sentiment of resentment implies in its nature a belief of an injury done by the person who is the object of our resentment. What is it then which we call a favour, and which by the very constitution of human nature excites the natural sentiment of gratitude? No man who is capable of reflecting on the operations of his own mind, can be at any loss to answer this question. An action which produces pleasure or advantage to me, is not a favour unless that advantage or pleasure was intended. We are told of a Physician who gave a medicine to his patient with an intention to poison him; that the medicine, however, contrary to the intention of the Physician, cured the disease. There was surely no gratitude due by the patient when he knew the real state of the case. It is evident to every man, that a benefit arising from the action of another, either against or without his intention, cannot move to gratitude. Another thing implied in a favour is, that it be not due. A man may save my credit by paying what he owes me, and in this case the thing which he does tends to my benefit, yet it is not a favour. It is no more than he is bound to do. A servant does his work, and receives his wages -- this is no favour. Now what we may observe from this is, that the conception of favour includes in it the conception of a thing not due. A negative cannot be conceived by one who has no conception of the corresponding positive. Not to be due is the negative of being due; and he who conceives the first must conceive the last. The idea of things due or not due must be conceived by every one who has any sentiments of gratitude, and therefore not less natural then the sentiment of gratitude is, because no gratitude is due; nor is any raised naturally in the mind, unless where some good is done that was not due. Let us consider, on the other hand, that which we call an injury, and which I conceive to be the natural object of resentment. Every man who is capable of looking into his own heart, conceives an injury implies something more than receiving hurt. If I am hurt by a stone falling out of the wall, or by a flash of lightning, or by an involuntary motion in another man's arm, no injury is done, no resentment is raised. In this, as well as in all other immoral actions, there must be will and intention in the agent to do the hurt. Nor is this sufficient to constitute an injury. A man who treads down my corn, or breaks down my fences, in order to fly from danger, when he as no ill intentions, and is willing to indemnify me for the hurt, is not injurious, nor is he the object of resentment. The executioner who only does his duty in cutting off the head of a condemned criminal, is not the object of punishment. He is not injurious. He does nothing unjust. For it is evident that injury, which is the natural object of resentment, implies in it the notion of injustice; and no man can have the notion of injustice without having the notion of justice. It appears therefore, I think, from what has been said, that the notion of justice is no less natural to the human mind than the notion of a favour, or of an injury no less natural than the affection of gratitude and resentment. These three, to wit, a favour, an act of justice, and an injury are so related to each other, that he who conceives one of them must conceive all: they lie all, as it were, in one line, and resemble the three ratios of -- greater, middle, and less. He who understands what is meant when one line is called less or greater than another, can be a no loss to know what is meant by one line being equal to another; for if it is neither greater nor less, it must be equal. A favour is more than justice, an injury is less; and that which is neither a favour nor an injury, is a just action: for in every state of society in which there is gratitude for good offices, or resentment for injuries, there must be a notion of justice; and this notion of justice is as natural to man as the notion of favour or injury, consequently as natural as the emotions of gratitude and resentment. But these are acknowledged by Mr. H/UME\ himself to be natural; and if they are, it necessarily follows that the notion of justice must be so also, which is the thing that was to be proved. [1][COPYRIGHT: (c) 1995, James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu), all rights reserved. Unaltered copies of this computer text file may be freely distribute for personal and classroom use. Alterations to this file are permitted only for purposes of computer printouts, although altered computer text files may not circulate. Except to cover nominal distribution costs, this file cannot be sold without written permission from the copyright holder. This copyright notice supersedes all previous notices on earlier versions of this text file. When quoting from this text, please use the following citation: , ed. James Fieser (Internet Release, 1995). EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS: letters between slashes (e.g., H/UME\) designate small capitalization. Letters within angled brackets (e.g., ) designate italics. Note references are contained within square brackets (e.g., [1]). Original pagination is contained within curly brackets (e.g., {1}). Spelling and punctuation have not been modernized. Printer's errors have been corrected without note. Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu).]