THE EARLY BRITISH REVIEWS OF HUME'S WRITINGS Review of David Hume's from William Rose January 1752 5/1/95 Copyright 1995, James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu). See end note for details on copyright and editing conventions. This is a working draft; please report errors.[1] Editor's Note: This review appeared anonymously in January 1752, Volume 6, pages 1-19 of . William Rose's authorship is established in Benjamin Christie Nangle's, (1934). Two editions were published of the January issue. The second edition contains minor differences in punctuation, spelling, and corrected printer's errors from the first edition. The first edition is followed here; printer's errors have been corrected without note. * * * * January 1752 Vol. 6 {1} A/RT. I\. David Hume, ; 12. 3. Millar. THE reputation this ingenious author has acquir'd as a fine and elegant writer, renders it unnecessary for us to say any thing in his praise. We shall only observe in general, that clearness and precision of ideas on abstracted and metaphysical subjects, and at the same time propriety, elegance and spirit, are seldom found united in any writings in a more eminent degree than in those of Mr. The work now before us will, as far as we are able to judge, considerably raise his reputation; and, being free from that sceptical turn which appears in his other pieces, will be more agreeable to the generality of Readers. His subject is important and interesting, and the manner of treating it easy and natural: His design is to fix the just origin of morals, in the execution of which he has shewn a great deal of judgment as well as ingenuity, as every candid reader must needs allow, whatever sentences he may pass upon his scheme in general, or how much soever he may differ from him in regard to what he has advanced on the subject of justice. In the first section of this performance, our author treats of the general principles of morals; he introduces it with some general reflections, after which he gives a short but clear view of the principal arguments that are urged to prove that morals are derived from , and of those which {2} are adduced to shew that they are derived from . The arguments on both sides he thinks are so plausible, that he is apt to suspect they may, both of them, be solid and satisfactory, and that reason and sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions. 'But tho' this question, says he, concerning the general principle of morals, be extremely curious and important; 'tis needless for us, at present, to employ farther care in our enquiries concerning it. For if we can be so happy, in the course of this enquiry, as to fix the just origin of morals, 'twill then easily appear how far sentiment or reason enters into all determinations of this nature. Mean while, it will scarce be possible for us, e're this controversy is fully decided, to proceed in that accurate manner required in the sciences; by beginning with exact definitions of /virtue\ and /vice\, which are the objects of our present enquiry. But we shall do what may be justly esteem'd as satisfactory. We shall consider the matter as an object of experience. We shall can , virtuous, : and we shall denominate vicious, . These qualities we shall endeavour to collect; and after examining, on both sides, the several circumstances, in which they agree, 'tis hoped, we may, at last, reach the foundation of ethics, and find those universal principles, from which all moral blame or approbation is ultimately derived. As this is a question of fact, not of abstract science, we can only expect success, by following this experimental method, and deducing general maxims, from a comparison of particular instances. The other scientifical method, when a general abstract principle is first established, and is afterwards branched out into a variety of inferences and conclusions, may be more perfect in itself, but suits less the imperfection of human nature, and is a common source of illusion and mistake, in this as well as in other subjects. Men are now cured of their passion for Hypotheses and systems in natural philosophy, and will hearken to no arguments but those derived from experience. 'Tis full time they should begin a like reformation in all moral disquisitions; and reject every system of ethics, however subtile or ingenious, that is not founded on fact and observation. Having laid down the method he intends to prosecute, our Author proceeds in the second section to treat of benevolence; and shews how ill-founded that system of morals {3} is, which resolves all humanity and friendship into self-love. He makes it clearly appear that there is such a sentiment in human nature as disinterested benevolence; that nothing can bestow more merit on any human creature than the profession of it in an eminent degree; and that a part, at least, of its merit, arises from its tendency to promote the interests of our species, and bestow happiness on human society. "In all determinations of morality, says he, this circumstance of public utility is ever principally in view; and wherever disputes arise, whether in philosophy or common life, concerning the bounds of duty, the question cannot, by any means be decided with greater certainty, than by ascertaining, on any side, the true interests of mankind. If any false opinion, embraced from appearances, has been found to prevail, as soon as farther experience, and sounder reasoning have given us juster notions of human affairs; we retract our first sentiments, and adjust a-new the boundaries of moral good and evil.' In the third section our author treats of justice, and endeavours to shew that public utility is the origin of it, and that reflections on its beneficial consequences are the foundation of its merit. In order to make this appear, he puts a variety of cases, and supposes extreme abundance or extreme necessity to be produced among men; perfect moderation and humanity, or perfect rapaciousness and malice implanted in their breasts: In all these cases we are told, that by rendering justice totally , we thereby totally destroy its essence, and suspend its obligation upon mankind. 'The more, says he, we vary our views of human life; and the newer and more unusual the lights are, in which we survey it, the more shall we be convinced, that the origin here assigned for the virtue of justice is real and satisfactory.' 'Were there a species of creatures, intermingled with men, which, tho' rational, were possest of such inferior strength, both of body and mind, that they were incapable of all resistance, and could never, upon the highest provocation, make us feel the effects of their resentment; the necessary consequence, I think, is, that we should be bound by the laws of humanity, to give gentle usage to these creatures, but should not, properly speaking, lie under any restraint of justice with regard to them, nor could they possess any right or property, exclusive of such arbitrary Lords. Our intercourse with them could not be called society, which supposes a degree of equality; but absolute command on the one side, and servile obedience on the {4} other. Whatever we covet, they must instantly resign: Our permission is the only tenure, by which they hold their possessions: Our compassions and kindness the only check, by which they curb our lawless will: And as no inconvenience ever results from the exercise of a power, so firmly established in nature, and the restraints of justice and property being totally , would never have a place, in so unequal a confederacy. "Were the human species so fram'd by nature as that each individual possest within himself every faculty, requisite both for his own preservation and for the propagation of his kink: Were all society and intercourse cut off betwixt man and man, by the primary intention of the supreme Creator: It seems evident, that so solitary a being would be as much incapable of justice, as of social discourse and conversation. Where mutual regards and forbearance serve to no manner of purpose, they would never direct the conduct of any reasonable man. The headlong course of the passions would be checked by no reflection on future consequences. And as each man is here supposed to love himself alone, and to depend only on himself and his own activity for safely and happiness, he would, on every occasion, to the utmost of his power, challenge the preference above every other being, to none of which he is bound by any ties, either of nature, or of interest. 'But suppose the conjunction of the sexes to be established in nature, a family immediately arises; and particular rules being found requisite for its subsistance, these are immediately embraced; tho' without comprehending the rest of mankind within their prescriptions. Suppose, that several families unite together into one society, which is totally disjoined from all others, the rules, which preserve peace and order, enlarge themselves to the utmost extent of that society; but, being entirely useless, lose their force when carried one step farther. But again suppose, that several distinct societies maintain a kind of intercourse for mutual convenience and advantage; the boundaries of justice still grow larger and larger, in proportion to the largeness of men's views, and the force of their mutual connexions. History, experience, reason sufficiently instruct us in this natural progress of human sentiments, and the gradual increase of our regards to property and justice in proportion as we became acquainted with the extensive of that virtue.' {5} After a short section upon political society, our Author proceeds in the fifth to shew why utility pleases. 'Usefulness, says he, is agreeable, and engages our approbation. This is a matter of fact, confirmed by daily observation. But ? For what? For somebody's interest surely. Whose interest then? Not our own only: For our approbation frequently extends farther. It must, therefore, be the interest of those, who are serv'd by the character or action approved of; and these we may conclude, however remote, are not totally indifferent to us. -- Usefulness is only a tendency to a certain end; and 'tis a contradiction in terms, that any thing pleases as means to an end, where the end itself does no way affect us. If therefore usefulness be a source of moral sentiment, and if this usefulness be not always considered with a reference to self; it follows, that every thing, which contributes to the happiness of society, recommends itself directly to our approbation and good- will. Here is a principle, which accounts, in great part, for the origin of morality: And what need we seek for abstruse and remote systems, when there occurs one so obvious and natural?' Our author employs several pages in illustrating this principle, and concludes the section in the following manner. 'Thus, says he, in whatever light we take this subject, the merit, ascrib'd to the social virtues, appears still uniform, and arises chiefly from that regard, which the natural sentiment of benevolence engages us to pay to the interests of mankind and society. If we consider the principles of the human make, such as they appear to daily experience and observation; we mus, , conclude it impossible for such a creature as man to be totally indifferent to the well or ill-being of his fellow-creatures, and not readily, of himself, to pronounce, where nothing gives him any particular byass, that what promotes their happiness is good, what tends to their misery is evil, without any farther regard or consideration. Here then are the faint rudiments, at least, or outlines, of a general distinction betwixt actions; and in proportion as the humanity of the person is supposed to encrease, his connexion to those injured or benefited, and his lively conception of their misery or happiness; his consequent censure or approbation acquires proportionable force and vigour. There is no necessity, that a generous action, barely mentioned in an old history or remote Gazette, should communicate any strong feelings of applause and admiration. Virtue, placed at such a distance, {6} is like a fixt star, which tho', to the eye of reason, it may appear as luminous as the sun in his meridian, is so infinitely removed, as to affect the senses neither with light nor heat. Bring this virtue nearer, by our acquaintance or connexion with the persons, or even by an eloquent narration and recital of the case; our hearts are immediately caught, our sympathy enliven'd, and our cool approbation converted into the warmest sentiments of friendship and regard. These seem necessary and infallible consequences of the general principles of human nature, as discovered in common life and practice. 'Again; reverse these views and reasonings: Consider the matter ; and weighing the consequences, enquire, if the merit of all social virtue is not derived from the feelings of humanity, with which it affects the spectators. It appears to be matter of fact, that the circumstances of in all subjects, is a source of praise and approbation: that it is constantly appeal'd to in all moral decisions concerning the merit and demerit of actions: That it is the source of that high regard paid to justice, fidelity, honour, allegiance and chastity: That it is inseparable from all the other social virtues of humanity, generosity, charity, affability, lenity, mercy and moderation: and in a word that it is the foundation of the chief part of morals, which has a reference to mankind and society. 'It appears also, in our general approbation or judgment of characters and manners, that the useful tendency of the social virtues moves us not by any regards to self-interest, but has an influence much more universal and extensive. It appears, that a tendency to public good, and to the promoting of peace, harmony, and concord in society, by affecting {7} the benevolent principles of our frame, engages us on the side of the social virtues. And it appears, as an additional confirmation, that these principles of humanity and sympathy enter so deep into all our sentiments, and have so powerful an influence, as may enable them to excite the strongest censure and applause. The present theory is the simple result of all these inferences, each of which seems founded on uniform experience and observation. 'Were it doubtful, whether there was any such principle in our nature and humanity or a concern for others, yet when we see, in numberless instances, that, whatever has a tendency to promote the interests of society, is so highly approv'd of, we ought thence to learn the force of the benevolent principle; since 'tis impossible for any thing to please as a means to an end, where the end itself is totally indifferent. On the other hand, were it doubtful, whether there was, implanted in our natures, any general principle of moral blame and approbation, yet when we see, in numberless instances, the influence of humanity, we ought thence to conclude, that 'tis impossible, but that every thing, which promotes the interest of society, must communicate pleasure, and what is pernicious give uneasiness. But when these different reflections and observations concur in establishing the same conclusion; must they not bestow an undisputed evidence upon it? ''Tis however hoped, that the progress of this argument will bring a farther confirmation of the present theory, by showing the rise of other sentiments of esteem and regard from the same or like principles.' The sixth section treats of qualities useful to ourselves. It is introduced with the following just observation, . that nothing is more usual, than for philosophers to encroach upon the province of , and to engage in disputes of words, while they imagine, that they are handling controversies of the deepest importance and concern. 'Thus, says our author, were we here to assert or to deny, , many would imagine, that we had entered upon one of the profoundest speculations of Ethics; tho' tis probable, all the while , that the greatest part of the dispute would be found entirely verbal.' After this he makes the two following observations; that, in common life, the sentiments of censure or approbation, produced by mental qualities of every kind, are very similar; and that all antient moralists, (the best models) in treating of them, make little or no difference amongst them. These observations he confirms and illustrates, in the subsequent part of the section, with great beauty and elegance; shews that all the qualities, useful to the possessor, are approved, and the contrary censured; and examines that influence of bodily endowments and of the goods of fortune, over our sentiments of regard and esteem. In the seventh section, which treats of qualities immediately agreeable to ourselves, our author shews that there is another set of virtues, such as chearfulness, dignity of character, courage and serenity of mind, which, without any utility or any tendency to farther good, either of the {8} community or of the possessor, diffuse a satisfaction on the beholders, conciliate friendship and regard, and are praised from the immediate pleasure, which they communicate to the person possest of them. This section too is very entertaining, and contains several beautiful illustrations drawn from celebrated characters both in ancient and modern times. In the eighth section our author treats of qualities immediately agreeable to others, such as politeness, wit, the lively spirit of dialogue in conversation, eloquence, modesty, decency, &. and shews that, abstracted from any regard to utility or beneficial tendencies, they conciliate affection, promote esteem, and greatly inhance the merit of the possessor. He closes this section in the following manner. 'Amongst the other virtues, says he, we may also give /cleanliness\ a place; since it naturally renders us agreeable to others, and is no inconsiderable source of love and affection. No one will deny, that a negligence in this particular is a fault; and as faults are nothing but smaller vices, and this fault can have no other origin than the uneasy sensation, which it excites in others; we may, in this instance, seemingly so trivial, clearly discover the origin of moral distinctions, about which the learned have involved themselves in such mazes of perplexity and error.' 'But besides all the agreeable qualities, the origin of whose beauty we can, in some degree, explain and account for, there still remains something mysterious and unaccountable, which conveys and immediate satisfaction to the spectators, but how, or why, or for what reason, they cannot pretend to determine. There is a /manner\, a grace, a genteelness, an I-know-not-what, which some men possess above others, which is very different from external beauty and comeliness, and which, however, catches our affection almost as suddenly and powerfully. And tho' this be chiefly talked of in the passion betwixt the sexes, where the concealed magic is easily explained, yet surely much of it prevails in all our estimation of characters, and forms no inconsiderable part of personal merit. this class of virtues, therefore, must be trusted entirely to the blind but sure testimony of taste and sentiment; and must be considered as a part of ethics, left by nature to baffle all the pride of philosophy, and make her sensible of her narrow boundaries and slender acquisitions." {9} 'We approve of another, because of his wit, politeness, modesty, decency, or any agreeable quality he possesses, although he be not of our acquaintance, nor has ever given us any entertainment, by means of these accomplishments. The idea, which we form of their effect on his acquaintance, has an agreeable influence on our imagination, and gives us the sentiment of approbation. This principle enters into all the judgments which we form concerning morals.' The ninth section, which is the conclusion of the whole, our author introduces with observing that it may appear surprising, that any man, in so late an age should find it requisite to prove, by elaborate reasonings, that /virtue or personal merit\ consists altogether in the possession of qualities, to the or to . 'It might be expected, says he, that this principle would have occurred even to the first rude, unpractised enquirers concerning morals, and been received, from its own evidence, without any argument or disputation. Whatever is valuable in any kind so naturally classes itself under the division of or , the or the , that it is not easy to imagine, why we should ever seek farther, or consider the question as a matter of nice research or enquiry. And as every thing useful or agreeable must possess these qualities with regard either to the or to , the compleat delineation or description of merit seems to be performed as naturally as a shadow is cast by the sun, or an image is reflected upon water. If the ground, on which the shadow is cast, be not broken and uneven, nor the surface, from which the image is reflected, disturbed and confused, a just figure is immediately presented, without any art or attention. And it seems a reasonable presumption, that systems and hypotheses have perverted our natural understanding, when a theory, so simple and obvious, could so long have escaped the most elaborate scrutiny and examination. 'But however the case may have fared with philosophy; in common life these principles are still implicitely maintained; nor is any other topic of praise or blame ever recurred to, when we employ and panegyric or satire, any applause or censure of human action and behaviour. If we observe men, in every intercourse of business or pleasure, in each conference and conversation, we shall find them no where, except in the schools, at any loss upon the subject. -- {10} 'And as every quality, which is useful or agreeable to ourselves or others, is, in common life, admitted under the denomination of virtue or personal merit; so no other will ever be received, where men judge of things by their natural unprejudiced reason, without the delusive glosses of superstition and false religion. Celibacy, fasting, penances, mortification, self-denial, humility, silence, solitude and the whole train of monkish virtues; for what reason are they every where rejected by men of sense, but because they serve to no manner of purpose; neither advance a man's fortune in the world, nor render him a more valuable member of society; neither qualify him for the entertainment of company, nor encrease his power of self-enjoyment? We observe, on the contrary, that they cross all these desirable ends; stupify the understanding, and harden the heart, obscure the fancy and sower the temper. We justly therefore transfer them to the opposite column, and place them in the catalogue of vices; nor has any superstition force sufficient, amongst men of the world, to pervert entirely these natural sentiments. A gloomy hair-brained enthusiast, after his death, may have place in the calendar; but will scarce ever be admitted, when alive, into intimacy and society, except by those who are as delirious and dismal as himself.' Our author does not enter into that vulgar dispute concerning the of benevolence or self-love, which prevail in human nature; a dispute, which, as he justly observes, is never likely to have any issue, both because men, who have taken party, are not easily convinced, and because the phaenomena, which can be produced on either side, are so uncertain, and subject to such a variety of interpretations, that it is impossible accurately to compare them, or draw any determinate conclusion from them. He thinks it sufficient for his purpose, if it be allowed that there is some benevolence, however small, infused into our bosom; some spark of friendship for human kind, some particle of the dove kneaded into our frame, along with the elements of the wold and serpent. "Let these generous sentiments, says he, be supposed ever so weak; let them be hardly sufficient to move even a hand or finger of our body; they must still direct the determinations of the mind, and where every thing else is equal, produce a cool preference of what is useful and serviceable to mankind, above what is pernicious and dangerous. A , therefore, immediately arises; a general sentiment of blame and approbation; {11} a tendency, however faint, to the objects of the one, and a proportionable aversion to those of the other.' Avarice, ambition, vanity, and all those passions that are vulgarly comprehended under the denomination of , are excluded from our author's theory concerning the origin of morals, not because they are too weak, but because they have not a proper direction for that purpose. 'The notion of morals, says he, implies some sentiment, common to all mankind, which recommends the same object to general approbation, and makes every man, or most men, agree in the same opinion or decision concerning it. It also implies some sentiment, so universal and comprehensive as to extend to all mankind, and render the actions and conduct, even of persons the most remote, an object of censure or applause, according as they agree or disagree with that rule of right which is established. These two requisite circumstances belong alone to the sentiment of humanity here insisted on. The other passions produce, in every breast, many strong sentiments of desire and aversion, affection and hatred; but these neither are felt to much in common, nor are so comprehensive, as to be the foundation of any general system and established theory of blame or approbation. 'When a man denominates another his , his , his , his , he is understood to speak the language of self-love, and to express sentiments peculiar to himself, and arising from his particular circumstances and situation: but when he bestows on any man the epithets of or , or , he then speaks another language, and expresses sentiments, in which he expects all his audience are to concur with him. He must here, therefore, depart from his private and particular situation, and must choose a point of view, common to him with others: he must move some universal principle of the human frame, and touch a string, to which all mankind have an accord and symphony. If he means, therefore, to express, that this man possesses qualities, whose tendency is pernicious to society, he has chose this common point in view, and has touched the principle of humanity, in which every man, in some degree, concurs. While the human heart is compounded of the same elements as present, it will never be altogether indifferent to the good of mankind, nor entirely unaffected with the tendencies of characters and manners. And tho' this affection of humanity may not generally be esteemed so strong as ambition or vanity, yet, being common to all men, it can alone be the foundation of morals, or of any {12} general system of conduct and behaviour. One man's ambition is not another man's ambition; nor will the same event or object satisfy both: but the humanity of one man is the humanity of every one; and the same object touches this passion in all human creatures. 'But the sentiments which arise from humanity, are not only the same in all human creatures, and produce the same approbation or censure; but they also comprehend all human creatures: nor is there any one, whose conduct and character is not, by their means, an object, to every one, of censure or approbation. On the contrary those other passions, commonly denominated selfish, both produce different sentiments in each individual, according to his particular situation; and also contemplate the greatest part of mankind with the utmost indifference and unconcern. Whoever has a high regard and esteem for me flatters my vanity; whoever expresses contempt mortifies and displeases me: but as my name is known but to a small part of mankind, there are few, that come within the sphere of this passion, or excite, on its account, either my affection or disgust. But if you represent a tyrannical, insolent, or barbarous behaviour, in any country or in any age of the world; I soon carry my eye to the pernicious tendency of such a conduct, and feel the sentiment of repugnance and displeasure toward it. No character can be so remote as to be, in this light, altogether indifferent to me. What is beneficial to society or to the person himself must still be preferred. And