EARLY COMMENTARIES ON HUME'S WRITINGS "On Mr. Hume's Account of the Origin of the Idea of Necessary Connection" from H. Richter 1797 5/1/95 Copyright 1995, James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu). See end note for details on copyright and editing conventions. This is a working draft; please report errors.[1] Editor's note: The author of this essay, H. Richter, is probably Henry James Richter (1772-1857), London born painter and philosopher. Richter was an intimate friend of William Blake and, like Blake had both artistic and literary interests. He was influenced by Kant, and his other writings include (1817). Richter's essay on Hume's account of the origin of the idea of necessary connection was written when he was 25 and reflects an early phase in his philosophical development, in view of his concluding comment which recommends the rejection of Kant. In this essay Richter argues that neither habit, instinct, nor a renewed propensity can account for either the idea of necessary connection or the belief. However, he believes that there is value in tracing the origin of such ideas. * * * * 1797, Vol. 4, pp. 533-536 {533} . ON MR. HUME'S ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNECTION. SIR, THE principal means by which Mr. Hume proposes to "banish all that jargon, which has so long taken possession of metaphysical reasonings, and drawn disgrace upon them," is the following: "all our ideas, or more feeble perceptions, are copies of our impressions, or more lively ones." This he lays down as a general rule, and requires those who assert that it is not universal, to produce an instance of some idea which is to derived from any impression. In the mean time, however, he takes a precaution which effectually secures his principle against any possible exception, by resolving, that if any idea shall hereafter present itself, which cannot be derived from some impression, he will consider it as no idea at all. "When we entertain," he tells us, "any suspicion, that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as it is but too frequent) we need but enquire, And if it be possible to assign any, this will serve to confirm our suspicion." "Where we cannot find any impression, we may be certain that there is no idea." Having thus established his principle, he proceeds to its illustration. The idea which he selects for this purpose, and the reality of whose existence he thus puts to the test, is that of a cause. "We mus enquire," says he, "how we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect?" And this, he assures us, perfectly accords with his principle; it "arises from experience," that is to say, it is copied from our . He does indeed acknowledge, that "the particular powers," , "by which all natural operations are performed, never appear to the senses;" that is, , and that "he has not by all his acquired any idea or knowledge of the secret power by which one object produces the other." And upon this he remarks, agreeably to his principle, that "as we can have no idea of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be, that we have no idea of connection or power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any {534} meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasonings, or common life." The question here seems to be, whether we shall relinquish the principle, or discard this stubborn idea that will not submit to it? Some men, I have no doubt, would willingly give up every idea in their heads, rather than incommode their favorite system; but Mr. Hume would not do this rashly. "There still remains," says he, "one method of avoiding this conclusion." Well, the, let us see how this unfortunate idea will escape. It is not, he owns, reasonable to conclude, merely "because one event, in one instance, precedes another, that, therefore, the one is the cause, the other the effect;" because, "we can never observe the tie between them." For instance, when I strike this table, the blow is followed by a sound, and all that I perceive are the motion and the sound; but I do not see what it is that connects these events, nor if this were the first time I had observed them, should I have any idea of a necessary connection between them? But "when many uniform instances appear, and the same object is always followed by the same event, we then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connection." That is to say, after observing two events constantly succeeding one the other, we conclude that they must always occur for the future in the same order, and that whenever the first takes place, the other must of necessity follow it. Mr. Hume says, it is not "by any process of reasoning" that we draw this conclusion. How then? By "custom or habit; for," he argues, "whenever the repetition of any particular act or operation, produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding; we always say, that this propensity is the effect of custom." "When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only, that they have acquired a connection in our thought." Accordingly, one of his definitions of a cause is, "an object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other." Let us try this by an instance: -- Suppose a philosopher, who, with an excellent stomach, had all his life been used to live well, so that at a certain hour, when he began to feel himself hungry, he was regularly served with a good dinner then imagine that a set of lean half-famished philosophers, of some other sect, merely for the sake of an experiment, should eat up his dinner for him. Well, at the usual time his appetite returns. That event, which had always been succeeded by another so very agreeable, immediately conveys his thoughts to that other; because, forsooth, the appetite and the dinner have acquired a connection in his thought, and he feels a strong propensity to renew a particular act or operation. Here are all the symptoms of causation; but no dinner! How the philosopher would be surprised. In a little time, however, he would see that Hume was mistaken. He would find that the customary connection of two events might cause an association of his ideas, so that, when one of the events occurred it would convey his thought to the other; but this would no more make him expect that other, than he would expect a dinner because his appetite put him in mind of it. He would learn not to consider one event as the effect of another, merely because the ideas were associated in his mind; he would look not only for a customary, but a necessary connection between them: but it is clear that custom or habit can only associate our ideas, and give us the notion of a customary connection. The question is, how do we get the idea of a necessary connection? Says Mr. Hume, "When the same object is always followed by the same event, we then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connection." This is a fact which no one disputes; the only question is, do we then begin to entertain such a notion? Upon the bare experience, that a certain event has hitherto been succeeded by another, why do we with such assurance conclude, that it must always be succeeded by it? Mr. Hume tells us, it is because "We then feel a new sentiment or impression, to wit, a customary connection in the thought or imagination, between one object and its usual attendant; and this sentiment," he informs us, "is the original of that idea which we seek for." If the idea in question, which is that necessary connection, be copied from the idea of customary connection, the idea of black may be copied from that of white. Let the customary connection have lasted as long, and the habit of observing it have grown as obstinate as you please, it can never change its nature; it is still but a customary connection, and {535} how it should raise in the mind a totally new idea, seems perfectly inconceivable. The gap is still unclosed, and the space between the and the , is as wide as ever. But it may be insisted, that the habit of constantly observing a connection, acts so upon the mind, as to make us afterwards positively expect it, and believe it absolutely necessary. If this assertion were sufficient, nothing could be more easy or more common; but the cause here assigned is notoriously inadequate to the effect. What is there in the circumstance, of my having hitherto always seen two events connected, that seems at all calculated to raise in me a belief, that they could not possibly have occurred separately, and that they must always for the future be so joined? That, upon experiencing a customary connection, or rather a constant order of succession, we do conceive the idea of a necessary connection, is allowed; but what proof have we that this experience is the cause of the idea? If we examine the nature of the experience, we find nothing in it that bears the least reference to such an idea; so that the argument stands thus: habit certainly produces the idea of necessity, because it is succeeded by that idea in the mind. In fact, it is an assertion unsupported by argument. What is the usual effect of habit? Mr. Hume tells us, it is "a propensity to renew a particular act or operation," in other words, it is a desire of obtaining something to which we are accustomed. But can my desire of a thing persuade me that I must necessarily obtain it, and that the whole order of nature would be destroyed if I should not? Doubtless it will be insisted, that the strong desire or propensity, derived from habit, to renew the connection between two events, does absolutely raised in us a belief, that there is a necessary connection between them, and that this desire of renewing it, compels us to think that it will be renewed. Yet this assertion is still more destitute of proof than the last. How has it been proved that we have any desire that the effect should follow the cause? Ask the thief at the gallows whether he desires that the rope should strangle him. It may be said, perhaps, that desire is the constant effect of habit, and may therefore be supposed; but never, surely, did the greatest dunce contract a liking to the birch, though in the habit of being flogged daily. The repetition of even of what was once agreeable, frequently becomes tiresome, and what is so eagerly pursued as variety? But that the mind takes no pleasure in the constant union of the effect with its cause (merely as such) seems evident from the greediness with which men swallow the monstrous stories of enchantment, ghosts, miracles, &c. where all that so much delights us is, the disorderly production of some effect by an unusual cause. Yet I will even suppose it proved, that we have some occult desire or propensity to renew the connection between events; still the chief point is to be considered. It has not yet been shown, that the mere desire of a thing is in any way calculated to produce a belief of its necessity, nor does it appear that such a desire could even form the idea of necessity in the mind; at least, I can see no reason to conclude that it does, and Mr. Hume does not supply me with any; on the contrary, he confounds the two things together, and then accounts for them as if they were one and the same. In order to prove that the habit of observing a connection gives us the idea of its necessity, he tells us, that it creates a propensity to renew it; as if the propensity to, or desire of a thing were not to be distinguished form the conception of its necessity. These are certainly two very different ideas, nor do I see that one in the least refers to the other. Whether we are told, therefore, that habit produces the idea of necessity, or, that habit only raises a propensity, and that this propensity causes the idea; what is all this but assertion and conjecture, unsupported by reason? Indeed, Mr. Hume himself, as if internally conscious that he had not traced the idea to its source, drops the term and has recourse to that of . Speaking of "this operation of the mind, by which we infer the effects from like causes;" he tells us, "it is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind by some instinct or mechanical tendency, which may be infallible in its operations, may discover itself at the first appearance of life and thought, and may be independent of all the laboured deductions of the understanding." I understand by instinct, a power depending upon the peculiar structure of the mind, and which determines it to some particular act. If it be by instinct, therefore, that we infer one event from another, that is, if the peculiar structure of the mind makes us conceive a necessary {536} connection between two events or impressions; that instinct is the origin of the idea of necessary connection, and not the mere impressions or events which were only connected by it in our thought. "Nature," he continues, "has implanted in us an instinct which carries forward the thought in a correspondent course to that which she has established among external objects." But this is not enough. An instinct which shall make me conclude one event to be the cause of another, must not only carry my thought from one to the other; it must not only associate the two ideas, and remind me of their customary connection; it must actually produce in my mind the idea of a necessary connection between them; for till it does this, it cannot make me conclude that one is the cause of the other. If the instinct do not give me the idea of a necessary connection between events, it cannot make me infer like effects from like causes; and, therefore, such an instinct would not answer the purpose; and if we get the idea from any other quarter, for instance, from observing the "course established among external objects," the instinct is altogether superfluous, for in that case, all we want is memory. But it has been proved, that we did not acquire this idea by observing the course of events, as in all that course there is nothing like the idea to be observed. Therefore, whether we have an instinct, and the idea originate in it, or whatever may be the origin of this idea, it does no appear that it could either arise from the connection of events in a single instance; or from the customary connection in a number of instances; or from the habitual association of ideas, arising from the customary connection; or even from any desire we may be supposed to have for the renewal of the connection. We cannot, therefore, attribute it to the impressions of sense, either immediately or mediately; so that it stands in direct opposition to the principle of Mr. Hume. It remains now to be decided, whether we shall discard an idea which seems essential to human reason, or give up the universality of this principle? Those who resolve to abide by the principle, let what will become of the idea, should at least be as candid as Mr. Hume has been, and first, carefully examine whether there be not some impression from which it might be derived; after that, they may, if they please, deny its existence, as a dogmatical shoemaker might swear you have no feet, because his shoes will not fit them. But it may be said, according to Mr. Hume's system, an idea is in fact no idea, unless it be derived from some impression; nor till he has discovered that impression, does he speak of it positively as such, he calls it only a . What an excess of refinement is this! We hear every day of the supposed advantages of a ruinous war, that is to say, advantages that exist only in idea; but here is an which exists . I wonder how some philosophers would have an idea exist. If we ask Berkeley in what way ideas exist, he tells us plainly (sec. 139) that , and I confess I am of his opinion. I shall not, however, attempt to prove the existence of this idea as to those who have not the idea, it would be impossible, and to those who have, superfluous. Yet it may not be amiss to apprize those who deny its existence, of the dilemma to which they are reduced. Either they must acknowledge they have the idea, whose existence they deny; or confess they have no idea of what they deny. It may be asked, of what use is this inquiry in the origin of ideas? Shall we not continue to act upon the belief of a necessary connection between events, and will not the effect as regularly follow its cause, whether we know the origin of this idea or not? Certainly. And what is more, we shall probably continue to dispute about the existence of a FIRST CAUSE, and argue as learnedly as ever, both for and against the doctrine of NECESSITY, whether we are able to tell or not. This is undoubtedly true, and yet there is one reason why I wish we were able to account, not only for this, but for a thousand other phenomena in the mind; and that is, that we might have some plea for rejecting, without examination, the system of Professor Kant; for it would be an excellent excuse for treating the philosophy of other nations with contempt, if we could but produce a reasonable and consistent theory of our own. H. RICHTER [1][COPYRIGHT: (c) 1995, James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu), all rights reserved. Unaltered copies of this computer text file may be freely distribute for personal and classroom use. Alterations to this file are permitted only for purposes of computer printouts, although altered computer text files may not circulate. Except to cover nominal distribution costs, this file cannot be sold without written permission from the copyright holder. This copyright notice supersedes all previous notices on earlier versions of this text file. 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