EARLY COMMENTARIES ON HUME'S WRITINGS 1753 5/1/95 Copyright 1995, James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu). See end note for details on copyright and editing conventions. This is a working draft; please report errors.[1] Editor's note: pamphlet appeared anonymously in 1753; this and James Balfour's (1753) are the first published discussion of Hume's (1751). After brief introductory comments, pages 7-12 focus on Lord Kames's, (1751) and pages 13-46 on Hume's moral . The author expresses general approval of Kames's account of morality, but criticizes Kames for identifying obligation with an approving sentiment. Hume's theory is found less favorable and is criticized for the central role that utility plays, particularly when issues of justice are taken into account. William Rose's complete review of this pamphlet in the is as follows: THIS letter, which is written in a genteel and sensible manner, contains some general observations on two books lately published; the one entitled, , by an anonymous author; the other by , esq; The first of these performances our letter- writer is, in general, highly pleased with, and thinks the author of it has great merit, were it only for stating so clearly the sentiment of duty, or moral obligation, and distinguishing it from the sentiment of simple moral approbation; the want of which distinction, he says, has always appeared to him a great defect in former authors, who acknowledged an internal sense to be the foundation of morality. As to the , he allows that the author is a very agreeable writer, and discovers an uncommon genius, but thinks that the love of simplicity has betray'd him, as it has many before him, into considerable errors. He examines a little mr. 's doctrine in regard to justice, and endeavours to shew that the arguments advanced in support of it are altogether inconclusive. After this he proceeds to consider that idea of approbation, which mr. makes to include the whole of the moral feeling, and upon which he founds the distinction betwixt virtue and vice; and here he takes a short view of that variety of different objects and qualities, which the author of the ranks under the same class of moral approbation; and endeavours to shew, that the sentiments they produce in us differ as widely as the approbation of inanimate from that of rational objects. He observes that morality can be founded and ascertained on our innate feelings of duty alone, and the authority which conscience carries in it, and that the overlooking these is an error which runs through the whole of the . [, 1753, Vol. 8, p. 400.] The following is from the 1753 and only edition of . * * * * SOME LATE OPINIONS Concerning the F/OUNDATION OF\ M/ORALITY\, EXAMINED. In a L/ETTER\ to a F/RIEND\. LONDON: Printed for R. D/ODSLEY\, in Pall-Mall; and M. C/OOPER\, in Pater-Noster-Row. MDCCLIII. {iii} Advertisement. IN the present indolent state of learning, when writing goes on without labour, and reading without profit, a new species of composition has become fashionable; which, not being honoured with a peculiar name, borrows from it's form the appellation of A letter to a friend. -- A happy invention for writers, who have not courage to undertake a regular work. One of this sort, when seized by a fond fit of ambition to become an author, has as an easy passage to fame by a familiar address to the public, under the character of an intimate acquaintance. {iv} Probably the following letter will be considered as a work of this kind; and, but for one reason, the mistake should pass, for there is no harm in it. The reason is, that the Person, to whom the letter was really addressed, reckoned himself so much indebted to the writer, that he could not deny himself the satisfaction of making a sort of public acknowledgement. And he was the more readily induced to do this, because the loss of so valuable a friend has not left him no other means to testify his gratitude. {5} SOME LATE OPINIONS Concerning the F/OUNDATION OF\ M/ORALITY\, EXAMINED. In a L/ETTER\ to a F/RIEND\. SIR, THE turn you have taken of late to moral speculations gives pleasure to your friends. You certainly cannot employ your present retirement better, than in such studies as have a direct reference to human nature, and to the conduct of life. Morality, as you well observe, justly lays claim to {6} the first place among the sciences, because of the importance of its end, which is, to regulate our behaviour. And therefore it concerns mankind to have the principles of this science, above all others, established in a satisfactory manner; and to have the consequences of these principles deduced with clearness and accuracy. In may other parts of knowledge we may be mistaken, without any considerable prejudice to ourselves: but in moral systems, any error, at least any capital error, ought not to be regarded with indifference; because it may draw consequences after it affecting the conduct of life. The accurate examination which, upon this account, you propose of the theories of morality advanced by several authors, I very much approve of: and as you are pleased to think I can be of service to you in this examination, you may be assured I shall not decline giving you any assistance that is in my power. It is what I owe to the memory of your father, and it is {7} what I cannot deny to the goodness of your own disposition, had I no other motive. Two books you Particularly mention lately published, which, by their singularity and novelty, have engaged your attention; the one entitled, the other, , by David Hume . I have read both with care; and shall communicate to you the observations I have made. To begin with the former. The author has discovered a bold and penetrating genius; and has advanced many things new and curious. In some points I cannot agree with him. His speculations concerning liberty and necessity, in particular, are liable, in my opinion, to several strong objections. But this is what I shall not at present inquire into, {8} as it is only his treatise concerning the law of nature, and the foundation of virtue, which I now mean to consider. And here I must confess he has afforded me a great deal of entertainment. Though he has not writ a professed system, yet he has given more openings into the subject, and has set it in a juster light than any other author I know. He traces the several feelings of human nature which relate to morality, and ascertains their different degrees of authority. In my opinion his merit is great, were it only for stating so clearly the sentiment of duty, or moral obligation; and distinguishing it from the sentiment of simple moral approbation. The want of this distinction appeared always to me a great defect in former authors, who acknowledged an internal sense to be the foundation of morality. In benevolence they comprise the whole of virtue; and, confounding obligation with a mere approbatory sentiment, they suppose mankind to be under the strictest obligation {9} to the highest acts of benevolence; because such actions produce the highest approbation. In this, their systems have the misfortune to contradict nature and experience; and therefore have undoubtedly a dangerous tendency. For no man, after he is dismissed from the schools of philosophy, and begins to act his part in life, can in any degree act upon such a plan as these philosophers lay down; and hence is too apt to consider the whole of virtue as a romance or chimera. He will indeed feel himself inwardly bound to a strict observance of the rules of justice and honesty; but will never be conscious of a perpetual obligation to exert, on every occasion, the highest acts of generosity and benevolence. Here then our author makes a distinction which is certainly founded in nature and truth; and which serves no a little to illustrate the wisdom of the human constitution. He observes, that indeed the highest approbatory pleasure attends generous and benevolent {10} actions; but that as justice, truth, fidelity and gratitude are more necessary to the support of human society; so, to these virtues only belongs the sentiment of strict moral obligation. The peculiarity of this sentiment, as expressed by the words, and , our author distinctly explains, and shews how it is to be distinguished from simple approbation by the sanction of self-condemnation and remorse. As this author has thus analysed the moral sense to better purpose, in my judgment, than had been done before him; so, in treating of our principles of action, he has thrown new light upon the affection of universal benevolence. He has very justly observed, that though there are principles in our nature exciting us to compassion, to gratitude and to friendship; yet, where there are no circumstances to awaken or engage the mind, we rest in a state of indifference, and are not conscious either of benevolence {11} or malevolence to an unknown person. The moralist, therefore, who requires us to lay aside all partial affection, and to act upon a principle of general benevolence to all men, require us to act upon a principle which, in truth, has no place in human nature. Providence has more wisely contrived it, that though our benevolence to individuals gradually decreases according to their distance, 'till at last it dwindles away to nothing, yet, when these individuals are collected into one body, and considered as a general object, benevolence rekindles towards them in the highest degree; and our country, our government, or mankind in general, are objects capable of raising the warmest feelings of zeal or public spirit. The attention which our author has shewn to trace the final causes of this and the other phaenomena which he points out in human nature, recommends his speculations to me the more, as tending to confirm and promote an admiration {12} of nature and providence; and end which it is highly worthy of every philosopher to keep in view, if he expects that mankind should be made truly better by any of his speculations. The delineation which the author has given of the laws of nature, I cannot but think extremely consonant to the natural feelings and sentiments of men. But it is needless to insist any longer upon this treatise, as there does not seem to be any difference of opinion betwixt us about it: and I entirely agree with you, that it is worthy of your repeated perusal. To proceed then to the ; I am of the same mind with you, that the author is a very agreeable writer, and discovers an uncommon genius. You seem pleased with him for having reduced the system of morals into a narrow compass, by resolving the whole into a single principle. But here we must differ; for I am afraid, the love of simplicity has betrayed him, {13} as it has many before him, into considerable errors. Patiently to investigate facts is doing a great deal; and very often is all that can be done: But to build systems, and to trace first principles, is too much for us to attempt in most sciences; and the appetite for it commonly diverts the mind from the fair and unbiassed view of facts. Let us examine a little how this author has succeeded in some of the chief parts of his theory. Utility is his favourite and capital principle, to which he reduces all the several branches of morals. With regard to benevolence, he admits of a moral sense which may produce an immediate and instinctive approbation of it; but with regard to justice, his notions are very singular. He denies that we have any natural sense or approbation of justice: he asserts it to be an artificial virtue, of which public utility is the sole foundation: and a great part of his treatise is employed in proving this. {14} This part of his doctrine I see has staggered you, nor without reason; for to me it appears not only ill founded, but even of dangerous tendency; and it puts justice, which of all virtues is the most necessary and fundamental to society, on a more loose and precarious bottom than the rest; and somehow degrades it into a lower class, and distinguishes it in a dishonourable manner. The author, of whom we were treating before, has a whole chapter upon this subject, in his essay on the laws of nature; in which, I think, he has clearly proved, that justice has a deeper foundation in our nature than mere reflexion on its utility. I confess it surprises me how a philosopher, who admits of a natural and immediate approbation as belonging to any virtue, should refuse this privilege to justice. For to me it seems clear, that no sentiment, no instinct, is so early observed in children, and so universally prevalent among all nations, even the most savage, as a notion of {15} property, a sense of right and wrong, of just and unjust. Perhaps there is no moral feeling whatever that is more clearly marked, that works stronger in the human breast, or that arises more instantaneously than indignation at injury and wrong; a feeling which is plainly natural, and by no means the consequence of any reflexions upon a public interest. Were this sentiment built only upon views of public utility, as our author contends that it is, there could never prevail among mankind so much uniformity of opinion concerning right and wrong. The varying views of utility, produced by the partialities of men for themselves, their relations, friends, country, &c. would be ever varying men's sentiments of justice, according to the different circumstances of the parties concerned. Of these inherent partialities and prejudices no education or enlarged views would ever wholly get the better. Or, supposing them to be, in some cases, overcome by reason, {16} the matter would not be much altered, considering the small number of men so happily disciplined. So that, if usefulness were the only foundation and measure of justice, the rules of right and wrong would be perpetually shifting, according to men's different apprehensions of a public interest. Nor is it here to be overlooked, that many cases occur in life, in which the consideration of a public interest loses its whole force, in restraining men from injustice; particularly with regard to secret transactions. Suppose me, for instance, privately trusted by a friend with some of his most valuable effects; he dies suddenly, leaving an overgrown fortune to his heir, who is a miser or a prodigal I have a numerous family, hopeful children, upon whom my deceased friend's effects would be bestowed much more for the public good, than upon his heir who, knowing nothing of this matter, suffers nothing. Every argument, that can be drawn from utility, {17} seems here to justify me in retaining these effects, by which I shall be enabled to give my children a virtuous education and a creditable establishment. Here utility unluckily takes the wrong side; and if, even this singular case, the duty of restitution and fulfilling a trust continues rigidly the same as in ordinary cases, of which no honest man will doubt, it follows evidently, that justice must rest upon some foundation independent of utility. As it is a very material point, in any system of morals, to ascertain the foundation of justice; let us follow our author a little, and see what are the arguments he advances in support of his hypothesis. I cannot help thinking they are altogether inconclusive. He argues from the supposition of a golden age, where all the conveniencies of life are in perfect abundance, without need of any labour to procure them; and where the minds of men are animated with {18} perfect friendship and generosity to each other. "Suppose such a state," says he[2], "and it would follow, that men could not have the least idea of justice or separate property:" From whence he infers, that this virtue derives its existence altogether from its use in the present intercourses of mankind. This is a very lame conclusion; for his argument proves no more than, that certain circumstances are requisite in order to give the natural sentiment of justice an opportunity of displaying itself. "Reverse," says our author,[3] "in any considerable circumstance, the condition of man: produce extreme abundance or extreme necessity: implant in the human breast moderation and equity, or perfect rapaciousness and malice: by rendring justice totally useless, you thereby totally destroy its essence, and suspend its obligation upon mankind." That is, suppose man no longer to be man; endow him with another nature; place {19} him in another world; suppose him no more subject to the same wants and necessities he is now subject to: and what follows? Why, no doubt, that, upon such a supposition, several of his present feelings and sentiments would become useless, and have no place. But will any man draw this consequence, that therefore these feelings and sentiments are not natural to him? Upon the same chimerical supposition of a perfect state, neither would there be any place for some exercises of benevolence, such as compassion; seeing there would be no objects of distress. And yet compassion, according to our author's express doctrine, is among those principles which are natural to man. The same argument holds for justice. "But," says he, "in some cases which actually happen in life, such as that of famine, or a besieged city, the distinctions of property are overthrown, and the obligation to justice ceases." And what does this prove, but that, in certain cases {20} of extremity, the great law of self-preservation takes place of all other principles whatever; which all moralists have allowed. It is most true, as our author observes, that the laws, which direct the exercise of justice, have always public good for their object; . This, no doubt, shews, that justice and public good coincide; but will never prove, that we have no sentiment of justice but what arises from a reflection on public good. For so likewise public good directs and limits the exertions of private friendship and benevolence; whilst yet, according to our author's own theory, these virtues have a separate and independent foundation in the nature of man. Why then should we deny the same foundation to justice, when public good has no more authority over the exercise of the one than over the exercise of the other? Our author is so unlucky in his arguments, the he makes use of one which {21} turns, in my opinion, directly against him. It is in his second Appendix; where, professedly supporting his hypothesis concerning justice[4], he bestows a great deal of illustration to shew, That every single act of benevolence carries in it a manifest character of utility, or tendency to public good: That this tendency, however, is far from being so manifest in every single act of justice or fidelity: but, That, here, the benefit to the public arises from the general observation of the rules of justice, as a scheme concurred in by the whole society: and he adds, That particular acts of justice may, sometimes, be attended with such apparent inconveniencies and evils, as may lead a young inexperienced mind (as in the case of , which he instances) to decide in favour of what is unjust, under the notion of its being better for the public. Now, if this be the case, as plainly it is, this alone clearly shews, That justice {22} can never be an artificial virtue, formed only on a sense of public interest: for this public interest, to which it is supposed to be subservient, is, by the author's own reasoning, an object so much out of view, as to be quite insufficient for supporting that general sense of justice, which we find prevailing in the world. If our author admits, that benevolence is attended with a natural and immediate approbation, tho' the utility of that virtue, or its tendency to public good, is, in every instance, so obvious; must he not admit, that there is much more reason for justice being supported and recommended by the same natural and direct approbation; and that, in the constitution of our nature, it would be something extremely preposterous, if justice were, in this respect, left upon a worse footing than benevolence; both as justice is more necessary for the subsistence of society than benevolence, and as the utility of {23} justice, in its single and separate acts, is, by the author's own confession, much less obvious and apparent? But it is needless to insist longer on what is so evident. You yourself, Sir, though you seem to have no small partiality for this author, admit, that there is something which appears unsound in his notions of justice; and which, you are of opinion, will never please philosophers. What will please philosophers is indeed not easy to say, when we find a noble author, who would have taken it very much amiss not to have been ranked in the philosophical class, I mean the late lord (if a pamphlet, published no long ago under his name, be truly his) seriously maintaining, That there is no instinct, or innate principle, in men, which prompts them to compassion; because travellers tell us, That savages and man-eaters seem to have as strong an instinct for cruelty, as for {24} compassion. But, whatever speculations philosophers may devise concerning these matters, in their profound enquiries, if we make an appeal to persons of plain sense and judgment, they will tell us, with one voice, That both justice and compassion are natural principles; which, without reasonings or deductions, either from self love or public good, they find engraven on their hearts. Having discussed our author's sentiments concerning justice, I will freely own to you, that there is another part of his system which appears to me no less exceptionable; I mean that loose and vague idea of approbation, which he makes to include the whole of the moral feeling, and upon which he founds the distinction betwixt virtue and vice. This seems to me a capital error running through his whole treatise. His notion is, That whatever, in character or conduct, is approved as useful, {25} is virtue; and thus, by reducing morality into the same class in which we place some very trifling qualities, he destroys moral distinctions altogether. It is to be observed, that approbation is a word of a very undetermined signification; and the author has never endeavoured to fix its meaning. It is whatever we take pleasure in; whatever we consider as useful or agreeable. We approve of may inanimate things, in the view of their being useful; useful herbs, useful medicines, houses &. Is this sort of approbation then sufficient to characterise virtue? or may we call these inanimate objects virtuous? No[5], says our author; for, as he tells us, though there is indeed a species of approbation attending inanimate objects, when beneficial; yet it is so weak, and so different from the approbation bestowed upon beneficial magistrates or statesmen, that they ought not to be ranked under the same class or appellation. {26} But let us now take a view of that variety of different objects and qualities which he ranks under the same class of moral approbation; and let us enquire, whether the sentiments they produce in us do not differ as widely as the approbation of inanimate from that of rational objects. First, he includes in the class of virtues, which are entitled to moral approbation, those qualities of the mind, which are commonly known by the name of intellectual abilities; such as penetration, courage, industry, secrecy, and the like. This is a pretty wide step: for the greatest villain may be possessed of these qualities in a very high degree; and it were strange to say, that they give him any share of moral desert. The world, indeed, value these qualities, as useful to the possessor: but to call every thing virtue which, upon any account, is valued, or which a man would wish to possess as useful, is {27} strangely altering the use of words; to say no worse of it. Nor will the authority of the ancients, whom he affects to represent as on his side, at all avail him here. For the philosophers, especially , and , when they treat professedly of such virtues as courage, prudence, magnanimity, and the like, always consider them as moral habits, cultivated for the sake of worthy and good ends. And as for the historians, whom he quotes, it is plain that, in drawing characters, they use the word in a loose sense, and not with philosophical accuracy. But, besides those qualities which comprehend the higher sort of abilities, we find our author, bye and bye, extending the moral sentiment of approbation to qualities of an inferior nature, such as chearfulness of temper; politeness and good address; wit; decency; and even cleanliness. When we find these qualities ranked upon a level with the {28} virtues of benevolence, justice, and humanity, we have a sufficient proof how loose our author's criterion of approbation is, and how little to be depended upon. But what comes afterwards is astonishing. He has a section expressly to shew,[6] that the sentiments of regard which bodily endowments, such as strength and beauty, and which riches and other external gods of fortune produce, coincide, in their nature, and the moral approbation, and rest upon the same foundation, . the utility of these things, or their tendency to produce happiness. Upon this footing, he says, we approve of a rich man, that is, we pay him regard, and prefer him to a poorman; because riches present us those ideas of satisfaction, plenty, cleanliness, &. which are agreeable to the social sense, as conducive to the happiness of mankind. Nay, not only is our approbation of riches put upon a level with our approbation of virtue, but our author {29} descends so low[7] as to account, in the same way, for that approbation which women pay a man of that make of body, which distinguishes what is called, to use his own phrase, a "a like principle," he adds, "operating more extensively, is the general source of moral affection and approbation." I must now ask you, what he has left, to distinguish the excellency of virtue from the many trifling accomplishments, which are agreeable or useful in the lowest degree? With how many heterogeneous things has he blended those moral distinctions, which mankind have hitherto held sacred? And does not his theory thereby tend to obscure and lessen the dignity of virtue? Our author, indeed, acknowledges the sentiment of approbation, which we give to some of those useful qualities, to be, perhaps, inferior, in degree, to that which we give to the virtues of justice and humanity: but he contends, {30} however, that the sentiments are similar, and of the same kind. I absolutely deny that they are similar, or of the same kind. One man betrays his trust; is inhuman to his parents, or false and ungrateful to his friend: another man means well, buy, through want of discretion, frequently blunders; is aukward in his address; or blunt and forbidding in his manner. Compare these two together; and I appeal to you, Sir, or to any other man, whether the sentiment of disapprobation and blame in the one case be not very widely different from what it is in the other; and whether we feel the least of that indignation, with respect to the disagreeable or unpolite man, which we feel with respect to the betrayer and the villain? And after all, if morality is to be brought so low, I see no reason for excluding even inanimate objects: if utility is the only characteristic of virtue, they must be comprehended; as it must be owned, that many inanimate objects are much {31) more beneficial than several of the qualities he ranks under the moral class. This consideration, even in a superficial view, must create a suspicion, that our author is not in the right track; and that he has, unwarily, suffered himself to be misled, by following an object that has more of splendour than of substance. It is a particular disadvantage of our author's theory, that, according to it, no distinct account can be given of our obligation to virtue. In his section upon this head, he resolves it into a motive from interest, leading us to acquire those laudable qualities which, experience teaches us, are so useful. This confounds all; and shews upon what a weak, or rather, upon what a false bottom his hypothesis is built. For if the word obligation, when applied to morality, has any meaning; if there be any ideas which correspond to the words and , they certainly imply something else than an interested motive: {32} otherwise, the miser would be under the same obligation to increase his wealth, which is his notion of interest or happiness, as an honest man is to fulfil his word, or pay his debts. Obligation and duty are equivalent terms: and as, according to our author, they extend to all those useful qualities which are the subject of moral approbation, in his sense of the work; it follows, that it is our duty to be chearful, well bred, witty, or cleanly, which are all moral qualities according to his theory, as much as to be just, and honest; or, if the obligation is not precisely in the same degree as to both, it is, however, by his system, most certainly an obligation of the same kind. This seems to me repugnant to sound morals, as well as to the common actions of mankind. It is our author's error, from the beginning to the end, to have overlooked those innate feelings of duty; that authority which conscience carries in itself, prescribing to us certain virtues as a rule or law; upon which {33} alone morality can be founded and ascertained. Instead of this, he has a loose and indeterminate approbation, which may be applied to so many qualities of the mind, and of such different natures, that it can never ascertain virtue or found moral obligation. What you are most pleased with in this author's performance, you tell me, is his great principle of utility; and you cannot but think he has very happily illustrated it, as a key to that general admiration and esteem which all mankind have for virtue. You think there is something new, and, at the same time, simple and neat, in this manner of stating the foundation of virtue. Not altogether new, I must observe; for Mr. led the way by resolving all the several virtues into benevolence, as our author has done into utility; which, in his sense of it, is much the same. That all virtue is useful, or has a tendency to promote general happiness, is {34} what no mortal denies: but the question is, whether that approbation, which we give to virtue, is founded upon the sense of this useful tendency; and whether even the most rude and untaught minds carry this always in view, whenever they approve of an action as virtuous? is it not, for instance, very forced to suppose, with our author[8], that female chastity has no other foundation than a sense of the utility of this virtue? that it is a virtue of great advantage to society, and, in that view, highly to be prized, will be readily granted him. But does he really think, that, when the chastity of a virtuous woman is attacked, it is nothing but the sense of a public interest, and regard to the good of society, that prompts her to maintain her innocence? Besides education and acquired habits, which I allow to have great influence, is there no such thing as an instinct of natural modesty, or a sense of honour or pride, {35} which acts as the guardian of chastity, independent of all utility? Indeed, the more I reflect upon it, the more presumptions occur, that there is something unsound in the manner in which our author applies his principle of utility. Utility, in his sense of it, signifies the tendency of every kind of quality, whether to our own happiness or to the happiness of others. Now, self-love is, undoubtedly, a stronger principle in our nature than social sympathy; and, therefore, it seems clearly to follow, that, if utility be the only, or chief foundation of the moral approbation, qualities, which are useful to ourselves in particular, ought to raise a much higher degree of this moral approbation, than qualities useful to mankind in general. But this does not hold in fact. Private usefulness raises little or no moral approbation, in comparison of what is raised by being useful to the public. This is a stubborn fact, {36} incapable of being disguised; and, in my apprehension, is quite inconsistent with our author's theory. Another presumption against his doctrine is this. Were usefulness the principal foundation of morals, justice ought to have a much higher degree of praise and approbation attending it, than generosity, magnanimity, heroism, or any of the exalted virtues; because, undoubtedly, justice is more useful to the world than any of these. But the contrary holds good in fact. Matters are, indeed, so artfully contrived by the author of our nature, that the transgression of justice is more severely punished by inward remorse, and by universal blame, than a transgression of any of the exalted virtues. But, at the same time, it is certain, that these exalted virtues stand higher, in the praise and approbation of mankind, than justice: which seems clearly to shew, that usefulness {37} is not the chief foundation of that approbation of praise. But, to come nearer to the point, I think it is in my power demonstrably to evince, That utility cannot possibly be any part of the foundation of morals; and, that our author plainly has mistaken the effect for the cause. And here you will not grudge the utmost attention, where the purpose is to ascertain the true foundation of morality. To begin with benevolence; with regard to which, the author admits, That it is, in some measure, the object of an immediate approbation; but, at the same time, contends, that "[9]at least a part of the merit of benevolence arises from its tendency to promote the interests of our species, and bestow happiness on human society." This, no doubt, is a very innocent proposition, and may be indulged in popular discourse. But, in strict reasoning {38} and true philosophy, it cannot be admitted. By the of benevolence, our author can mean nothing else but the value which we put upon it; the respect and esteem which we have for it. Now, if this be the meaning, it can easily be demonstrated, That the very reverse of his proposition is true; . That the merit of usefulness arises from the principle of benevolence. Nothing can be more clear. For, take away the principle of benevolence, where would be the merit of our author's boasted utility? or what foundation would there be for putting any value upon useful actions? To a being that had no benevolence, useful, or pernicious actions, would be indifferent: and, to a being thoroughly malicious, actions of a bad tendency would be the most grateful. It is incontestably clear then, that actions, cone to promote the interests of our species, are approved of, upon the principle of benevolence: and, so far is {39} benevolence from deriving any part of its merit from usefulness, that, on the contrary, the whole merit of usefulness is derived from benevolence. Let us apply the same sort of reasoning to justice, which, our author strenuously contends, has no foundation whatever, but its usefulness. Before I give my assent to this proposition, the author cannot take it amiss to have question or two put to him. The first is, To what end is justice useful? Our author, foreseeing this question, has given his answer in the following words, "That justice is useful, for preserving to every man the peaceable possession of what he has acquired by his labour and industry." Hiving got satisfaction upon this head, I demand again, Whence arises the utility of preserving to every man the peaceable possession of what he has acquired by labour and industry? The answer must be, that it arises from that peculiar satisfaction which every man has, when he {40} is secured in the possession of such goods, without being exposed to violence; for, had he no satisfaction of this kind, nor any affection for such goods, the utility would vanish. Again, were there no benevolence, would the distress, which man feels when his goods are torn from him, give us any concern? Certainly not. Why then is benevolence overlooked in searching for the foundation of justice? It now clearly appears, not only, that justice supported by benevolence, but, considered as an useful virtue, that it also derives part at least of its merit from benevolence. But further, our author must acknowledge a fact which is incontestably true, that every man distinguishes goods acquired by his labour and industry, from what he has acquired the possession of by fraud, force, or other unjustifiable means. With regard to the former, he is conscious of wrong done him {41} when dispossessed by violence; he calls such an action robbery: when deprived of the latter by the hands of justice, he has no such consciousness; but rather, that he was treated as he deserved. At the same time, all mankind join with him in these sentiments; and hence that universal indignation against those who, breaking through all natural restraints, are guilty of robbery or theft. But one step further, my dear Sir, and we shall have displayed to us in full light the true and solid foundation of justice. Recollecting what is laid down above, we find, that goods which we have acquired by labour and industry, by inheritance, or by other honest means, are distinguished form all others. We have a peculiar affection for such goods: we have a consciousness of wrong when deprived of them; and the person, who commits the wrong, {42} becomes the object of our resentment, and of the indignation of mankind. Here, a relation is established betwixt us and such goods by the strongest natural sentiments; and this singular relation, mankind have agreed to denominate by the word . It is evident then, in the first place, that property is founded in the nature of man, antecedently to all positive laws and conventions: in the next place, that justice derives its force and authority from the singular feelings which characterize property; and consequently, that justice rests upon these feelings, as its true and solid foundation. To conclude, the error is the same here that our author has unwarily committed, with regard to benevolence. He has endeavoured to invert human nature, by assigning that as the cause which is truly the effect. "Utility," he says, "is the foundation of justice, {43} and justice of property:" whereas, in truth, property, and the natural sentiments which give it birth, are the foundation of justice, as well as of all the utility we ascribe to it. And, after all, a single reflexion might have made this evident to him. Laying aside property and the natural sentiments which produce it, there could be no such thing as injustice; we could have no conception of justice; and as little of that beauty, merit and usefulness we ascribe to it. In handling this subject, I would by no means be understood to deny, that usefulness, by a reflex act, may become an additional motive to justice. I only assert, that it is not the foundation of this virtue; which, I think, can be clearly traced back to a primary, original feeling in human nature. The case of justice, with respect to utility, is pretty much the same as that of eating and {44} drinking, with respect to self-preservation. Nature has provided us with proper appetites, which move us to eat and drink, in the same manner, as the feelings of right and wrong move us to do justice. Justice, it is true, is useful, and so are eating and drinking; but usefulness is not the foundation or principle of either; though usefulness may sometimes become an additional motive to do justice, as well as to take nourishment when we have no appetite. The above is so agreeable to the natural notions of mankind, that whoever endeavours to establish an opposite theory, will find it difficult to keep clear of contradictions. Our ingenious author may be taxed with something of this nature. For, reasoning upon the usefulness of justice[10], he shews it to be the design of public laws, to secure to every man the peaceable possession of his property, the privilege of transmitting {45} it to his posterity, and the power of transferring it to others, by mutual consent. This is, in effect, acknowledging the idea of property to be antecedent to these laws, and to be the foundation of them. And yet, in the same page, he asserts, That and have no meaning, but in consequence of these laws. Thus, he makes property the foundation of these laws, and these laws the foundation of property. I am not surprised you should be pleased with a work, which, in an elegant dress, promises a neat and simple theory of morals. But, if the above hints shall engage you to a more accurate review, I am confident you will discover this new theory to be slight and altogether unsound. Human nature is a complex machine; and, by a careful investigation of its several springs and movements, it appears {46} to me, That we are more likely to arrive at a just view of morals, as a science, than by establishing, too hastily, a single principle, and building an entire system upon it. Any further observations of mine you desire, I shall always be ready to communicate, as you know me to be, with sincere attachment, SIR, Your most humble Servant. FINIS. [Notes] [1][COPYRIGHT: (c) 1995, James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu), all rights reserved. Unaltered copies of this computer text file may be freely distribute for personal and classroom use. Alterations to this file are permitted only for purposes of computer printouts, although altered computer text files may not circulate. Except to cover nominal distribution costs, this file cannot be sold without written permission from the copyright holder. This copyright notice supersedes all previous notices on earlier versions of this text file. When quoting from this text, please use the following citation: , ed. James Fieser (Internet Release, 1995). EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS: letters between slashes (e.g., H/UME\) designate small capitalization. Letters within angled brackets (e.g., ) designate italics. Note references are contained within square brackets (e.g., [1]). Original pagination is contained within curly brackets (e.g., {1}). Spelling and punctuation have not been modernized. Printer's errors have been corrected without note. Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a working draft. Please report errors to James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu).] [2]Page 34, 35. [3]Page 41. [4]Page 215. [5]Page 75. [6]Page 133, & seq. [7]Note, page 135. [8]Page 66. [9]Page 31. [10]Page 52.