EARLY COMMENTARIES ON HUME'S WRITINGS
                                  
                                  
    <Remarks on Mr. David Hume's Essay on The Natural History of
                             Religion>
                                  
                                 by
                                  
                         William Warburton

                                1757
                                  
                                  
                               5/1/95
                                  
Copyright 1995, James Fieser (jfieser@utm.edu). See end note for
details on copyright and editing conventions. This is a working
draft; please report errors.[1]
                                  
Editor's note: William Warburton (1698-1779) was bishop of
Gloucester and was known for his editions of Shakespeare and Pope,
his attack on deism in the  <Divine legation of Moses
demonstrated>.... (1737-1741), and his involvement in numerous
controversies. He first became interested in Hume in 1749 after
reading the essay "Of Miracles" which prompted him to sketch a brief
attack.[2] His contempt for Hume's essay is also reflected in a
passing reference in his 1751 edition of Pope's  <Dunciad>.[3]
Warburton originally wrote his <Remarks> in the margin of his copy
of Hume's <Four Dissertations>, which his colleague Richard Hurd
later transcribed into publishable form. It appeared anonymously in
1757, six months after Hume's <Four Dissertations>, disguised as a
letter <to> Warburton by an unnamed admirer. The <Critical Review>
opened its review of the <Remarks> with the following:
                                  
     This little Pamphlet of seventy-six pages contains some short,
     but severe strictures on Mr. David Hume, addressed to the
     learned Dr. Warburton, with whose works our author seems to be
     intimately acquainted. He hath therefore professedly copied
     that ingenious writer's turn of thinking and expression, which
     he has done, as the Italians say, <con amore>. Whether the copy
     is exact, or, to use the painter's phrase, is done after the
     doctor's best manner or not, our readers will be able to
     determine....
                                  
     Hume learned of Warburton's authorship from his printer,
William Strahan, who also printed the <Remarks>.[4] In a letter to
his publisher, Andrew Millar, Hume writes: "I am positively assurd,
that Dr Warburton wrote that Letter [i.e. <Remarks>] to himself
which you sent me; and indeed the Style discovers him
sufficiently."[5] Nevertheless, in his autobiography, Hume
identifies Hurd as the author, and not Warburton.[6]
     In 1777, shortly after Hume's death, the <Remarks> were
published again, with only minor changes in spelling and
punctuation, probably introduced by the printer. The 1777 edition
contains the following preface:
                                  
     The bookseller to the reader: The following is supposed to be
     the Pamphlet referred to by the late Mr. David Hume, in Page
     21, of his Life, <as being written by> Dr. Hurd. Upon my
     applying to the Bishop of Litchfield and Coventry for his
     permission to republish it, he very readily gave me his
     consent. His Lordship only added, he was sorry he could not
     take to himself the whole infamy of the charge brought against
     him; but that he should hereafter, if he thought it worth his
     while, explain himself more particularly on that subject.
     Strand, March, 1777. T. Cadell.[7]
                                  
     Warburton died in 1779, and in 1788 the first edition of his
collected works appeared, which included the <Remarks> in Volume
seven.[8] The 1788 edition retains the printer's alterations from
the 1777 edition and introduces further changes, both major and
minor. In 1794 Hurd wrote his <Discourse, by way of general preface>
to this edition of Warburton's Works (excerpts of which are included
in this anthology). There Hurd explains his own role in the
<Remarks>,[9] and notes that the 1788 edition presents the <Remarks>
"in their original form," presumably as appeared in Warburton's
marginal comments. Comparison of the 1757 and 1788 editions
indicates that Hurd's literary contribution to the piece was mainly
in writing the opening address and conclusion. He also added to the
body a few paragraphs and transitional sentences. The 1811 and 1848
editions of Warburton's <Works> follow the 1788 edition. I have
followed the 1757 version which includes Hurd's contributions. Major
changes which appear in the 1788 edition are given in footnotes.
Biographies on Warburton are Hurd's <Discourse> (1794), John Selby
Watson's <The Life of William Warburton> (London: 1863) and A.W.
Evans's <Warburton and the Warburtonians>, (London: 1932).


                              * * * *
                                  
                                  
                                  
                 REMARKS ON MR. DAVID HUME'S ESSAY
                                  
                ON THE NATURAL HISTORY OF RELIGION:
                                  
               ADDRESSED TO THE REV. DR. W/ARBURTON\.

     "To wash away a few slight stains be mine;
     "Charge him with Heaven's artillery, bold D/IVINE\.[10]

                              LONDON.
                                  
           Printed for M. C/OOPER\, in Pater-noster-row.
                                  
                             MDCCLVII.
                                  
                       [Price One Shilling.]
                                  
                                  
                                  
                                 TO
                                  
                    The Rev. Dr. WARBURTON.[11]

     R/EV\. S/IR\,

I TAKE leave to address myself to you as to the supposed Author of
the F/OUR\ L/ETTERS\ <on Lord Bolingbroke's Philosophy>.[12] Under
this character, if indeed it belongs to you, you seem to have a
right to the following Remarks; which are, in truth, little more
than your own Remarks, only transferred from your Patrician, to this
Plebeian Naturalist.
     Permit me to say, that you have unmasked and for ever
discredited the philosophical lucubrations of that unhappy Nobleman;
who, in times that demanded the mere Politician to assist in
impressing the belief of a moral Governor on the minds of men, was
so forsaken of every patriot principle as to labour with all his
might to exclude the Creator from his Works, and by the doctrine of
an impious fatalism to emancipate an abandoned people from the /FEAR
OF\ G/OD\.
     It became the eminence of your character to go forth against
this bold invader of Heaven. Your conquest was complete. And what
could one expect as the fruit of it, but that, this chieftain of
Impiety being subdued, the rabble of the enemy would disperse and
fly before you; at least that they would not rally again, till in
future times some other Champion of their cause, as illustrious by
his name and quality, should arise to reconduct them to the charge.
     But, alas! the irreligious Spirit, tho' it may be disgraced, is
not so easily suppressed. E'er the public had time to celebrate your
triumphs, behold a puny Dialectician from the North, (for as Erasmus
long since observed, <Scoti> D/IALECTICIS\ A/RGUTIIS\ <sibi
blandiuntur>),[13] all over armed with doubts and disputation, steps
forth into his place; and, with the same beggarly troop of routed
sophisms, comes again to the attack.
     But now, as the enemy is so contemptible, and the danger so
little pressing, you may well enjoy your repose, and leave it to
some inferior hand to chastise his insolence. And the very weakest
may be equal to this attempt. For nothing remains but to employ
against him the weapons which you have furnished; in a word, to draw
again that sword of the spirit, which you had borrowed from the
Sanctuary, and whole resistless splendour flashes, if not
conviction, yet confusion in every face.
     To this office I presume to devote myself. I have a portion at
least of your zeal to animate my endeavours. And if my talents
should be found as mean as those of my Adversary, this circumstance
would not discourage me. The contest would only be more equal; and
in such a quarrel the serious advocate for Religion would be sorry
to owe his success to any thing but the goodness of his cause.
     This, Sir, is all I had thought to say of myself. But being got
on so seducing a subject, the importance, which every author is of
to himself, makes me imagine that perhaps you may be tempted to push
your inquiries concerning me somewhat farther. And if, haply, any
such curiosity should be raised, tho' I have my reasons for being a
little on the reserve with you, something at least I could be
content to hazard for your satisfaction.
     Of my <Person>, indeed, I must have leave to make no discovery.
And to tell you the truth, I have taken such effectual precautions
as to that particular, that I venture to say you will never know
more of me than you do at present. You may believe, if you please,
that my vanity has suffered something in resolving on this
concealment.
     But then in quality of <Author> of these Remarks, I have not
the same scruples. It may be fitting, you should know something more
of the W/RITER'S\ intention and character. And in this respect he is
very ready to gratify you.
     T/HE\ A/UTHOR\ then of these Remarks on Mr. Hume's Essay is
O/NE\ who, as you would otherwise conclude from the Remarks
themselves, hath made a diligent study of your works; is familiar
and, in a manner, conscious to your turn of thinking upon all
subjects; and interests himself, more particularly, in all your
views and projects for the support and advancement of religious
truth.
     But notwithstanding this intimacy with you, which might be
justly suspected of creating a bias in most minds, he arrogates to
himself the merit of judging of you more freely, nay to be plain
with you, more severely, than perhaps your enemies themselves. He is
extremely apprehensive of being misled or imposed upon in matters of
this high concern: he considers the difficulty of the subjects; the
fascination of favourite principles; the errors to which the best
and most watchful writers are liable: And is the last man in the
world who, out of a fondness for your notions, would neglect or
betray any useful truth. He is One therefore that weighs your
arguments without considering your authority, or even the disgrace
you might be thought to incur from the confutation of them. Reading
and criticizing you with this spirit, you are not to wonder that he
hath sometimes seen cause to censure, where others admire. He hath
even considered your volumes with a diligence which might have
profited your adversaries; for he hath detected, not inaccuracies
only, but <weaknesses> in your writings, which the most malignant of
them have overlooked. To make you amends for this mortification, he
does you the justice to profess that those Adversaries, as far as he
is acquainted with them, have universally done you wrong.
     With all this suspicious and unrelenting criticism about him,
he is ready to believe however that your views are honest: he
acknowledges that the main of your System is strong and impregnable;
he sees no reason for you to desert the great design you have
undertaken; and admits that your talents for the execution of it,
tho' not in his eyes what your fond admirers represent them, yet are
such as may not unusefully, and, considering the times in which we
live, may even creditably enough be employed by you in such a cause.
     In a word, the A/UTHOR\ of these Remarks is One who approves
your Principles; or he would not have made use of them, even in this
service. He thinks there is force and conviction in your Reasonings;
or he would not have tried the strength of them upon others, and
least of all upon so captious, versatile, and evasive a writer as
Him, with whom he is here concerned. But what he takes upon himself
to say he is most confident of, is your <zeal for the interests of
truth and virtue>; without which, whatever your merit there might be
in your writings, he could have no complacency in the writer.
     In consequence of this last judgment, which he forms of you, he
hath not scrupled to adopt your <manner> of composition, as well as
Arguments. He knows what the gentle reader thinks of it. But he is
not one of those cool opposers of Infidelity, who can reason without
earnestness, and confute without warmth. He leaves it to others, to
the soft Divine and courtly Controversialist, to combat the most
flagitious tenets with serenity; or maintain the most awful of
religious truths in a way, that misleads the unwary reader into an
opinion of their making but little impression on the writer's own
heart. For himself, he freely owns he is apt to <kindle> as he
writes; and would even blush to repel an insult on sense and virtue
with less vigour than every honest man is expected to shew in his
own case.
     At the same time he is not so blinded by his zeal, as to
overlook a difference on /OCCASIONS\. He would not incur the
ridicule of misapplying his strength; and is therefore content to
soften his polemics a little, not in complaisance to such judges,
but in conformity to his subject. Yet to put matters at the lowest,
he remembers what the character of his piece should be, as delivered
by a great Master -- M/ULTAE, ET CUM GRAVITATE, FACETIAE: QUODQUE
DIFFICILE EST, IDEM ET PERORNATUS ET BREVIS\.[14] And if he should
not be thought to have catched the spirit of it so fully, as you
have done on certain occasions, he pretends at least to have had
this character in view, and to have copied it, as he was able; tho'
at the hazard, he foresees, of passing with the too delicate critic,
for a /SERVILE\ I/MITATOR\.
     This, Sir, is the whole of what he thinks fit to declare of
himself. For the R/EMARKS\ themselves, which are here offered you,
he pretends only, that they are such as occurred to him on a single
reading of the Essay; that they were entered hastily on the margin,
as he went along; and that he now transcribes them with little or no
variation, for the public use. Nor let that Public take it amiss
from the writer, that he treats them with this appearance of
neglect. The various topics, he knows, which are touched upon in the
Essay, might afford room for much useful and curious speculation. He
knows too, what his Duty to the public requires from him on a proper
occasion. But he never designed the following animadversions for an
elaborate piece of instruction or entertainment to the learned
reader. He would only employ a vacant hour in exposing to the
laughter of every man, that can read, the futility, licence, and
vanity of Mr. D/AVID\ H/UME\.

                             REMARK I.
                                  
     The writer, I have to do with, is a Veteran in the dark and
deadly trade of Irreligion. But my concern at present is only with a
volume of his, just now given to the public and entitled, F/OUR\
D/ISSERTATIONS\. And of these <Four>, I confine myself to the
F/IRST\, which bears the portentous name of an Essay, <On the
natural history of Religion>.[15]
     The purpose of it is to establish N/ATURALISM\ on the ruins of
R/ELIGION\; of which, whether under Paganism and Polytheism, or
under Revelation and the doctrine of the Unity, he professes to give
the N/ATURAL\ H/ISTORY\.[16]
     And here let me observe it to his honour, that, tho' he be not
yet got to T/HEISM\, he is however on the advance and approaching to
the borders of it;[17] having been in the dregs of Atheism when he
wrote his Epicurean arguments against the being of a God.[18]
Sometime or other he may come to his senses. A few animadversions on
the <Essay> before us may help him forwards. The thing is full of
curiosities: And the very <title-page>, as I observed, demands our
attention. It is called,
                                  
              T/HE\ N/ATURAL\ H/ISTORY OF\ R/ELIGION\.
                                  
     You ask, why he chuses to give it this title. Would not the
<Moral history of Meteors> be as full as sensible as the <Natural
history of Religion>? Without doubt. Indeed had he given the history
of what he himself would pass upon us for the only true Religion,
namely, N/ATURALISM\, or the belief of a God, the Creator and
Physical Preserver, but not moral Governor of the world, the title
of <Natural> would have fitted it well, because all <Morality> is
excluded form the Idea.
     But this great Philosopher is never without his Reasons. It is
to insinuate, that what the world calls Religion, of which he
undertakes to give the history, is not founded in the J/UDGMENT\,
but in the P/ASSIONS\ only. However the expression labours
miserably, as it does thro' all his profound Lucubrations. And where
is the wonder that he who disdains to think in the mode of common
sense, should be unable to express himself in the proprieties of
common language?
     <As every Inquiry which regards Religion> (says that
respectable Personage) <is of the utmost importance, there are two
questions in particular which challenge our principal attention, to
wit, that concerning its foundation in reason, and that concerning
its> /ORIGIN IN HUMAN\ N/ATURE\.[19]
     Here we see, he aims at a distinction. And what he aims at is
not hard to find. The question is, whether he has hit the mark. I am
afraid, not. And then the discovery of his aim is only the detection
of his ignorance. In a word, it is a distinction without a
difference.
     If man be rightly defined a <rational animal>, then his Nature,
or what our Philosopher calls <human Nature>, must be a <rational>
Nature. But if so, a /FOUNDATION IN\ R/EASON\ and an /ORIGIN IN
HUMAN\ N/ATURE\ are not too different predicates, but one and the
same only in different expressions. Do I say, therefore, that our
Philosopher had no meaning, because he was unable to express any?
Far be that from the Reverence due to this Rectifier of Prejudices.
My objection at present is not to his Theology but his Logic. By
<Origin in human Nature> he meant, Origin in the fancy or the
Passions. For that Religion, which has the origin, here designed, is
what the world calls R/ELIGION\; and this he resolves into
<fanaticism> or <superstition>: As that Religion which has its
<foundation in reason> is what the world calls N/ATURALISM\, the
Religion of Philosophers like himself, and which he endeavours in
the Essay to establish.
     But do not believe, I intend to meddle with this <Religion of
Philosophers> any further than to expose it to the public contempt,
as it deserves. Even I should be finely employed, not to say you, to
enter into a formal confutation of Mr. David Hume's <Naturalism>.
However I think it incumbent on me to prove, that this is indeed the
Religion which this honest man means to recommend in his <Natural
History>. For so heavy a charge ought never to be made without good
evidence to support it.[20]
     In his third Section, at the 16th page, he makes /UNKNOWN
CAUSES\ the origin of what men call <Religion>, that Religion which
his History pretends to investigate.
                                  
     These /UNKNOWN CAUSES\, says He, become the constant object of
     our hope and fear; and while the passions are kept in perpetual
     alarm by an anxious expectation of the events, the imagination
     is equally employed in forming ideas of those powers, on which
     we have so entire a dependance.
     
He then goes on to acquaint us with the original of these /UNKNOWN
CAUSES\.
                                  
          Could men anatomize Nature, according to the most
     probable, at least the most intelligible philosophy, they would
     find, that these <Causes> are nothing but the particular fabric
     and structure of the /MINUTE PARTS OF THEIR OWN BODIES AND OF
     EXTERNAL OBJECTS\; and that, by a regular and constant
     machinery, all the events are produced, about which they are so
     much concerned. But this Philosophy exceeds the comprehension
     of the ignorant multitude.[21]
                                  
     Here we see, the original of these <unknown causes> is nothing
but the result of /MATTER\ and /MOTION\. And again,
                                  
     The Vulgar, that is, indeed, /ALL MANKIND\, a few excepted,
     being ignorant and uninstructed, never elevate their
     contemplation to the Heavens, or penetrate by their
     disquisitions into the /SECRET STRUCTURE OF VEGETABLE OR ANIMAL
     BODIES\; so as to discover a supreme mind or original
     providence, which bestowed order on every part of Nature. They
     consider these admirable works in a more confined and selfish
     view; and finding their own happiness and misery to depend on
     the secret influence and unforeseen concurrence of external
     objects, they regard, with perpetual attention, the /UNKNOWN
     CAUSES\, which govern all these natural events, and distribute
     pleasure and pain, good and ill, by their powerful, but silent,
     operation. The /UNKNOWN CAUSES\ are still appealed to, at every
     emergence; and in this general appearance or confused image,
     are the perpetual objects of human hopes and fears, wishes and
     apprehensions. By degrees, the active imagination of men,
     uneasy in this abstract conception of objects, about which it
     is incessantly employed, begins to render them more particular,
     and to cloathe them in shapes more suitable to its natural
     comprehension. It represents them to be sensible, intelligent
     beings, like mankind; actuated by love and hatred, and flexible
     by gifts and entreaties, by prayers and sacrifices. H/ENCE THE
     ORIGIN OF\ R/ELIGION\: <And hence the origin of idolatry or
     Polytheism>.22
                                  
     The <few excepted> out of the <whole race of mankind> are, we
see, our Philosopher and his gang, with their Pedler's ware of
<matter> and <motion, who penetrate by their disquisitions into the
secret structure of vegetable and animal bodies>, to extract, like
the Naturalist in Guliver, <Sunbeams out of Cucumbers>; just as wise
a Project as this of raising Religion out of the intrigues of
<matter and motion>.
     All this shews how desirous our Essayist was of not being
misunderstood: as meaning any thing else than Naturalism (or the
belief of a Creator and Physical Preserver, but not Moral Governor)
by the Religion he would recommend in the place of that Phantom,
whose physical, or rather metaphysical, history he is writing. For
this Phantom of a Religion, which acknowledges a <moral Governor>,
arises, he tells us, from our ignorance of the result of <matter>
and <motion>, caballing <in the minute parts of vegetable and animal
bodies>.
     The sum then of all he teaches is this; That that Religion, of
which he professes himself a follower, and which has <its foundation
in Reason>, is N/ATURALISM\: and, That that Religion which <all
mankind> follow, <a few excepted>, and of which he undertakes to
give a <natural history>, is nothing but <Superstition> and
<Fanaticism>, having <its origin in human Nature>; that is, in the
imagination and the passions only.

                             REMARK II.
                                  
     This fully justifies the censure, which has been passed upon
him for his <History of Great Britain>; namely, that he owned no
R/ELIGION\ but what might be resolved into S/UPERSTITION\ or
F/ANATICISM\; having represented the established Episcopal Church,
and the tolerated Presbyterian Form under the Names and the Ideas of
Superstition and Fanaticism.[23] Indeed, (to do him justice,) tho'
with much offence, yet without much malignity and contrary to his
intention. For he ingenuously enough confessed, that he gave his
History that attic seasoning for no other end than to fit it to the
palate of a very polite people; whose virtues, having only reached
him at a distance, had, as is usual, been much exaggerated. To make
amends, however, for this false step, he thought proper to give an
ample apology for his conduct towards the close of the second Volume
of his History.24 And this containing something more than an
Insinuation that he believed, what his <Natural History of Religion>
shews he does not believe, namely, the truth of Christianity, I
shall take leave, without any suspicion of being thought to go out
of my way, to consider it paragraph by paragraph.
     <This Sophism>, says he, <of arguing from the abuse of any
thing, against the use of it, is one of the grossest, and at the
same time the most common to which men are subject. The history of
all ages, and none more than that of the Period which is our
subject, offers us examples of the abuse of Religion: And we have
not been sparing in this volume, more than in the former, to remark
them. But whoever would from thence draw an inference to the
disadvantage of Religion in general, would argue very rashly and
erroneously>.[25]
     Thus he begins his Apology: And would not every Reader of him
naturally believe that he was quoting the words of an animadverter
upon him, in reproof of this very Sophistry; which he was going to
answer? For who was it that had been <drawing this inference to the
disadvantage of Religion>, but our wise Historian himself; who had
acknowledged no Religion but one or other of these specieses,
<Superstition> or <Fanaticism>; and had done his best to shew of
what infinite mischief both of them were to Society? The Reader may
believe what he pleases; (and if he be a Reader of Mr. Hume, he will
find exercise enough for his faith) but, this sage observation is
our Historian's own. And the pleasantry of it, is, you are obliquely
requested to consider it as a reproof, not of his own malice, but of
the folly of his readers, who understood their Historian to be in
<earnest> when he gave this picture of the religion of his country;
whereas they had read him to little purpose, if they did not see him
to be in the number of those who throw about them firebrands and
death, and say, am I not in <jest>? However, to be fair, I am ready
to excuse <his readers> in this (perhaps they can be excused in
little else) for it is not to be disguised that their master does
indeed make <the abuses of Religion> and <Religion itself> to be one
and the same thing. All things considered therefore, I cannot but
take this introduction to his apology, to be the pleading guilty
with the insolent air of an Accuser, and, under the circumstances of
a convict, talking the language of his judge.
     However, tho' in his first Volume of History he neither spoke
of, nor supposed any other Religion than what might be comprised
either under superstition or fanaticism, yet here, in the second, he
does indeed bring us acquainted with another, and defines it thus;
<The proper office of Religion is to reform men's lives, to purify
their hearts, to inforce all moral duties, and to secure obedience
to the laws of the civil Magistrate>. Now, was Mr. David Hume only
playing the Philosopher, I should take this to be no more than the
Definition of a mere <moral mode>, known by the name of a <divine
philosophy in the mind>; something fluctuating in the <brain> of
these Virtuosi, and ennobled with the title of <Natural Religion>:
But as he is writing History, and the History of Great Britain,
where the <Religion of Jesus>, as he has since learnt, is yet
professed, I can hardly persuade myself that he can mean any other,
than a Religion whose abode is in the <heart>, and which expatiates
into virtuous practice; and is therefore indeed capable of
performing all these good things he speaks of. But why then, when he
had heard so much of those bug-bear Counterfeits, <Superstition> and
<Fanaticism>, was there not one Word slipt in, in recommendation of
this <reforming Religion>? One word, in mere charity, for the honor
of his dear country? That Strangers at least (for he writes at large
and for all mankind) might not suspect, if ever indeed there was a
true Religion amongst us, that these Impostors and Counterfeits had
driven her quite away. Well; be not too hasty. To this he has an
admirable Answer; and you shall have it in his own Words -- <While
it> [i.e. the true species of Religion, which he had just defined]
<pursues these salutary purposes, its operations, tho' infinitely
valuable, are secret and silent, and seldom come under the
cognizance of history. The adulterate species of it alone, which
inflames Faction, animates Sedition, and prompts Rebellion,
distinguishes itself on the open theatre of the world, and is the
great source of Revolutions and public Convulsions. The Historian
therefore has scarce any occasion to mention any other kind of
Religion, and he may maintain the highest regard for true piety,
even while he exposes all the abuses of the false>.
     So it seems, that what <reforms men's lives, purifies their
hearts, inforces moral duties, and secures obedience to the laws of
the civil magistrate>, is not worth a wise Historian's Notice. If it
were, he gives a very cogent reason why he should bring it to the
Notice of his readers likewise, for he tells us that the effects of
this are /SECRET\ and /SILENT\. Should not the Historian therefore
lend a tongue to this powerful but modest directress of human life,
and bring her in all her lustre into our acquaintance? But <she
seldom comes under the cognizance of History>. More shame for these
false masters of the Ceremonies who so scandalously abuse their
office.
     Then it is, the Historian shines when he celebrates that
<adulterate species of Religion, which inflames faction, animates
sedition, and prompts rebellion>: For then it is that to these
public Mischiefs he may add his own, and under the cover of the
<adulterate species> inculcate to the people that all Religion is
either <superstition> or <fanaticism>.
     If this was not his purpose, and he had no other design than to
write sober history, how could it ever enter into his head, that it
was not at least equally his business to explain to us what that
thing is which makes society happy, as what that is which makes it
wretched and miserable? But from the honest man let us turn to the
able writer, for in that light too he seems to have failed. It
appears to me a matter of much greater importance that we should be
brought acquainted with true religion and its blessings, than with
the false and all its mischiefs: Because how shall we be able to
avoid the latter, under our ignorance of the former, without running
into the opposite extreme, and professing no religion at all? Now,
tho' this perhaps is what our historian would be at, yet he has
found by experience, his Readers are not so ready to follow as he is
to lead.
     Had our Historian only consulted the Dignity of his Subject, in
this too he would have found a great difference; or if he could not,
a great example at least was before his eyes, to have pointed out
that difference; Lord B/ACON\, in his history of Henry VII. This,
which in many respects is a model for this kind of writing, is much
larger and more precise in the account of those Laws by which Henry
laid the foundation of a flourishing and happy Kingdom, than of the
Insurrections and Rebellions which disturbed his own reign.[26] Had
he taken our Author's route, and incurred the censure so justly due
to it, I apprehend he had made a very foolish figure both amongst
his contemporaries and posterity, by an apology of this kind. <The
proper office of> L/AWS\ <is to reform men's lives, to inforce all
moral duties and to secure obedience to the civil Magistrate; but
while they pursue their salutary purposes, their operations, tho'
infinitely valuable, are secret and silent, and seldom come under
the cognizance of History>. L/AWLESS\ R/AGE\ <alone, which inflames
faction, animates Sedition, and prompts Rebellion, is what
distinguishes itself on the open theatre of the world, and is the
proper province of the Historian>. Suppose this great Historian, and
He too was a <Philosopher>, had executed what he once projected, the
history of his illustrious Mistress, are we to believe that because
Walsingham's <Salutary operations> were done in <Secrecy> and in
<Silence>, that there he would let them have lain, as <not coming
under the cognizance of history>, and <only> buried[27] himself in a
circumstantial detail of the rogueries and turbulencies of the sons
of Loyola? Would he not have gained more honour to himself, and
procured more benefit to his reader by revealing and explaining all
the wheels and movements of that political machine, from which, as
from the urn of a Demi-God, flowed abundance and felicity on his
country, than by unravelling the intrigues of the Jesuits which
spread sedition, rebellion and murders all around them?
     But to see how differently men's heads are framed even amongst
great Historians. T/ACITUS\ laments bitterly that his fortune had
thrown him in an age, when there was nothing to write of but these
horrors, <factions, seditions, public convulsions and Revolutions>.
                                  
     Opus aggredior opimum casibus, atrox praeliis, discors
     seditionibus, ipsa etiam pace faevum: quatuor principes ferro
     interempti: tria bella civilia, plura externa, ac plerumque
     permixta.[28]
                                  
Our Christian Historian riots in these calamities; and thinks that
<what inflames faction, animates sedition, prompts rebellion, and
distinguishes itself on the open theatre of the world, is the only
thing becoming the dignity of History>.
     In a word, the offence he gave was for calling the Christian
Religion, <Superstition> and <Fanaticism>. He says, it was <false>
Religion, not the <true>, which he thus qualifies. He is asked then,
how he came to say so much of the <false>, and nothing of the
<true>? His answer is, That the true does everything in <secrecy and
silence>. The greater occasion therefore was there for him to reveal
this noble Mystery; for he tells us that both its aims and
operations are <infinitely valuable>. If therefore he be for keeping
it hid, like a court-secret, or if, in his own words, <it comes not
under his cognizance>, we must conclude, that either he knows little
of the matter, or that he believes less.
     In conclusion, his own Apology has reduced him to this Dilemma.
If he says, he intends the definition of Religion here given, for
the definition of the <Christian>, how came he to comprise all
Religion, as he does in the first volume of his History, under the
names of <Superstition> and <Fanaticism>? He there mentions no other
species; and so great a Philosopher could not be guilty of an
imperfect enumeration. If he says, he means <Natural Religion> by
his definition; he only fixes the charge against him the more
strongly, namely, Irreverence and contempt of Revelation.
     Either way, you see, our Apologist comes off but lamely. But
what then?
                                  
     -- To be of no Religion
     Argues a <Subtle moral Understanding>
     A/ND IT IS OFTEN CHERISH'D\. --
                                  
Thus it has been said; and I observe it for our virtuous Author's
consolation, notwithstanding the ill success of his History.[29]

                            REMARK III.

     But from his <Civil> let us return to his <Natural History>;
and see how he supports his Thesis. He does it by something between
history and argument. He calls it both: And You[30] perhaps will
think it neither.
     The belief of one God, the physical preserver but not moral
Governor of the Universe is, what we have shewn our Philosopher
dignifies with the title of <the primary principles of genuin Theism
and Religion>. Now, if the belief of one God, a moral Governor, was
prior in time to Polytheism, it will follow, that N/ATURALISM\ or
the belief of one God, a Physical preserver only, is not <genuin
Theism and Religion>. Because in his endeavour to prove Polytheism
the first in time, he has shewn the inability of mere uninstructed
man to rise up to this knowledge, on the first Essay of his Reason;
the consequence of which is, that if the infant world had this
knowledge, it must have been taught them by Revelation, and
whatsoever is so taught, must be <true>.
     But it is become the general opinion (which, though it has been
a long while growing, our philosopher hopes very speedily to
eradicate) that a belief of one God, the moral Governor, was the
first Religion; induced thereto by the express assertion of an
antient book confessedly of as good authority as any other record of
very remote antiquity.
     Our Philosopher's business therefore is to disprove the Fact.
And how do you think he sets about it? You see there are but two
ways. Either to prove <a priori>, and from the nature of things that
Polytheism must be before Theism; and then indeed he may reject
history and record: Or else <a posteriori>, and from antient
testimony; in which case, it will be incumbent on him to refute and
set aside that celebrated record which expressly tells us, Theism
was the first. Our honest Philosopher does neither. He insists
chiefly on antient testimony, but is as silent concerning the Bible
as is no such book had ever been written.
     Lord Bolingbroke, you know, before him had employed this very
medium of the priority of Polytheism to Theism, to inforce the same
conclusion, namely, N/ATURALISM\:[31] but knowing better how to
reason, and being perhaps at that moment less disposed to insult
common sense in so profligate a manner, he labours all he can to
depreciate the authority of the Bible. But our North British
Philosopher despises his reader too much to stand upon Punctilios
with him: he roundly affirms that all antiquity is on his side; and,
as if Moses had no human authority because he allows him no divine,
he will not condescend so much as to do him the honour, he has done
Sanconiathon,[32] of quoting him, tho' it was in order to confute
him. But you shall hear his own words, because his egregious
dishonesty has led him into as ridiculous an absurdity.
                                  
          As far as writing or history reaches, mankind, in antient
     times, appear universally to have been Polytheists. Shall we
     assert, that, in more antient times, before the knowledge of
     letters, or the discovery of any art of science, men
     entertained the principles of pure Theism? That is, while they
     were ignorant and barbarous, they discovered truth: But fell
     into error, as soon as they acquired learning and
     politeness.[33]
                                  
     <Shall we assert>, says he. Why, no body ever asserted that
Theism was before Polytheism but those who gave credit to their
bible. And those who did so can easily evade his difficulty, <that
it is not natural to think that before the knowledge of letters, or
the discovery of any art or science men entertained the principles
of pure Theism>; because this Bible tells us, that the first man did
not gain the principles of pure Theism by <a knowledge of letters or
the discovery of any art of science>, but by R/EVELATION\. But this
man, who had run into unlucky mistakes before concerning the state
of Religion in South Britain, believed in good earnest that we had
burnt our bibles, and that therefore it would be less generous to
insult its ashes, than to bury them in silence. This, I think, can
only account for that virtuous assurance where he says, that /AS FAR
AS WRITING OR HISTORY REACHES, MANKIND IN ANTIENT TIMES APPEAR
UNIVERSALLY TO HAVE BEEN\ P/OLYTHEIST\. And what system do you think
it is, of the <origin of mankind>, which he espouses, instead of the
Mosaic, to prove that Polytheism was the first Religion? No other, I
will assure you, than the old Egyptian nonsense, which attempts to
teach that men first started up like Mushrooms. In a word, the men
on whose principles this wonderful Logician argues, never questioned
the truth of his Thesis. To them therefore all this bustle of a
discovery is ridiculous and impertinent. And those, who dispute the
fact with him, the Religionists, he leaves in possession of all
their arguments. So they laugh at it as an idle dream, raised on the
absurdest of the Atheistic principles, the Epicurean.
     To this ridicule the reader sees, our philosopher exposes
himself, even if we believe him to be here speaking of <pure
theism>, in the proper sense of the words; that is of the belief of
a God, the <moral Governor of the World>. But <Ridicule> may not be
all which this mighty <Theist> deserves. For what, if our
Philosopher should mean by his <pure and geniun theism>, to which he
denies a priority of being, his favourite N/ATURALISM\? I should not
be surprised, if he did: It is but running his <usual> philosophic
course, from knavery to nonsense.
     The reader, as he goes along, will see abundant reason for this
charge. An Essay, then, so devoid of all manly sense, and even
plausibility of reasoning, can afford a Remarker no other
opportunity of entertaining the public with him, than that of
drawing the picture of some of his characteristic features, some of
the predominant qualities, of which he is made up. An admired
Antient, I remember, has given us his opinion of this Godless
Wisdom, which sets Heaven and Earth at defiance. It is according to
him,
                                  
                          GREEK QUOTE[34]

The charge is severe; yet you have made it out, but too clearly,
against this author's noble precursor in the waste spaces of Nature.
I would now do as much by the disciple and follower; and to that end
shall keep your example in view while I present the public with a
few specimens of his philosophical virtues, his Reasoning, his
Consistency, his Candour, and his Modesty; and all these
promiscuously, as the rise in the natural disorder of his
<Essay>.[35]

                             REMARK IV.

          Convulsions in Nature, says he, disorders, prodigies,
     /MIRACLES\, tho' the most opposite to the plan of a wise super-
     intendent, impress mankind with the strongest sentiments of
     religion; the causes of events seeming then the most unknown
     and unaccountable.[36]
                                  
     Our philosopher forgets himself. He owns and admits <the plan
of a wise superintendent>: this <plan> is essential to his
N/ATURALISM\. He owns and admits the actual existence of
<convulsions in Nature, disorders and prodigies>: for these conform
to his great principle of /EXPERIENCE\, his only rule of credit, and
which therefore should be his rule of right. Yet these <convulsions,
disorders, prodigies are>, he tells us, <most opposite to the plan
of a wise superintendent>. Which in plain english is neither more
nor less than, "That a wise superintendent crosses and defeats his
own Plan."
     You ask, how he fell into this absurdity? Very naturally. He
was betrayed into it by his childish prejudice to /MIRACLES\: which
happening to cross a hurt imagination, while he was in the
neighbourhood of <Prodigies>, as Mountains and Giants always met
together in the rencounters of Don Quixote, he would not let them
pass without carrying with them some mark of his resentment. And
having shewn, in a book written for that good purpose, that
/MIRACLES\ were <most opposite to the plan of a wise
superintendent>, he was not content to brand miracles alone with
this infamy, but (so dangerous it is to be found in ill company) he
charges the same villany, on <Convulsions in nature, disorders and
prodigies>, things in themselves very innocent, and by old
experience known to have existed.
     Thus a laudable zeal against his capital Enemy, M/IRACLES\,
happening to be ill placed, this great philosophic detection of one
of the prime master-wheels of superstition labours with immoveable
nonsense.

                             REMARK V.
                                  
     But now I have mentioned our Author's aversion to miracles, it
may not be improper just to take notice, in passing, of that capital
argument, which he and Lord Bolingbroke have borrowed from Spinoza
against them.[37] "It is, that they are incredible, because contrary
to all experience, and to the established course of Nature."
     But is not this an admirable argument? A circumstance is urged
against the reality of miracles, which must necessarily attend
miracles, if there ever were any: their <essence> consisting in
their being effects produced contrary to the common course of
Nature; and their <end> in their being effects contrary to
experience. For could they be esteemed the immediate work of the
Lord of Nature, if they did not controll Nature? Or, could they be
esteemed the extraordinary declaration of his will, if not contrary
to our experience of the common course of Nature?
                                  
          But hold a little, he will say. It is indeed of the
     <essence> of a miracle, that it be contrary to common
     experience. But for this very reason I affirm, that no miracles
     at all can ever be proper objects of <Belief>. For why believe
     an event <against> all experience, upon a testimony the
     credibility of which is founded <in> Experience?
                                  
     Short and round, it must be owned. But, Good Sir, since you put
the matter so home, one word in your ear about this same experience.
To what <experience> is it that miracles are contrary? If you mean
honestly and would answer to purpose, you must say, "To Experience
in all /SUCH CASES\ as those in which the existence of miracles is
alledged." But what experience then do miracles contradict? Where do
you find your <such cases>, in order to draw your argument from
experience? In the moon, or in any other of the worlds which
philosophers have found or fancied in the heavens? For in the world
which we <men> inhabit I know not what <like cases> can be
pretended. What then becomes of your <experience>? Or, rather how
unhappy is your appeal to it, when <all> the experience, we have
had, lies on the other side?
     But this is only a brief hint to the wise. And our philosopher,
in particular, is left to make his best of it. The reader sees, this
is no time or place to pursue a consideration of such importance any
further.[38]

                             REMARK VI.
                                  
     There is a strange perversity in the arrangement of our
Author's philosophical ideas, occasioned by the vain affectation of
singularity.
     Nothing hath been more uncontroverted, either in antient or
modern times, than that the notion of the Unity, amongst the Pagans,
arose from their <Philosophers>. No, says this penetrating Sage, it
came from the <People>: and that by the most natural progress in the
world.
                                  
     Men's exaggerated praises and compliments still swell their
     ideas upon them; and elevating their Deities to the utmost
     bounds of perfection, at last beget the attributes of U/NITY\
     and Infinity, Simplicity and Spirituality.[39]
                                  
                                  
          "T/HE\ P/EOPLE\ sure, the people are the sight."[40]
                                  
     Turn this people to the South, and you see them fall down
before Dogs and Cats and Monkeys. Place them to the North, and they
worship stocks and stones. But give them once an Eastern aspect, and
they shoot out into <praise> and <panegyric>, which presently
produces a <first Cause>. It is pity but we could leave them here in
quiet possession of their glory. It is not my fault that we cannot.
Our Philosopher seems to be oppressed with his own discovery. Tho'
the people might, in this manner, find out the <first cause>, yet he
is sensible they knew not what to do with it, when they had it. They
<would> not leave their false Gods for the true; they <could> not
bring both to a good understanding; they had neither skill nor
address to associate them together; and the true God was neither to
be <praised> or <panegyrised> into an alliance with the false. What
was to be done? Some philosophic fetch, much above the people, was,
as he rightly observes, necessary to compleat the system of
paganism. This the Philosophers performed, and finished all with a
master-stroke.
                                  
          Such refined ideas, being somewhat disproportioned to
     /VULGAR COMPREHENSION\, remain not long in their original
     purity; but require to be supported by the notion of inferior
     mediators or subordinate agents, which interpose betwixt
     mankind and their supreme deity. These demi-gods or middle
     beings, partaking more of human nature, and being more familiar
     to us, become the chief objects of devotion, and gradually
     recall that idolatry, which had been formerly banished by the
     ardent prayers and panegyrics of timorous indigent mortals.[41]
                                  
     Thus the <vulgar>, you see, in their high flights of <praise
and panegyric>, rose up to the discovery of a <first Cause>; while a
set of <wiser men> are called in to restore the mob of middle
deities to their pristine honours: And this, to suit the objects of
worship to <vulgar comprehension>.
     Now shallow men, like You or me, would say, why all this bustle
and the bandying about of an unjointed System? Why did not one set
of workmen undertake the whole? Or, if there was need of Coadjutors,
how came the parties to act in so preposterous a manner, that the
people assumed to themselves what belonged to the Philosophers, the
<discovery of the first cause>; and the Philosophers undertook what
belonged to the people, the <discovery of demi-gods and middle
beings>? Or, will he say, that the <People> did both? discovered the
Unity in their blind, <timorous and indigent> state, and, when they
were so well informed, struck out, in a lucky moment, their gross
system of Polytheism?
     He may say what he will; but nobody shall persuade me but that
an Author, who makes so great a figure himself in the various walks
of Philosophy, would have given the honour of the whole to is own
Profession; could it have been done without dimming and impairing,
in so capital a matter, the illustrious character of an original
thinker.

                            REMARK VII.
                                  
          The Getes (says our Historian) affirmed Zamolxis their
     Deity to be the only true God; and asserted the worship of all
     other nations to be addressed to fictions and Chimaeras.[42]
                                  
     This assertion contradicts all Antiquity, as well as the very
nature and genius of Paganism itself. But what of that? It served an
honest purpose: the purpose to which all his patriot endeavours
tend, the discredit of Revelation. And on such an occasion a
gratuitous assertion costs him nothing.
     Now it hath been deemed one characteristic mark of favourable
distinction in behalf of Revelation, that <the Jews affirmed the God
of Israel to be the only true God; and asserted the worship of all
other nations to be addressed to mere fictions and chimaeras>. So
far was well. But then he should have taken care not to contradict
himself so very soon afterwards, where speaking of the universal
genius of Paganism, he tells us,
                                  
     Idolatry is attended with this evident advantage, that by
     limiting the powers and functions of its deities, it naturally
     admits the Gods of other sects and nations to a share of
     divinity, and renders all the various deities, as well as
     rites, ceremonies or traditions, compatible with each
     other.[43]
                                  
     But as this observation was not his own, being stolen from a
late writer on the history of Paganism, it is no wonder he should so
easily forget it.

                            REMARK VIII.
                                  
     But the Paragraph (from which the last quotation is borrowed)
will afford us further matter of speculation. It contains a detailed
comparison between the advantages and disadvantages of I/DOLATRY\
and T/HEISM\; and thus the account is stated.
                                  
          P/OLYTHEISM\ or idolatrous worship, being founded entirely
     in vulgar traditions, is liable to this great inconvenience,
     that any practice or opinion, however barbarous or corrupted,
     may be authorized by it; and full scope is left for knavery to
     impose on credulity, till morals and humanity be expelled from
     the religious systems of mankind. At the same time, idolatry is
     attended with this evident /ADVANTAGE\; that, by limiting the
     powers and functions of its deities, it naturally admits the
     gods of other sects and nations to a share of divinity, and
     renders all the various deities, as well as rites, ceremonies,
     or traditions, compatible with each other. Theism is opposite
     both in its advantages and /DISADVANTAGES\.[44]
                                  
     The advantages and disadvantages of <Polytheism> are, we see,
such as arise from the <nature and essence> of idolatry. Would you
not expect that the advantages and disadvantages of <theism> should
have the same relation to their subject. Good logic seems to require
it. But what of that, if his cause requires other management. He
scruples not therefore to tell us in the same page, that the
<disadvantages> here mentioned as arising from Theism, come not from
the <nature> but the abuse of it. "<They arise>," says he, "<from
the vices and prejudices of mankind>."

                             REMARK IX.
                                  
     Still we are detained on the same spot; which is so fruitful of
curiosities that there is no stirring from it. He is speaking of the
absurdities or mischiefs, I cannot well say which, that arise from
Revelation. And one, or perhaps both of these he intends to infer
from the following observation.
                                  
          While one sole object of Devotion is acknowledged, the
     worship of other deities is regarded as absurd and /IMPIOUS\.
     Nay, this <unity of object seems naturally to require the>
     /UNITY OF FAITH AND CEREMONIES\, and furnishes designing men
     with a pretext for representing their adversaries as prophane,
     and the subjects of divine, as well as human vengeance.[45]
                                  
     The calumnious insinuation, in this passage, about the origin
of Persecution (the abuse, and not the reasonable consequence of a
true principle) is below any body's notice. What I quote it for is a
curious observation; tho' made, but on the by -- <that the unity of
object seems naturally to require the> /UNITY OF FAITH AND
CEREMONIES\.
     <Unity of object>, says he, <seems to require unity of faith>.
I am apt to think it does. For if the object of belief be single,
the belief can scarce be double: unless by a drunkenness of the
Understanding, like that which doubles the objects of sense. But
then, <that unity of object as naturally requires unity of
ceremony>, is not so clear. <Unity of faith> is necessary, because
<truth>, which is the general object of faith, is but <one>. But who
ever affirmed, before our author, that <unity of ceremony> was
necessary? <Ceremony> is only an expression of duty: And duty may be
expressed a thousand different ways. <Unity of civil obedience>,
under the same government, is necessary. But is <unity of civil
obeisance> to the same Governor, equally necessary?
     But in the brain of this paradoxical philosopher <Faith> and
<Ceremonies> seem to have changed places. We see here how he has
exalted <ceremonies>. You shall see next how he degrades <faith>.
     He assures us, that "the <Egyptian Religion, tho' so absurd,
yet bore so great a resemblance to the Jewish that the antient
Writers, even of the greatest genius, were not able to observe any
difference between them>;"[46] in proof of which he quotes Tacitus
and Suetonius: And then adds, "<These wise Heathens, observing
something in the> /GENERAL AIR\ <and> /GENIUS\ <and> S/PIRIT\ of the
two Religions <to be the same>, /ESTEEMED THE DIFFERENCES OF THEIR
DOGMAS TOO FRIVOLOUS TO DESERVE ANY ATTENTION\."[47]
     These <wise Heathens> were shrewd observers. But what then
becomes of the wisdom of a much greater man, our Philosopher
himself? who hath assured us, that <the general air and genius and
spirit of the two Religions> were so far from being the <same> that
they were totally different. For speaking of Revelation and
Paganism, or of Theism and Polytheism, he found this remarkable
difference in <the air and genius and spirit> of the two Religions,
that
                                  
     Idolatry has this evident /ADVANTAGE\ over Theism, that by
     limiting the powers and functions of its deities, it naturally
     admits the Gods of other sects and nations to a share of
     divinity, and renders all the various deities, as well as
     rites, ceremonies or traditions compatible with each other.
                                  
-- Whereas in Theism, "While one sole object of devotion is
acknowledged, the worship of other deities is regarded as absurd and
impious." Nay he tells us in the same place, "That Theism is
opposite to Polytheism both <in its advantages and
disadvantages>."[48]
     In short, in that Section nothing is alike: in the Section
before us every thing is the same. So various in wisdom is antient
and modern Infidelity! However a difference between the Jewish and
Egyptian Religion, he owns, there was. But it was a difference only
in /DOGMAS TOO FRIVOLOUS TO DESERVE ATTENTION\; being indeed nothing
more than this, whether mankind should fall down before a dog, a
cat, or a monkey, or whether he should worship the God of the
Universe. From this curious specimen of our Author's ideas
concerning F/AITH\ and C/EREMONIES\, we cannot but conclude that he
has set up for a writer against Religion, before he had learned his
Catechism.

                             REMARK X.
                                  
          M/ACHIAVEL\ observes, says our great Philosopher and
     Divine, that the doctrines of the Christian Religion, (meaning
     the C/ATHOLIC\, for he knew no other) which recommended only
     passive courage and suffering, had subdued the spirit of
     mankind, and fitted them for slavery and subjection. And this
     observation would certainly be just, were there not many other
     circumstances in human society, which control the genius and
     character of a Religion.[49]
                                  
     <Machiavel>, says he, <meant the Catholic Religion>. That is,
he meant the Roman Catholic, in contradistinction to the Gospel.
Machiavel meant no such thing. If he had, the <super-subtile
Italian> had wrote like this rambling North-Briton. For it is not
the Catholic Religion, so distinguished, but the Gospel itself which
gave libertine men the pretence of saying, that <it subdued the
spirit of mankind, and fitted them for slavery and subjection>. but
here a sudden qualm comes over our Philosopher. He was ashamed of
saying this of the Gospel. And well he might. For, tho' he says,
<the observation is certainly just>, there never was a ranker
calumny. The Gospel recommends no such thing as <passive courage and
suffering>, either with regard to the domestic invaders of our civil
rights, or to the foreign enemies of our country: And there are but
one or two illiterate and fanatic sects, of very small extent, in
the whole Christian world, who have so understood and abused the
Gospel. The only <passive courage and suffering it recommends> is to
particulars, whose consciences civil society hath iniquitously
violated. Now, if instead of this <passive courage and suffering>
the Gospel had recommended to its private followers to fly to arms
and repel the force of the civil magistrate, when he abused his
authority, in suppressing truth and the rights of conscience, what
tragical exclamations would these very men have raised against the
factious spirit of Christianity? Indeed, to our Author's shame be it
spoken, the very contrary of all this is the truth. The effects of
the Gospel are most salutary to <human Society>: for by encouraging
inquiry and by inspiring a spirit of liberty in religious matters,
it naturally inclines its followers to carry the same dispositions,
into Civil.

                             REMARK XI.
                                  
     But this honest man can allow himself, on all occasions, to
calumniate the Religion of his country: sometimes openly and
grossly; but oftner, as in the following instance, in the oblique
way of Insinuation only.
                                  
     Were there a Religion (<and we may suspect Mahometanism of this
     inconsistence>) which sometimes painted the deity in the most
     sublime colours, as the creator of heaven and earth: sometimes
     degraded him nearly to a level <with human creatures in his
     powers and faculties>; while at the same time it ascribed to
     him <suitable infirmities, passions and partialities of the
     moral kind>: That Religion, <after it was extinct>, would also
     be cited as an instance of those contradictions, which arise
     from the gross, vulgar, natural conceptions of mankind, opposed
     to their continual propensity towards flattery and
     exaggeration. Nothing indeed would prove more strongly the
     divine origin of any Religion, than to find (<and happily this
     is the case with Christianity>) that it is free from a
     contradiction so incident to human nature.[50]
                                  
     We see what the man would be at, thro' all his disguises. And,
no doubt, he would be much mortified, if we did not; tho' the
discovery, we make, is only this, That, of all the slanders against
Revelation, this before us is the tritest, the dirtiest and most
worn in the drudgery of Freethinking. Not but it may pass with his
friends. And they have my free leave to make their best of it. What
I quote it for is only to shew the rancour of heart which possesses
this unhappy man, and which could induce him to employ an
insinuation against the Jewish and Christian Religions; not only of
no weight in itself, but of none, I will venture to say, even in his
own opinion.

                            REMARK XII.
                                  
          The learned, philosophical Varro (says our no less learned
     and philosophical Naturalist) discoursing of Religion, pretends
     not to deliver any thing beyond probabilities and appearances:
     Such was his good sense and moderation! But the passionate, the
     zealous Augustin insults the noble Roman on his scepticism and
     reserve, and professes the most thorough belief and assurance.
     A Heathen poet, however, contemporary with the Saint,
     /ABSURDLY\ esteems the religious system of the latter, so
     false, that even the credulity of children, he says, could not
     engage them to believe it.[51]
                                  
     From the fact, as here delivered, we learn, that the Pagans
insulted the Christians, and the Christians the Pagans, for the
supposed absurdity of each others system. Agreed. And what then?
Were their several systems equally absurd? This is what he would
insinuate, or his observation is impertinent. Yet does not Mr. David
Hume insult the <Religionists>, as absurd; They, him, as ten times
more absurd? Will he say, that He and they have equal reason? But
what, in the mean time, becomes of <Naturalism>? We must conclude
then, that it is possible, one party may be in the right and the
other in the wrong. The consequence is, that his approbation of
Varro, and his censure of Augustin, is temerarious and unjust. For
what hinders but that Augustin's <thorough belief and assurance>
might be full as reasonable when he defended Christianity, as
Varro's not venturing <beyond probabilities and appearances>, when
he apologized for Paganism? Had our modern Philosopher, who has a
much worse cause than Varro's to defend, but imitated Varro's
<moderation>, which he commends, instead of Augustin's <thorough
assurance>, which he condemns, his reader perhaps would have thought
better both of his sense and honesty. -- Oh, but for his honesty and
impartial indifference between Christianity and Paganism, he has
given us such a convincing proof in this very instance, that he
ought ever hereafter to go scot-free. We have observed, that he has
praised Varro and condemned Augstin: but to shew -- Tros Rutulusve
fuat[52] -- he tells us honestly -- <that a Heathen poet, however,
contemporary with the Saint>, /ABSURDLY\ <esteems the religious
system of the latter> [i.e. Christianity] <so false, that even the
credulity of children>, he says <could not engage them to believe
it>. Now here, where he has been at the expence of so much fair
dealing, he ought to be indulged in rewarding himself for it, which
he has done in this modest insinuation, that Christianity was so
false and nauseous that even children could not be brought to
swallow it.
     He may talk what he pleases of the <absurdity> of poets. But
while one Philosopher lives, I defy all the poets of antient or
modern date to equal him either in absurdity or fiction. The poet,
he here abuses, is C/LAUDIUS\ R/UTILIUS\ N/UMATIANUS\. He tells You,
how this poet reviles Christianity: and quotes the Poem, the book,
and the page. Would you suspect all this to be a flam, and not one
word of truth, from beginning to end? Yet so it is. Rutilius is
speaking of a J/EW\, by name and title; and the Rites of <Judaism>,
as they distinguish that Religion from all other, are the subject of
his Satire. The whole passage is as follows.
                                  
     -- Namque loci querulus curam J/UDAEUS\ agebat;
          <Humanis> animal dissociale <cibis>.
     Vexatos frutices, pulsatas imputat algas,
          Damnaque libatae grandia clamat aquae.
     Reddimus obscaenae convicia debita genti,
          Quae <genitale caput propudiosa metit>:
     Radix stultitiae, cui frigida <sabbata> cordi;
          Sed cor frigidius religione sua est.
     <Septima> quaeque dies turpi damnata veterno,
          Tanquam lassati mollis imago Dei.
     Cetera mendacis deliramenta catastae,
          Nec pueros omnes credere posse reor.[53]
                                  
     The Pagan writers indeed frequently confound the two sects of
Judaism and Christianity, with one another. But here, there is not
the least room for that poor subterfuge. Rutilius speaks of Judaism
by name: and to shew us that he understood his subject, he reviles
it for those very rites, which are peculiar to Judaism; namely, the
distinction between <clean and unclean meats, circumcision>, and the
<Sabbath>. Yet, if You will believe this honest man, Rutilius
represents C/HRISTIANITY\ as so false, that even the <credulity of
children could not engage them to believe it>. And why should You
believe him?[54] He is a Philosopher, a follower of truth, and a
virtuous man: One, (as he says of himself) <whose errors should be
excused>, /ON ACCOUNT OF THE CANDOUR AND SINCERITY WHICH ACCOMPANIES
THEM\.[55]

                            REMARK XIII.
                                  
          If ever there was a nation or a time (says our
     Philosopher) in which the public religion lost all authority
     over mankind, we might expect, that infidelity in <Rome>,
     during the <Ciceronian> age, would openly have erected it's
     throne, and that Cicero himself, in every speech and action,
     would have been its most declared abettor. But, it appears,
     that, whatever sceptical liberties that great man might use, in
     his writings or in philosophical conversation; he yet avoided,
     in the common conduct of life, the imputation of D/EISM\ and
     P/ROFANENESS\. Even in his own family, and to his wife,
     <Terentia>, whom he highly trusted, he was willing to appear a
     devout religionist; and there remains a letter, addrest to her,
     in which he seriously desires her to offer a sacrifice to
     <Apollo> and <AEsculapius>, in gratitude for the recovery of
     his health.[56]
                                  
     Here he seems to commend Cicero (for his vanity, perverseness,
and love of paradox make him always think at large, and write at
random) on a topic which exposes his own wicked practice, namely,
Cicero's care, <in the common conduct of life>, to set the people an
example of reverence for the established Religion. But whether this
was said in praise or dispraise of that noble Roman, it matters not,
since presently after he contradicts his own account, and assures us
that the same Cicero was so far from <avoiding, in the common
conduct of life, the imputation of> D/EISM\ <and> P/ROFANENESS\,
that <He made no scruple in a public court of Judicature, of
teaching the doctrine of a future state, as a> /MOST RIDICULOUS
FABLE\, <to which no body would give any attention>.[57] And this
without the least care of reconciling Cicero, to himself; or his own
contradictory observations, to his reader.

                            REMARK XIV.
                                  
     But he treats whole Bodies of men no better than Particulars.
                                  
     We may observe (says he) that, notwithstanding the dogmatical,
     imperious style of all superstition, the conviction of the
     Religionist, in all ages, is more affected than real, and
     scarce ever approaches, in any degree, to that solid belief and
     persuasion, which governs us in the common affairs of life. Men
     dare not avow, even to their own hearts, the doubts, which they
     entertain on such subjects: they make a merit of implicite
     faith; and disguised to themselves their /REAL INFIDELITY\, by
     the strongest asseverations and most positive bigotry. But
     nature is too hard for all their endeavours, and suffers not
     the obscure, glimmering light, afforded in those shadowy
     regions, to equal the strong impressions, made by common sense
     and by experience. The usual course of men's conduct belies
     their words, and shews, that the assent in these matters is
     some unaccountable operation of the mind betwixt disbelief and
     conviction, but approaching much nearer the former than the
     latter.[58]
                                  
     This is superlatively modest. -- When the Religionist says that
an infidel writer, (like this man) in order to skreen himself from
the resentment of the Law, says one thing and thinks another, there
is no end of the clamours raised against uncharitable Churchmen. But
Mr. David Hume may say all this and more of Religionists, and yet
preserve his character of a philosopher and a friend of Truth. But
infidelity owed him a shame, and he presently unsays it all; and
confesses that Religionists are so far from being tossed about in
<doubt> and <unbelief>, that nothing is more constant than the
course of even the wisest and most experienced of them, invariably
steady to the point of faith. For after having said a great deal to
shew that Socrates and Xenophon did in reality give credit to Augurs
and Omens, he concludes thus,
                                  
     It is for the same reason, I /MAINTAIN\, that Newton, Locke,
     Clarke, &c. being Arians or Socinians, were /VERY SINCERE\, in
     the creed they professed: and I /ALWAYS OPPOSE THIS ARGUMENT\
     to some Libertines, who will needs have it, that it was
     impossible but that these great Philosophers must have been
     H/YPOCRITES\.[59]
                                  
     Our modest philosopher had employed the 83d page of this
wonderful essay to prove, that notwithstanding <the dogmatical
imperious style of all superstition>, yet Religionists are
H/YPOCRITES\; <their conviction in all ages being more> /AFFECTED\
<than> /REAL\: and a great deal more trash to the same purpose. Yet
here in the 91st page he /MAINTAINS\ <against Libertines>, that
these Religionists are /VERY SINCERE\, and no Hypocrites. Nay, in
spite, as it were, to his 83d page, he affirms that he /ALWAYS\
<opposes this argument to libertines>.
     But are you to think, he talks thus wantonly, for no other end
than to shew his contempt of the reader? By no means. For tho' this
be, sometimes, motive sufficient for our paradoxical Gentleman to
<contradict>, yet we must needs think there was some important
occasion which induced him thus <to give the lye to himself>. He had
it in his choice (for what hindered him, when unrestrained by the
considerations of truth or falshood) to represent the Religionists
as either K/NAVES\ or F/OOLS\. But this did not content his noble
passion for mischief. He would have them B/OTH\. Unluckily this
could not be done without a contradiction. To make them <Knaves>, he
was to shew they professed one thing and believed another: to make
them <Fools>, they were to be represented as <steadily> and
<sincerely> believing all things. The contradiction, we see, was
unavoidable: but how he came so needlessly to saddle himself with
the <lye> -- <I> /ALWAYS\, says he, <oppose this argument to
libertines> -- I confess surpasses my comprehension.
     Well, having floundered so shamefully, he is for recovering
himself; and therefore stops into the gap, between these two
extremes, a moderating tenent; and so leaves all Religionists, both
antient and modern, in a kind of /MIDDLE STATE\, between <Knaves>
and <Fools>. His conciliating tenent, is this --
                                  
     In the meantime it is obvious, that the empire of all religious
     faith over the understanding is wavering and uncertain, subject
     to all varieties of humour, and dependent on the present
     incidents, which strike the imagination. The difference is only
     in the degrees. An ancient will place a stroke of impiety and
     one of superstition alternately through a whole discourse: A
     modern often thinks in the same way, tho' he may be more
     guarded in his expressions.[60]
                                  
     I am so tired with his contradictions that I shall let this
passage go, unexamined upon that head, notwithstanding it looks so
asquint both to the right and left, and agrees neither with the
thorough <Hypocrisy>, nor the <sincere belief> of the two passages,
it is brought to reconcile. But, as it stands alone, I may be
allowed to ask, Why is the <modern> Christian <more guarded in his
expressions>, than the <antient> Pagan? Does not human nature always
operate alike in the like circumstances? If therefore, in this
<modern superstition>, called <Christianity>, men are more
consistent in the profession of their belief, than in that <antient
superstition>, called Paganism, does not this shew that the
circumstances were not alike? And what other differences in
circumstances could there be, if not this, that Christianity having
a rational foundation, it's professors stood steady and unmoved; and
Paganism only fluctuating in the fancy and unsupported by the
understanding, communicated the same inconstancy and variableness to
its followers?
     Oh, but says our Philosopher, I will not allow that steadiness
to be more than pretended, <A modern often thinks in the same way>,
[i.e. inconstantly,] <tho' he may be more guarded in his
expressions>. How prejudiced! what pretence has he to suppose it an
<inconstancy>, only <guarded in the expression>, when the very
uniformity of the profession excludes all data whereon to ground his
suspicion that the belief is only pretended?
     He must take it then for granted (as without doubt he does)
that Christianity has no more reasonable foundation than Paganism.
No need, will he say, of that, at present. The <fashion>, the
fashion, does all. An unsteadiness in Religion is discreditable in
these <modern> times: hence the <guarded expression>.
     Well, admit it to be so. What, I pray you, made unsteadiness in
Religion now discreditable, which was creditable in former times,
but this, that Christianity has now the support of, at least,
plausible arguments, which Paganism never had?

                             REMARK XV.
                                  
     In comparing the two Religions, Paganism and Christianity, our
philosopher finds that the former is to be preferred to the latter,
both in it's R/EASONABLENESS\ and in its /BENEVOLENT SPIRIT\.
                                  
          Upon the whole, the greatest and most observable
     differences betwixt a <traditional mythological> religion, and
     a <systematical, scholastic> one, are two: The former is often
     more /REASONABLE\, as consisting only of a multitude of
     stories, which however groundless, imply no express absurdity
     and demonstrative contradiction; and sits also so easy and
     light on mens minds, that tho' it may be as universally
     received, it makes no such deep impression on the affections
     and understanding.[61]
                                  
     The <reasonableness>, we see, is resolved into this, that You
cannot reduce the Professors of Paganism to <an express
contradiction>; and that the Profession <sits mighty light and easy
on men's minds>. As to the first property of paganism, its
incapacity of being reduced to a contradiction, this it has in
common with /NONSENSE\, which is likewise incapable of suffering the
same disgrace. And this will account too for its second property,
the <sitting so light and easy on the minds of men>. For nothing
takes less hold of the mind than /NONSENSE\, or so little disturbs
its tranquility, while we have the discretion to take it for what it
is. To this he will tell you, you mistake his aim, if you think it
was to credit paganism: the comparison was made only to discredit
Christianity; by insinuating that its /DOGMAS\ are <contradictory>,
and its S/ANCTIONS\ <oppressive>.
     As to the superior B/ENEVOLENCE\ in the spirit of Paganism,
this is made out as follows.
                                  
          Lucian observes, that a young man, who reads the history
     of the Gods in <Homer> or <Hesiod>, and finds their factions,
     wars, injustices, incest, adultery, and other immoralities so
     highly celebrated, is much surprized afterwards, when he comes
     into the world, to observe, that punishments are by Law
     inflicted on the same actions, which he had been taught to
     ascribe to superior beings. The contradiction is still perhaps
     /STRONGER\ betwixt the representations given us by some latter
     Religions and our natural ideas of generosity, lenity,
     impartiality, and justice; and in proportion to the multiplied
     terrors of these religions, the barbarous conceptions of the
     divinity are multiplied upon us.[62]
                                  
     You, Sir, who took your idea of the D/II MAJORUM\ G/ENTIUM\[63]
from ancient story, seem not to have characterised them amiss where
you call them,[64] "<a rabble of Tyrants, Pathics, and Adulterers,
Whores, Vagabonds, Thieves, and Murderers>."[65] Yet, gracious
Heaven! a Philosopher of the North Britain, in the Reign of George
the Second, has dared to tell us, with very little disguise, that
<the barbarous conceptions of the divinity, multiplied upon us> by
Christianity, are still more <contradictory to our natural ideas of
generosity, lenity, impartiality, and justice>.
     But here his <modesty> seemed to labour a little; and he is for
casting part of the odium of this diabolic insinuation, from himself
upon another.
                                  
     But in order, says he, to shew more evidently, that it is
     possible for <a Religion> to represent the Divinity in a still
     more immoral, unamiable light than the antient, we shall cite a
     long passage from an author of /TASTE\ and /IMAGINATION\, who
     was surely no enemy of Christianity.[66]